The measurement of the gains or losses to an enterprise through relative price changes: The terms-of-trade effect and real income

This paper provides a framework for measuring the terms-of-trade effect for an enterprise. This effect is the impact on the organization of changes in input to output prices as well as in the prices of goods and service upon which the income is utilized. The measurement of the effect is outlined with illustrative data and applied to the German Telecom sector, which has suffered particularly badly through adverse relative price changes. The case study of the German Telecom sector is also used to introduce the concept of real income. The framework advocated is argued to be particularly useful, since it allows not only the effects ex post of relative price movements to be evaluated, but also the effects ex ante of particular spending scenarios to be simulated (for example, investment). As such, it should be a useful addition to the ‘toolbag’ of managerial economists.     

Price discrimination and bargaining power in the U.S. vaccine market: Implications for childhood immunization policy

The U.S. vaccine market exhibits a pricing structure in which the major purchaser of vaccines, the public sector, receives substantial discounts. This outcome is consistent with three theories of market behavior: third-degree price discrimination; bargaining power; and cost differences. The true nature of this pricing structure has important efficiency and policy implications. This paper uses a longitudinal data set of private catalog and federal contract prices to empirically determine whether price discrimination or bargaining power is being practiced in this market. I find that, while it is not possible to eliminate other factors, the results favor the bargaining power hypothesis.     

Financially constrained arbitrage in illiquid markets

This article analyzes trading strategies when arbitrageurs impact prices. Trades of financially constrained arbitrageurs are feedback functions of their capital, which depends on the amount traded. A component of arbitrage trading ensures financial flexibility. This hedging component explains why price deviations persist in spite of arbitrage. Financial constraints are responsible for volatile prices and for time variation in the correlations of prices across markets. Distortions arise when regulated firms can influence the dynamics of prices on which capital requirements are based. Under current value at risk (VaR) measures, large traders behave aggressively and have a cost advantage relative to other traders.     

煤炭价格对燃煤发电项目内部收益率影响关系的研究

煤炭价格对燃煤发电项目经济效益具有决定性影响,煤价与电价的相对水平决定了煤炭行业、电力行业、政府间的利益分配。电力行业的市场化进度相对落后于其上游的煤炭产业,煤炭价格波动对电力企业的运营构成较大的成本风险。内部收益率是燃煤电厂经济效益的关键指标,文章以内部收益率作为研究对象,分析煤炭价格变动对内部收益率的影响,运用回归方法拟合煤炭价格对内部收益率的影响曲线,进一步通过数值差分法得到煤炭价格对内部收益率的微分曲线即边际影响曲线,并利用双曲函数拟合边际影响曲线。研究结果表明,在较低价格区间内,煤炭价格变化对内部收益率的边际影响度较小;在较高价格范围内,边际影响度以双曲函数的形式快速下降。     

Building Permit Policy and Land Price Distortions: Empirical Evidence

This study examines the impacts of building permit policy on suburban land prices. The central premise of this study is that building permit policy may be a binding constraint and may lead to price distortions in land markets. We use a database of 354 suburban land sales to examine the impact of permit policy on land prices in 26 municipalities in a suburban county of Philadelphia. Our study offers evidence of price distortions. We find that land prices go up with planned increases in residential building permits. We also find that a progrowth building permit policy causes land prices to rise more in municipalities where developable land is scarce and vice versa.     

Regulation and cost efficiency in the European railways industry

The objective of this article is to analyze European railways’ incentives to improve efficiency in the recent liberalization context. We build and estimate a structural model accounting for regulatory pressures faced by the firms. Our model includes demand equations, capacity constraints and a cost function, in which are specified an exogenous technical efficiency component and an endogenous cost reducing effort parameter. We find a significant positive effect of implementing the reforms on cost reducing activities, and a smaller cost of effort for firms choosing a more advanced separation of infrastructure from operation activities.     

