The London Business School with Gower Publishing: Forecast Release: EARNINGS AND UNEMPLOYMENT IN THE CAR INDUSTRY: THE BEST AND WORST OF BRITISH INDUSTRY

The Chancellor has described the cost in terms of lost output and higher unemployment of getting inflation down as ‘well worth paying’. Yet the trade-off so far is a miserable 1.25 per cent off the underlying rate of growth of earnings for an unemployment increase approaching 600,000, some 2–3 per cent off the underlying rate of inflation for a 3 per cent drop in GDP and a 7 per cent fall in manufacturing output. The question is clear: why is it that in the UK we seem to have to pay such a high price in terms of lost output and higher unemployment to make only modest progress on reducing wage and price inflation? One possible answer is in terms of the NAIRU; another stems from the way in which we measure retail price inflation. Using the example of the car industry as a backdrop, we examine the relationship between unemployment and inflation and ask whether there is a role for government to play in improving the trade-off. Our conclusion is that the present non-interventionist stance is probably appropriate but that the government should be doing more to educate both sides of the wage bargain - a challenge picked up by the Prime Minister in his recent speech to the CBI. This is especially appropriate at the present time, because price inflation is falling but wage inflation is lagging behind. It is not a cut in real wages that is required but an equi-proportionate deceleration in both wages and prices. By joining the ERM, we will ultimately obtain German rates of inflation; low wage settlements would both shorten the time-scale and reduce the unemployment cost of convergence.     

Forecast Summary

The economy is now in the middle of a sustained cyclical upswing in demand, but because of interruptions to supply caused by the miners' strike we expect output growth of only 21/4per cent this year, accelerating to 2% next year. (This assumes that the strike does not affect output significantly in the second half of this year.) The relatively rapid growth of output over the past two years has caused some acceleration of inflation from the low point last June, but we see these pressures subsiding, with consumer prices growing at 5% per cent this year and 5 per cent or less thereafter. Over the medium term, on the usual assumption that the economy is not subjected to any severe shocks, we expect output growth to settle at a sustainable 2 per cent p.a. against a background of slowly declining price inflation.     

Forecast Summary

As the Chancellor recognised in his Mansion House speech, sterling M3 is once again proving to be a wayward indicator, and it is the exchange rate which is currently the principal instrument of the government's policy to reduce inflation. The strength of sterling, reinforced by the Group of Five commitment to a lower dollar, is the main factor behind decelerating retail prices and we endorse the Chancellor's forecast that inflation will fall to under 4 per cent in the middle of next year. A strong exchange rate, however, hits UK competitiveness and results in a slower rate of growth in output next year. Output growth, over 3% per cent this year including the post-strike rebound, remains at 2% per cent in 1986 and comes down to an underlying 2 per cent in the medium term.     

Forecast Summary

A pause in world activity held back UK industry in the first quarter of the year and, even though we expect faster growth from now on, we forecast total output growth of only 2 per cent this year. But next year a stronger world economy and pre-election tax cuts lift growth to 3 1/4per cent. Lower oil prices and falling interest rates help keep inflation at its current level both this year and, as long as wages respond, next. In the medium term we expect the growth rate to fall back but, assuming that a fairly tight fiscal policy is pursued by whichever government is in power, we predict that inflation stays below 3 per cent     

