On the stability of coalition structures

We resolve a seeming conflict between a non-existence result on solutions to coalition formation in hedonic games [Barberà, S., Gerber, A., 2007. A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games. Economics Letters 95, 85–90] and the universal existence of stable coalition structures in TU games under the χ-value [Casajus, A., 2008. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability, Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming). doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003].     

第三方市场合作:“一带一路”倡议下的国际合作新模式——基于中法两国第三方市场合作的分析

一带一路倡议以政策沟通、设施联通、贸易畅通、资金融通、民心相通为引领,为世界经济增长开辟了新空间,为国际合作提供了新的平台。随着一带一路建设的进一步推进,我国和沿线国家的经贸合作不断深入、国际产能合作项目逐渐落地见效,为中外企业共同开发第三方市场的合作创造了新的机遇。中法两国已经在一带一路倡议下开展了多领域多行业的交流与合作,作为第三方市场合作的先行者,形成大量的探索和积累,本文以中法在第三方市场合作为例,对第三方市场合作的现状、问题、未来发展、对策建议等方面进行深入思考。目前第三方市场合作已经确定了重点行业领域和区域,但是总体处于起步和探索阶段,尚未形成成熟的合作机制,需要尽快建立和完善第三方市场合作所必需的体制机制,包括企业沟通对话、政策法规协调、利益公平分配、矛盾公正解决、资金顺利融通等。     

Unique stability in simple coalition formation games

We investigate the uniqueness of stable coalition structures in a simple coalition formation model, for which specific coalition formation games, such as the marriage and roommate models, are special cases that are obtained by restricting the coalitions that may form. The main result is a characterization of collections of permissible coalitions which ensure that there is a unique stable coalition structure in the corresponding coalition formation model. In particular, we show that only single-lapping coalition formation models have a unique stable coalition structure for each preference profile, where single-lapping means that two coalitions cannot have more than one member in common, and coalitions do not form cycles. We also give another characterization using a graph representation, explore the implications of our results for matching models, and examine the existence of strategyproof coalition formation rules.     

当代国际经济合作的趋势及特点

上世纪90年代至今,经济全球化的进程和高科技术革命的发展,对传统的国际经济合作产生了深刻的影响,这个影响至今仍在继续。笔者认为,除了七八十年代已经形成的趋势,如发展中国家在国际经济合作中的地位增强,国际贸易适当的增速支持经济增长以及服务贸易异军突起等以外,对本世纪经济发展至关重要的还有如下几个新的趋势,值得我们做深入的研究和思考。一、WTO成为世界范围维护和完善贸易秩序的重要机制国际贸易的进行和发展,需要比较合理的国际贸易秩序作为支撑环境,战后的几十年时间里,从林林总总的商品组织到联合国贸发会上震…     

Bilateral transfers and lending in international environmental cooperation

The paper analyzes environmental lending and transfers in a two country general equilibrium framework. The lender country chooses specific environmental investments which it finances in the neighbour country on the basis of the returns they generate for the lender. The gains from this kind of international environmental financing are illustrated with a numerical calibration of the model showing that the gains to the lender country may be fairly sizable in relation to the expenditure directed currently towards environmental protection. These gains, however, essentially depend on the terms of the environmental financing. We also find that debt-for-nature swaps do not in general produce efficient environmental protection if applied uniformly in international environmental financing.     

Policymakers' horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation

This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to “collude” to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation.     

技术差距模型与中非合作的利益分配

近年来,随着中国经济实力的增强和非洲国家经济贸易地位的提升,中非经贸关系发展迅速.双方经济联系趋向紧密,意味着发生经济摩擦的几率加大.最近两年,一些非洲国家与中国的贸易争端有增长之势,成为一些西方舆论制造"中国新殖民主义"的口实.本文运用技术差距国际贸易模型,分析了中非合作在国际贸易利益分配方面的动态变化,旨在为反驳"中国新殖民主义"论提供一定的理论支持,同时提示中国在合作中须保持一定的技术优势.     

Proof of global stability,transitional dynamics,and international capital flows in a two-country model of innovation and growth

Global stability properties of dynamic two-country models can be easily studied in the case of perfect international capital flows. With internationally constant relative productivities, balanced-growth path values for factor prices will hold on any path leading to the balanced-growth path unless one country experiences a period of no innovation. Innovation rates converge in the case of perfect international knowledge spillovers but long-run consumption levels and trade patterns are path-dependent. GDP per capita is predicted to converge slowly despite the presence of perfect international capital markets and no explicit inclusion of adjustment costs. The trade balance of the rich country is initially positive but after some time turns into a deficit.     

A game-theoretic model of coalition formation among primates

This paper models the coalition formation process among primates as a sequential game. The population consists of individuals having distinct social ranks which is determined by the individual’s resource holding potential. Each member of the population is interested in gaining access to a food resource, either individually or via a coalition. At any given stage of the game, a player can either propose a specific coalition or he can be proposed to in order to join one. Hence, the strategy of a player consists of a sequence of decisions regarding who to propose to for the formation of a coalition and which proposals to accept or reject. We derive the preferences of the players over the various coalition structures under the assumption that the probability of a coalition to obtain the resource is given by a logistic distribution as a function of relative strengths of the players. We show that, given the primates’ strategic behavior, a variety of different coalition structures can emerge in equilibrium.      

