An Economic Analysis of "Riding to Hounds": Pierson v. Post Revisited

Pierson v. Post, an 1805 New York case, concerns the ownershipof a dead fox; Post had organized a fox hunt and was pursuinga fox, when Pierson appeared and killed the animal. The ruleestablished by the court in this case (awarding ownership toPierson) has proven to be highly influential. This article undertakesan economic analysis of the issues raised by the case. The incentivesfor the killing of foxes created by the court's rule and thealternative rule, giving property rights to Post, advocatedin a vigorous dissent by Justice Livingston are analyzed. Theconsequences for social welfare are derived under various circumstances;the formal approach leads to a number of new insights. Finally,the implications of this analysis for contemporary issues inproperty law are explored through an application to the phenomenonof "cybersquatting" (involving the ownership of Internet domainnames).     

有效会计监管的均衡模型

会计欺诈已经成为世界范围内的重大问题 ,它给世界经济带来了重大的负面影响。本文通过建立两阶段动态博弈模型并对其求解发现 ,会计规则执行者的违规程度与惩罚力度、执行者的贴现因子以及政府的监管概率成反比 ;而政府的会计监管力度与惩罚力度、执行者贴现因子的平方以及政府的监管成本成反比。政府的最优事后会计监管的合适目标并不是要杜绝会计规则执行者的会计欺诈行为 ,而是将部分会计规则执行者的会计欺诈行为控制在一定的范围之内 ;最优的会计监管对于控制很看中当期收益的会计规则执行者的会计欺诈行为来说无能为力 ,控制这类会计欺诈行为的唯一措施在于提高会计监管的时效性 ;有效会计监管需要额外成本 ;并且有效会计监管实施的基本条件存在优先次序 :首先区分不同类型的会计规则执行者 ,其次区分会计规则执行者所承担的他们真正能够感知的违规处罚 ,然后才是选择最优的监管力度。     

军民协同创新中知识产权归属问题研究

军民协同创新活动中,知识产权归属问题是影响协同创新成效的重要因素。据此,提出计划主导、计划市场共同作用和市场主导3种军民协同创新模式,分析了军民协同创新知识产权归属的主要问题。计划主导、计划市场共同作用、市场主导3种模式下的知识产权归属应分别坚持“平衡利益、鼓励创新”、“注重效率、侧重长远”、“经济效率优先”原则,相应地采取“法律规范、兼顾合约”、“章程式契约”、“尊重市场、契约优先”的思路进行制度设计。同时,还要从军民融合深度发展战略、知识产权保护环境、配套政策举措、法律制度等方面提供外部环境保障和激励。     

Two Remarks on the Property-Rights Literature

We first point out that the recent property-rights literature is based on three assumptions: (1) that contracts are always subject to renegotiation; (2) that the exercise of a property right confers a private benefit and (3) that parties are risk-neutral. Building on Hart–Moore (1999), we provide conditions under which an optimal contract consists of nothing more than an assignment of property rights.
We also examine the robustness of some of the literature's standard predictions about asset ownership to the introduction of mechanisms for eliciting parties' ex post willingness to pay for the assets (such as options or financial markets). To illustrate the issue, we revisit the Hart–Moore (1990) proposition that joint ownership is suboptimal, and argue that ownership by a single party is dominated by joint ownership with put options.     

“Love of wealth” and economic growth

In a Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans growth framework it is shown that for an optimum a benevolent social planner cannot have an excessive “love of wealth”. With a “right” “love of wealth” an optimum exists and implies higher long‐run per‐capita capital, income, and consumption relative to the standard model. This has important implications for comparative development trajectories. The optimum implies dynamic efficiency with the possibility of getting arbitrarily close to the golden rule where long‐run per‐capita consumption is maximal. It is shown that the optimal path attains its steady state more slowly. Thus, the beneficial effects of love of wealth materialize later than in the standard model. Furthermore, the economy can be decentralized as a competitive private ownership economy. One can then identify “love of wealth” with the “spirit of capitalism.” The paper thus implies that one needs a “right” level of the “spirit of capitalism” to realize any beneficial effects for the long run.     

