Board Turnover and Reorganisation Outcomes: Evidence from Voluntary Administration

This paper examines the relation between board turnover and the likelihood that a company that enters voluntary administration will conclude a deed of company arrangement with its creditors, which provides stakeholders with a better outcome than would be achieved by liquidation. We examine director turnover generally, as well as turnover of specific board personnel including the CEO or managing director and the board chairperson. A significant positive relation is found between a deed outcome and the percentage of director turnover and turnover of a CEO or managing director. We interact board turnover variables and company size and find that the turnover benefit is reduced as company size increases and the complexity of the administration becomes greater. The results inform a controversial and largely unanswered question as to whether board turnover leads to better outcomes for insolvent companies. Moreover, the results have implications for the Australian voluntary administration legislation because they suggest that there are difficulties applying it to large and complex corporate insolvencies.     

Outside options and CEO turnover: The network effect

Most studies consider chief executive officer (CEO) turnover from the firm's perspective. In this paper, I suggest that the labor market conditions for CEOs affect turnover outcomes. I use CEOs' positions on corporate executive and director networks to assess their employment options. Controlling for performance, firm characteristics, and personal traits, I find that CEO connectedness significantly increases turnover probability, especially for poor performers. I also show that connectedness increases the likelihood of CEOs leaving for other full-time positions, or their retiring and taking part-time positions elsewhere, but does not have a significant effect on the likelihood that they will step down and remain with the firm in other capacities. The evidence supports the idea that a CEO's connectedness expands outside options and thus increases turnover probability.     

Communicating production outcomes as gains or losses,operator skill and their effects on safety-related violations in a simulated production context

In this study, violation-producing conditions from an organizational and individual point of view are investigated. In concrete terms, framing effects of production outcome displays in relation to production goals, the risk of a technical accident, as well as person-related variables and their impact on violations are investigated based on the theoretical assumptions of prospect theory and risk-taking. It is assumed that violations are more likely when performance is below the aspiration level associated with an anticipated loss. A 2?×?3 factorial experimental design (n?=?118) was selected in accordance with the ‘Asian Disease’ decision scenario in the form of a computer-simulated task environment Simulation Waste Water Treatment. Participants acted out the role of a production supervisor running a plant. Experimental conditions were (1) the framing of individual performance outcomes in relation to the production goals in terms of losses or gains, and (2) the risk (20, 35, and 5%) with which an accident (a deflagration) might occur through using a corner-cutting procedure. A significant main effect of the framing conditions and no effect of risk conditions or interaction effect emerged. An additional path analysis shows the influence of risky decision-making and acquired skills in terms of knowledge of the safety-related procedure on a violation. In summary, violations are strongly affected by (a) framing effects of production outcomes when the performance is below the aspiration level and (b) person-related variables, in particular risky decision-making and skill. Results strongly emphasize that we found violation-producing conditions over and above what has so far been proposed and give rise to our claim that communicating production outcomes as gains and the increase of skill increases the likelihood of compliance with safety-related procedures.     

CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences

We study large discrete decreases in CEO pay and compare them to CEO forced turnover. The determinants are similar, as are the performance improvements after the action. After the pay cut, the CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity is abnormally high, such that the CEO can restore his pay level by reversing the poor performance. After either a pay cut or forced turnover, CEOs reduce investment and leverage, and improve performance, on average. Together, our results show that the possibility of these large compensation cuts provides ex ante incentives for CEOs to exert effort to avoid poor performance and that CEOs take actions to improve poor performance once pay is cut. The similarity of the causes and outcomes of large pay cuts compared to forced turnover suggests that large pay cuts are used as a substitute for forced turnover, helping to explain why forced turnover is rare.     

Explaining the accounting disclosure index of stock exchanges by foreign exchange market activity

In this article, researcher-created accounting disclosure index of 23 stock exchanges for the year 1992 and its relationship with variables including foreign exchange turnover, economic and financial indicators were investigated. The accounting disclosure index of global stock exchanges crafted by Adhikari and Tondkar (1992) was regressed on foreign market turnover which was utilized as a proxy for foreign exchange market activity. The OLS results supported that along with the activity of foreign exchange market; GNI per capita, market capitalization, energy and electric consumption, number of listed companies were significantly related with the accounting disclosure index. The foreign market turnover was found to be positively influencing the accounting disclosure index. The models explained about 73% of the variation in the index with an F-ratio of 26.56 indicating the overall significance of the model.     

