Optimal capital structure: A multi-period programming model for use in financial planning

This paper describes a multi-period, chance constrained mathematical programming model to compute for each period, the firm's optimal debt to equity ratio and the optimal maturity distribution of its debt. The model assumes that the firm's objective is to maximize total value of the firm, and that the firm operates in a world of uncertainty, with corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs. Finally, the actual coupon rate paid by the firm which is commensurate to the risk of default is endogenously determined by the model.     

人力资本投资:风险与风险规避

自美国经济学家发现人力资本对经济发展的巨大贡献以来,人们的注意力主要集中于阐述人力资本投资的高收益性,而人力资本投资的风险性却很少被论及。实现有效的人力资本投资,必须建立在充分认识人力资本投资特点的基础上,而规避人力资本投资风险的根本途径是明晰人力资本产权和建立人力资本市场。     

Evidence of the impact of mandatory changes in accounting principles on corporate loan agreements

The Theory in this paper predicts that mandatory changes in accounting princples can affect the measurement rules defined in restrictive covenants in firms' lending agreements. Consequently, those mandatory changes can have an impact on the value of a firm's equity, even if the changes appear to be merely ‘cosmetic’. This contracting cost theory is tested by examining of both event-related and cross-sectional abnormal performance of the equity of a sample of firms when the Accounting Princples Board changes accounting princples for business combinations. The theory provides, at best, in incomplete explanation of the observed abnormal performance.     

Types of investor uncertainty and the cost of equity capital

We jointly test the effects of two types of investor uncertainty, one related to future firm performance and unrelated to accruals (cash flow uncertainty) and one directly related to accrual estimation errors (accounting quality uncertainty). Distinct from prior studies, our uncertainty estimates are based on a matched‐firm design that minimizes the mechanical relationship between the two uncertainty variables. We find a strong negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and multiple estimates of the cost of equity capital. With respect to accounting quality uncertainty, we find a strong positive association with both expected stock returns and implied costs of equity, but only in settings that control for cash flow uncertainty. Collectively, our results suggest the need to consider different types of investor uncertainty when examining how investor uncertainty affects the cost of equity capital.     

Asset prices in dynamic production economies with time-varying risk

We examine the effect of changes in output uncertainty on theprice of aggregate capital and on the prices of levered claimson capital. The relation between the volatility of the marginalproduct of capital and the price of capital depends on the levelof capital adjustment costs and the elasticity of intertemporalsubstitution. For available estimates of this elasticity thevalue of capital and risk are directly related while the valueof levered equity claim on capital may be decreasing in risk.We use these results to analyze the argument that increasedrisk was responsible for the U.S. stock market decline of the1970s.     

Private acquisition gains: A contingent claims explanation

This paper studies announcement returns of Western European acquisitions of private and public targets. It uses a contingent claims perspective to offer a new explanation for the difference in abnormal returns between acquirers of private and public targets. In this context, an acquisition is analogous to buying a call option and the value of the acquirer increases with uncertainty about its growth prospects (options). We test this idea by studying the relation between announcement returns and acquirer's characteristics that proxy for the existence of growth options. Consistent with the contingent claims hypothesis, the private acquisition gains are associated with the combined effects of growth options (having higher runup before the acquisition announcement) with low level of leverage (near-all equity capital) and with uncertainty (measured by age and analyst coverage of acquirers).     

Employee stock ownership and the cost of capital

This paper investigates the relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of capital, the main determinant of shareholder value creation computed through economic value added (EVA). By reducing agency conflicts within the firm, we hypothesize that employee share ownership reduces the firm’s cost of capital by affecting its two components, i.e. the cost of equity and the cost of debt. We test this hypothesis in France, a leading country in terms of employee ownership, based on a panel of the 120 largest listed companies for the 2000–2011 period. We find: (i) no significant relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of equity; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the cost of debt; (ii) a negative curvilinear relationship between employee stock ownership and the weighted average cost of capital. These results suggest debtholders regard ESO as positive as long it is moderate because it shifts risk from them to employees and that this effect is still perceptible in the weighted average cost of capital.     

