The economic performance of state-owned enterprises in Central and Eastern Europe

This article explores the economic performance of state ownership in the largest non-financial enterprises operating in 13 post-socialist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries over the period 2007–2013. The largest state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are selected based on the ‘Coface – 500 Top Companies in CEE’ list in 2013. Of these 500 enterprises, 69 were identified as state-owned. All originated in the socialist period. The majority of them are from Poland and Ukraine. SOEs hold a dominant position in energy supply, the oil and gas sector, and transport. We find that the persistence of state ownership in post-socialist countries is caused by incomplete privatisation and the presence of SOEs within strategic sectors. The economic performance of the largest state-owned companies is, on average, comparable to their private counterparts.     

Industrial development in the inland region of China: A case study of the motorcycle industry

Although the inland region of China has generally been left behind in economic development compared with the coastal region, the motorcycle industry in Chongqing has recorded remarkable growth due to the meteoric rise of private enterprises over the last decade. Based on panel data of enterprises, we attempt to identify the factors behind the dynamic development of this industry. We conclude that the success of the motorcycle industry in Chongqing is attributable to a combination of positive features from the Wenzhou model in the 1990s, in which industrial development is based on clustering of private enterprises, and the Sunan model in the 1980s, in which industrial development is based on the effective use of human resources recruited from existing state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Learning by collective enterprises from SOEs in Chongqing coupled with the growth of the private enterprise sector fostered cluster-based industrial development. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 818–838.     

中国的金融发展、所有制结构调整与经济增长

本文利用中国分省面板数据证明:银行虽然将大部分资金贷给了国有企业,但是通过所有制结构调整,主要包括合法的国有企业改制,和不合法的国有资产流失等形式的资金漏损,使得银行信贷资产从国有企业手中转移到民营企业手中,提高了信贷资金的使用效率和资本边际生产率,促进了经济增长."拨改贷"使得银行贷款成为国有企业的主要外部资金来源,银行贷款的偿还压力推动了国有企业的改制,而政府出于保护银行信贷资产安全的需要也会催促国有企业加快改制.本文的结论为财政、外汇资金补充银行资本金和国有银行体制改革提供了理论和经验支持,为转轨国家的经济改革次序提供了启示.     

Ownership and earnings inequality in urban China

Along with advances in urban state-owned enterprise reform, fast growth of private sector and changes in the wage structure, earnings inequality in urban China has been increasing. Using data from the 1988 and 2007 waves of the urban household survey conducted by China Household Income Project, this paper attempts to examine the impact of the change in ownership structure on earnings distribution in urban China. We find that developing non-state-owned enterprises (nonSOEs) or privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) enlarge earnings inequality, but the difference in earnings level between the two sectors is small. Although workers in SOEs receive higher income than in nonSOEs, the difference is more caused by endowment difference rather than coefficient differences. Introducing market power to wage determination system is more influential to the rising earnings inequality which leads more rewards on working experience and educational attainment.     

You are suffocating me: Firm-level analysis of state-owned enterprises and private investment

Literature on whether government spending crowds out or crowds in the private sector is large, but still without an unambiguous conclusion. Using firm-level data from Ukraine, this paper provides a granular empirical investigation to disentangle the impact of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on private firm investment in Ukraine—a large transition economy. Controlling for firm characteristics and systematic differences across sectors, the results indicate that the SOE concentration in a given sector has a statistically significant negative effect on private fixed capital formation, and that the impact of SOEs is stronger in those industries in which SOEs have a more dominant presence. These findings imply that private firms operating in sectors with a high level of SOE concentration invest systematically less than businesses that are not competing directly with SOEs.     

Reappraising the performance of China's state-owned industrial enterprises, 1980-96

This paper seeks to reappraise the performance of China's state-ownedindustrial enterprises over the period 1980-96. By examiningall the available indicators of performance, and by placingthat performance in the context of the country's specific pathof economic system reform and industrial growth, it argues thatthe state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed much betterthan is widely perceived in the literature. In particular, theperformance of large-scale, state-owned enterprises has beenat least comparable to that of the acclaimed collectively-ownedenterprises. The latter have been much more market-orientedthan SOEs, but their status has been equally unclear from thestandpoint of private ownership. The paper thus constitutesa challenge to the big-bang or shock-therapy approach to thetransformation of Soviet-type economic systems.     

The dynamics of wage determination in Romania

This article examines wage developments in Romania over the last 20 years, discusses the evolving role of government wage policy and structural labour market changes, and analyses the dynamics of the wage determination process. It finds that government wage policy has had a significant demonstration effect on private sector wages, driven mainly by policy decisions over the past few years. The article also finds strong causality from private sector wages to wages in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) and government. No causality was found for changes in government wages to wages in SOEs or from SOE wages to private sector wages.     

PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIVATIZATION

During the past two decades, the Singapore economy has performed remarkably well. Its achievement has often been cited as an economic miracle for a 600-square kilometre city nation without resources except its three million inhabitants. Public enterprises have contributed much to this achievement. They have been so successful in competing with the private sector that there have been some criticisms against the dominance of government in business. Several major government companies have been privatized and listed on the local stock exchange. Preparations have been made for commercially viable statutory boards to become private enterprises. The government will play a catalytic and supportive role and refrain from local competition. Its new emphasis will be on internationalizing the economy through joint ventures in informational technology and telecommunication industries where the local private sector lacks the resources.     