立法视角下职务科技成果所有权规定模式对比研究

职务科技成果权益归属是影响科技成果转化效率的关键因素之一,科技成果的权利性质、权利归属和管理权限划分,是政府引导市场机制发挥促进科技成果转化作用的前提和关键所在。目前各地区都在积极探索职务科技成果权属改革,很多地区在地方性法规中对其进行了规定。总结了我国各地法规对于职务科技成果所有权归属的规定模式,并对比分析不同模式的优劣势。研究发现：目前职务科技成果所有权在地方立法中的规定包括原则性规定、奖励一定比例权属份额、分类规定权属、赋予全部或部分权利、单位弃权后科研人员优先取得等5种模式,不同模式各有优劣;即便是同一种模式,在不同地区立法中也有着不一样的解读,对于各地职务科技成果所有权赋权改革也会产生不同程度的影响。     

A long-run cost allocation problem in the political economy of electric utility power pools

Summary and Conclusions Discussants of the electric power industry point to three principal reasons for corporately unaffiliated electric utility companies to establish formal interorganizational relations: optimal short-run dispatching of production facilities, the scale economies (more precisely, the subadditivity) of long-run costs, and the advantage of pooling the risk of equipment failure. This paper has analyzed the organizational properties of power pools established to realize the advantages of subadditive long-run costs. A formal organizational model of a power pool was presented, recognizing the economic and normative structure of a pool. The normative structure chosen was the subsidy freedom equity concept familiar in the literature on natural monopoly and in game theory. The principal result of the paper is the construction of a subsidy-free cost allocation rule for the deterministic multiple-technology long-run system planning problem.The applicability of this result depends on the organization of the power pool as an entity capable of contracting for the power needed by the members. Conspicuously in the model used here, the optimal poolwide cost is allocated but ownership of the generating plants is not.In power ppols of independently owned utilities (IOUs), capacity planning may be centralized but, with the exception of joint ventures in individual generating plants, ownership is maintained at the level of the member firms. IOU power pools allocate separately the fixed and variable costs of the system. Pool members often take turns in building new plants for the pool, thereby indirectly allocating system capacity costs. Having identifiable ownership in the generating plants, the members can allocate the energy costs of the system in a subsidy-free manner using the short-run marginal cost of energy established by central dispatching or energy brokering (Herriot 1985). But that is an approach to short-run energy charges which is very differet from the energy charge in the peaker rule studied here, and it may result in an allocation of total costs that is not subsidy-free.There are partnership among rural electric distribution cooperatives, called generation and transmission (G&T) co-ops, which do share costs without allocating ownership interests. G&T co-ops build generating plants or secure power contracts from IOUs sufficient to meet their members' requirements at an agreed level of reliability. Ownership of the plants, and liability for the contracts, is not disaggregated. Yet in most cases the G&T co-op does not sell power to non-members, so all costs must be allocated among the member firms.The ownership structure presumed here could also obtain under the scenarios for electric power deregulation envisioned by Joskow and Schmalensee (1983). If the distribution segment is disaggregated from generation and transmission, then locally franchised distribution firms mist face in common the subadditive long-run cost function discussed in the second section. The regional bulk power market would therefore have the structure of a natural monopsony, so the distribution firms would have an incentive to pool their forecast loads and collectively negotiate long-term power contracts with the independent generating firms. Ownership of generation would rest with the generation firms, but the cost of the regionally optimal portfolio of power contracts would have to be allocated among the pooled distribution firmsThe deterministic system planning model used here is somewhat simplistic, certainly as must any model to be admit a closed-form solution in a contexts where the real capacity planning problems are solved using very large scale linear programs and simulation. However, the cost allocation rule derived for this model may be useful guidepost for the development of practical cost-sharing rules in power pools. An important implication of the peaker rule (4) is the equity of not attempting to allocate separately the fixed and variable costs of a system. Though adjustments must be made to the peaker rule to account fully for the uncertainties, indivisibilities, unreliabilities, and nonhomogeneities faced by system planners, as well as for the growth of future loads and the development of new generation technologies, this cost-allocation rule appears to be helpful as a starting point in power pool rate design.     

Executive compensation in government-linked companies: evidence from Malaysia

The aim of this study was to explore the characteristics of executive pay, equity ownership incentives and pay–performance relationship in government-controlled firms. Data were hand-collected from the annual reports of 179 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia. The results show that executive pay is lower in government-linked companies. Positive pay–performance relationship is also not evident for this category of firms, which indicates that their executives were largely guaranteed with certain level of pay irrespective of performance. The level of equity ownership incentives provides the executives in government-controlled firms with very little incentive to produce effort that can improve firm performance. Overall, our findings are consistent with the inefficient pay hypothesis developed in this study.     

