提高城市公共品供给效率的研究与探讨

随着时代的进步,城市公共品的供给已经成为衡量一个城市甚至是一个国家文明及进步程度的关键因素.本文首先对城市公共品进行了界定,分析了现有城市公共品的主要供给模式.然后针对当前我国城市公共品供给存在的主要问题:政府和公共部门的过度干预控制,而私人部门或是第三部门在城市公共品的供给过程中参与程度却比较低,整体供给效率不高等,进一步剖析其原因.最后指出为了提高我国城市公共品的供给效率,应继续推进并不断地深化城市公共品的供给市场化改革思路,进行配套地改革,建立起多样化的投融资模式;进一步探求多样化的公共品供给模式,以地方政府和民间资本为城市公共品的有效供给者;建立和规范规制机构,建立健全补偿机制和供给机制;转变政府的职能角色,由“划桨”向“掌舵”进行转变,树立起服务理念;同时还要提高市民享有城市公共品的权利意识.     

中国公共品供给制度的缺陷分析

中国公共品供给制度的显特征是政府调节是其公共部门的过度垄断，市场机制及私人部门和第三部门在公共品供给中的参与程度较低。因公共品供给过程中垄断代替了竞争，单一的政府调节和公共生产，导致公共部门规模膨胀，财政负担过重，公共咨询配置效率低下，公共品供给不足以及寻租行为猖獗，腐败现象蔓延等诸多积重难解的问题。本在简要回顾中国公共品供给制度变迁的历史过程的基础上，着重分析中国现行公共品供给制度的缺陷及其成因，理出中国公共品供给制度创新的基本思路。     

基于顾客满意度理论的公共品供给效率研究

社会公众是政府税费的缴纳者,也是政府公共品和公共服务的消费者,更是政府公共品和公共服务供给效率的评判者.各个城市居民对公共品和公共服务供给的总体满意度及满意率各不相同,对单项公共品和公共服务的偏好各不相同.年龄、性别、婚姻等个体特征变量对公共品和公共服务供给总体满意度的影响因人而异.因此,各级政府要高度重视社会公众对政府提供的公共品和公共服务的满意度.在提供公共品和公共服务时,一定要具体问题具体分析,提供符合各地区社会公众真正需要的公共品和公共服务,还要注重采用新技术、新工艺、新材料等提高政府的公共品和公共服务供给效率.     

农村公共品供给与农民村务治理权利的保障——基于村庄制度设计为中心的考察

目前,农村公共品供给存在着不符合农民需求的状况,并且农民在农村公共品供给评价机制中的地位缺失,他们在农村公共品供给中的参与意识也不强。从村庄制度设计看,产生以上问题的原因在于,政府以单纯行政化的方式供给农村公共品,农村自治组织机构之间缺乏制衡机制,农民在农村公共品供给中制度化的利益表达渠道不畅。因此,必须健全有效的村庄公共品供给决策制度、规范的村庄公共品供给执行制度、有力的村庄公共品供给监督制度、良性的村庄公共品供给协商制度,以保障农民村务治理权利。     

农村公共品供给主体建构的若干思考——基于“官民合作”的视角

我国目前还处在社会主义初级阶段,由于经济发展水平的客观制约,国力总体上还不够强,所以农村公共品供给水平与城市以及发达国家农村相比较还有较大的差距.因此,一方面,政府必须采取积极措施以缩短城乡间公共品供给的巨大差距,另一方面,在政府财力有限、投入资金有限的情况下,应积极创新农村公共品供给机制,拓宽供给渠道,增加供给主体,提高供给效率,即走一条“官民合作”的道路.     