A note on estimating the divisional cost of capital for diversified companies: an empirical evaluation of heuristic-based approaches

This note provides an empirical analysis of the potential for heuristic-based approaches to derive a divisional cost of equity from a firm's total cost of capital. Since an empirical relationship between fundamental information and systematic risk has previously been shown in other studies, idiosyncratic information on risk and performance ought to serve as a good proxy to calculate divisional adjustments. Two practically used, heuristic-based approaches are tested and a significant relationship is found between one of the measures and CAPM beta. This method may offer a plausible and comparatively uncomplicated method for adjusting a firm's total cost of capital for divisional use.     

环境不确定性、多元化经营与权益资本成本

以2009~2012年我国 A 股上市公司为研究样本,检验环境不确定性及多元化经营对公司权益资本成本的影响。研究发现,环境不确定性越高则公司的权益资本成本也越高,同时在高环境不确定性背景下,多元化经营将有助于缓解环境不确定性与权益资本成本之间的正相关关系;进一步,对于政府控制公司,多元化经营能够更显著地降低环境不确定性所导致的代理问题,并且若其所处地区政府干预程度较低,则多元化经营缓解环境不确定性与权益资本成本之间正相关关系的作用越大。     

The Informational Content of Initial Public Offerings

The ability of capital markets to distinguish firms of different value by the size of their initial equity offerings is attenuated when insiders can sell equity more than once. A model is developed in which there is price risk from holding equity between periods. When the uncertainty is small, there must be pooling in the first period. When uncertainty is large, the pooling equilibria dominate the separating equilibrium.     

Policy and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital

This paper investigates the effect of voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies/oversight of corporate political activities/spending on the cost of equity capital for S&P 500 firms over the period 2015–2018. Using the CPA-Zicklin Index to measure the level of policies, oversight, and disclosure of corporate political activities, we find that firms with a greater level of policies and oversight enjoy a lower cost of equity capital. We also document that a higher index is associated with higher stock liquidity. The negative relation is more pronounced among firms with higher exposure to political risk and firms with higher dependence on government spending. We also find that a firm’s information environment plays an important role in moderating the relation between policies and oversight of corporate political activities and the cost of equity capital. Our findings suggest that voluntary adoption and disclosure of policies and oversight mitigates risks and uncertainties related to firms’ political activities, thereby reducing information asymmetry and the cost of equity capital.     

The implied cost of equity capital,corporate investment and chief executive officer turnover

This study investigates how the cost of equity capital, along with corporate investment, affects chief executive officer (CEO) turnover decisions. We hypothesize that the cost of equity conveys information about firm performance uncertainty that is informative of CEO talent. Consistently, our empirical results show that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, after controlling for earnings and stock performance measures and risk factors. Additional analysis of reverse causality supports the causal effect of the high cost of equity on CEO dismissals. We also find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to suffer from underinvestment problems. These results suggest that the cost of equity plays a more important role in assessing CEO performance when the firm needs more external equity capital to pursue investment opportunities.     

A note on foreigners’ trading and price effects across firms

We study the investment behavior of foreign investors in association with an equity market liberalization, and find a strong link between foreigners’ trading and local market returns. In the period following the liberalization, net purchases by foreign investors induced a permanent increase in stock prices, suggesting that local firms reduced their cost of equity capital. We also find a strong link between a firm’s fraction of foreign ownership and the magnitude of the cost reduction. Foreign investors seem to prefer large and well-known firms, and these firms realize the largest reduction in capital cost. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that foreigners increase their net holding in firms that have recently performed well. Analyzing foreigners’ performance, we find very little evidence of informed trading, suggesting that risk sharing is the most plausible explanation for the reduction of the cost of equity capital.     

Toward Real‐Time Financial Reporting: How to Reduce Investors' Information Gap and the Cost of Capital

Public companies are struggling to provide detailed and accurate guidance in a turbulent world. Many have dropped guidance altogether, or substantially reduced the precision of their guidance. However, they pay a price for the resulting increase in investor uncertainty in the form of a higher cost of capital and reduced equity valuations. This article provides evidence that improving investors' information can help to reduce the cost of capital of public companies. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. The article explores ways for both individual companies and financial regulators to improve investor information and reduce the cost of capital. For individual companies, the proposed solution is more frequent and voluntary provision of information about actual performance in lieu of more extensive financial guidance. A look at market data for the years 2007 through 2009 for German DAX 30 companies suggests that investor uncertainty stemming from current financial reporting practices appears to be amplifying the expected association between increases in the beta coefficient and the volatility of fundamentals such as revenues and income, which in turn could be increasing the cost of equity capital. Quarterly reporting is a matter of tradition while today's information technology could easily provide investors with real‐time, or close to real‐time, financial information. Internal financial controls, the quality of financial reporting, and the cost of capital might all be improved by mandating faster reporting cycles.     

