Information asymmetry,corporate disclosure,and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature

Financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. We provide a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital markets setting, and identify key research questions. We then review current empirical research on disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. Our survey concludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. We identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.     

The Development of Accounting and Reporting in Ghana

In this paper, we examine the economic, political, and legal systems as well as the institutional factors that influence the accounting and disclosure practices in Ghana. The impact of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on disclosure is also investigated, as Ghana has recently completed full adoption. We find that the accounting and reporting practices are significantly influenced by legal, political, institutional, and economic factors and that the regulatory environment is neither effective nor efficient due to the weak monitoring and enforcement of compliance. Although there has been some recent progress, the Companies' Code, which is the corporate legal framework of Ghana, must be updated to reflect the dynamic nature of world operations. This study advances the course of standards setters, regulators, accounting practitioners, and policymakers to improve the corporate reporting and accounting practices. Urgent measures need to be undertaken to reform and build the capacities of institutions charged with the responsibility of regulating and monitoring Ghanaian accounting and reporting practices to ensure best practices and build investors' confidence.     

Voluntary CSR disclosure,institutional environment,and independent audit demand

Using a sample of A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, this study examines the impact of voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure on independent audit demand in different institutional environments. The sample covers the 2008–2016 period and excludes firms that are required to disclose CSR information. The findings show that compared with companies that choose to not disclose such information, companies that voluntarily disclose CSR information prefer to employ “small” accounting firms for auditing services, although the auditing fees are much higher. However, as the institutional environment improves, this preference is weakened. Further analyses show that this preference is stronger in enterprises where CSR disclosure is driven by strong political motivations and managerial self-interest motivations. Legitimate motivations and economic motivations do not significantly impact the preference for “small” audit firms. Furthermore, this preference is more obvious in enterprises with poor operational performance and low information disclosure quality, and it increases as CSR disclosure level decreases. The study enriches our understanding of the economic consequences of voluntary CSR disclosure and the factors that influence independent audit demand. The results also have implications for the construction and regulation of China’s system for supervising CSR information disclosure in the transitional phase.     

The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research

This paper discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, drawing on U.S. and international evidence. Given the policy relevance of research on regulation, we highlight the challenges with (1) quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, (2) measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and (3) drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies. Next, we discuss empirical studies that link disclosure and reporting activities to firm‐specific and market‐wide economic outcomes. Understanding these links is important when evaluating regulation. We then synthesize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, including the evidence on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Several important conclusions emerge. We generally lack evidence on market‐wide effects and externalities from regulation, yet such evidence is central to the economic justification of regulation. Moreover, evidence on causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. We also lack evidence on the real effects of such regulation. These limitations provide many research opportunities. We conclude with several specific suggestions for future research.     

Free market environmentalism and the neoliberal project: The case of the Climate Disclosure Standards Board

In the absence of good social, political, economic and environmental policy, the ecological status of the planet continues to deteriorate. In this paper, we argue that environmental decline has provided scope for new forms of policy-making, yet these emergent policies and policy-making bodies remain poorly understood. Drawing on the work of political geographers and political economists this paper explores the impact of neoliberalism on the development of global environmental regulation. We argue that climate disclosure practices and regulation have provided an opportunity to reinforce the ideological landscape of neoliberalism. In order to anchor this argument, we show that the origins of carbon regulation have emerged almost exclusively from within non-elected coalitions of multinationals operating through private, not-for-profit entities. These organisations continue to shape community expectations and influence government of climate change abatement strategies. To explore the impact neoliberalism has had on the environment, we examine the Climate Disclosure Standards Board (CDSB), its role, and its global impact on the regulation of reporting firms.     

Testing the effect of portfolio holdings disclosure in an environment absent of mandatory disclosure

This study examines a number of portfolio disclosure regimes with respect to accuracy and susceptibility to copycat behaviour in an environment absent of mandatory disclosure. We find that periodic portfolio disclosure tends to underestimate true excess performance as well as idiosyncratic risk in top‐quartile fund managers, with longer inter‐reporting intervals tending to result in greater differences. ‘Copycat funds’ following the disclosed holdings of top‐tier managers significantly underperform the underlying fund, while copycats following bottom‐tier managers significantly outperform the underlying fund. Our findings suggest that periodic reporting at monthly intervals or longer would not affect fund alpha generation.     