新农村建设与农村公共品投入机制创新

新农村建设需要加大公共品投入力度.本文认为农村公共品的投入是两个层次的投入:纯公共品的投入和准公共品的提供.农村当前主要问题是准公共品的投入,即"拥挤"产品的投入.通过分析农村公共品需求范围、特点,指出农村公共品缺位的主要方面.提出建立农村公共品投入机制的思路:政府和市场多渠道投入.具体:增加财政支农支出的规模和总量,创新财政支出方式,广泛应用利益诱导机制,财政补贴机制,财政减免税机制等吸引"私人"供给农村公共产品.     

制度变迁中的制度构建失灵及其解决模式--义乌小商品市场变迁的案例研究

本文指出,现有市场主导型(需求诱致性)和政府主导型(供给强制性)制度变迁理论存在许多的问题.它没有对为什么有些制度变迁是成功的而有些却是以失败告终的给出解释,也没有理清两种制度变迁模式相互作用的规律以及相互转化的条件.本文以义乌小商品市场制度变迁案例的研究为线索,试图弥补这些缺陷,并得出了以下结论:(1)单纯的市场主导型制度变迁或政府主导型制度变迁都可能以失败告终,因为单一的制度变迁引导机制无法很好克服制度变迁机制中所面临的"制度构建失灵"问题--市场力量无法提供制度变迁中所必需的公共品,政府力量无法很好解决制度变迁中的利益共融与信息冲突的问题;(2)成功的制度变迁需要通过结合诱致力量和强制力量来解决公共品提供不足以及利益冲突等问题,因此,制度变迁方式的转换以及共融利益关系的形成是制度变迁成功的核心.     

城乡公共产品供给失衡的原因剖析及政策选择

实现城乡统筹,构建和谐社会,现下最关键的是解决"三农"问题.文章立足新农村建设的时代主题,深入剖析了城乡公共品供给失衡的原因,提出了按照城乡一体化要求建立公共产品供给制度、优化财政支农结构、科学界定各级政府财权事权范围、改革"自上而下"公共品决策机制,实现农村公共品供给由"政府选择向农民选择"、"官员偏好向农民偏好"转变的政策建议.     

农村公共品提供:社会与政府的互补机制

为了提高农村公共品供给规模、质量与效率,实现乡村振兴,政府既需要鼓励引导社会资本参与农村公共品供给,也需要提高政府公共支出的效率。本文从集体行动的角度研究宗族多样性对中国农村公共品供给的影响,包括其对农村公共品私人供给的影响,及社会与政府相互作用提高政府在农村公共支出效率的影响。基于中国21个省758个县1949—1990年前后农村公共品私人供给数据及20世纪80年代反映宗族多样性的姓氏数目和姓氏集中度数据,本文发现,姓氏数目与农村公共品私人供给存在显著负相关关系,而姓氏集中度与农村公共品私人供给存在显著正相关关系。本文还发现,社会力量有效地补充了政府的作用,在姓氏数目少、姓氏集中度高的地区,政府公共支出效率更高,具体表现在对农村公共品私人供给的促进作用更显著。     

中国地方政府财政能力的检验与评价——基于因子分析法的省际数据比较

地方政府财政能力是地方政府汲取资源、有效供给公共品的能力.分税制改革以来,中国地方政府因各自拥有的资源禀赋和制度环境差异,导致地方政府之间的财政汲取能力强弱不同,地区间的公共品供给能力也存在巨大差异.本文运用因子分析方法,选取中国30个省级政府作样本.从财政汲取能力和公共品供给能力两个层面设定23个评价指标,对地方政府财政能力进行实证分析.分析结果表明,中国地方政府之间的财政能力参差不齐、弱者居多,不利于公共品特别是基本公共品在地区之间的大致均等化供给,对此本文给出提升地方政府财政能力的政策建议.     

Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility

This paper explores the feasibility and desirability of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We identify CSR with creation of public goods or curtailment of public bads. Using a model with profit-maximizing firms, the paper shows that there is a direct parallel between CSR and traditional models of private provision of public goods. Indeed, firms that use CSR will produce public goods at exactly the same level as predicted by the standard voluntary contribution equilibrium for public goods. We compare CSR with government provision and charitable provision, discussing when CSR by private for-profit firms could have a comparative advantage in dealing with public goods provision.     