Labor standards, labor-management bargaining and international rivalry

Using the labor union's bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, ‘a race to the bottom’ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North's imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.     

Unionized oligopoly,labor-management cooperation,and international competitiveness

In a model of a duopolistic product market with a unionized labor force, this paper explores the interaction between firms' duopolistic behavior and union-firm bargaining. In a two-union/two-firm setting, we show that adopting efficient bargaining can improve a firm's competitiveness as well as efficiency, and it arises in equilibrium; while in a one-union/two-firm set-up, we find that an industry union prefers wage bargaining. However, when foreign competition in the product market intensifies, even the industry union prefers efficient bargaining. As an application, the analysis may explain differences in international competitiveness and the recent trend toward labor-management cooperation in the labor market.     

Blame-game politics in a coalition government

Delays in the adoption of reforms is an important question in political economics. This paper explores this issue in the context of a representative democracy where the government is a coalition and citizens observe neither the decision-making process, nor politicians' preferences for a reform. We show that a coalition member who favors a reform may nonetheless choose to veto its adoption (thus delaying it until after the next election) and let his coalition partners share the blame for the non-adoption. We refer to this strategy as blame-game politics. We then identify three reasons for a politician to play the blame-game. One is to make an issue salient in the next election. A second reason is to avoid a split in his electorate, which is accomplished by hiding his stance on an issue. A third reason is to enhance ‘bargaining power’ during the formation of the next government.     

湖南国际科技合作的现状及趋势

当今世界,科技全球化己成为科技进步和发展的主流趋势.加强和扩大国际科技交流与合作不仅势在必行,而且意义重大.近年来,湖南按照“平等互利、取长补短、成果共享、结合实际、尊重国际惯例、保护知识产权”的基本原则,开展国际科技合作,在引进技术,引进人才,引进资金,促进技术贸易方面出现了可喜局面.尤其是“十一五”期间,湖南对外开放政策环境不断改善,极大地促进了国际科技合作的开展.面对日益激烈的全球竞争,湖南省国际科技合作工作与建设创新型湖南的需求相比,还存在一些薄弱环节,迫切需要加以解决.     

Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures*

The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a three-stage game-theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing along with R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the model is that voluntary information sharing between cooperating firms increases information leakage from the RJV to outsiders. It is found that RJVs representing a larger portion of firms in the industry are more likely to share information. It is also found that when sharing information is costless, firms generally don't choose intermediate levels of information sharing: they share all the information or none at all. The size of the RJV is found to depend on three effects: a coordination effect, an information sharing effect, and a competition effect. Depending on the relative magnitudes of these effects, the size of the RJV may increase or decrease with spillovers. In response to an increase in leakages, RJV members reduce their R&D spending. In addition, they either increase the RJV size while maintaining information sharing unchanged (when leakages are low), or they reduce both information sharing and RJV size (when leakages are high).     

国际石油合作合同模式的特征及演进

20世纪80年代以来，我国石油企业以跨跃式的速度进入国际石油市场，参与国际石油市场的合作与竞争。而国际石油合作在经历了上百年的发展后，已形成了一套相对固定的模式与惯例。我国石油企业在进入国际石油市场的过程中，研究国际石油合作的模式与惯例显得愈来愈重要，其中国际石油合作合同就是最重要的内容之一。在国际石油合作的发展过程中，经历了租让、对抗和合作三个不同性质的阶段，在三个阶段演变的过程中，国际石油合作合同也发生了质的变化。自20世纪70年代以来，随着国际政治形势的变化，国际石油合作合同逐步体现了公平合理、双…     

对四川国际经济合作工作的几点思考

2002年，四川应紧紧抓住西部大开发和中国加入WTO的有利时机，充分发挥比较优势，积极实施“市场多元化”和“走出去”的发展战略，推动外经企业的结构调整和制度创新，增强企业的核心竞争能力，不断巩固传统外经市场，奋力开拓新的国外市场，全面提升对外经济合作事业的发展水平。一、继续实施“市场多元化”战略，进一步优化市场结构和布局。工程和海外投资方面，在巩固和深度开发西亚、南亚、东非等传统市场的基础上，近期四川外经市场开拓战略可由五大部分组成：以俄罗斯为主体的独联体市场；以尼日利亚、多哥、马里、尼日尔为重点的…     

Structural stability in a cross-country neoclassical growth model

This paper tests for structural stability of the Solow growth model, as recently extended to human capital and applied to a large section of countries by Mankiw, Romer and Weil. The evidence is obtained by ranking each explanatory variable of the model in ascending order and then running recursive regressions and by then splitting the original sample according to cluster analysis before running separate regressions. The evidence shows that the model exhibits overall structural breaks; the convergence coefficient, however, is very stable; the coefficients of the production factors become unstable where the factors become very abundant or very scarce; the coefficient of labour growth is negative and significant, as required by the theory, only if a small group of countries with scarce labour is considered; the same coefficient is instead positive and significant for a group of countries with abundant labour and favourable initial income and investments; the coefficient of investment in human capital is not significant if abundant labour countries or, simply, if influential countries in the regression are not considered.     

A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.     

Dynamic stability in a model of dual exchange rates

The dynamic stability of a small open economy operating under a regime of dual exchange rates is shown to depend on residents' net foreign asset position. This result is in contrast to the economy's dynamic behavior under unified fixed-rate and flexible-rate regimes where stability is unrelated to net foreign asset position.