Dynamic adjustment and long-run equilibria: Panel data estimates for the East German states

The economic development in East Germany after unification shows both, success and failure. In the early nineties wages and productivity increased fast; later on catching up faded out. A central question from a policy viewpoint is whether this fading out indicates a reduction of the adjustment speed or an equilibrium gap. This points towards a stationarity analysis of differences between East and West Germany. Our paper presents panel data estimates for the East German states for wages, productivity, competitiveness and unemployment. The results reveal that the adjustment was fast, but the equilibrium gaps are large.     

Nonlinearity in dynamic adjustment: Semiparametric estimation of panel labor supply

We estimate a semiparametric dynamic panel data model by the local linear kernel method and we interpret the slope of the nonparametric component function as a varying slope coefficient. Thus, the slope coefficient is a smooth, but otherwise unknown, function of some of the regressors. A Monte Carlo experiment is reported to examine the finite sample performance of the local linear estimator. We apply the estimation method to a labor supply equation for men from the triannual Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). Specification tests based on the estimated labor supply elasticities, partial adjustment coefficients, and residuals demonstrate the improvements from a semiparametric partially linear model. Our empirical results point to a need by economists to revisit the issue of the speed of labor market adjustment to policy induced shifts in labor demand and to take more formal econometric account of heterogeneity in wage effects when studying the distributional consequences of tax reforms for labor supply earnings. First version received: July 2000/Final version received: January 2001     

Comparative political economy when anarchism is on the table

Scott’s (2009) research on stateless Southeast Asia describes behavioral patterns amidst indigenous peoples that parallel certain contemporary social phenomena, especially, prohibition and military occupation. Unintended consequences caused by government are continuously interpreted to reaffirm the rationale for interventionism. Governments’ role in social processes involving violence is presumed necessary and sufficient. As a result of conceptual biases, non-governmental processes such as markets and civil society are ignored as sources for potential solutions to complex social problems. Comparative political economy should take more seriously models developed by the tradition of constitutional political economy and classical liberalism wherein the state is recognized as a significant threat to social order.     

The dynamic adjustment towards target capital structures of firms in transition economies*

We examine the capital structure dynamics of Central and Eastern European firms to get a better understanding of the quantitative and qualitative development of the financial systems in this region. The dynamic model used endogenizes the target leverage as well as the adjustment speed. It is applied to microeconomic data for ten countries. We find that during the transition process, firms generally increased their leverage, lowering the gap between the actual and the target leverage. Profitability and age are the most robust determinants of capital structure targets. Although banking system development has in general enabled firms to get closer to their leverage targets, information asymmetries between firms and banks are still relatively large. As a result, firms prefer internal finance above bank debt and adjust leverage only slowly.     

An estimation of Feldstein's dynamic adjustment model for physicians' services with Austrian data

Zusammenfassung Eine anhaltende Überschußnachfrage nach Arzt-Diensten (Feldstein, 1970: Permanent Excess Demand Hypothesis) läßt sich im Bereich der Primärnachfrage als Folge sogenannten moralischen Hasardierens der Patienten und im Bereich der Sekundärnachfrage als Folge einer Nachfrageinduktion durch einkommensmaximierende Mediziner erklären. Da die Überschußnachfrage-Hypothese eine Überversorgung mit Arzt-Diensten auf Grund einer umfassenden Krankenversicherung impliziert, wurde sie in der gesundheitspolitischen Diskussion heftig bestritten. Feldstein (1970) bestätigte für die Vereinigten Staaten die Existenz einer anhaltenden Überschußnachfrage. Unter geringfügigen Abänderungen liefert das Feldstein'sche Modell für Österreich für die private (Zusatz-)Krankenversicherung inhaltlich das gleiche Ergebnis. Um die Genannte Hypothese auch für die öffentliche Krankenversicherung, die in Österreich weitaus bedeutsamer ist als die private, zu untersuchen, wurde eine andere Methode gewählt. Statt eines ökonometrischen Modells wurden zwei Intensitätsresiduen aus trivial-arithmetischen Beziehungen zwischen Wachstumsraten gebildet. Sowohl die Intensivierung der Behandlung der einzelnen Patienten wie die Erhöhung der Zehandlungen pro Arzt im Zeitraum von 1964 bis 1980 spricht für eine Bestätigung der obigen Hypothese.

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For helpful comments I am indepted to W. Schönbäck and two unknown referees.     

Direct sale of information when precision is unobservable

Abstract.  This paper studies the incentives of an information seller to provide precise information when precision is not observable and investors with rational expectations can extract information from the equilibrium asset price. I show that the seller can verify her precision by employing a non‐linear contract. I derive the equilibrium fee for information as a function of the seller's incentives, the sales volume, and buyers' trading intensity. I also analyse the implications of allowing the seller to trade on her own account for truthfulness and precision choice. JEL Classification: G11, G14, D42     

Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure

In many social and economic situations the optimal solution requires the formation of coalitions that partition the set of players. When the individual player is small relative to the size of the existing coalitions, it seems realistic to assume that the prevailing coalition structure dictates the set of possible blocking coalitions. Specifically, it is assumed that an individual does not consider forming any coalition, but rather joining an already existing one. Two solution concepts for these games are investigated: structural equilibrium and stable payoffs, which are derived from the application of ψ-stability to the core and to the bargaining set, respectively. To this end an extension of the bargaining set to games without side payments is offered. Both solution concepts are shown to exist for some coalition structure. However, while structural equilibrium may fail to exist for any non trivial coalition structure, for every coalition structure there exists a stable payoff.     