建筑业农民工人力资本产权结构研究

建筑业由于其项目管理要求,就其工作性质而言具有很强的工作范围不确定性、工作内容一次性、工作地域分割性等特点,决定建筑业农民工人力资本在资本取得、价值实现、基本权益保障等方面都具有一定的特殊性.在文献梳理基础上,本文借鉴人力资本产权理论提出建筑业农民工人力资本产权权能结构包括所有权、收益权和发展权三种权利束.在此基础上,研究三类权利束的特征:在所有权方面表现为投资主体的非系统性、在交易过程中弱抵押性和制度失衡引起的基于所有权的基本权利受损;在收益权方面表现为先天弱势资本导致的产权主体交易能力低下、折价交易以及交易的被动性;在发展权方面表现为人力资本定价的滞后、人力资本价值折损高风险以及人力资本价值提升的曲折.     

研发合作中的产权结构与投资激励

不完全合同背景下,产权分配在参与方的投资决策中至关重要。利用产权理论讨论了研发合作中的序贯投资决策和创新的产权分配问题。研究表明,最优产权结构随着参与方的谈判力变动,谈判力较低的一方单独拥有产权能够平衡其投资积极性;随着投资关系专用性程度的增加,最优产权为联合产权在产品开发者谈判力区间的范围更广。为了提高双方合作效率,可考虑采用由一个产品开发者出价并按照研究单位投资积极性分配初始产权的期权合同。比较分析发现：期权合同能够缓解投资不足问题,并进一步提高双方合作效率。     

集体林权制度配套改革中的林权抵押贷款研究——基于金融机构信贷风险视角

从金融机构信贷风险的视角分析,认为导致集体林权制度配套改革中的林权抵押贷款困境的原因为信贷约束,而信贷约束主要是金融机构提供信贷时的收益与风险严重不匹配造成的。林权抵押物价值保全风险和处置变现风险是金融机构承受的主要信贷风险。因此,打破林权抵押贷款困境,降低金融机构信贷风险的重要举措为大力发展政策性森林保险和适度放宽林木采伐管制。     

职务科技成果赋权改革的法治标准及优化路径研究

中国公立高校院所职务科技成果权属改革进入赋权科研人员的改革深水区。赋权改革关系到公共财产合理处置与国家知识产权安全建设，必须在法治框架内施行。只有以落实单位权属法定与依法赋权原则为形式标准、以落实合比例赋权原则为实质标准推进改革，才能以法治手段规避改革过程中政府与市场的双重失灵。当前中国职务科技成果赋权改革面临试点方案违背上位法、赋权决策不合比例等法治难题。鉴于此，有关部门应进一步梳理完善职务科技成果单位所有与依法赋权的顶层设计，从目的适当性、手段必要性与结果均衡性等实质法治标准出发修正现有赋权改革措施，重点完善公立科研单位赋权科研人员的国资管理宽容规范、权利共有规则体系以及公益保障机制。     

正确认识利益相关论者的企业产权和社会责任观

"利益相关者"理论描述了企业同其他社会主体的联系,却没有看清各种不同关系的实质,以它作为诉求企业所有权的根据,混淆了不同的产权主体和产权客体,颠倒了所有权与契约关系的地位和作用,分不清不同经济关系的处理原则,在产权理论上产生一系列错误.另一方面,它指出企业不可能离开社会的支持,必须处理好同其他社会主体,特别是企业职工的关系,为改善企业的经营管理,树立企业的社会责任感,构建正常的市场关系,作出有益的启示.但是,社会主义公有制内部的利益关系已经大大超越了在资本主义土壤产生的"利益相关者"理论所涉及的内容.只有它才是构建社会主义和谐社会的可靠基础.以社会主义关系及其形成的思维去论证"利益相关者"理论,或者以这种理论去解释和处理社会主义公有制的内部关系,都是不可取的.     