A financial accelerator in the business sector of a macroeconometric model of a small open economy

We have incorporated a financial accelerator mechanism operating through investments in the business sector in a dynamic macroeconometric model of the Norwegian economy. In this new and amended model aggregated credit and equity prices are determined simultaneously in a system characterized by a two-directional contemporaneous causal link, which has been designed and estimated by a new procedure for simultaneous structural model design. Combined with a mechanism where credit and asset prices are mutually influenced by real investments, this creates a financial accelerator amplified by a credit-asset price spiral. Simulations illustrate how the introduction of a financial accelerator significantly reinforces and extends the economic cycles in projections and forecasts, in particular when confronted by a severe shock. Furthermore, monetary policy has a markedly stronger effect in the short and medium term, while the impact of fiscal policy is affected to a relatively small degree as it is more remotely linked to financial markets.     

Quantity precommitment and price-matching

We study the effects of price-matching in a capacity-constrained duopoly setting. We show that no firm does worse at any pure equilibrium under price-matching relative to Bertrand, but as capacity increases, one or both firms do better relative to Bertrand. If the firms choose their capacities simultaneously before making pricing decisions, then the effect of price-matching varies with the cost of capacity. Specifically, when the cost is “high” price-matching either (i) has no effect on the market price, i.e., the market price associated with the pure SPEs is the Cournot one, or (ii) weakly decreases the market price relative to Cournot. Furthermore, when the cost is “low” price-matching leads to a set of (pure) SPE prices that includes the Cournot price in the interior. Therefore, price-matching does not necessarily benefit the firms when firms select their capacities before competing in price.     

Distorted prices and producer efficiency: the case of Romania

This research aims at shedding empirical light on the relative efficiency of small-scale maize producers in Romania. Farmers in transition countries still face heavily distorted price systems resulting from imperfect market conditions and socioeconomic and institutional constraints. To capture such distortions we formulate a stochastic shadow-cost frontier model to investigate the systematic input-specific allocative inefficiency. We further adjust the underlying cost frontier by incorporating shadow price corrections and subsequently reveal evidence on farm specific technical inefficiency. Different models are estimated due to the imposition of curvature correctness and the effects on the individual efficiency estimates are shown. The empirical results show a relative high technical efficiency of the small-scale farmers but relatively poor scores on systematic input price efficiency. The usage of extension services as well as agricultural training on the farm level are found to have a positive effect on the technical efficiency level of the farms. All model specifications further agree on the negative effect on efficiency with respect to the use of insecticides. The imposition of functional concavity on the shadow cost frontier leads to relative differences in the efficiency estimates of up to 240%.      

Income taxation when markets are incomplete

We investigate the welfare effects of proportional income taxation in a standard general equilibrium model with incomplete markets (GEI). Formally, our analysis is on the allocative effects of state-contingent income tax reforms. Tax reforms are restricted to be anonymous, publicly and truthfully announced before markets open, and they are required to result in an ex-post constrained efficient allocation. Our main result is to show that there do typically exist contingent tax reforms that are Pareto improving. These reforms, acting directly on the asset span, modify private risk-sharing opportunities. Thus, unlike most of the GEI literature, the type of policy transmission mechanism considered does not rely on second-order, relative spot price effects. Yet, the key welfare effects of our tax reforms are substantially equivalent to those induced through changes in relative spot prices, as, for example, in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), Geanakoplos et al. (1990), or in Citanna et al. (2001). Mathematics Subject Classification (2000): 58E17, 46N10, 93B29 Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D52, H21, H24, H25     

Adverse effects of leverage and short-selling constraints in a financial market model with heterogeneous agents

This paper investigates the impact of leverage and short-selling constraints on financial market stability. Investors׳ demand is modelled in a well-known asset pricing model with heterogeneous beliefs. In particular, I generalise the heterogeneous agents model of Brock and Hommes (1998) and Anufriev and Tuinstra (2013) to allow for leverage constraints as well as a short-selling tax. I consider two examples of adaptive belief systems describing the coevolution of prices and investors׳ beliefs. First, if the market is inhabited by fundamentalist and chartist traders, demand constraints have potential adverse effects and may restrict the stabilising fundamentalist strategy such that mispricing and price volatility increase. Second, if the market is inhabited by fundamentalists, optimists and pessimists with fixed beliefs, demand constraints drive down price volatility, but mispricing remains. The results suggest the stabilising effects of demand constraints in financial markets are limited. Only if asset prices are too high compared to fundamentals, policy makers should consider constraining leverage ratios in order to deflate financial bubbles.     

