Innovating Beyond the Horizon: CEO Career Horizon,Top Management Composition,and R&D Intensity

Decreasing research and development (R&D) can impair the ability of firms to remain innovative in the long run. CEOs have been accused of curtailing R&D investments as they approach expected retirement, yet received findings on R&D investment behaviors of late‐career CEOs are mixed. We argue that one reason for these inconsistent findings could be that traditional approaches overlook the fact that CEOs are not isolated agents in making R&D decisions. We build on the premise that CEOs interact with their top management team (TMT) when shaping R&D strategy and advance a contextualized view of CEO dispositions in their late career stages as being constrained or enabled by their TMT. We hypothesize that some TMT attributes (e.g., tenure and age) may amplify, whereas others (e.g., functional experience and education) may mitigate inclinations to reduce R&D. Our findings, based on a longitudinal sample of 100 US manufacturing firms from 1998 to 2008, provide nuanced insights into how different TMT characteristics influence CEO‐TMT dynamics, with TMT age and TMT tenure playing particularly pronounced roles. We discuss implications of our CEO‐TMT interface approach for theory and practice. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Four ways to choose a CEO: Crown heir,horse race,coup d'Etat,and comprehensive search

Most attempts to understand CEO succession fail to adequately differentiate the various ways by which CEOs are chosen. This article presents a conceptual framework that identifies four kinds of CEO succession processes, distinguished according to two key factors: political dynamics (who rules?) and the candidate search (are preferences known in advance?). Our main point is that the response of organizational stakeholders to CEO successions—(a) whether the process is perceived as fair, (b) whether the chosen successor is seen as good for an organization's future, and (c) the extent of disruption attending the leadership change—reflects how the politics and the search are managed. How internal and external stakeholders respond to a CEO succession can affect a new CEO's capacity for exercising effective leadership. Examples of each type (Apple, General Motors, Kodak, and Procter & Gamble) are offered and implications are drawn for researchers and for human resource executives. © 1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

In search of a kingdom: Determinants of subsequent career outcomes for chief executives who are fired

Research on forced CEO succession has focused on determinants of exit, impact on the organization, or implications for the incoming CEO. Generally unexamined is what happens to the ousted CEO. Using a sample of 60 forced exits from the Business Week 1000 from 1988 to 1992, this study seeks to identify factors which influence the career outcomes for the ousted CEO. The study found that age matters—older CEOs were less likely to obtain other active executive positions, but were more likely than younger ousted CEOs to enter advisory roles. Further, the reason for the CEO's exit had a significant impact on the likelihood of subsequently assuming either an active or an advisory role. No relationship was found between career outcomes and the following: media coverage, levels of compensation at exit, board memberships. © 1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Keeping Their Cards Close to Their Chests: How Non‐Delegating CEOs Avoid Forced Career Ends

It is a common belief that CEOs must delegate to be successful. We hesitate to support this generalization and investigate how the distribution of responsibility within top management teams (TMTs) can influence the likelihood of a CEO’s dismissal. Consistent with an agency theory perspective, our results indicate that CEOs may choose not to delegate their responsibilities to other executive TMT members, so as to benefit from an increased information asymmetry vis‐à‐vis the board of directors. Taking the resource‐based view as a complementary theoretical perspective, we find that non‐delegating CEOs benefit from their greater firm‐specific knowledge, which the board of directors considers as a valuable resource that should be retained. Our work also demonstrates that a more intense CEO–TMT interaction weakens the relation between non‐delegation and the likelihood of CEO dismissal. In sum, our research shows that the CEO’s delegation decision does not necessarily lead to a competence distribution that is in the firm's best interest; rather, it reflects a complex interplay between the potentially opportunistic career interests of the CEO, the involvement of other TMT members and the board of directors. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

HR's role in corporate governance: Present and prospective

Corporate wrongdoing is damaging investor confidence and tarnishing the credibility of the U.S. business community, guilty and innocent alike. Some misdeeds are clearly criminal, others simply unethical or damaging to reputations. They range from “massaging” numbers (“managed earnings”), which tests the limits of financial prudence, to outright fraud. Caught in the limelight are U.S. corporate giants representing some of the world's best‐known brands and most famous CEOs, many only yesterday lionized in the business press. We have explored this issue from the perspective of the HR function through a survey of the senior HR professionals who attended the Human Resources Forum. The survey was augmented with focus groups. Our purpose was to understand current practices, attitudes, and behaviors with respect to legal standards and professional and ethical codes. We also explored the roles of the CEO, HR leadership, and the HR function in minimizing ethical breaches that have diminished investor and public trust. We hope to shed light on the responsibilities, actions, and risks of the HR function and its leadership now and in the future. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Seeking distinctiveness through divestments: CEO succession and the effect of demographic similarity on the divestment of predecessor's investments

Why do successor CEOs divest those organizational units that they divest shortly after taking office? In order to contribute to this question, we take a behavioral perspective and develop a theoretical framework that draws on pioneering work in social psychology, in particular, research on individuals' need for distinctiveness and argue that demographic similarity to their CEO predecessors may evoke negative affect as it threatens CEO successors' need for distinctiveness. Assuming that CEOs are high need for distinctiveness individuals, we argue that negative emotions associated with similarity to their CEO predecessors are likely to force CEO successors to engage in behavioral coping strategies aimed at restoring a sense of distinctiveness. In particular, we predict and empirically observe that demographic similarity increases the likelihood that in their pursuit of distinctiveness, CEO successors deliberately divest specific organizational units, namely, those that their CEO predecessors had invested in.     