Pareto improving price regulation when the asset market is incomplete

Summary. Incomplete asset markets cause competitive equilibria to be constrained suboptimal and provides scope for Pareto improving interventions. In this paper, we examine how intervention in prices in asset or spot commodity markets serves this purpose. We show that, if fix-price equilibria behave sufficiently regularly near Walrasian equilibria, Pareto improving price regulation is generically possible. An advantage of price regulation, contrasted with interventions in individuals asset portfolios, is that it operates anonymously, on market variables.Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 10 July 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D45, D52, D60.Earlier and longer versions were circulated as Discussion Paper No. 9841 (June, 1998), CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, and Working Paper No. 01-31 (2001), Department of Economics, Brown University.The research of Herings was made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences and a grant of the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO); while this paper was being written, he enjoyed the generous hospitality of the Cowles Foundation.John Geanakoplos and Hamid Sabourian asked questions that clarified a number of points in earlier drafts of the paper. An anonymous referee made comments that were insightful and helpful.     

Factor Price Equalization when the World Equilibrium is not Unique

It is shown that, whatever the multiplicity of the integrated world equilibrium, (i) factor prices are equalized if and only if the distribution of primary factors between trading countries can be represented by a point in or on the boundary of a certain convex subset of R ^m , where m is the number of primary factors, and (ii) the likelihood of factor price equalization is independent of the multiplicity of the equilibrium.     

Voluntary contributions when the public good is not necessarily normal

We argue that there are interesting examples of privately provided public goods that do not satisfy the assumption of strict normality, and reconsider voluntary-contribution games in a more general framework. We show that, in general, (1) equalizing transfers between individuals with identical tastes can increase total supply of the public good, and (2) more of the public good can be supplied if agents move sequentially rather than simultaneously. These results are in sharp contrast to earlier conclusions derived in the literature under the assumption of strict normality.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.     

Pareto efficient insurance contracts when the insurer's cost function is discontinuous

Summary. We consider the problem of efficient insurance contracts when the cost structure includes a fixed cost per claim. We prove existence of efficient insurance contracts and that the indemnity function in such contracts is non-decreasing in the damage. We further show that either there is no insurance, or the indemnity is positive for all losses, or efficient insurance contracts have a unique jump. We study variants of the model and provide a generalization to the case of non expected utilities. Our results are then applied to Townsend's model of deterministic auditing. Received: November 8, 2000; revised version: March 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to F. Salanié for pointing out an error in the previous version of the paper and for suggesting Proposition 6 to us. Correspondence to: R.-A. Dana     

Interest rate pass through and asymmetric adjustment: evidence from the federal funds rate operating target period

This study examines the long-run interest rate pass through of the federal funds rate to the prime rate and whether there is asymmetric adjustment in the prime rate using the Enders–Siklos (2001) momentum threshold autoregressive model over the period February 1987 to October 2005. Once allowance is made for the endogenously determined structural break in the cointegrating relationship in April 1996, the adjustment of the prime rate to changes in the federal funds rate appears asymmetric with upward rigidity, a result contrary to previous studies which found that the prime rate exhibits downward rigidity. The finding of upward rigidity in the prime rate lends support for the customer reaction and adverse selection hypotheses. Moreover, the empirical evidence seems to support the observation of increased pass through as a result of heightened competition in the banking industry as well as the Federal Reserve's enhanced transparency in monetary policy during the 1990s.     

State dependence and unobserved heterogeneity in the employment transitions of the over-50s

This paper examines employment transitions among men and women in the UK aged between 50 and the state pension age. We use a fourth order Markov model to estimate quarterly transitions while allowing for potential endogeneity of initial conditions. The results reject exogeneity of initial conditions and show the importance of state dependence. We compare the results to those obtained with a younger sample and find evidence of a sorting process over the life-cycle whereby men’s employment transitions are increasingly characterized by state dependence while, for women, unobserved heterogeneity becomes more important. We discuss some potential policy implications of the results.     

Is the slope of the Phillips curve time-varying? Evidence from unobserved components models

This paper formally tests for time variation in the slope of the Phillips curve using a variety of measures of inflation expectations and real economic slack. We find that time variation in the slope of the Phillips curve depends on the measure of inflation expectations rather than the measure of real economic slack. We find strong evidence in support of the time-varying slopes of the Phillips curve with different measures of inflation expectations. Thus, we conclude that the slope of the Phillips curve is time-varying.     

Aggregation and pairwise aggregation of demand when the distribution of income is fixed

This paper derives necessary and sufficient conditions for “pairwise aggregation” of the demand functions of a group of consumers (conditions under which the mean demand for each pair of consumers satisfies the Slutsky restrictions) when the distribution of income is fixed. The sufficient conditions imply existence of a “representative” competitive consumer whose demand is the mean demand of the group. The necessary conditions imply that such a representative consumer exists for every fixed income distribution only if the consumers have homothetic preferences or, alternatively, if for each price vector, all the consumers' income expansion paths lie in the same plane.