THE VALUE IMPACTS OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY REGULATION AND STOCHASTIC DEPOSITS

The relationship between a bank's soundness and the set of factors evaluated by supervisory agencies is so complex that the regulation of certain factors might have unintended consequences. This paper demonstrates that, ceteris paribus, binding capital adequacy regulation in the presence of stochastic deposits both reduces the expected future value of a bank and increases the uncertainty of that bank's future value. The uncertainty conclusion is not inconsistent with the notion of a decrease in the probability of financial distress as equity is substituted for debt; it involves an altogether different uncertainty and one that has heretofore not been recognized in either the theory of the banking firm or the literature of capital adequacy.     

Aligning Incentives at Systemically Important Financial Institutions: A Proposal by the Squam Lake Group

To address the moral hazard problem that can motivate bank executives to take excessive risks and to fail to raise capital when needed, a group of 13 distinguished financial economists recommends that systemically important financial institutions be required to issue contingent convertible debt (CoCos) and to hold back a substantial share—as much as 20%—of the compensation of employees who can have a meaningful impact on the survival of the firm. This holdback should be forfeited if the firm's capital ratio falls below a specified threshold. The deferral period should be long enough—the authors suggest five years—to allow much of the uncertainty about managers' activities to be resolved before the bonds mature. Except for forfeiture, the payoff on the bonds should not depend on the firm's performance, nor should managers be permitted to hedge the risk of forfeiture. The threshold for forfeiture should be crossed well before a firm violates its regulatory capital requirements and well before its contingent convertible securities convert into equity. The Swiss Bank UBS has paid bonuses to its top 6,500 executives that have been structured in exactly this way. Management forfeits its deferred compensation if the bank's regulatory capital ratio falls below 7.5%, and its contingent convertible debt is set up to convert into equity if the bank's capital ratio falls below 5%.     

Cash demand,liquidation costs and capital market equilibrium under uncertainty

In this paper, the portfolio and the liquidity planning problems are unified and analyzed in one model. Stochastic cash demands have a significant impact on both the composition of an individual's optimal portfolio and the pricing of capital assets in market equilibrium. The derived capital asset pricing model with cash demands and liquidation costs shows that both the market price of risk and the systematic risk of an asset are affected by the aggregate cash demands and liquidity risk. The modified model does not require that all investors hold an identical risky portfolio as implied by the Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin model. Furthermore, it provides a possible explanation for the noted discrepancies between the empirical evidence and the prediction of the traditional capital asset pricing model.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Portfolio Choice and Life Insurance: The CRRA Case

We solve a portfolio choice problem that includes life insurance and labor income under constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences. We focus on the correlation between the dynamics of human capital and financial capital and model the utility of the family as opposed to separating consumption and bequest. We simplify the underlying Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation using a similarity reduction technique that leads to an efficient numerical solution. Households for whom shocks to human capital are negatively correlated with shocks to financial capital should own more life insurance with greater equity/stock exposure. Life insurance hedges human capital and is insensitive to the family's risk aversion, consistent with practitioner guidance.     

Accounting Treatment of Inherent versus Incentive Uncertainties and the Capital Structure of the Firm

This paper studies the accounting treatment of uncertainty and how it affects a firm's capital structure. We distinguish two sources of uncertainty that raise reliability concerns: inherent uncertainty and incentive uncertainty. By inherent uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of raw information regarding future cash flows. By incentive uncertainty, we refer to uncertainty about the quality of accounting numbers conveying the raw information. We explore features of accounting that can effectively deal with these two types of uncertainties in order to aid in the debt‐equity decision of the firm. To handle inherent uncertainty, preferable accounting involves flexible revenue/expense recognition rules that recognize more profit when the uncertainty level is low. To deal with incentive uncertainty, a stringent revenue/expense recognition rule may be desirable to fend off management's opportunistic reporting behavior. Inflexible accounting rules cause a firm's financing choices to deviate from what would hold with complete information. Given any accounting rule, an information environment with a lower (higher) uncertainty regarding future cash inflows leads to higher (lower) expected debt financing. This is because assessed default risk is increasing in the uncertainty of future cash inflows, holding the uncertainty of the outflows constant.