Comparative analysis of environmental,social, and governance disclosures

We examine the level of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) sustainability disclosure by firms between two regimes where disclosure is mandatory versus voluntary. We use the regulatory environment between the United States (US) and European Union (EU) to compare ESG disclosures. Firms in the US are currently under a voluntary disclosure regime. In contrast, EU members are under a mandatory disclosure regulatory regime that began in 2017. We find that EU firms outperform US firms under voluntary disclosure requirements (2007–2016), and the ESG disclosure of EU firms further improves relative to US firms after the implementation of the mandatory disclosure in Europe in 2017. Our results suggest that the 2017 adoption of disclosure guidelines in the EU is associated with improvements in EU firms' ESG disclosure. Our results regarding the value-relevance of ESG disclosure support a move toward mandatory ESG disclosures. Results support current initiatives that have been taken by global regulators and stock exchanges in recommending and requiring globally listed companies to disclose their ESG sustainability information to portray accurate and comprehensive corporate reporting. The results further our understanding of how firms from different institutional environment settings may have disclosed their ESG practices, thus providing opportunities for future research.     

Disclosure of GAAP line items in earnings announcements

We provide new evidence on the disclosure in earnings announcements of financial statement line items prepared under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). First, we investigate the circumstances that might provide disincentives generally for GAAP line item disclosures. We find that managers who regularly intervene in the earnings reporting process limit disclosures at the aggregate level and in each of the financial statements so as to more effectively guide investor attention to summary financial information. Specifically, this disclosure behavior obtains when managers habitually cater to market expectations, engage in income smoothing, or use discretionary accruals to improve earnings informativeness. Second, we predict and find that the specific GAAP line items that firms choose to disclose are determined by the differential informational demands of their economic environment, consistent with incentives to facilitate investor valuation. However, these valuation-related disclosure incentives are muted when managers habitually intervene in the earnings reporting process.     

Segment Disclosure and Cost of Capital

We investigate whether segment disclosure influences cost of capital. Improved segment reporting is expected to decrease cost of capital by reducing estimation risk. However, in a competitive environment segment disclosure may also generate uncertainties about future prospects and lead to a larger cost of capital. Asset‐pricing tests confirm that segment disclosure is a priced risk factor. Also, segment disclosure reduces ex‐ante estimates of cost of equity capital and other measures connected to risk. These results suggest a negative relation between segment disclosure and cost of capital. Our results also show that competition reduces, but does not eliminate, the previous relationship.     

Country-specific risks and geographic disclosure aggregation: Voluntary disclosure behaviour by British multinationals

Country-by-country reporting can promote accountability and corporate transparency by highlighting the activities of multinational firms in different countries. We examine the voluntary disclosure behaviour of leading British multinational firms in respect of country-specific risks. Specifically, we consider whether British multinationals' engagement in geographic disclosure aggregation/disaggregation of their country-by-country operations is associated with the country-specific business, economic, and political risks faced by their principal operating subsidiaries. We study the information disclosed in two key sections of corporate annual reports: segment information, and principal uncertainties and risks. Our findings show that British multinationals are less likely to voluntarily report their segment and risk information on a disaggregated geographic country-by-country basis if they are engaged in operations in countries associated with higher levels of country-specific risks. Country-specific risk disclosures are an important case, consistent with voluntary disclosure theory, where costs tend to outweigh benefits from the perspective of what is perceived to be in a multinational firm's best interests.     