能源价格对能源强度的影响——以国内制造业为例

本文运用1985-2003年的时间序列数据，对我国制造业、能源价格和能源强度之间的关系作了实证研究。计量检验的结果表明，能源相对价格的上升对于降低总能源强度、石油强度、电力强度和煤炭强度具有积极的贡献。提高能源价格是改善能源效率的一个有效政策工具。     

Credit risk pricing and the rationality of lending decision-making within dual banking systems: A parametric approach

The reduction of non-performing loans, and making correct provisions for them, plays a primary role in the management and minimization of banking credit risk. However, these actions depend primarily upon the cost at which banks may dispose of these bad loans. Hence, this study aims to perceive the price of banks’ credit risk via estimating the shadow price of non-performing loans. We assess and compare the perceived price of the credit risk of Islamic and conventional banks operating in 9 countries from the Middle East and Asia, using a quadratic directional distance function. Following this, we evaluate the impact of different settings of directional vectors on shadow prices by conducting a risk-sensitivity analysis. Applying bootstrap regression, the factors affecting NPLs’ prices are further investigated. The paper concludes that the estimation of the shadow prices of bad loans can provide important elements in favor of credit risk management and, therefore, credit risk mitigation.     

Transfer prices and incentive contracts in vertically-integrated divisionalized companies

This paper studies a divisionalized firm with sequential transfers in which central management wants to motivate two division managers who receive predecision information. Central management can only contract on the observables price, cost and quantity. Starting with the optimal compensation schemes as a benchmark, the paper considers the question whether using transfer prices to substitute for price and cost, respectively, can replicate the optimal solution or not. This is to say, whether using an aggregate measure comes at a loss. The results are dependent on the design constraints (i) single or ‘dual’ transfer prices and (ii) simultaneous design of the reward functions or exogenously given reward functions. Basically, only in the case that central management is restricted to given reward functions, and wants to use the same single transfer price for both divisions, there is a loss relative to the benchmark solution. In the other cases, generally, there is enough latitude to design the available functions to mimic the benchmark. The paper goes on to discuss special cases. First, it finds conditions when purely cost-based transfer prices are optimal, and second, it derives explicit solutions for given linear compensation schemes over divisional book profits.     

Introducing the supply side into the LBS Model

This Briefing Paper describes a new version of the London Business School model, which incorporates our most recent research on the supply side. The changes reflect the desire to improve the specification of the supply-side of the model, and to capture the effects of taxes on the incentives to save, invest and to work, while still retaining the basic features of the income-expenditure framework. The main features of the new model are: - Gross domestic product is determined as the sum of the outputs of five sectors. Previously GDP was determined by the demand side as the sum of the expenditure components. - Domestic demand for the output of the private sector depends on domestic absorption and on the price of this output relative to import prices. Overseas demand for exports depends on world economic activity and on the price of exports relative to the world price of exports. - Supply depends on the capital stock, real unit labour costs and real raw material prices. In the short run, input prices are allowed to affect the mix between goods which are exported and those which are supplied to the domestic market. In the long run, however, the mix depends only on the price of exports relative to the price of domestically supplied goods (i.e., relative profitability). - In the short run, disequilibrium in the goods market is reflected in adjustments to prices, inventories and the external balance. - Since gross domestic product is determined by summing the output of each sector, output decisions are reconciled with expenditure decisions by making imports the difference between final expenditure and aggregate supply. - In the long run, increases in government expenditure crowd out private expenditure, but the effect takes several years to come through. - A cut in corporation taxes which is not financed by higher taxes elsewhere boosts the supply side by raising investment and the capital stock, but not by enough to raise revenues sufficiently to pay for the tax cut. Private sector saving increases but not by enough to fund higher public sector borrowing, so the current account goes into deficit. - In the short run, both supply and demand factors influence economic activity; in the long run, the path of the economy depends only on population growth, capital accumulation and technical progress.     