Reversing the Question: On What Does the Turnover of Mutual Funds Depend? Evidence from Equity Mutual Funds in Chile

Abstract:

The purpose of this research is to study the factors that influence portfolio turnover in equity mutual funds in Chile. The main result of this research indicates that turnover is related to a combination of variables associated with efficiency, and with behavioral and agency problem hypotheses. In addition, negative effects of turnover are observed on the returns from the funds; positive effects are observed on portfolio liquidity. This study should be of interest to policymakers who regulate and monitor the delegated portfolio management industry in developing countries, as well as individual and institutionalinvestors concerned about the efficiency and performance of their investments.     

Hedge fund activism,CEO turnover and compensation

This paper examines the governance role of hedge fund activists by analyzing the impact of these activists on CEO turnover, CEO pay, and CEO pay-performance link in targeted companies. Using the difference-in-difference approach, we first find significantly higher CEO turnover following hedge fund activism. After we split target companies into the CEO-turnover and non-CEO-turnover sub-samples, we find that only new CEOs in targeted companies get more compensation following hedge fund activism while incumbent CEO pay does not significantly change. The relationship between CEO bonuses and return on assets following hedge fund activism also differs across the subsamples split by CEO turnover. Pay-performance relationship is enhanced by hedge fund activism for new CEOs, but not for incumbent CEOs. In additional analyses, we document that CEO turnover is positively associated with Tobin’s Q and shareholder votes on Say on Pay in target companies after hedge fund activism.     

Is China's corporate governance beginning to come of age? The case of CEO turnover

This study examines the effectiveness of China's corporate governance during the rapid transition of its economy. We find that poor performance is associated with voluntary and involuntary CEO turnover. We also find that exceptionally good performance is marginally associated with voluntary CEO turnover. For governance variables, more non-executive directors are associated with CEO turnover and CEO duality is marginally negatively related to CEO turnover. In addition, some of the governance variables are related to voluntary, but not involuntary, turnover. These results indicate that China's corporate governance is beginning to resemble the Anglo-American model as its market institutions come of age.     

The CEO pay slice

We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)—the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer—and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The CPS could reflect the relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extracts rents. We find that, controlling for all standard controls, CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's q. CPS also has a rich set of relations with firms' behavior and performance. In particular, CPS is correlated with lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases. Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is associated with agency problems and indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and behavior of firms.     

An assessment of the learning benefits of using a Web-based Learning Environment when teaching accounting

The impact and use of information and communication technology on learning outcomes for accounting students is not well understood. This study investigates the impact of design features of Blackboard¹ used as a Web-based Learning Environment (WBLE) in teaching undergraduate accounting students. Specifically, this investigation reports on a number of Blackboard design features (e.g. delivery of lecture notes, announcements, online assessment and model answers) used to deliver learning materials regarded as necessary to enhance learning outcomes. Responses from 369 on-campus students provided data to develop a regression model that seeks to explain enhanced participation and mental effort. The final regression shows that student satisfaction with the use of a WBLE is associated with five design features or variables. These include usefulness and availability of lecture notes, online assessment, model answers, and online chat.     

Equity Issuance,CEO Turnover and Corporate Governance

There is substantial evidence on the effect of external market discipline on chief executive turnover decisions in poorly performing companies. In this study we present evidence on the role of institutional monitoring in these decisions through the equity issuance process. We find that firms which undertake equity offerings are associated with an increased rate of forced CEO turnover that is focused on the managers of poorly performing companies. At the same time, equity offerings increase the likelihood of a new CEO being appointed from outside the current management team. We also provide evidence that independent boards are more likely to forcibly remove CEOs from their position, although this is not conditional on poor performance.     

The coverage assignments of financial analysts

Previous studies document that forecast accuracy impacts analyst career outcomes. This paper investigates the influence of forecast accuracy on coverage assignments. I show that brokerage houses reward accurate analysts by assigning them to high-profile firms and penalise analysts exhibiting poor accuracy by assigning them to smaller firms. The coverage of high-profile firms increases the potential for future compensation linked to investment banking and trading commissions. In addition, covering such firms increases analysts' recognition from buy-side investors, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of obtaining broker votes and votes for the Institutional Investor star ranking. Overall, my results indicate that high forecast accuracy leads to increased future compensation.     

CEO turnover and bankrupt firms’ emergence

This paper examines whether CEO turnover within a bankrupt firm predicts the firm's likelihood to reemerge from bankruptcy proceedings as a reorganized entity. Using 836 bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code from 1989 through 2016, we show that firms that undergo CEO turnover are significantly more likely to emerge from Chapter 11 proceedings. We conduct further analyses to examine the potential mechanisms through which CEO turnover is linked to a firm's chance of emergence. Consistent with the perspective that CEO turnover constitutes an observable event that can signal creditor support, we find that CEO turnover in bankrupt firms is positively associated with debtor-in-possession financing. Additionally, there is a significant increase in managerial quality post-turnover. Further, we document that the predictive power of CEO turnover is stronger in bankruptcy cases with greater uncertainty, such as in free-fall bankruptcies, where there is less preexisting agreement between the firm and its creditors. Overall, our findings provide valuable insight into external investors and stakeholder groups, whose interests are significantly impacted by corporate bankruptcies.     