Voluntary disclosure,mandatory disclosure and the cost of capital

We examine the association between a firm's cost of capital and its voluntary and mandatory disclosures. We include two types of mandatory disclosure: those that are a function of periodic reports that are realizations of ex‐ante reporting systems and those that arise due to specific corporate events. To capture a firm's voluntary and event‐driven mandatory disclosures, we use information the firm provides via 8K filings. To capture periodic mandatory disclosures, we use earnings quality measures derived from the literature. Consistent with endogenous relations predicted by theory, we find that voluntary disclosure and both types of mandatory disclosure are correlated, although only event‐driven mandatory disclosures are significant in models that explain voluntary disclosure. We also find that the cost of capital is generally influenced by each of these disclosure types. We also find that controlling for periodic mandatory disclosure does not affect the relationship between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital, while controlling for event‐driven mandatory disclosure sometimes affects the relationship depending on the measures used. Our study suggests that a firm's disclosure environment includes the three types of disclosure examined, although the inclusion of mandatory disclosures does not affect the measured association between voluntary disclosure and the cost of capital.     

An international investigation of associations between societal variables and the amount of disclosure on information technology and communication problems: The case of Y2K

This study examines the association between five societal variables—political and civil system, cultural values, type of legal system, level of economic development, and equity market features—and the amount of corporate disclosure on the Year 2000 (Y2K) technological dilemma. Data are collected from the 1997/1998 fiscal-year annual reports of 1618 publicly listed firms spanning 17 nations. Empirical findings indicate the amount of Y2K disclosure varied significantly across national boundaries. Statistical analysis indicates a strong positive association between the amount of Y2K disclosure and the level of (a) political rights and civil liberties and (b) economic development. Results also imply publicly listed firms in Common Law nations disclose more Y2K information than counterparts in Roman-German Law nations. Of Hofstede's [Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications] four cultural dimensions, only power distance is a significant explanatory factor of variations is the amount of Y2K disclosure.     

Government Accounting: An Assessment of Theory, Purposes and Standards

Government accounting and financial reporting aims to protect and manage public money and discharge accountability. These purposes, and the nature of public goods and tax financing, give rise to differences with commercial accounting. This is not yet reflected either in government accounting standards in English–speaking developed nations or in international public sector accounting standards. All of these are heavily influenced by private sector practices, which favour the accrual basis and consolidated reporting. This article argues for a gradual symmetric approach to accruals and a combination of government–wide and fund reporting. The author also proposes some broad accounting principles to promote political and economic accountability.     

Audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure as complements: A test of the Confirmation Hypothesis

We examine the “confirmation” hypothesis that audited financial reporting and disclosure of managers' private information are complements, because independent verification of outcomes disciplines and hence enhances disclosure credibility. Committing to higher audit fees (a measure of financial statement verification) is associated with management forecasts that are more frequent, specific, timely, accurate and informative to investors. Because private information disclosure and audited financial reporting are complements, their economic roles cannot be evaluated separately. Our evidence cautions against drawing inferences exclusively from market reactions around “announcement periods” because audited financial reporting indirectly affects information released at other times and through other channels.     

Incentives for risk reporting — A discretionary disclosure and cheap talk approach

This paper adopts and reviews discretionary disclosure and cheap talk models to analyze risk reporting incentives and their relation to regulation. Given its inherent discretion, risk reporting depends on disclosure incentives. To assess these incentives the analytical models consider risk reporting as an endogenous feature, thereby providing a benchmark to discuss regulatory attempts. Particularly, discretionary disclosure models refer to verified disclosure, e.g., on risk factors or risk management, whereas cheap talk models refer to unverified disclosure, like managerial forecasts on the impact of risk factors. This provides an analytically-based framework for discussion. Unlike prior literature, which focuses on disclosure cost, I argue that uncertainty of information endowment and issues of credible communication can explain restricted risk reporting observed empirically. Linking regulatory attempts to these restrictions implies that regulation may mitigate the incentives-driven restrictions to some extent, but can have adverse effects on risk reporting. I particularly discuss the link between effective risk monitoring and the precision of risk reporting; the ex post assessment and usefulness of managerial forecasts on impacts of risk factors; the claimed decreasing cost of capital by mandatory risk reporting; and the threat of self-fulfilling prophecies. While the discussion has implications for both specific risk reporting requirements and empirical research, overall results suggest that we should not overestimate the informativeness of risk reporting even in a regulated environment.     