WORLD OUTLOOK

World output, which was strengthening immediately prior to last October, appears to have barely suffered in the short term from the stock market crash. Apart from an early reaction by US consumers - since reversed - demand is proving robust and in early 1988 OECD industrial production is, we estimate, 6 per cent up on year-earlier levels, with GNP more than 4 per cent higher. Indeed such is the strength of activity that the present balance of risk is not that recession is imminent but that inflation may pick up again. In the United States, where activity rates are at their highest level for eight years and unemployment is at a fourteen-year low, monetary policy has been tightened and interest rates are moving higher. The Bundesbank is keen to follow suit and the BoJ is keeping the situation under review. Nevertheless, with wages in most countries still adjusting to the low inflation rates of the last two years, there is little evidence yet that prices are accelerating.
We expect to see world interest rates edging higher in the second half of the year as recorded inflation picks lip. But we believe that underlying inflation remains low and that, even on the assumption that oil prices return to 18 a barrel, OECD consumer price inflation will peak early next year at a little over 4 per cent. Tighter monetary policy is also expected to hold back demand over the next 12 months. Consequently, we expect some weak- ness in output in the first half of next year but discount the possibility of a severe recession. GNP growth in the OECD area is forecast to decline from the 3 per cent rate of 1987–8 to a little over 2 per cent next year and to a sustainable 2½ per cent p.a. over the medium term.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Relative to what we expected following the collapse in the oil price, growth in the OECD economy was disappointing last year and, with activity still not registering a convincing pick-up, we have lowered our forecast for 1987–88. Previously we argued that the sharp drop in oil prices from around 27 a barrel in 1985 to an average of 15-16 last year represented a significant boost to real incomes in the oil-consuming countries. Notwithstanding the corresponding real income loss to the oil producers, we expected OECD demand to rise sharply in the course of last year, with clear benefits to output becoming apparent by the end of the year. In the event this analysis, though correct in outline, has apparently underestimated the negative elements - tighter fiscal policy, the failure of consumers in some countries to obtain the terms of trade gains from lower oil prices and/or currency appreciation, the offset to domestic demand from falling exports. Consequently, we now expect OECD output to rise by only 3 per cent p. a. over the next two years. The corollary of this is that inflation is also unlikely to record a marked increase and this enhances the prospect of sustained output growth in the medium term. The forecast combines steady output growth of around 3 per cent p. a. with inflation stable in the 3–4 per cent range.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

Over the last 12 months industrial production in the OECD area has risen by 8–9 per cent, only slightly less rapidly than in the first year of recovery from the OPEC 1 oil crisis. Much of the growth in output stems from a very rapid expansion in North America although, in the second half of 1983, output in Europe and Japan began to accelerate. We expect the recovery to be maintained during 1984 with some convergence of growth rates. For the year as a whole we are now forecasting 61/2 per cent growth of industrial production, 33/4 per cent for total GNP. By the end of 1983 the long-standing reduction in inflation had run its course and OECD consumer prices were about 5 per cent higher than a year earlier. Within the area some countries, such as France and Italy, were still reducing inflation, but this was offset by the US where inflation has been rising slowly since the summer. We expect these trends to continue in 1984, i.e. stable inflation in the OECD but accelerating prices in the US, producing in each case about 5 per cent inflation. In 1985 we are now forecasting a slowdown in the world economy. This is expected to be centred on the United States, where the problem of the Federal Budget remains to be tackled. By the time of the Presidential election the US economy will have registered two years of relatively rapid growth. This is likely to be producing upward pressure on prices and interest rates and, as a result, a pause in 1985 in the growth of output. In Europe and Japan, where output has grown more slowly, we expect the recovery to be sustained in the medium term.     

Forecast Summary

The recovery in demand, which began in the second half of 1982, produced output growth of about 23/4 per cent in 1983. We expect this growth rate to be maintained, if not bettered, in 1984. The long-standing reduction in inflation has now come to an end but we do not expect prices to accelerate. Over the next four years a stable inflation rate of 5–6 per cent is forecast.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Last year saw the most coordinated cyclical upturn in the world economy since the early I970s, with OECD output rising 4per cent, industrial production and world trade even more rapidly. The boom in demand, which followed five years of continuous expansion, has outstripped supply and prices have begun to accelerate. To tackle inflation, the G7 monetary authorities have tightened policy over the last year, reversing the short-lived drop in interest rates necessitated by the stock market crash. This tightening may have to go further, especially in Germany and Japan where the effects of a rising oil price and higher indirect taxes are being exacerbated by currency depreciation. Although the rise in interest rates came too late to stop inflation rising, it has beet pursued with sufficient vigour to prevent inflation from seriously breaching the 5 per cent level. It is on these grounds that we forecast a relatively soft lending for the world economy on output, with growth continuing at 2.5–3per cent, accompanied by a limited reduction in inflation which stays in the 4–5per cent range. Progress on current account balances is also likely to be sluggish: in the absence of a serious attack on the budget deficit, the US deficit is likely to stay in the region of $140bn a year.     

Forecast Summary

The forecast illustrates the costs and benefits of joining the ERM at the relatively high central parity of DM2.95. It shows that, providing the government does keep the pound within its wide 6 per cent EMS band, retail price inflation can be brought down to the average European level of 3 per cent by the mid 1990s. But there is a cost in terms of lower output and rising unemployment. GDP growth is expected to slow to about 1 1/2per cent this year and next and to average 2 per cent or slightly more from 1992 onwards. This is less than the rate of growth of productive potential and implies a weak labour market with unemployment rising steadily bock above 2 million. The forecast assumes a $25 oil price; in an alternative we sketch out the implications of a rise in the price to $45 for a limited period.     