From central planning towards a market economy: The role of ownership and competition in Vietnamese firms’ productivity

This paper examines the role of ownership and market competition in Vietnamese firms’ total factor productivity (TFP) from 2001 to 2011. Making use of a large panel dataset of manufacturing firms, we find that, on average, both foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have performed better than privately owned enterprises (POEs) in terms of their TFP levels. However, while FOEs’ TFP ranked the highest in the period 2001–2006, SOEs “closed the gap” in the period 2007–2011. Moreover, we find that market competition has been effective in enhancing average firm productivity and in reducing the gaps in efficiency across ownership types. SOEs’ remarkable performance may be linked to several concurrent factors experienced during the period 2001–2011, namely, the process of restructuring the state sector during the 2000s, the increased economic integration due to the country's accession to the World Trade Organization (2007) and, finally, the preferential access to financial capital and land granted to SOEs. While some evidence supports SOEs’ equitization as an explanation for their remarkable productivity performance, WTO accession and cheaper access to inputs do not fully explain it.     

税负抑制了公司投资吗?——基于国有股权私有收益的解释

文章分析了税负对公司投资决策的影响.与民营控股股东不同,作为国有企业的最终股东,政府不仅可以获得与股权投资相关的收益,而且可以获得独占性的税收,独占性的税收收入越高,政府控股的私有收益越大.因此,国有企业在投资决策时不仅考虑税后现金流量,而且会关注相关的预期税负,这提高了国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性;政府对税收的需求越大,国有企业的投资?预期税负敏感性越高.实证结果表明:(1)与民营控股上市公司相比,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关关系更弱;(2)随着注册地基础设施投资回报率的增加,国有控股上市公司的投资与预期税负之间的负相关性显著下降.因此,最大化税收收入也是国有企业投资决策的重要考虑因素.文章为我国股权结构在公司财务决策中的作用提供了新的研究视角.     

Where have China’s state monopolies gone?

If China’s economy is an example of “state-capitalism,” then its large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) could be expected to monopolize key sectors. But previous estimates of industrial concentration, using the Herfindahl—Hirschman Index (HHI), have suggested that the level of industrial concentration—and therefore the potential for the abuse of monopoly power—is very low. These studies have significantly underestimated HHI, since they do not consolidate subsidiary enterprises in Chinese survey data into larger business groups, or according to ultimate ownership. After making these adjustments, a measure of potential HHI shows that large state monopolies remain in oil and gas, electricity, tobacco and, potentially, automobiles. In particular, SOEs supervised by the central government are heavily invested in potentially concentrated industries. But aggregate profits of the state sector are driven more by the portfolio distribution of assets between resources, manufacturing and utilities, rather than industrial concentration within sectors.     

明晰产权与规范政府

2 0世纪 80年代以来的放权让利含有丰富的产权改革内涵。它既使财政从国有企业的融资活动中逐步淡出 ,也使财政不再为国有企业承担盈亏责任。但是 ,这种改革未能实现国有企业的产权明晰化 ,因为它局限于国有企业制度中的经济性层面 ,没有触及国有企业制度中的行政性层面。这是行政权利益左右中国改革走向的结果。要进一步深化改革 ,必须约束行政权力 ,规范政府行为 ,必须改革国有企业制度中的行政性层面。不然 ,明晰产权就是一句空话     

Reform and competitive selection in China: An analysis of firm exits

This paper considers aspects of the competitive selection process in China – firm entry, survival, and exit – in an important sector of manufacturing, looking in particular for changes resulting from the process of reform. Using industry census data from a province in North-East China, we find substantial differences in the process between ownership types. By conducting decompositions of aggregate growth and exploring the determinants of firm's exit using a hazard rate model, we observe a substantial rate of churning of enterprises in the sector, finding that the competitive selection processes operate, for small and collectively owned enterprises (COEs), in a manner consistent with what is known about a private market economy. While the hazard for state owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than for COEs, we find that the reforms introduced in 1992 were important in closing the gap for similarly situated firms.     

Foreign Exchange Accumulation and the Entrapment of Chinese Monetary Power: Towards a Balanced Growth Regime?

This article criticises the notion that China's foreign exchange reserves have strengthened its monetary power. While some scholars have argued that China's international monetary influence has been ‘entrapped’ by the domestic interests of its export sector, a one-sided focus on the export sector fails to identify the significant constraints on its macroeconomic autonomy. This article proposes an extension of the concept of entrapment that draws attention to the key role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their domestic fixed-asset investment in its growth regime: China's external monetary dependency – which is understood as both export dependency and the need to maintain foreign exchange accumulation – has been caused by a disparity between fixed-asset investment and private consumption that reflects a redistribution of income from the household sector to the SOE sector. In particular, I expose the SOE sector's rising interests in foreign exchange accumulation by uncovering a mutually reinforcing dynamic between China's external monetary dependence and the financial repression of its banking system. By entrenching an investment-led growth regime that provides key benefits the SOE sector, this dynamic is found to have seriously constrained the macroeconomic policy autonomy of Chinese authorities to rebalance growth away from investments and exports towards private consumption.     

