Does garbage pricing increase the immoral disposal of household waste?

Some empirical studies have attempted to clarify the mechanism of illegal dumping by examining the degree to which per-bag pricing plays a role. However, previous research on the behaviour of avoiding paying a charge for waste collection has tended to neglect so-called ‘immoral disposal,’ which is less risky than illegal dumping because there is no legal penalty. In this study, we define immoral disposal as the dumping of waste in a manner that is immoral but not illegal. To detect the existence of immoral disposal, we apply a spatial econometric approach, namely an extended panel spatial Durbin model, to identify the actual spillover effect of garbage pricing in neighbouring municipalities on immoral disposal from the total waste. A major finding of this study is that immoral disposal exists in unit-based pricing, two-tiered pricing, and fixed pricing.     

Differential Provision of Solid Waste Collection Services in the Presence of Heterogeneous Households

A model of household refuse production is presented in which individuals differ in their distaste for the waste stock and the supply of waste collection services is continuous in pick-up frequency. The inclusion of pick-up frequency into household solid waste management analyses has already been shown to have policy implications. In fact, even in the absence of the waste stock externality, a system of uniform consumption taxes and legal (or curbside) disposal and recycling subsidies has been found to be necessary (and sufficient) to induce households to socially optimally allocate their resources when illegal disposal (or simply dumping) incentives exist but a per unit punishment system for dumping is lacking. This policy is here concluded to be no longer feasible; instead, a system of differential consumption taxes and recycling subsidies and uniform legal disposal subsidies is found to be optimal (but possibly nonimplementable). In the presence of heterogeneous households, which are however identifiable on the basis of their relative location to the landfill site, an optimal and implementable policy is then shown to require a differential provision of collection services.     

Wasting Time? Recycling Incentives in Urban Taiwan and Japan

What makes recycling work? We study the factors driving household waste disposal and recycling in 18 cities in Taiwan and Japan in order to understand the impact of alternative waste management incentives. We show that this depends on the effect of distinct policies on the relative costs of the main alternative disposal methods: recycling, disposal to landfill and illegal dumping. The willingness both to recycle and to dispose to landfill depends on the relative costs of the waste collection regime, and these are dominated by the time cost of alternative disposal methods. The higher the frequency of waste collection, the less recycling and the more disposal to landfill there will be. This is because frequent collection reduces the marginal time-cost of disposal to landfill. Curbside collection of recyclable material, and the frequency of that collection, has a similar effect on the recycling rate. Although direct incentives, such as unit pricing are important in the waste disposal decision, recycling depends primarily on management of the time-costs it involves.     

Challenging the enforcement of environmental regulation

If a firm can contest the enforcement of an environmental regulation, neither increasing the probability nor severity of the fine will guarantee a reduction in a firm's illegally dumped waste. A policy that can unambiguously decrease illegal dumping is lowering the cost of legal disposal. This result occurs because the use of monitoring and fines to increase the probability or severity of enforcement triggers investment to evade enforcement, while a decrease in the costs of legal disposal does not. Investment in the resources to evade enforcement decreases the attractiveness of monitoring by significantly increasing the costs of environmental audits, administrative hearings, and judicial procedures. This occurs even with a high degree of regulator information about the firm's cost structure and no monitoring errors. In addition, if the regulator can only imperfectly monitor a firm's behavior so the firm can be accused of another firm's behavior, observable commitment to challenge enforcement will lead to overinvestment in resources to evade enforcement, an increased level of illegal dumping, and an overall increase in total costs relative to the unobservable case.     

An economic analysis of mixing wastes

Using a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous waste, this paper studies optimal waste policy when households have to exert separation effort to produce homogeneous waste streams suitable for recycling. Our model explicitly allows for changes in the composition (quality) of waste streams depending on how much effort households are willing to spend on separating different types of waste. Accordingly, we are able to generalize some earlier contributions to the waste management literature and demonstrate that with both mixing and effort included, a first-best optimum is feasible under reasonable conditions. In particular, we find that a (modified) deposit-refund system still provides the optimal incentives to guide recycling as well as legal disposal (landfilling) and illegal dumping. Both the number and level of taxes and subsidies needed to reach the first-best depend crucially on the socially optimal level of dumping as well as the socially optimal composition of the mix. We are grateful to two anonymous referees, Leon Bettendorf, Elbert Dijkgraaf, Don Fullerton and Matthieu Glachant for constructive comments and useful discussions on an earlier version of this paper.     