WORLD OUTLOOK

The strength of US domestic demand is exerting a very strong pull on the world economy. Japan in particular is benefiting from soaring export demand, but the effects on European exports have been offset by weak domestic demand and, in the case of West Germany and the UK, by damaging industrial disputes which have interrupted supply. Over the next 12 months we expect the US economy to slow down under the weight of the financial and external balance pressures, which two years of very rapid but unbalanced growth have built up. For the world economy, however, we expect the slowdown in the US to be counterbalanced by expanding domestic demand in Europe and Japan, especially if a lower dollar permits reductions in interest rates. We forecast world output growth of about 3 per cent next year, well below the near-5 per cent projected for 1984 - the cyclical peak. By the second half of 1985 the world recovery will be three years old and we expect a pause in the growth of output. Against a background of stable monetary growth we expect world inflation in the 5–6 per cent range over the medium term. This is consistent with some increase in US inflation, low and stable inflation in Japan and West Germany and further progress in reducing inflation in countries such as France and Italy. Our forecast is based on the assumption that the dollar falls next year. If it does not fail we believe there is a significant risk of slower growth.     

THERE'S MANY A SLIP…

There has to be a General Election at some time in the next eighteen months. It has long been clear that the economy will not be in the best of shape in time for the election and that the best the Conservatives can hope for is a significant reduction in inflation and interest rates together with modest output growth. Our October forecast suggested that this combination was feasible and that the government would be able to go to the country with base rates of 12 per cent, retail price inflation at half its present level and output growing at a rate of 2per cent after a relatively short and shallow recession. It may turn out that this is an overly optimistic central forecast and in this Forecast Release we examine some of the ways in which it could go wrong. In a worst possible scenario the government may have to face the electorate with the economy in recession, inflation high and interest rates still at or close to their present levels.     

Forecast Summary

Short-term economic prospects for the UK will depend critically on what happens to oil prices and on the government's response to any changes. Our central case assumes that North Sea oil averages £20 a barrel for the remainder of the year and that the government holds the sterling index at about 74. In the Focus we also examine the sensitivity of the forecast to changes in oil prices. The willingness of the government to let the exchange rate fall in response to the fall in oil prices means that we still expect GDP to grow by about 21/2. per cent in 1986 and we expect inflation to fall below 4 per cent by the middle of the year. Lower oil prices generate a faster growth of world output; the UK benefits from this and we are forecasting growth of nearly 3 per cent in 1987 with inflation falling further.     

WORD OUTLOOK

As the world economy enters the 1990% a significant reorientation of growth and demand is taking place amongst the major economies. The desynchronuation of the economic cycle, which occurred last year as the US economy slowed down while Europe and Japan continued to advance rapidly, is likely to be taken a stage further. Europe, in particular West Germany, is expected to continue to grow quickly in the run-up to the completion of the single EC market in 1992 and as a result of the opening of eastern Europe. Japan and the Asian NICs, adapting with an unprecedented programmed of industrial re-tooling to their new circumstances, are already set on an accelerated growth path. In contrast, the US appears to be in for a period of sluggish growth, as the Fed attempts to press down on inflation without causing a recession. As a result we expect US output growth of only 2 per cent a year over the next few years compared with a sustainable 3 per cent in Germany and 4 per cent in Japan. Despite these differences in growth, US inflation performance lags behind that in Germany and Japan and, partly because of the sue of existing IPD flows, little progress is like& on reducing current account imbalances.     

Forecast Summary

Led by manufacturing industry, output has accelerated and GDP growth approaching 4 per cent is likely this year. But strains are emerging and we expect slower growth from now on. Over the medium term GDP is forecast to rise at a sustain- able 3 per cent rate, nearly 31/2 per cent for non-oil output. This should enable the reduction in un- employment to continue, though at a slower pace than in the last year. Against a background of rising activity, we expect inflation to remain at its present underlying rate of about 4 per cent and the current account deficit to settle at about £2bn p.a. We show in the Focus how this forecast might change if the stock market fails to recover from its mid-October crash     