公共品供给的实验研究 及其未来可能的进展

传统经济学基于理性“经济人”基础,认为公地悲剧问题是个体理性选择的必然结果,公共品供给需采取与个体真实公共品偏好相兼容的激励机制,并由政府承担供给角色。实验经济学研究则提供个体异质社会偏好的稳健性证据,并在合适的惩罚、沟通交流和声誉等机制下提供诸多可以实现公共品自愿供给的实验证据,表明群体或自愿组织也可作为公共品供给主体。这些公共品实验研究为现实公共治理创新提供更为科学的偏好基础和公共治理思路。     

Voluntary Provision of Public Goods and Technology

This paper highlights issues in the theory of voluntary provision of public goods, building on the investigation by Peacock in connection with the contributions by Coase and Buchanan. Our goal is twofold. We first draw attention to the early literature investigating the provision of public goods and to the successive theoretical analysis. We then focus on the impact of technology on supply and demand. Examples of different types of public goods are provided, with special attention to the cultural sector, to investigate whether and how technology affects the efficiency and the effectiveness of the related public goods provision. The implementation and exploitation of technological advancements are investigated in view of the role of different actors (public, private) at different levels of government.     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

Public Good Provision Under Monopolistic Competition

This paper presents a model of voluntary private provision of public good under monopolistic competition following Pecorino. Consumers prefer product varieties and a public good. Marginal utility of income depends inversely upon the aggregate consumption of private goods in this model. As population size increases, aggregate consumption of private goods goes up and marginal utility of income falls. This explains the positive relationship between population size and public good provision. Any technological changes in the production of private goods are shown to be neutral to the aggregate provision of public good. These results are in contrast to Pecorino.     

Demand for collective goods in private nonprofit markets: Can fundraising expenditures help overcome free-rider behavior?

Economic theory ascribes the primary role in the provision of public goods to government. This emphasis on government overlooks the role of the not-for-profit sector in providing collective-type goods. In this paper we seek to determine the factors influencing charitable contributions to private nonprofit organizations by estimating a demand function for the output of these collective-good providers. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that voluntary giving is responsive to conventional market variables such as advertising expenditures, price, and quality. Overall, the results are strongly supportive.     

公共物品非营利组织供给的经济学分析

非营利性组织可以弥补政府和市场在公共物品提供上的不足。文章分析了非营利性组织提供公共物品的必要性，深入探讨了我国非营利组织提供公共物品时存在的主要问题，在此基础上，提出了一些对策和建议，以更好地发挥我国非营利性组织的公共物品提供中的作用。     

Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods

Public provision of a private goods is justified on efficiency grounds in a model with no redistributive preferences. A government’s involvement in the provision of a private good generates information about preferences that facilitates more efficient revenue extraction for the provision of public goods. Public provision of the private good improves economic efficiency under a condition that is always fulfilled under independence and satisfied for an open set of joint distributions. The efficiency gains require that consumers cannot arbitrage the publicly provided private good, so our analysis applies to private goods where it is easy to keep track of the ultimate user, such as schooling and health care, but not to easily tradable consumer goods.     

Gorman and Musgrave are dual: An Antipodean theorem on public goods

This paper examines the conditions under which the ‘allocation branch’ of the government can determine the optimum provision of public goods independently of the distribution of private goods. We draw attention to the duality with the literature on aggregation over consumers private goods economies.     

Constrained public goods in networks

This paper analyses the private provision of public goods where agents interact within a fixed network structure and may benefit only from their direct neighbours’ provisions. We generalise the public goods in the networks model of Bramoullé and Kranton [J. Econ. Theory 135 (2007), pp. 478–494] to allow for constrained provision. In so doing, we characterise Nash equilibria with no intermediate contributors.