Strategic design under uncertain evaluations: structural analysis of design‐build auctions

I investigate firms' competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of Design‐Build (DB) auctions. Reviewers' design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder's perspective, leading luck to dampen differences in the firms' chances of winning. I model bidders' behavior and show semiparametric identification of the model primitives. Uncertain design evaluations increase the expected price of design quality and exacerbate an auctioneer's uncertainty in auction outcomes. These effects are mostly due to changes in bidding strategies. Bid ranking swaps due to uncertain evaluations account for a small share of these effects.     

“Upping the ante”: how to design efficient auctions with entry?

Of primary importance in auction design is the set of strategies available to the seller at the auction stage. We first formalize hold‐up regarding entry costs that preys on second‐price auctions when the seller may engage in a costly shill‐bidding activity. We derive the optimal reserve and show how shill bidding can make posted prices outperforming auctions. Second, we advocate for a new regulation where shills would be banned but with the possibility of canceling sales ex post, which offers some valuable flexibility: the English auction with jump bids implements, then, the first best in general environments.     

Underpricing and Ex Post Value Uncertainty

As documented by a vast empirical literature, initial public offerings (IPOs) are characterized by underpricing. A number of papers have shown that underpricing is directly related to the amount of ex ante uncertainty concerning the IPOs valuation. Recent theoretical papers propose that not all value uncertainty is resolved prior to the start of trading, but rather continues to be resolved in the beginning of the after market. We term this type of uncertainty as ex post value uncertainty and develop proxies for it. We find strong support for the existence of ex post value uncertainty and find that including a proxy for it more than doubles the explanatory power of previous models.     

Nonparametric correlation models for portfolio allocation

This article proposes time-varying nonparametric and semiparametric estimators of the conditional cross-correlation matrix in the context of portfolio allocation. Simulations results show that the nonparametric and semiparametric models are best in DGPs with substantial variability or structural breaks in correlations. Only when correlations are constant does the parametric DCC model deliver the best outcome. The methodologies are illustrated by evaluating two interesting portfolios. The first portfolio consists of the equity sector SPDRs and the S&P 500, while the second one contains major currencies. Results show the nonparametric model generally dominates the others when evaluating in-sample. However, the semiparametric model is best for out-of-sample analysis.     

Return and Maturity Relationships for Treasury Auctions: Evidence from Turkey

The relationship between the interest rate and the maturity of newly issued bonds provides information on the debt dynamics of an economy as well as on the sustainability of its debt. Such information is crucial especially for countries that have debt‐rollover concerns due to financial stress and/or macroeconomic instability. This study investigates the relationship between treasury auction maturity, which also dictates the debt maturity, and auction interest rates. When the Turkish treasury auction data from 1988 to 2004 are analysed, a reciprocal linkage between auction interest rates and maturities can be observed, especially for the 1995–2000 period, when there were chronic high inflation, high political uncertainty, high public deficits and unsuccessful attempts at stabilisation. This suggests that under an adverse shock, the Treasury decreases the auction maturity in order not to increase interest rates too much. A change in this reciprocal relationship is also reported for the post‐2001 era, which is characterised by decreasing inflation, higher political stability, lower public deficits and successful stabilisation attempts.     

Land Value and Parcel Size: A Semiparametric Analysis

We use a semiparametric estimator to analyze the relationship between land values and parcel size in a sample of 158 undeveloped parcels in the Portland, Oregon, metropolitan area. The semiparametric estimator combines the benefits of parametric and nonparametric estimation. The value-size relationship is estimated nonparametrically, which permits the function to be linear, convex, and concave in different regions. A simple log-linear parametric relationship is assumed for the rest of the model, which conserves degrees of freedom and simplifies hypothesis testing. Our semiparametric estimates do not reject log-linearity for the value-size relationship.     

On the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price in a clock model of a multi‐unit,oral, ascending‐price auction within the common‐value paradigm

Using a clock model of a multi‐unit, oral, ascending‐price auction, within the common‐value paradigm, we analyze the behavior of the transaction price as the numbers of bidders and units gets large in a particular way. We find that even though the transaction price is determined by a fraction of losing drop‐out bids, that price converges in probability to the true, but ex ante unknown, value. Subsequently, we demonstrate that the asymptotic distribution of the transaction price is Gaussian. Finally, we apply our methods to data from an auction of taxi license plates held in Shenzhen, China.     

