上市公司收购:动因、效率与机制优化--对一起失败的"买壳上市"案例的反思

本文从一起失败的“买壳上市”案例入手,从经济学的角度透视上市公司收购背后的动因、效率与机制,作者运用一个简单的最优所有权结构和帕累托最优购并空间的理论模型,探究了我国上市公司收购的症结所在。在此基础上,进一步从股权结构、治理结构、监管行为和政府角色等方面研究了交易的优化机制。     

共享经济双边市场的信任机制博弈分析

本文基于共享经济点对点的经济特征, 以双边市场为切入点, 对共享经济商业模式中的供给方和消费者之间的信任交易行为进行了有限次博弈和无限次重复博弈分析, 在此基础上, 引入平台这个中介因素, 阐述了平台的介入对于双边市场信任机制形成的影响。结果显示： 在有限次博弈中, 供给方和消费者都会选择“失信” 的帕累托低效均衡解; 在无限次重复博弈中, 由于存在冷酷策略, 供给方和消费者都会选择“守信” 的帕累托最优均衡解; 而平台的介入, 对于双边市场中的供给方和消费者具有非常显著的约束力, 通过奖惩机制改变了供给方和消费者单独博弈时的利益均衡点, 推动形成共享经济信任机制。     

市场失灵理论对电力市场化改革的启示

依照西方微观经济学的论证,市场机制可以实现资源的最优配置。然而,在现实经济中,由于外部条件或内部原因导致的市场机制配置资源的能力不足,帕累托最优状态通常不能得到实现,出现资源配置失当。这种情况被称为“市场失灵”。导致市场失灵的主要原因是垄断、外部影响等。市场失灵理论对电力市场化改革也有重要的启示。     

组织间关系形成的内在动因:基于帕累托改进的视角

组织间关系的形成不仅为成员企业带来利润,更是一种社会福利的帕累托改进。从经济学理论研究的视角看,组织间关系的形成是为了弥补当今不完全市场缺陷的制度性工具,其本质可以视为单个组织通过组织间关系的形成获得帕累托边界外推所产生的超额租金,从而获得竞争优势,实现一般均衡和企业间交易的利益最大化。组织间关系的形成一方面通过实现完全竞争市场的假设条件而推动帕累托边界的静态变化,以弥补当前市场中的各种市场失衡问题;另一方面通过实现资源重新配置产生正外部效应的同时,改变了专业化分工水平和市场结构,实现帕累托边界动态外推的演化过程,由此解决市场失灵和市场结构不完全的问题。本文试图从经济学的视角通过引入帕累托作为分析工具,构建一个组织间关系形成动因的解释框架,以期从本质上解决企业组织理论对组织间关系形成动因分析范式的不足。     

碳金融与企业低碳转型研究——以中国钢铁行业为例

随着碳市场的建立，碳金融随之诞生。为分析碳金融对企业低碳转型的影响，本文以碳排放权质押贷款为例，构建了一个企业转型与银行贷款的决策模型，考虑碳市场和碳金融对于钢铁行业绿色转型的促进作用。本文得出两个主要结论：(1)以碳排放权质押贷款为代表的碳金融可以促进企业低碳转型，实现企业与银行的帕累托改进；(2)碳市场中碳价的剧烈波动会阻碍碳金融的发展。本文根据钢铁行业数据、全国碳市场碳排放配额(CEA)交易数据进行实证研究，提出发展碳金融与促行业转型的实践启示。     

浅谈城镇化背景下城市公共资源的有效配置

城镇化的不断提高使得城市居民(新居民与原居民)对公共资源的数量、类型和结构等产生了新的需求,而现有公共资源供给的有限性导致了供需矛盾的凸显:道路拥堵、停车难、公共绿地减少、教育及医疗资源不均衡等诸多现象频繁出现。对此,笔者提出城镇化进程中公共资源有效配置的三个基本原则,即:问题守恒原则、帕累托最优原则和公平优先兼顾效率原则。在此原则基础上,创新性的提出了构建大数据智慧城市,为资源配置提供科学决策依据;用"时空对换"的思维解决道路拥堵、停车难等实际问题;依据马斯洛需求层次细分公共资源类型,提升资源利用价值;设置公共资源配置的合理门槛,保障资源使用的公平和效率。     