Advance disposal fee vs. disposal fee: A monopolistic producer’s durability choice model

This study examines how the timing of waste disposal fee collection affects the producer’s choice of built-in product durability and social welfare in a durable-goods monopoly model. We categorize the waste disposal fee policies into two: advance disposal fee (ADF) policy and disposal fee (DF) policy. We show that a DF policy has two opposing effects on durability. Firstly, a DF policy gives the producer an incentive to increase durability in order to delay the households’ waste disposal and to discount future payments of the disposal fee (the payment-discounting effect). Secondly, a DF policy creates an incentive for consumers to dump waste illegally in order to mitigate the payment of the disposal fee, and gives the producer an incentive to reduce durability in order to avoid market saturation and the associated future price cuts (the illegal-dumping effect). When the disposal fee is low, the payment-discounting effect dominates the illegal-dumping effect under a DF policy, leading to the enhancement of durability. In this case, from a social welfare viewpoint, a DF policy may be more desirable than an ADF policy if the environmental damage associated with illegal dumping is not serious. However, when the disposal fee is high, a DF policy induces more illegal dumping, reduces durability, and inflicts more environmental damage. Therefore, an ADF policy is more socially desirable than a DF policy when the disposal fee is high. Moreover, we consider an oligopoly case and find that an ADF policy is more socially desirable in an industry with smaller market power.     

ILLEGAL DISPOSAL AND WASTE COLLECTION FREQUENCY

A model of household refuse production is presented in which the implications of the presence of dumping incentives for the public choice of garbage collection frequency under a user fee system are analysed. Insofar as governments wishing to balance their waste collection service budgets can set the marginal benefit of collecting garbage equal to its marginal cost, no externality arises through pick‐up frequency. However, when the expected punishment for dumping is zero or independent of its extent, the public provision of refuse collection frequency turns out to be negatively affected by the amount of garbage that individuals dump and, therefore, intervention in the management of household waste is required. The optimal policy is found to consist of taxes on consumption goods and subsidies for curbside (or legal) disposal and recycling that are directly linked to collection costs.     

Effects of Unit-Based Garbage Pricing: A Differences-in-Differences Approach

Using a unique 10-year dataset of all 458 Dutch municipalities, we apply a differences-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of unit-based pricing on household waste quantities and recycling. Community-level studies of unit-based pricing typically do not include fixed effects at the local level. We find that failure to do so may substantially inflate the estimated price effect. We also find that unit-based pricing may be endogenous, and use instrumental variables to account for this. Our analysis shows that user fees depend on user fees in neighboring jurisdictions (policy interaction). Our estimate of the garbage reduction per $1 user fee is lower than any previous estimate bar one. The price effect depends on the pricing system: weight-based systems reduce garbage quantities more than volume-based systems. User fees increase recycling, especially of paper, but not nearly as much as they reduce garbage quantities. We find no evidence for waste tourism or illegal dumping.     

Economic feasibility analysis for electrical generation from biogas in waste disposal sites in Mexico City

This article highlights the main aspects related to energy generation from biogas in a controlled landfill of Mexico City in order to determine profits and environmental benefits. The designed structures and public policies to provide waste management services in Mexico City have been exceeded. A significant increase in demand has led the government of Mexico City to base public services on rudimentary techniques using obsolete equipment. The modernization of waste disposal facilities and the diversification of services linked to waste treatment can offer several business opportunities to optimize energy generation from solid wastes. The use of landfills to dispose large amounts of waste enables the energy generation from biogas. The energy generated can diversify the electricity market and provide economic benefits to landfills managers to cover operational costs.     

造纸废水处理经济效益分析

造纸废水污染危害严重,是我国当前重点控制的主要污染源之一。从经济学角度出发分析了一个中型造纸企业投资建设废水处理设施所取得的一定的环境效益和经济效益,并从保护环境角度强调管理手段的重要性。     

基于行业视角的中国对外反倾销影响因素研究

本文利用1999年-2009年中国对外反倾销申诉数据,运用logit模型和经典线性模型测量了行业企业单位数、全部从业人员年平均数、总资产贡献率、资本密集度、工业成本费用利润率、竞争力指数、进口渗透率对中国对外反倾销行为在发起阶段的影响程度。结果表明行业企业单位数、总资产密集度和进口渗透率是发起反倾销申诉的重要影响因素,进口渗透率和全部从业人员年平均是影响申诉频率的主要因素。本文结论对中国反倾销理论分析和实践有参考价值。     

The U.S. Department of Commerce’s approach to targeted dumping: the wrong test and the wrong response

The U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC) defines targeted dumping as a pattern of significant differences in the prices that importers charge in the U.S. to different purchasers, in different regions, or during different periods. If DOC finds targeted dumping, then it calculates the average dumping margin using zeroing, a practice that increases the calculated dumping duty. This article shows that DOC is using an inappropriate statistical test in targeted dumping investigations. The article also shows that a finding of targeted dumping does not justify the use of zeroing, an inherently flawed methodology that DOC has discarded in cases without targeted dumping.     

对国际贸易中生态倾销的理论分析

随着经济全球化的发展,国际贸易与环境保护之间的复杂关系日益成为人们关注的焦点。究竟是自由贸易主导国际贸易,还是国际贸易让位于环境保护,成为理论研究的热点课题。本文探讨了理论界对国际贸易中生态倾销的界定以及对生态倾销特点的认识,同时着重分析和研究了发达国家和发展中国家实行生态倾销的理论依据,意在为我国经济和贸易的可持续发展提供一定的理论参考。     

Recycling of plastics: A materials balance optimisation model

At present the volume of solid waste produced in modern consumer societies is increasing, requiring policy measures to reduce the volume of waste to be dumped or incinerated. In this article a materials balance optimisation model for the recycling of plastics is developed to analyse the impact of policy measures that stimulate recycling. The study presents the structure of the optimisation model and it gives the results of a charge imposed on the dumping and incineration of plastics. The calculations show that considerable effort should be made to reach the recycling targets for plastic that have been set by the public authorities for the year 2000.     