Strategic ex ante contracts: rent extraction and opportunity costs

This article cosiders the possibility that a seller can contract with one uninformed buyer prior to an auction involving two potential buyers. The seller's optimal strategic ex ante contract more accurately reflects joint opportunity costs of the seller and the contracted buyer, and therefore extracts more rent from the entrant. Moreover, this ex ante contract mitigates the seller's ex post rent seeking vis‐à‐vis the contracted buyer. Accordingly, it may create more social welfare than the absence of ex ante contracts, depending upon the contracted buyer's financial constraint and the distributions of trade surplus. Implementation of the optimal strategic ex ante contract and policy implications are discussed.     

Specification and negotiation in incomplete contracts

We investigate contractors' bargaining power and holdup on buyers in procurement auctions of incomplete contracts held by California Department of Transportation. Using a model where contractors bid competitively in response to a buyer's choice of initial contract design, we infer the contractors' costs and bargaining power from the bids and transfers negotiated after the auction. We find that the contract winners have substantial bargaining power in post‐auction negotiation. The average holdup on the buyer is about 20% of project costs. Counterfactual cost‐plus contracts would reduce the buyer's surplus in 72% of the projects, with an average reduction over $382,000.     

Estimating the Strategic Value of Long-Term Forward Purchase Contracts Using Auction Models

We demonstrate how an auction model can be used in a traditional capital budgeting context to assign a value to the strategic advantage of long-term forward contracts. Research in the field of industrial organization has pointed to the danger of ex post opportunistic bargaining as a motivation for the use of forward contracts in natural resources and manufactured products, but no operational procedure exists for estimating the value secured by these contracts. Arbitrage methods for valuing forward contracts assume a competitive market in which the factors creating the bargaining problem and motivating the use of long-term contracts are not present. Use of the model is illustrated in the case of take-or-pay contracts for natural gas.     

An empirical study of auction revenue rankings: the case of municipal bonds

Using a novel dataset of 386 first‐price municipal bond auctions held in California, I perform counterfactual revenue comparisons, based on the theoretical result of Milgrom and Weber (1982). I show that the revenue in the second‐price auction is nonparametrically identified, and the counterfactual revenue in the English auction can be bounded in an informative way. These results form a basis for nonparametric estimation of counterfactual revenue differences. I find that the revenue gain from using the English auction would be in the range of 11%—19% of the gross underwriting spread, and that most of it would already be captured by using the second‐price auction. The recent explosive growth of Internet English auctions, administered by Grant Street Group, provides external support to the claim that auction design matters in this market.     

Subcontracting and competitive bidding on incomplete procurement contracts

This article examines the impact of incomplete contracts on subcontracting and the design of procurement auctions. I estimate the effect of ex post contract revisions on unit costs for both subcontracted and in‐house performed work items on bridge projects procured by the California Department of Transportation. I model a scoring auction showing how ex post revisions skew bidding decisions and estimate unit costs from bid data using the method of sieve estimation. The results highlight the cost implications of incomplete contracting frictions, subcontracting decisions, and bidding distortions. In conclusion, I propose alternative auction mechanisms that could improve outcomes.     

Choice of Selling Mechanism at the IPO: the Case of the French Second Market

This study examines the choice of flotation mechanism within the framework of the French Second Market. Between 1983 and 1996, a firm that opted for a quotation on the Second Market, had the choice between (i) an auction‐like procedure (there were two variants) and (ii) a fixed‐price introduction procedure. Several interesting results are presented. First, the choice for an auction‐like procedure appears to be positively related to firm valuation uncertainty at the IPO. Second, the likelihood of opting for an auction‐like procedure decreases as the reputation of the investment bank guiding the flotation increases. Third, the likelihood of opting for an auction is increasing in the number of secondary shares sold by venture capitalists and investment banks.     

Information control in the hold‐up problem

We study the use of information control to mitigate hold‐up risks. We identify a distinction between asymmetric information that creates an ex ante investment incentive and asymmetric information that causes ex post inefficiency, which then allows ex post inefficiency to be eliminated without compromising the ex ante investment incentive. We characterize the properties of the optimal information structure and the payoffs and welfare achievable with information control in the presence of hold‐up risks.     