自然资本代际配置研究--可持续发展的产权制度设计

自然资本配置不仅涉及当代人利益,也涉及后代人利益,即涉及代际利益问题。现代产权理论,对于说明市场机制配置资源产生帕累托最优效率,提供了反传统的论证,但是缺乏代际利益均衡理念,无法令人信服地说明可持续发展框架下的自然资本的最优配置问题。本文以罗尔斯的代际正义论为伦理基础,提出自然资本代际产权理论,以期对现代产权理论加以修正并对可持续发展进行产权制度设计。     

公路客运市场模型

本文通过研究在竞争的客运市场上,运输企业在价格和运输时间两方面展开竞争的特征和乘客从旅行总费用的角度进行选择的行为特征,建立了竞争的运输市场模型。指出了竞争性运输市场达到帕累托最优的可能性及其条件。     

煤炭交易中心市场结构解析及优化

随着我国社会主义市场经济建设进程加快,拍卖这一交易方式在经济社会生活中日益广泛。政府债券、土地使用权、矿产资源开采权等都开始进入拍卖市场。拍卖是否能够有效地配置资源,哪种拍卖机制能为卖方获得最大收益,这些都依赖于所交易商品的市场特性、拍卖市场的深度、竞标者之间利益的相互独立性、拍卖人的公平性和公正性等市场环境因素。陕西煤炭交易中心设立之初预定提供煤炭现货招标、拍卖交易服务和煤炭中远期合约交易服务,但是由于各种原因,目前仅     

公司治理中的大、小股东监督行为分析

在现代公司治理中大股东和小股东是两个不同的利益亚集团,它们从自身利益出发对公司的监督程度也不一样,本文通过一个简单的博弈模型分析了小股东的"搭便丰"倾向,监督相对于帕累托最优下的不足,以及对我国公司治理的启示.     

OPTIMAL AUCTIONS WHEN A SELLER IS BOUND TO SELL TO COLLUSIVE BIDDERS*

I consider optimal auctions for a seller who is bound to sell a single item to one of two potential buyers, organized in a ‘well‐coordinated’ cartel. I show that, even though the seller cannot deter collusion, he can optimally accommodate it by employing a simple mechanism which imposes an inefficient allocation on the bidders unless they pay a sufficiently high amount to avoid it.     

Revenue maximizing with return policy when buyers have uncertain valuations

This paper examines the optimal mechanism design problem when buyers have uncertain valuations. This uncertainty can only be resolved after the actual transactions take place and upon incurring significant post-purchase cost. We focus on two different settings regarding how the seller values a returned object (salvage value). We first study the case where the salvage value is exogenously determined. We find that the revenue maximizing mechanism is deterministic and “separable”. We illustrate that the optimal revenue can be implemented by a mechanism with a “no-questions-asked” return policy. In addition, we show that “linear return policies” are suboptimal when the hazard rates of initial estimates are monotone. We next examine the case where the salvage value is endogenously determined. We demonstrate that “separability” no longer holds and the “recall” of buyers is necessary in the optimal mechanism.     

Optimal mechanisms for an auction mediator

We consider a dynamic auction environment with a long-lived seller and short-lived buyers mediated by a third party. A mediator has incomplete information about traders’ values and selects an auction mechanism to maximize her expected revenue. We characterize mediator-optimal mechanisms and show that an optimal mechanism has a simple implementation as a Vickrey auction with a reserve price where the seller pays to the mediator only a fixed percentage from the closing price.     

Information disclosure in optimal auctions

This paper analyzes a situation in which the seller controls the accuracy of what potential buyers learn about their valuation of a good to be sold. This setting is related to many real situations such as home sales, antique auctions, and digital platforms such as Google and Facebook selling online advertising slots. Two important questions arise: what is the optimal selling mechanism, and what is the optimal disclosure policy of the seller. Under the assumption of private values, a simple auction with a reserve price is the optimal mechanism. What we show is that the amount of (costly) information provided increases with the number of potential bidders when using the optimal mechanism and is greater than when the object is always sold. Because information changes the distribution of a bidder’s expected valuations, the optimal reserve price also changes, so that the number of bidders (indirectly) affects the reserve price. We show that as the number of bidders increases, the optimal reserve price becomes more restrictive.     

