Multinational firms,acquisitions and job tasks

We revisit the question how inward FDI and multinational ownership affect relative labor demand. Motivated by the recent literature that distinguish between skills and tasks, we argue that the impact of multinational and foreign ownership on the demand for labor is better captured by focusing on job tasks rather than education. We use Swedish matched employer–employee data and find that changes of local firms to both foreign and Swedish multinationals increase the relative demand for non-routine and interactive job tasks in the targeted local firms. Hence, in a high-income country, both inward and outward FDI have a task upgrading impact on local firms. The effect is primarily driven by wage effects leading to increased wage dispersion for workers with different non-routine and interactive task intensity. We also show that the effect is not the same as skill upgrading since dividing employees by educational attainment does not capture changes in the relative labor demand. Hence, our results suggest a new aspect of the labor market consequences of FDI.     

Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN A TWO‐TIER OLIGOPOLY: COORDINATION,VERTICAL INTEGRATION,AND WELFARE*

We study foreign direct investment (FDI) by two independent investors/entrants into a two‐tiered oligopolistic industry. An FDI subsidy at a single stage of production can be sufficient to resolve the coordination problem facing investors thereby inducing entry at both stages. However, due to linkage offsetting, FDI at both stages may yield lower domestic welfare than FDI at a single stage. Vertical integration not only solves the coordination problem, it also eliminates double marginalization. But since the integrated multinational does not sell the intermediate to local firms, its entry generates no vertical linkages and can yield lower welfare than FDI by independent firms.     

Power in the multinational corporation in industry equilibrium

Recent theories of the multinational corporation introduce the property rights model of the firm and examine whether to integrate or outsource firm activities locally or to a foreign country. This paper focuses instead on the internal organization of the multinational corporation by examining the power allocation between headquarters and subsidiaries. We provide a framework to analyse the interaction between the decision to serve the local market by exporting or FDI, market access and the optimal mode of organization of the multinational corporation. We find that subsidiary managers are given decision power to run the firm at intermediate levels of host country competition. We then provide comparative statics on the optimal organization of the multinational corporation for changes in fixed FDI entry costs, trade costs, as well as changes in information technology.      

A NOTE ON FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND EXPORTS IN VERTICALLY DIFFERENTIATED INDUSTRIES

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of a multiproduct multinational firm which supplies vertically differentiated products, and show that the proximity‐concentration trade‐off can generate FDI‐export coexistence, i.e., the firm supplies the low‐quality products through FDI and the high‐quality products through exports. We also show that the opposite can never happen. Moreover, when the multiproduct multinational firm faces price competition in the target markets, it has an incentive to use trade costs to soften price competition, which can reduce its FDI incentive.     

Capacity Choice and Preemption of a Foreign Market

This paper studies the strategic role of foreign direct investments (FDIs) when specified as a device for a multinational enterprise (MNE) to precommit capacity. This captures the idea of an MNE preempting the host market or, at least, achieving more profitable outcomes by setting the initial conditions of the post-entry competition with local rivals. Here, the MNE chooses FDI even if "exporting costs" (e.g., tariffs) are not considered. Market preemption is an alternative justification for FDI, but not the only one; sometimes the tradeoff between advantages of strategic leadership and cost of establishing offshore facilities, alone, justifies FDI.     

WHAT ATTRACTS FOREIGN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS TO CHINA?

After adopting the open-door policy, China experienced a boom of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) by multinational corporations. This article attempts to assess effects of location characteristics and government policies on FDI flows during the period 1987–98. A model of FDI determinants is specified and estimated with cross-section and panel data. The estimates indicate that China's huge market size, liberalized FDI regime, and improving infrastructure are attractive to multinationals. The regional distribution of FDI within China is influenced largely by FDI incentives and historical-cultural links with foreign investors, along with other location factors.     

FDI Policy,Greenfield Investment and Cross‐border Mergers

This paper examines a multinational's choice between greenfield investment and cross‐border merger when it enters another country via foreign direct investment (FDI) and faces the host country's FDI policy. Greenfield investment incurs a fixed plant setup cost, whereas the foreign firm obtains only a share of the joint profit from a cross‐border merger under the restriction of the FDI policy. This trade‐off is affected by market demand, cost differential, and market competition, among other things. The host country's government chooses its FDI policy to affect (or alter) the multinational's entry mode to achieve the maximum social welfare for the domestic country. We characterize the conditions shaping the optimal FDI policy and offer intuitions on FDI patterns in developing and developed countries.     