混合所有制改革能有效化解国有企业产能过剩吗

在深化国有企业混合所有制改革的政策背景下,相比于采用正向逻辑来研究国有企业与其他所有制企业产能过剩的成因与化解机制异同,本文通过逆向逻辑构造反事实因果推断,即国有企业经过混合所有制改革身份属性发生变更后产能过剩能否得到化解,来探究国有企业产能过剩的制度性成因。在实证分析中,本文通过PSM—多期DID方法识别了国有企业混合所有制改革对于其产能利用率的政策影响,分析了不同市场结构下国有企业规模对产能利用率影响的非线性关系,明晰了国有企业混合所有制改革化解产能过剩的作用途径,探究了产能过剩的制度性根源与衍生因素之间的传递效应。     

国有企业双重效率损失研究

本文基于企业效率最大化要求剩余索取权与剩余控制权相对应这一企业理论分析了国有企业的生产效率损失和创新效率损失问题。国有企业的公有产权属性决定了国有企业中存在着生产效率和创新效率的双重损失。国有企业改革通过监督和激励机制设计在一定程度上实现了生产中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,从而提高了国有企业的生产效率。然而,由于创新具有不同于一般生产的特殊属性,已有国有企业改革措施并不能实现创新中的剩余索取权与剩余控制权的匹配,因而无法改善国有企业的创新效率。由此,本文提出了国有企业的创新效率损失大于生产效率损失的理论假说。基于中国省级国有企业和民营企业的工业行业数据,统计分析和计量模型估计结果都稳健地支持了该假说。     

Business fixed investment of Chinese manufacturing firms in the post-financial crisis era

ABSTRACT

I document the investment decline of Chinese manufacturing firms after 2011, following the end of the 4 trillion fiscal stimulus program and expansionary monetary policies for combating the 2008–2009 financial crisis. I employ a difference-in-difference strategy to show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) acted as investment stabilizers. In the post-crisis era, SOEs’ investment rates fell less compared to their private counterparts. Moreover, they had a smaller chance of exiting the market than private firms. In the face of monetary tightening, SOEs enjoyed a much smaller increase in the interest rates of their long-term debts. Although these may fuel the growth of the SOE sector relative to the private sector, and thus raised concerns for capital misallocation, the adverse effect on reallocation was dampened by shadow banking.     

Post-privatization corporate governance and firm performance: The role of private ownership concentration,identity and board composition

We examine and analyze the post-privatization corporate governance of a sample of 52 newly privatized Egyptian firms over a period of 10 years, from 1995 to 2005. We look at the ownership structure that results from privatization and its evolution; the determinants of private ownership concentration; and the impact of private ownership concentration, identity and board composition on firm performance. We find that the state gives up control over time to the private sector, but still controls, on average, more than 35% of these firms. We also document a trend in private ownership concentration over time, mostly to the benefit of foreign investors. Firm size, sales growth, industry affiliation, and timing and method of privatization seem to play a key role in determining private ownership concentration. Ownership concentration and ownership identity, in particular foreign investors, prove to have a positive impact on firm performance, while employee ownership concentration has a negative one. The higher proportion of outside directors and the change in the board composition following privatization have a positive effect on firm performance. These results could have some important policy implications where private ownership by foreign investors seems to add more value to firms, while selling state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to employees is not recommended. Also, the state is highly advised to relinquish control and allow for changes in the board of directors following privatization as changing ownership, per se, might not have a positive impact on firm performance unless it is coupled with a new management style.     

Liquidity Shock,Credit Constraint and the Development of Private vs. State-Owned Enterprises

Based on firm level data for the period of 1998–2007, this paper attempts to explain the growth differences between private enterprises and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, in the context of liquidity shocks, and institutional and financial environments. It is found that (1) when liquidity tightens, the private enterprises face stricter credit constraints than SOEs, which restricts the development of private enterprise; (2) when liquidity becomes abundant, private enterprises face fewer financial limitations and grow much faster than SOEs; (3) the effect of liquidity shocks on the growth rate gap between private enterprises and SOEs has weakened during the period 2002–2007. These findings reveal that the credit discrimination against private enterprises can be mitigated by improving institutional and financial environments, which weaken the effects of liquidity shocks on firm growth.     

The targets of state capitalism: evidence from M&A deals

Over the last decade, particularly after the Great Recession, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been expanding their role in the global economy, including through merger & acquisitions (M&As). What are the characteristics of the firms targeted by SOEs? Are they different from firms controlled by private investors? By looking at a unique sample of around 25,000 M&As occurred over the period 2005–2012, we find that only SOEs controlled by means of minority of stakes (state-invested enterprises, SIEs) do not show any statistically significant difference in their targeting strategy compared to private enterprises. Conversely, majority-owned SOEs, and in particular financial SOEs buy lower performing firms compared to private acquirers. We interpret this fact as evidence of the internalization of political objectives by fully controlled and financial SOEs, but not by SIEs.