Board Effectiveness and CEO Pay: Board Information Processing Capacity,Monitoring Complexity,and CEO Pay‐for‐Performance Sensitivity

We have developed an information processing theory of board effectiveness to examine board‐chief executive officers (CEOs) pay relations. We theorize that CEO pay reflects the information processing context of boards. Boards have limited information processing capacity and therefore prefer to use outcome‐based CEO pay when they have difficulty in processing information for monitoring their CEOs. Using a longitudinal sample of Standard and Poor's (S&P's) large‐, medium‐, and small‐cap manufacturing firms in the United States from 1998 through 2005, we found support for our theory. Large boards and boards in less complex monitoring contexts tend to link CEO pay less tightly to firm performance by providing less stock‐based incentives, and the tendency of large boards to decrease outcome‐based CEO pay is even greater when boards are not busy or when boards are in less complex monitoring contexts. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO overconfidence and labor investment efficiency

We examine the impact of CEO overconfidence on labor investment efficiency (LIE). The findings suggest that firms with overconfident CEOs are more likely to have lower LIE. The findings are robust to alternative measures of CEO overconfidence and LIE and after accounting for endogeneity and CEO experience, age, managerial ability, high tech industry, and economic recession. Further analysis shows that: i) our findings are not due to the relation between net hiring and contemporaneous non-labor investments and the difference between high- and low-skilled labor, ii) firms with more analyst following, financially constrained firms, and firms located in states with wrongful discharge laws force CEOs to invest more efficiently in labor. In contrast, firms with dominant CEOs or facing high economic policy uncertainty are less efficient in labor investments, iii) firms with overconfident CEOs exhibit higher labor cost stickiness than those of non-overconfident CEOs, and iv) a lower LIE caused by CEO overconfidence has negative impacts on a firm's future profitability.     

Financial reporting fraud and CEO pay-performance incentives

Because prior studies find mixed results on the relation between CEOs’ pay performance incentives and a firm’s likelihood of financial reporting fraud, we restudy their relationship using innovative research methods. First, we concentrate on incentives from granting options rather than equity-based incentives. Second, we emphasize vested options, disregarding unvested option holdings, and take the logarithm transformation of option incentives. Third, we analyse the impact of option incentives on future financial reporting irregularities. Using this innovative approach as well as a full sample and a matched sample, we find that an increase in executives’ option incentives raises the likelihood of financial reporting violations. Moreover, the effect of option incentives on financial reporting fraud is moderated by auditor effort. In addition, we find that another proxy for the measurement of executives’ option incentives, namely, the number of vested options by executives, is highly correlated with the CEO’s vested stock option sensitivity.     

New Business Development: A Challenge for Transformational Leadership

This article analyzes how the behavior of CEOs of major divisions of corporations who are successful at new business development differ in behavior from those who attempted new business development programs and failed. Successful top managers affected organization transformation via three major differences in leadership behavior. Successful CEOs inspired pervasive commitment throughout their division. They built confidence in their subordinates' ability to develop new business. Finally, they found ways of applying appropriate disciplines to the process, particularly in the ara of management of failure. Challenges for the HRM function in terms of orchestrating these CEO behaviors are discussed.     

What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession?

When boards hire CEOs, the board and successor CEO have an opportunity to redesign the predecessor's compensation contract. The CEO's relative bargaining power will influence the outcome of compensation negotiations. Analyzing 508 successions, we find that total compensation of successor CEOs increases by 69% over their predecessor, but the structure of successor compensation is heavily influenced by the predecessors’ contracts. When the board's bargaining power is large, successors have a greater proportion of pay-at-risk and smaller proportion of salary. When the CEO's bargaining power is large, there is a smaller proportion of pay-at-risk and relatively greater proportion of salary.     

CEO retention,firm performance and corporate governance

This paper seeks to determine if CEO turnover is a function of firm performance, and therefore attempts to gauge the extent to which CEO interests are aligned with those of stockholders. The methodology in this paper focuses primarily on estimating the relationship between the probability of CEO exit and indices of firm performance and corporate governance structure. A major finding of the paper is that the accountability of CEOs to stockholders is significantly limited by CEO power, and CEO turnover is influenced more by internal governance structure than by firm profit or sales performance.     