RULE CHANGES AND UNCERTAINTY IN DISCRIMINATORY AND UNIFORM PRICE AUCTIONS

The auction literature indicates that uncertainty about the value of auctioned goods increases underpricing in discriminatory price auctions. Such uncertainty has a smaller effect on uniform price auctions because the pricing rule aggregates bidders' information. We find that uncertainty resulting from inexperience with an auction mechanism has similar effects. Using initial public offering (IPO) data from Japan and Israel, we find that average underpricing increases temporarily in Japan's discriminatory price auctions after changes in the auction rules, which suggests that bidders reduce their bids in response to uncertainty. Underpricing in Israel's uniform price auctions is not affected by rule changes.     

Buy‐out prices in auctions: seller competition and multi‐unit demands

Online auction sites often enable sellers to add a buy‐out price. In one‐shot auctions, this has been motivated by appeal to impatience or risk aversion. We offer additional justification in a dynamic model, by showing that an early seller has an incentive to use a buy‐out price, if a similar product is offered later by another seller, and bidders desire multiple objects. Revenue in the first auction increases, but revenue in the second auction decreases, as does the sum of revenues. The buy‐out price causes the auction sequence to become inefficient, because the first item may be awarded to a bidder who should have received none.     

Yield curve modeling and forecasting using semiparametric factor dynamics

Using a dynamic semiparametric factor model (DSFM) we investigate the term structure of interest rates. The proposed methodology is applied to monthly interest rates for four southern European countries: Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain from the introduction of the Euro to the recent European sovereign-debt crisis. Analyzing this extraordinary period, we compare our approach with the standard market method – dynamic Nelson–Siegel model. Our findings show that two nonparametric factors capture the spatial structure of the yield curve for each of the bond markets separately. We attributed both factors to the slope of the yield curve. For panel term structure data, three nonparametric factors are necessary to explain 95% variation. The estimated factor loadings are unit root processes and reveal high persistency. In comparison with the benchmark model, the DSFM technique shows superior short-term forecasting in times of financial distress.     

Understanding Investor Sentiment: The Case of Soccer

We examine the extent to which the stock market's inefficient responses to resolutions of uncertainty depend on investors’ biased ex ante beliefs regarding the probability distribution of future event outcomes or their ex post irrational reactions to these outcomes. We use a sample of publicly traded European soccer clubs and analyze their returns around important matches. Using a novel proxy for investors’ expectations based on contracts traded on betting exchanges (prediction markets), we find that within our sample, investor sentiment is attributable, in part, to a systematic bias in investors’ ex ante expectations. Investors are overly optimistic about their teams’ prospects ex ante and, on average, end up disappointed ex post, leading to negative postgame abnormal returns. Our evidence may have important implications for firms’ investment decisions and corporate control transactions.     

A semiparametric factor model for implied volatility surface dynamics

We propose a semiparametric factor model, which approximatesthe implied volatility surface (IVS) in a finite dimensionalfunction space. Unlike standard principal component approachestypically used to reduce complexity, our approach is tailoredto the degenerated design of IVS data. In particular, we onlyfit in the local neighborhood of the design points by exploitingthe expiry effect present in option data. Using DAX index optiondata, we estimate the nonparametric components and a low-dimensionaltime series of latent factors. The modeling approach is completedby studying vector autoregressive models fitted to the latentfactors.     

A Semiparametric Two-Factor Term Structure Model

This article proposes a semiparametric two-factor term structuremodel based on a consol rate and the spread between a shortrate and the consol rate. The diffusion functions in both theconsol rate and spread processes are nonparametrically specifiedso that the model allows for maximal flexibility of diffusionfunctions in fitting into data. The drift function of the spreadprocess is specified as a mean-reverting function, while thedrift function of the consol rate process is left unrestricted.A nonparametric procedure is developed for estimating the diffusionfunctions. The asymptotic biases of the nonparametric estimatorsare quantified when the step of discretization is fixed, whilethe asymptotic distributions of the nonparametric estimatorsare derived when the step of discretization tends to zero. Thepricing and hedging performances of the model are evaluatedin a simulated economic environment. Results show that the modelperforms quite well in the simulated economy.