Monitoring by the financial press and forced CEO turnover

This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm performance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.     

Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective

We report evidence on chief executive officer (CEO) turnover during the 1971 to 1994 period. We find that the nature of CEO turnover activity has changed over time. The frequencies of forced CEO turnover and outside succession both increased. However, the relation between the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and firm performance did not change significantly from the beginning to the end of the period we examine, despite substantial changes in internal governance mechanisms. The evidence also indicates that changes in the intensity of the takeover market are not associated with changes in the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance.     

Analyst Optimism and Incentives under Market Uncertainty

We examine how analysts’ changing incentives driven by changes in market uncertainty affect their forecast optimism. Analysts issue more optimistically biased earnings forecasts and buy recommendations under high market uncertainty (VIX). The lower reputational costs and larger benefits of optimistic output explain the increased optimistic output: Analysts are less likely to be penalized for inaccuracy and can stimulate more trading activity from optimistically biased output when market uncertainty is high. We find that the likelihood of analysts’ turnover decreases, while the trading volume associated with optimistic output increases, with VIX. No evidence suggests that analysts’ self‐selection affects our findings on optimism and market uncertainty.     

An examination of the relationship between manager self-efficacy and entrepreneurial intentions andperformance in mexican small businesses

Self-efficacy refers to the subjective beliefs that people have of their capability to perform a given task, a topic of continual research in the last two decades in different fields of human functioning. There is ample research about the relationship between self-efficacy and performance, and with entrepreneurship. Chen et al. (1998) in particular proposed a construct to predict the likelihood of an individual being an entrepreneur, which they tested in parallel samples of students and small business owners and executives; the construct consisted of five factors: marketing, innovation, management, risk-taking, and financial control. The present study was meant to validate the construct in a sample of small businesses in a small city of west-central Mexico, but results found show that the data converge in three factors that seem to relate to the difficulty and complexity of the task; such factors explain the business perceived performance, as well as the entrepreneurial intention of business owners and managers.     

CEO Turnover after Acquisitions: Are Bad Bidders Fired?

We examine the relation between bidder returns and the probability of chief executive officer (CEO) turnover in acquiring firms. Using a sample of 714 acquisitions during 1990 to 1998, we find that 47% of CEOs of acquiring firms are replaced within 5 years, including 27% by internal governance, 16% by takeovers, and 4% by bankruptcy. A significant inverse relation exists between bidder returns and the likelihood of CEO turnover. This relation is not associated with governance structure. It also is not significantly different in stock versus cash acquisitions, which appears to be inconsistent with Shleifer and Vishny's theory of “stock market driven” acquisitions.     

Job perceptions and turnover behavior of tenure-track accounting educators

This paper compares the job-related need fulfillment of academic accountants in 1994 with that reported nearly a quarter of a century earlier by Carpenter and Strawser (1971. A study of the job satisfaction of academic accountants. The Accounting Review (July), 46, 509-518). We also investigate whether job dissonance (dissatisfaction resulting from unmet needs) foreshadowed turnover of faculty respondents during the 2-year period following our survey. Results suggest that fulfillment for most job-related needs was lower for 1994 accounting educators than for their 1970 counterparts. Within the 1994 sample, certain perceptual differences were attributed to both race (black versus non-black) and gender. Regardless of demographics, however, reported job dissonance in 1994 was strongly associated with subsequent job turnover, particularly among assistant professors. Taking steps to reduce or eliminate job dissonance is arguably more important in today's environment than in 1994. Accounting faculty members today enjoy a greater number of opportunities and thus can more readily remove themselves from situations that create perceived job dissonance.     

Blockholder monitoring and the efficiency of pay-performance benchmarking

In this article I examine how the performance sensitivity of CEO compensation is related to the level and turnover of outside block ownership. Separating firm performance into firm-specific (Skill) and exogenous (Luck) components, I find that pay sensitivity to Luck increases with blockholder turnover, whereas pay sensitivity to Skill increases with blockholding size. Furthermore, when blockholder turnover is higher, CEO pay increases more with positive Luck but does not decrease as much with negative Luck; also, excess CEO compensation is larger. Thus, the rent accruing to CEOs via asymmetric pay sensitivity to Luck is partly explained by short investment horizons of large shareholders.