中国跨国公司在企业国际化过程中的外国市场选择与进入模式

基于中国跨国公司的崛起，它们如何在外国市场选择与进入模式方面作出决策需要系统研究。通过对中国制造企业的调查，我们发现它们的外国市场选择及进入模式战略在不同的对外，直接投资（FDI）的经营模式中存在着显著差异。发达经济体及发展中国家都是中国企业出口的重要市场，同时这些企业更倾向于在发达经济体中投资于营销、生产及研发领域。本研究结论对理解新兴市场跨国公司的海外市场选择和进入模式有重要启示。     

FDI对东道国经济发展的溢出效应:文献综述

对国内外FDI溢出效应的实证研究和理论研究进行了系统回顾。大多数实证研究发现,FDI的行业间溢出效应尤其是后向关联溢出效应显著为正,而行业内溢出效应并不显著或为负向溢出效应;技术差距、交流成本以及FDI进入方式是影响FDI溢出效应的重要因素。理论研究发现:适当的技术差距和市场容量能使FDI进入产生明显的后向关联效应,并增加上下游行业的产出,同时会促使跨国公司向本地供应商进行非排他性的技术扩散;中间产品的多样化和市场竞争结构显著影响FDI后向关联溢出效应——这是实证研究很少涉及的部分,是未来进一步研究的重点。     

Welfare effects of competition for FDI between technologically asymmetric countries with varying trade costs

Given the traditional argument that host countries' excessive competition for FDI (foreign direct investment) deteriorates the host countries' welfare, this paper examines the impact of policy competition for FDI on social welfare considering varying trade costs. Based on a model where two technologically asymmetric countries compete for FDI, we determine an equilibrium where a multinational firm relocates to a less efficient country. Moreover, we demonstrate that the policy competition for FDI between less integrated economies might improve social welfare when the multinational firm relocates to a country with a lower technology and a less competitive market. Nonetheless, we show that the traditional argument can be true when the policy competition for FDI between highly integrated economies deteriorates host countries' welfare, as supported by the empirical evidences of moderated competition for FDI within EU member countries.     

Product Lifetime: A Determinant of Entry Decision by Multinational Firms

Existing literature on the role of intellectual property rights (IPR) protection has painted an ambiguous picture about the size of the effects of stronger IPR on the choice of the multinational firm’s mode of entry into foreign market. Some empirical studies suggest that improving IPR in recipient countries will have higher effect on licensing, while others found larger effect on foreign direct investment (FDI). The available indices of protection only measure country-wide characteristics and do not pick inter-industry variation, while the data show significant differences in losses of US multinationals by industry. In this paper, we introduce and empirically estimate a new dimension to multinational firm’s decision to enter a foreign market—a parameter that reflects the length of positive profits that the firm can earn in various industries. We dub the estimated parameter a perceived time of rent extraction. The introduction of the time parameter allows us to differentiate the effects of stronger IPR on the entry modes in different industries and reconcile the ambiguity results in the literature. Particularly, strengthening IPR has higher impact on FDI in industries with shorter rent extraction time, while licensing is affected more than FDI in industries with longer rent extraction time.     

Asymmetric Demand Information and Foreign Direct Investment*

We examine the FDI versus exports decision of firms competing in an oligopolistic (quantity‐setting) market under demand uncertainty and asymmetric information. Compared to a firm that chooses to export, a firm that chooses to set up a plant in the host market has superior information about local market demand. In addition to the well‐known tension between the fixed set‐up costs of investment, the additional variable costs of exports and oligopoly sizes, the incentive to invest abroad is explained by the strategic learning effect. FDI may be observed even if trade costs are zero. The analysis is robust to price competition and to the possibility that a foreign firm can engage in both FDI and exports.     

Trade,foreign direct investment or acquisition: Optimal entry modes for multinationals

We examine multinationals' optimal entry modes into foreign markets as a function of market size, FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs. Our results highlight why large countries are more likely to attract acquisition investment, while intermediate sized countries may be served predominantly through trade, even in the presence of high tariffs. Small countries are most likely to experience either FDI or no entry. We also show how these results vary with the competition intensity in the host country.FDI fixed costs, tariffs and transport costs are crucial not only in determining whether to engage in FDI or trade, but they are also shown to influence the acquisition choice as trade and FDI threats influence the acquisition price. Finally, we explore the welfare implications of tariff reductions for both the local firm and the multinational and investigate political motives to impose endogenous tariffs that influence not only the welfare of a local firm, but also the entry mode of the multinational.     