Price Strategies for Idiosyncratic Goods—The Case of Housing

We determine the mechanism that a rational, profit-maximizing seller would use to revise his reservation price for a heterogeneous or infrequently exchanged good. For instance, while one dimension of a home's quality may be easily determined in competitive markets (e.g., the valuation of floor size, location, etc.), other dimensions of quality may be idiosyncratic (unit specific) and unobservable by the seller (e.g., aesthetics of the home). Here, a seller of a new or infrequently exchanged housing unit may use sales success information to revise his expectation of the unit's market-determined value and hence revise his reservation price. The rational seller will, upon arrival of the first buyer inspecting the unit, determine a sequence of reservation prices for this and expected subsequent buyers. This price sequence falls for subsequent buyers and starts from a lower initial price if the first buyer arrives later than expected. Through this mechanism, we offer an explanation for price dispersion and vacancy durations in housing markets. While we explicitly model the real estate market here, this price revision mechanism is also applicable to rental markets, labor markets, used car markets, and other markets characterized by heterogeneity and infrequent sales.     

Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition*

A monopoly seller advising buyers about which of two goods fits their needs may be tempted to recommend the higher margin good. For the seller to collect information about a buyer’s needs and provide truthful advice, the profits from selling both goods must be similar enough, i.e., within an implementability cone. The optimal regulation controls pricing distortions and information-collection incentives separately via price regulation and fixed rewards respectively. This no longer holds when the seller has private information about costs as both problems interact. We study whether competition and the threat by buyers to switch sellers can substitute for regulation.     

Market structure and business performance: An evaluation of buyer/seller power in the pims database

This paper explores the patterns of buyer and seller structure among business units in the PIMS database and how buyer/seller structure is related to profit outcomes, both long-term through the product life cycle and short-term between periods of boom and recession. Businesses with a favourable structure (few sellers, many buyers buying items of low importance) typically maintain margins through the product life cycle, but if there are many sellers facing few and determined buyers, margins and profitability are likely to deteriorate in recession and to continue to decline through the life cycle.     

Empfehlungen für das Auktionsdesign für Emissionsberechtigungen

From an economic perspective, auctions are an appropriate mechanism for the initial allocation of emissions allowances, because they tend to be advantageous with respect to distributional and efficiency goals. Different auction designs can lead to different outcomes, though, and so the choice of the auction rules is a critical challenge. Recent developments in auction theory and rich experiences with practical auction design in the energy and many other sectors can help avoiding mistakes and designing an appropriate auction mechanism. This study summarizes the relevant research and concludes with concrete recommendations for the auction design for CO₂ allowances. In particular, it analyzes how the strategic options of buyers and sellers depend on the auction rules, and explains how secondary markets for allowances interact with bidding strategies and optimal institutional design.     

Mechanism choice and the buy-it-now auction: A structural model of competing buyers and sellers

A striking feature of many online sales platforms is the coexistence of multiple sales mechanisms. Items on eBay, for instance, are frequently offered through auctions, posted prices, and buy-it-now auctions. In this article, I study how this mechanism multiplicity influences the welfare of buyers and sellers. I specify and estimate a structural model of mechanism choice in online markets, in which I consider both sides of the market: On the demand side, buyers' choices among available listings are equilibrium outcomes of an entry game. On the supply side, sellers make equilibrium decisions when choosing sales mechanisms and prices. I estimate this model using data from sales of baseball tickets on eBay and calculate consumer and seller rents in three markets: the actual market with all three sales mechanisms and two counterfactual markets with auctions and fixed prices or only fixed-price listings, respectively. I find that the addition of auctions to fixed-price markets hurts sellers and risk-averse buyers but benefits risk-neutral buyers. Additionally, the consumer surplus increases when buy-it-now auctions are offered but the seller surplus is reduced further. I discuss the intuition for the cause of this result.     

Matching of Buyers and Sellers by Brokers: A Comparison of Alternative Commission Structures

This note characterizes the set of Pareto optimal and stable matchings among buyers and sellers and examines the optimality of matching strategies employed by brokers under different commission structures. It is shown that the profit-maximizing matching strategy for the broker under percentage commission and flat-fee systems also maximizes the number of houses sold, but it minimizes the buyers' and sellers' surplus. On the other hand, net listing results in the sale of fewer houses, but it yields larger surplus for buyers and sellers.