The usefulness of firm risk disclosures under different firm riskiness,investor-interest,and market conditions: New evidence from Finland

To date, there is only meager research evidence on the usefulness of mandatory annual report risk disclosures to investors. Although it has been argued that corporate disclosure decreases information asymmetry between management and shareholders, we do not know whether investors benefit from high-quality risk reporting in a highly regulated risk disclosure environment. In this paper, we performed association tests to examine whether the quality of firms' mandatory risk disclosures relate to information asymmetry in the Finnish stock markets. In addition, we analyzed whether the usefulness of risk disclosures depends on contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition. We demonstrate that the quality of risk disclosure has a direct negative influence on information asymmetry. We also document that risk disclosures are more useful if they are provided by small firms, high tech firms, and firms with low analyst coverage. We also found that momentum in stock markets affects the relevance of firms' risk reports.     

Policy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital

This paper investigates the effect of voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies/oversight of corporate political activities/spending on the cost of equity capital for S&P 500 firms over the period 2015–2018. Using the CPA-Zicklin Index to measure the level of policies, oversight, and disclosure of corporate political activities, we find that firms with a greater level of policies and oversight enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. We also document that a higher index is associated with higher stock liquidity. The negative relation is more pronounced among firms with higher exposure to political risk and firms with higher dependence on government spending. We also find that a firm’s information environment plays an important role in moderating the relation between policies and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies and oversight mitigates risks and uncertainties related to firms’ political activities, thereby reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.     

Accounting Information, Employees and Collective Bargaining

Social and political opinion in the United Kingdom has been moving in the direction of greater disclosure by companies of financial and economic information of interest to employees and trade union negotiators. This article examines the arguments which surround the issue. In particular, the role of information in the collective bargaining context is investigated in the light of a fairly simple bargaining model, The tactical and strategic impact of greater disclosure is indicated with the aid of the model. Finally the article highlights some implications for companies, trade unions and accountants.     

Privacy in E-Commerce: Development of Reporting Standards, Disclosure, and Assurance Services in an Unregulated Market

Government regulation of financial reporting by publicly listed firms, coupled with a punitive regime for violation of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), has been in place in the United States for seven decades. Whether this regime is effective or useful is an open question, especially in the absence of data on the behavior of unregulated economies. Privacy disclosure in e‐commerce is essentially an unregulated environment with some parallels to financial disclosure. A study of privacy standards, disclosures practices, and demand for audits can help accountants and security regulators project the consequences of a competitive regime sans regulation for accounting standards, disclosure and audit practices. In this article we set up a framework for such a study, gather data from the field, and analyze privacy standards, privacy disclosure practices, and the effectiveness of opt‐out practices of 100 high‐traffic e‐commerce Web sites. We observe four diverse sets of privacy standards (TRUSTe, BBB Online, WebTrust, and PWC Privacy) competing in this market, attracting clienteles of their own as reflected in privacy policies and the disclosure of such policies. With a few exceptions, actual disclosure and opt‐out practices correspond reasonably well to stated policies in e‐commerce. There is little evidence that the prevailing competitive regime induces a race to the bottom with respect to privacy standards and disclosures. We explore the implications of these results for the consequences of a competitive regime for regulation of financial reporting.     

Financial Reporting Quality,Structural Problems and the Informativeness of Mandated Disclosures on Internal Controls

Even before firms report internal control weaknesses under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX), they are characterized by structural problems, are prone to internal control weaknesses, and have low financial reporting quality. If the stock market incorporates much of this information during the pre‐disclosure years, investors are less surprised when firms subsequently report internal control weaknesses under SOX. We find that for the pre‐disclosure period, firms reporting internal control weaknesses under SOX, (1) had structural problems, (2) were prone to internal control problems, and (3) had low financial reporting quality. Further, we provide direct evidence that stock prices during pre‐disclosure years incorporate much of the information about structural problems, the likelihood of internal control weaknesses, and low reporting quality. Finally, we find that many of these value‐relevant factors are not related to announcement period returns when firms eventually disclose such problems under SOX and that limited new information about structural problems is generated around this date. Our results provide a compelling explanation for the muted stock price reaction around the mandatory disclosure date.