THE 1981 BUDGET

In this Forecast Release we examine the short-term prospects for the UK economy in the light of the Budget and other developments. Compared with our February forecast the Budget has raised taxes by about £2 bn but it has also increased public expenditure by a similar amount The net effect on the PSBR, compared with our February forecast, is therefore small, especially if the Treasury's estimates for nationalised industry profits and/or public sector wages prove over-optimistic. We therefore believe that the outturn for the PSBR in 1981-82 could be close to the figure of £12 bn presented in our last forecast.
We also believe that the prospects for output and inflation are little changed The Budget by itself will have raised prices by about 1 per cent compared with our previous forecast but because we had probably over-estimated indirect tax receipts, the net effect on prices is small For output, the likely reduction in consumers' expenditure is more or less offset by higher public spending. We continue to expect a fall in output between 1980 and 1981 of 1–11/2 per cent, inflation during the year at about 10 per cent, a current account surplus of £3 bn, monetary growth of 8 to 9 per cent and a PSBR of £12 bn.     

Forecast Summary

Although hard evidence of recovery is still elusive, our forecast indicates that the trough of the recession occurred in the second quarter and that output fell 4 per cent peak-to-trough. We estimate that GDP rose 112 per cent in the third quarter - though only because of a rebound in North Sea oil production - and that for 1991 CIS a whole it will be 2 per cent down on 1990 levels. Next year GDP is forecast to rise 2 per cent but it is not until 1993 that the 1990 output peak is passed. Unemployment therefore still has a considerable way to rise - to a peak of 2.8 million in 1993. In the first year of full EMS membership, the economy has made an accelerated transition to European levels of inflation. Against a background of modest growth, it should be possible to consolidate this progress and we expect retail price inflation to average little more than 3 per cent over the next four years. Similar rapid progress has been achieved on the balance of payments where there is a trade surplus on manufactured goods for the first time since 1982. Here, however, we are less confident that the reduction in the trade gap can be sustained. In the recovery phase we expect imports to rise more rapidly than exports with the result that the current account deficit rises from £6bn this year to £8bn in 1992 and £10bn-£12bn in 1993-5.     

Forecast Summary

The outlook is conditioned by our assumption that sterling enters the ERM, probably in the autumn, at a central DM parity not very different from the current rate and that this exchange rate is held over the medium term. Fiscal and monetary policy have to be made consistent with a stable pound, which rules out tax cuts and restricts the fall in base rates to 12 per cent. The benefits of the ERM are to be seen in a reduction in the underlying rate of inflation to below 5 per cent by 1992. But ERM participation is not costless. The downside is four years of output growth averaging below 2 per cent and higher unemployment. The ERM offers the possibility of low inflation and steady growth in the second half of the 1990s: it is not a 'quick fix' for the current problems facing the UK economy.     

The London Business School with Gower Publishing

Output has stagnated in the main industrialised countries this year but we expect the benefits of lower oil prices to show up in rapid growth from now on. The present weakness in the world economy stems from tighter US fiscal policy and the oil price shock itself. These have combined to reduce domestic demand in the United States, and hence to cut the market for Japanese exports in particular, and also to reduce expenditure by energydependent countries and companies. A further factor is that, with prices of oil-based products falling, there is an incentive to delay expenditure. We expect this impact effect of OPEC III to be short-lived and to give way to its positive effects in the second half of this year. Specifically, we expect consumer spending to lead the recovery as real incomes will be boosted by the terms of trade gain from lower oil prices - equivalent to 3 per cent of GNP in the OECD area as a whole. On the basis of oil prices holding at $15. we forecast OECD output growth of 3 per cent this year, rising to 41/2 per cent in 1987. Additionally, we expect lower oil prices to produce a significant reduction in world inflation. Zero growth of producer prices is forecast on average this year arid consumer price inflation is expected to fall to wards 2 per cent in the course of the year.     

Is the Economy Overheating?

In the last year total output has risen 4 per cent and manufacturing is up 6 per cent. Unemployment has fallen by 400,000. The current account, which was in surplus in the first half of the year, has moved back into deficit. Does this mean that the economy is “over- heating”? In the context of our forecast we examine this issue; we consider how rapidly supply can increase and how fast demand is increasing. We conclude that the growth of output in the last year was initially driven by supply and that, more recently, domestic demand has been growing very rapidly. The emergence of a current account deficit is evidence of excess domestic demand but from now on we expect demand to grow less rapidly. With non-oil supply expanding at a rate in excess of 3 per cent, we forecast steady output growth and little change in either inflation or the current account. In our judgement, the economy, though hot, is not overheating.