中国地区腐败对民营企业国有化的影响

本文使用1998-2007年中国工业企业数据库与省级腐败数据,通过一个简单的模型,证明了在腐败的制度环境下,国有股权可以帮助民营企业避免政府侵害,因此腐败越严重、民营企业越倾向于国有化;并且,盈利能力强的企业更容易受到腐败的侵害。本文发现无论是狭义国有化还是广义国有化都与企业所在地区的腐败率以及企业资产回报率显著正相关;此外,资产回报率越高的企业因腐败而国有化的概率越高。因此,“国有化”可能是中国民营企业面对政府侵害的应对措施。这对我们理解转型国家中民营企业的生存环境与政企关系具有重要意义。     

论行业产权的存在与运作

产权不同于所有权,所有权是财产权,产权是利益权,经济学从研究所有权到既研究所有权又研究产权,是现代社会经济发展的反应,是现代经济学进步的表现,展现了现代经济学比传统经济学更为广阔的研究视野。行业不同于企业,并不是归属谁所有的,但是,有行业利益的存在,就有行业产权的存在。行业产权代表了行业的整体利益,这种产权是具有集合性的公共产权,不是可以分散给行业内的各个企业的,而是相对于行业的存在而存在的。行业协会依据行业产权维护行业利益,是通过行业协会的社会中介作用实现的,是表现为有组织的行业自律和企业自律达到目的的,不是依靠政府作用对于企业进行更强制的约束,更不是运用法律手段制止本行业企业的不当行为的。     

Evolving corporate governance and the dividends behaviour regime in Japan

This study investigates empirically the implications which the changing ownership structure and control transfers in the Japanese corporate market may have for the dividend policy of listed firms. The results show that firms with more concentrated ownership may distribute fewer dividends, as ownership concentration reduces distribution pressure from the capital market. Moreover, we show that institutional shareholding, both financial and non-financial, enables corporations to pay lesser dividends and also that the unwinding of the cross-shareholdings allows for efficiency gain and provides impetus to pay higher dividends. The recent pattern of increasing individual shareholding, both of domestic and foreign private individuals, is consistently associated with a higher dividend payment. Furthermore, managerial ownership has negative effects on dividends payouts and is not associated with the earnings of firms. The results suggest that government ownership does not have any significant impact on the payment of dividends. Moreover, our results support the principle of the dividends relevancy and the choice of an appropriate dividends policy affects the value of the firm.     

Relationship between management ownership and firm value among the business group affiliated firms in Korea

In this paper, we revisit an old issue on the relation between management ownership and firm’s value. The Korean panel data on the business group firms, allows us to compute ownership right and control right separately for each business group affiliated firm. Our measures are different from the similar measures on the Korean firms as in Baek et al. (2004) or Joh (2003). Rather than confounding the two offsetting effects, this paper tests convergence of interest hypothesis and entrenchment hypothesis separately. Empirical findings show that, given control right, there is no clear-cut relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for most firms with the inside management ownership less than 42%, that there is a positive relation between firm value and the inside management ownership for those firms with the inside management ownership higher than 42%, and that, given ownership right, profitability decreases as control right increases.     

建构中国的善意取得制度

善意取得制度是民法物权的一项重要制度。作者通过对善意取得制度进行新的价值定位,建议在制定物权法时,应注意善意取得制度的构成,以及善意取得制度与合同法中的无权处分制度、物权法中的时效取得制度的衔接和协调。     

Foreign Investment,Technology Transfer and Foreign Capital Impact Function

This paper analyzes the optimal capital accumulation of a small open economy by incorporating the impact of technology transfer that accompanies foriegn ivestment. Assuming that technology transfer depends on the extent of foreign ownership, it is shown that, whenever there is technology transfer through foreìgn participation, the optimal rule suggests that a host country maintain some foreign capital in the steady state. The concept of the foreign capital impact function is introduced to capture possible negative effects in addition to the positive effects of foreign investment. The impact of foreign investment is shown to involve an externality, calling for government intervention for a social optimum. [110]     

Mixed ownership in a mixed duopoly with differentiated products

We determine optimal privatization in a symmetric differentiated duopoly when the public firms do not bear the full cost of production and hence their objective functions differ from the government’s objective function. In the social optimum firms will generally have mixed ownership, and it will depend on the type of uncovered cost, the degree of substitutability of the two products and the output decision rule of the partially public firms. Different types of mixed duopoly emerge, ranging from both firms being partially privatized, to one being fully privatized. We also derive an optimal tax-subsidy scheme as a substitute for privatization.