Upstream conduct and price authority with competing organizations

We characterize the degree of price authority that competing upstream principals award their downstream agents in a setting where these agents own private information about demand and incur nonverifiable distribution costs. Principals cannot internalize these costs through monetary incentives and design “permission sets” from which agents choose prices. The objective is to understand the forces shaping delegation and the constraints imposed on equilibrium prices. When principals behave noncooperatively, agents are biased toward excessively high prices because they pass on distribution costs to consumers. Hence, the permission set only features a price cap that is more likely to bind as products become closer substitutes, in sectors where distribution is sufficiently costly, and when demand is not too volatile. By contrast, when principals behave cooperatively, the optimal delegation scheme is richer and more complex. Because principals want to charge the monopoly price, the optimal permission set features a price floor when the distribution cost is sufficiently low, it features instead full discretion for moderate values of this cost, and only when it is high enough, a price cap is optimal. Surprisingly, while competition (as captured by stronger product substitutability) hinders delegation in the noncooperative regime, the opposite occurs when principals maximize industry profit.     

Hospital performance standards and medical pricing: The impact of information disclosure in cardiac care

A policy concern is that the initiation of Hospital Compare (HC) reporting in Medicare provided leverage to insurers in price negotiations for lowering private sector prices without regard to hospital performance. Using the sequential Nash bargaining framework we provide economic intuition to the contrary: while average hospital prices decline under quality disclosures, hospitals with above‐average quality are able to exert a stronger bargaining position, consequently capturing prices above the market rate. To explore this issue empirically we estimate variants of difference‐in‐difference models, examining the effects of the three main scores (heart attack, heart failure, and combined mortalities) on transaction prices of related hospital procedures. States which had similar mandated reporting systems in place before the initiation of HC form the control group. Analyzing claims data of privately insured patients, we find that HC exerted downward pressure on prices. However, hospitals rated “above‐average” captured higher prices, thereby offsetting the overall policy effect fully or partially. Leads and lags analysis lends further support for our difference‐in‐difference approach. We find that highly ranked hospitals received a quality premium of 8–14%, comparable to price effects found in other health care markets. We conclude that HC was effective at constraining prices without penalizing high performers.     

Sectoral bubbles,misallocation, and endogenous growth

Stock price bubbles are often on productive assets and occur in a sector of the economy. In addition, their occurrence is often accompanied by credit booms. Incorporating these features, we provide a two-sector endogenous growth model with credit-driven stock price bubbles. Bubbles have a credit easing effect in that they relax collateral constraints and improve investment efficiency. Sectoral bubbles also have a capital reallocation effect in the sense that bubbles in a sector attract more capital to be reallocated to that sector. Their impact on economic growth depends on the interplay between these two effects. Bubbles may misallocate resources across sectors and reduce welfare.     

Large traders and illiquid options: Hedging vs. manipulation

In this article, we study the effects on derivative pricing arising from price impacts by large traders. When a large trader issues a derivative and (partially) hedges his risk by trading in the underlying, he influences both his hedge portfolio and the derivative's payoff. In a Black–Scholes model with a price impact on the drift, we analyze the resulting trade-off by explicitly solving the utility maximization problem of a large investor endowed with an illiquid contingent claim. We find several interesting phenomena which cannot occur in frictionless markets. First, the indifference price is a convex function of the contingent claim – and not concave as in frictionless markets – implying that for any claim the buyer's indifference price is larger than the seller's indifference price. Second, the seller's indifference prices of large positions in derivatives are smaller than the Black–Scholes replication costs. Therefore, a large trader might have an incentive to issue options if they are traded at Black–Scholes prices. Furthermore, he hedges option positions only partly if he has a negative price impact and thus exploits his ability to manipulate the option's payoff. For a positive price impact he overhedges the option position leading to an extra profit from the stock position exceeding a perfect hedge. Finally, we also study a model where the large shareholder has a price impact on both drift and volatility.     

The Efficiency of Input Use During the Early Transition in Hungary

This paper uses Hungarian firm level panel data for the agricultural and light manufacturing sectors during the early years of the transition to investigate differences and changes in the efficiency of input use. Programming techniques measure scale and technical efficiency. The simple radial measure, as well as two other measures that account for programming slacks, are used. The results show little wastage of materials and labour, but inefficient use of energy and capital, which suggests that the development of input markets was uneven. The price liberalisation of 1989 widened efficiency differences, especially in agriculture, but this sector recovered quickest, actually using capital more efficiently by 1991. However, energy efficiency levels were low in the period of soft budget constraints and fell still further after the reforms, suggesting that a free market for energy was not established, particularly in agriculture.