Comparing Line and HR Executives' Perceptions of HR Effectiveness: Services,Roles, and Contributions

This study compares HR and line executives' evaluations of the effectiveness of the HR function in terms of its service delivery, roles, and contributions to the firm. Survey responses from 44 HR and 59 line executives from 14 companies indicated that (a) HR executives consistently rated the functions' effectiveness higher than did line executives, and (b) the greatest differences were observed on the more important and/or strategic aspects of HR. Implications for improving HR effectiveness are discussed. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance

Literature regarding the impact of managerial incentives on firm’s research and development (R&D) investments suggests that due to the riskiness of R&D activities, firms need to provide managerial incentives to encourage managerial discretion on corporate long-term investments of R&D. In spite that managerial incentives influence corporate R&D spending, some also argue corporate R&D spending a function of managerial incentive schemes. This paper applies the simultaneous equation to investigate the association between managerial discretion on R&D investments and the incentive scheme of CEO compensations by using the sample firms listed in Taiwan Security Exchange and Taipei Exchange. The results indicate that the listed firms in Taiwan simultaneously determine corporate R&D investments and CEO compensations. They reward their CEOs in compliance with their efforts on R&D investments and CEO compensation motivates CEOs to align their interests with firms’ long-term investments on R&D. A further analysis of the protection effect from the directors’ and officers’ (D&O) liability insurance suggests that D&O protection intensifies the relationship between R&D investments and CEO compensation. It encourages CEOs to allocate resources on R&D activities and make CEO incentive contracts efficacious on corporate long-term investments. The result is robust in the electronic industry of Taiwan.     

Human resource managers' role consistency and HR performance indicators: the moderating effect of interpersonal trust in Taiwan

This study explores the consistency between human resource (HR) managers' roles and HR performance indicators. In particular it considers the moderating effects of interpersonal trust on the relationship between HR managers' roles and HR performance indicators. We selected 116 HR managers from the top 500 manufacturing companies in Taiwan as our sample, and hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to test our hypotheses. The results showed that the HR managers' roles were consistent with HR performance indicators. Also, a high level of affective trust weakened the positive relationship between HR manager roles and HR performance indicators. Thus we suggested that Chinese companies should design HR performance indicators according to the roles HR managers play. Additionally, when HR managers are playing the role of a strategic partner or change agent, top executives should avoid high affective trust with HR managers.     

Chief executive officer ability,corporate social responsibility,and financial performance: The moderating role of the environment

This paper seeks to explore how chief executive officer (CEO) ability influences the economic impact of corporate social responsibility strategic decisions. Currently, the evidence on the impact of corporate social responsibility on the value of the company is mixed; in this paper, we aim to observe the moderate role played by this particularity of the CEO in the relationship between socially responsible commitment and financial performance. Our results identify that the most able CEOs make investments in social and environmental practices that lead to greater financial performance; in contrast, the less able CEOs can overinvest or underinvest in an opportunistic way for personal benefit at shareholders' expense. In addition, the role that CEO ability plays in social and environmental strategies is particularly pertinent in munificent environments that foment managerial discretion; in these contexts, high managerial ability leads to investment in socially responsible performance, which benefits shareholders by alleviating moral hazard.     

Creating accountability through HR analytics – An audit society perspective

This paper introduces an accountability-based perspective of the effects of implementing HR analytics. Considering central arguments about HR analytics' potential to transform HRM and using research on the audit society and concepts from critical accounting research, we develop a framework that analyzes the emergence of three forms of accountability in HRM: accountability through exposure, design, and connectivity. The paper contributes to research on HR analytics by identifying three forms of accountability in HRM that result from implementing HR analytics and by determining how they influence how HRM is understood, how HR practices are augmented, and how HRM's status in organizations can be improved.     

The human resource department's role and conditions that affect its development: Explanations from Austrian CEOs

Using a qualitative approach, this study fills a void in the literature on strategic HRM by analyzing Austrian CEOs' perceptions of the role of the HR department in their organizations, and the conditions that affect the development of a strategic role. The results suggest that even if CEOs have an overall positive evaluation of their HR departments and are willing to delegate responsibility for higher‐level decision‐making, to develop the HR department's role, CEOs must also feel they have the scope to do so. A framework for future research and practical implications for opportunities and constraints confronting HR managers are discussed. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

The Value of CEO Mobility: Contextual Factors That Shape the Impact of Prior CEO Experience on Market Performance and CEO Compensation

This study examines the value that prior CEO experience has for the companies that hire such CEOs—as reflected in the firms’ subsequent market‐based performance—as well as its value for the CEO that possesses this experience—as reflected in his or her initial compensation. While we suggest that shareholders tend not to benefit from firms hiring experienced CEOs, we also argue that particular firm and industry contextual factors that shaped the prior CEO experience help ameliorate this detrimental effect. Regardless, we also suggest that prior CEO experience generally stands to benefit the CEOs, in that it brings them a compensation premium over those CEOs without such prior experience. We tested our hypotheses on a sample of 654 US CEO succession events that occurred between 2001 and 2004 and found broad support for our hypotheses. We close with a discussion of the implications of our findings for future research as well as what they mean for firms hiring experienced CEOs and for CEO careers more generally. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

CEO继任模式与战略变革研究评述

CEO作为公司战略决策制定和执行的核心人物,其继任模式对战略变革的影响一直是学术界关注的热点课题。本文回顾CEO继任研究发展及CEO继任模式与战略变革关系的研究。