Multinational Production, Absorptive Capacity, and Endogenous R&D Spillovers

Do R&D spillovers have an impact on whether firms choose to go multinational or not? We present a three‐stage Cournot duopoly model, which identifies under what conditions firms choose to service a foreign market through exports or localized production. The establishment of a foreign subsidiary improves the ability to learn from foreign R&D since spillovers are strongly moderated by geographical distance. We explicitly model the concept of absorptive capacity, where gains from spillovers are determined by own R&D investments. With exogenous R&D investments, the absorptive capacity effect contributes to increase the gains from going multinational when the firm is R&D‐intensive. However, if R&D investments are endogenous, only medium‐sized absorptive capacity effects will result in firms going multinational. Furthermore, higher spillover rates do not necessarily drive down R&D and profits for the multinational firm. This stands in contrast to models that ignore absorptive capacity effects.     

Taxes,institutions and foreign diversification opportunities

Investors can access foreign diversification opportunities through either foreign portfolio investment (FPI) or foreign direct investment (FDI). The worldwide tax regime employed by the US potentially distorts this choice by penalizing FDI, relative to FPI, in low-tax countries. On the other hand, weak investor protections in foreign countries may increase the value of control, creating an incentive to use FDI rather than FPI. By combining data on US outbound FPI and FDI, this paper analyzes whether the composition of US outbound capital flows reflects these incentives to bypass home and host country institutional regimes. The results suggest that the residual tax on US multinational firms' foreign earnings skews the composition of outbound capital flows — a 10% decrease in a foreign country's corporate tax rate increases US investors' equity FPI holdings by approximately 10%, controlling for effects on FDI. Investor protections also seem to shape portfolio choices, though these results are not robust when only within-country variation is employed.     

Market Familiarity and the Location of South and North MNEs

We use a systematic empirical analysis of the determinants of South‐South (SS) and North‐South (NS) foreign direct investment (FDI) as a canvas to explore how multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) location decisions are shaped by better acquaintance with a foreign market resulting from bilateral ties, experience of international expansion, and knowledge of how to deal with poor governance. We find that these various aspects of market familiarity, which can interact together, are important to explain and differentiate the location behaviors of South MNEs (S‐MNEs) and North MNEs (N‐MNEs) in developing countries.     

Location for Foreign Direct Investment in Vertically Related Markets

This paper studies a multinational enterprise's (MNE's) location decision in a vertically related market with endogenous vertical technology transfer (VTT). We show that, even though VTT is more costly in a less developed country, an MNE can transfer more technology there than in a developed country (DC). When the opposite occurs, the MNE sometimes locates in a DC where, although it faces stronger competition, it obtains the input at better terms. Therefore, by arguing that the MNE's decision can be crucially affected by the upstream market's outcomes, an alternative explanation is provided for the commonly observed foreign direct investment (FDI) in DCs.     

Measuring the Intensity of Vertically Integrated Multinational Enterprises

Using data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), this study attempts to measure the intensity of vertically integrated multinational enterprises (VMNEs) for US foreign direct investment (FDI). By comparing the primary industry of US parents and their foreign affiliates, it is found that a significant proportion of VMNEs exists for US FDI abroad, which range over 14 manufacturing and three nonmanufacturing industries. The intensity of VMNEs is found to be negatively related with the host countries' labor cost. Meanwhile, a critical amount of VMNEs arise to take advantage of proximity to customers through FDI.     

The choice of market entry mode: Greenfield investment,M&A and joint venture

Multinationals may enter a host market by different modes of foreign direct investment (FDI). This paper examines the choice of FDI mode, and shows that the profitability of greenfield investment influences this choice not only directly, but also indirectly since it determines the outside option of potential acquisition targets and joint venture partners. In particular, even if greenfield investment is a viable option, the multinational may prefer a joint venture to M&A, and M&A to greenfield investment, provided that M&A and joint venture both involve sufficiently low fixed costs. The reason is that the profitability of greenfield investment both reduces the acquisition price in the case of M&A, and gives local firms an incentive to agree to a joint venture.