A model of principal-agency control of wastes under technological progress

We analyze performance and outcome of principal-agency relationships in an environment with pollution externalities and technological progress. We assume that firms may not purposely violate the pollution control regulations but nonetheless generate some pollution due to negligence. The models allow firms two possible actions: either to increase the level of treated waste legally or pay an expected penalty if illegal pollution is detected. We show that in a world with pollution externalities, technological progress does not guarantee increases in the welfare level. Most important for policy purposes, the analysis shows the trade-offs between the policy instruments: penalties, taxes/subsidies and treatment costs in a world where technological progress occurs and firms may violate the law.     

Winners, Losers, and the Nuclear-Waste Dilemma

This paper explores how property-right assignment affects social efficiency when a public program has both “public good” and “public bad” components. We show that when willingness to accept a public bad exceeds the willingness to pay, the net benefit is unambiguously lower when the property right supports the status quo institutional structure. Thus, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency tests tend to favor public programs and mitigation over the status quo even when mitigation negatively affects another group. To illustrate the result, we develop social-cost estimates for moving nuclear waste from current temporary-storage facilities to a permanent central repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, USA. For a representative city with a population of 226,195, the present value of the external cost of shipping waste is $1.42 billion when those living near temporary nuclear-waste storage facilities are assigned the property right to “health and safety.” That number swells to $5.95 billion when those living near the transport route are assigned the property right. Thus, property-right assignment affects the efficient level of nuclear-waste, and thus nuclear energy, produced.     

试论国际反倾销中的规避与反规避

随着新贸易壁垒的升级，规避及反规避问题已经成为国际反倾销中的新问题，越来越受到国际社会的关注。在国际反倾销中，规避反倾销是国际贸易的产物，反规避是反倾销措施的延伸与发展。反规避问题的关键在于要建立一个统一、公平、合理的国际反规避规则和机制，最大限度地限制其消极作用和负面影响，以维持国际贸易和国际投资领域的公平竞争秩序。     

EFFECTS OF DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT ON LEGAL AND ILLEGAL EARNINGS

Although recent research has shown that drug abuse treatment reduces drug use and criminal activity in some clients, the impact of treatment on clients' post-treatment labor market behavior is relatively unknown. This study uses data from a longitudinal survey to analyze annual legal and illegal earnings for 2,420 drug abusers. The analysis focuses on two different time intervals—one year before entering a drug abuse treatment program and one year after leaving the same program. It describes client characteristics, labor market variables, and treatment history, and estimates the effects of length of time in treatment on post-treatment earnings. The regression analysis shows that length of time in treatment had a positive (negative) and statistically significant impact on real legal (illegal) earnings following treatment for methadone and residential clients, but the magnitude was small; accounting for possible selection bias had little effect on the results. Although residential clients experienced the largest relative changes in earnings outcomes, simply comparing the direct cost of residential treatment with the benefits from improved legal earnings and lower illegal earnings suggests that additional residential treatment is not cost-beneficial.     

Is the GATT/WTO Biased Against Agricultural Products in Unfair International Trade Investigations?

The unfair-trade codes of the GATT/WTO are better suited to addressing complaints from manufacturing than agriculture. This is because the seasonality and uncertainty of agricultural output, together with substantial use of contracting with factors of production, makes sales at a loss a rational business practice during certain times of the year. This cost dumping induces the use of constructed values in the calculation of dumping margins by the US, which typically generates high duties. The model provides for cyclical dumping arising as a supply phenomenon. This contrasts with cyclical dumping in manufacturing that is induced by demand fluctuations.     

Simultaneous Estimation of Legal and Illegal Supply and Demand: The Case of Motion Pictures

Prior research into illegal goods has typically looked at one-way effects, such as illegal demand on legal demand. This research investigates a previously unexamined component of the market, illegal supply. The authors examine the supply and demand of legal goods and their illegal counterparts as a market system of four interdependent components. This research makes theoretical and empirical contributions by evaluating illegal supply in this system. Simultaneous equations estimate each market component on the others using data from the motion picture industry. The results find illegal supply has no effect on legal supply (movie screens), positive effects on illegal demand (piracy downloads), and some effect on legal demand (box office revenues). Timing effects highlight this: illegal supply has a positive effect on legal demand during a film’s opening week, but no effect post-launch. The other market components have positive effects on illegal supply (except legal supply, which is negative in the opening week). Additionally, illegal demand has a negative effect on legal demand during the opening week of release, but not in the subsequent weeks. This finding alleviates prior research tension as to whether piracy helps or hurts legal sales, as omitting illegal supply could result in biased estimates.