Gender Differences in Financial Reporting Decision Making: Evidence from Accounting Conservatism

This paper investigates the effect of CFO gender on corporate financial reporting decision making. Focusing on firms that experience changes of CFO from male to female, the paper compares the firms' degree of accounting conservatism between pre‐ and post‐transition periods. We find that female CFOs are more conservative in their financial reporting. In addition, we find that the relation between CFO gender and conservatism varies with the level of various firm risks, including litigation risk, default risk, systematic risk, and CFO‐specific risk such as job security risk. We further find that the risk aversion of female CFOs is associated with less equity‐based compensation, lower firm risk, a higher tangibility level, and a lower dividend payout level. Overall, the study provides strong support for the notion that female CFOs are more risk averse than male CFOs, which leads female CFOs to adopt more conservative financial reporting policies.     

Chief Financial Officers as Inside Directors

Considerable prior research investigates whether the extent of insider presence on corporate boards is detrimental. However, the majority of past research treats all inside directors as a homogenous group. This study considers that issue in the context of chief financial officers (CFO) serving on their own company's board. Our research is important because individuals in different executive roles bring different skills and knowledge to board interactions, highlighting the potential for differential contributions. As prior research does not specifically distinguish CFOs from other board insiders, the potential benefits of knowledge sharing due to increased communication with other board members may have been masked. Specifically, the CFO is directly responsible for the quality of the financial reporting process and can therefore be associated with specific outcome measures. Our results show that the percentage of CFOs serving on their own boards is not large, likely due to the perspective (consistent with agency theory and reflected in independence guidelines) that company insiders on boards could promote their own best interest at the expense of shareholders. Contrary to this perception, we find that companies whose CFO has a seat on the board are associated with higher financial reporting quality (i.e., a lower likelihood of reporting a material weaknesses in internal controls or having a financial restatement, and better accruals quality). Yet, we also find potential drawbacks in that CFOs with a board seat tend to have higher excess compensation and lower likelihood of termination following poor performance, signaling greater entrenchment. While our results provide information to companies considering appointing the CFO to the board, both costs and benefits are demonstrated, and thus we conclude that each board should consider this decision based on its own circumstances and composition.     

Revealing Corporate Financial Misreporting

This study examines how frequently firms restate when they materially misstate their financial statements using stock option backdating as the setting. Stock option backdating provides a unique opportunity to study this issue because it is possible to estimate misstatements with publicly available information to a high level of confidence, and the extensive media coverage of backdating notified boards of directors of the significant risk of misstatement. After identifying firms that materially misstated earnings due to stock option backdating with 95 percent (99 percent) probability, we find that only 11.5 percent (16.1 percent) of these firms subsequently restated. Restating firms are larger, have greater board independence, higher litigation risk and ROA, a lower market‐to‐book ratio, less discretionary accruals, and are more likely to have a CFO that was not involved in backdating. Restating firms are also more likely to disclose other adverse news, face securities litigation, and turn over the CFO than firms that appear to materially backdate but do not restate. Since nearly 9 of 10 firms failed to restate, our results give pause to researchers who use restatements as an indicator of misreporting, and to regulators who levy penalties on those who do self‐report.     

Fraud Firms' Non-Implicated CFOs: An Investigation of Reputational Contagion and Subsequent Employment Outcomes*

We investigate labor market consequences for CFOs employed by fraud firms, focusing on reputational contagion for those who are not implicated. These individuals provide an opportunity to understand reputational contagion and the nuanced meaning of “guilt” because the labor market may suspect complicity or infer negligence regardless of whether that is truly the case. We compare these CFOs to a matched sample of non-fraud CFOs and track both turnover and subsequent employment positions. Non-implicated CFOs are more likely to experience turnover compared to non-fraud CFOs, driven in particular by the public revelation of fraud to the labor market. We further find that non-implicated CFOs are more likely to obtain comparable subsequent employment than non-fraud CFOs before the fraud is publicly revealed, but not after. In supplementary analyses, we find that turnover rates are highest for non-implicated CFOs who started their employment with the firm before the fraud began as compared to non-implicated CFOs who started their employment after the fraud began. These results highlight the labor market significance of the public revelation of fraud and imply that the labor market does not fully distinguish between fraud firm association and general firm performance when making executive hiring decisions.     

Professional Directors and Governance Quality

We examine professional directors—board members with no employment outside of serving as independent directors. We find that boards with a higher percentage of professional directors engage in more acquisitions, experience lower acquisition announcement returns, and exhibit lower performance‐turnover sensitivity and lower financial performance. We also examine the returns surrounding the appointment‐announcement dates of professional directors and find that firms experience significantly lower cumulative abnormal returns upon the appointment announcement of professional directors as compared to nonprofessional directors. The negative returns are primarily experienced by firms that face greater agency issues, suggesting that the market does not value professional directors for stricter monitoring. Overall, our findings do not lend support for calls to professionalize corporate boards.     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCING CHOICES OF FIRMS: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

We examine how corporate governance indicators such as board size, board composition and CEO duality impact on financing decisions of firms. Panel data covering the five year period 1999‐2003 from forty‐seven (47) listed firms on the Nairobi Stock Exchange (NSE) was used. Analysis was done within the Random‐effects GLS regression framework. Findings of the study indicate that firms with larger board sizes employ more debt irrespective of the maturity period and also the independence of a board negatively and significantly correlates with short‐term debts. Again, when a CEO doubles as board chairperson, less debt is employed. Thus, the study reaffirms the notion that the governance structure of a firm affects its financing choices.     

Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value Maximization: An African Perspective

Abstract: This study looks at corporate governance and its impact on shareholder value maximization in Africa. Data from South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria covering the period 1997–2001 were used and analysis done within the panel data framework. Results show that, though highly dispersed, both within and between firms, corporate boards in the selected countries are relatively not independent. The regression result shows that large board sizes enhance corporate performance and shareholder value maximization. Our study also shows that both sector and country‐specific effects have an impact on shareholder value maximization. While the mining sector is dominant in maximizing shareholder value, it also suffers from higher taxes and interest payments.     

Above board? Interlocking directorates and corporate contagion in 1980s Australia

The 1980s were an outrageous time in Australia's business history. This paper re-examines this era of misconduct, assessing the role of interlocking directorates for corporate governance of diversified business groups. Professional interlocked executives—those with professional training, executive status and mobility between member firms—enabled the takeover culture of the time, and allowed managers to ignore promised strategic benefits and redirect associated firms towards speculative share ownership. These results demonstrate the importance of board independence for corporate governance, and the way that expertise has been weaponised within managerial capitalism to encourage trust in risky and exploitative corporate structures.     

Audit Fee Differential,Audit Effort,and Litigation Risk: An Examination of ADR Firms

Prior studies find that audit fees are higher for cross‐listed firms, and these studies primarily attribute the incremental fees to added litigation costs. In this study, we investigate whether the higher audit fees that foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay are also attributable to incremental audit effort associated with U.S. disclosure requirements and a more stringent U.S. auditing environment. By comparing audit fees of foreign cross‐listed firms to U.S. domiciled firms and to non‐cross‐listed foreign firms, we are able to decompose incremental audit fees into portions attributable to added audit effort and to added litigation costs. We find that, on average, foreign firms cross‐listed in the United States pay significantly higher fees than domestic U.S. firms and foreign firms that do not cross‐list. Furthermore, we find that audit effort is almost as important as litigation costs in explaining the higher fees associated with foreign cross‐listed firms; our estimates suggest that between 29 percent and 48 percent of the incremental fees are attributable to incremental audit effort. In addition, the total cross‐listing premium is increasing in the difference between the U.S. auditing regulatory environment and that of the home country of the cross‐listed firm. Our study improves our understanding of the role of audit effort in explaining the added fees charged by auditors when foreign firms cross‐list in the United States.     

Globalizing activities and the rate of survival:: Panel data analysis on Japanese firms

This paper conducts a Cox-type survival analysis of Japanese corporate firms using census-coverage data collected by METI. A study of exiting firms confirmed several characteristics of Japanese firms in the 1990s. First, excessive internalization in the corporate structure and activities is harmful to corporate survival. Having too many establishments and affiliates weakens corporate performance. Efficient concentration on core competences increases the probability of survival. Second, global commitment helps Japanese firms be more competitive and more likely to survive. However, the channels of a firm's global commitment must be carefully selected. Small firms can benefit from exporting activities, though having foreign affiliates or conducting foreign outsourcing might aggravate their performance. Large firms, on the other hand, can conduct foreign direct investment and foreign outsourcing to possibly enhance the probability of their survival. Third, while corporate performance affects the choice of exits for affiliate firms, it does not affect the survival/exit of independent firms; suggesting the possible malfunctioning of the market mechanisms in the exits of independent firms. Fourth, we do not find any statistically significant evidence that firms with foreign shareholders are more likely to exit; there is little evidence of foot-loose behavior among foreign companies. J. Japanese Int. Economies 17 (4) (2003) 538–560.     

Corporate Cash Holding in Asia

In this paper, we analyze the determinants of corporate saving in the form of changes in cash holdings for 11 Asian economies using firm‐level data from the Oriana Database for the 2002–2011 period. We find some evidence that cash flow has a positive impact on the change in cash holdings (i.e. that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive) and that the positive impact of cash flow on the change in cash holdings is larger and more significant in the case of smaller and presumably more constrained firms than in the case of larger and presumably less constrained firms in both developed and developing economies. Both of these findings corroborate the importance of financial constraints in Asian firms. In addition, we find that the cash flow sensitivity of cash declined after the global financial crisis and that Tobin's q has a positive impact on the change in cash holdings, especially in the case of larger and presumably unconstrained firms.     

Do Exporting Firms Pay Higher Wages? Evidence from Kenya's Manufacturing Sector

Abstract: When trade liberalization was first embarked on in Kenya some 20 years ago, a key argument against it was that it would reduce domestic wages, as exporting firms sought to remain competitive versus, for example, the low‐cost Asian countries. A counter argument was that manufactured exports require more elaborate design, supervision, packaging and handling, and thus a more educated labor force than production for the domestic market. To attract such skills, exporting firms would need to pay higher wages than non‐exporting ones. This paper uses data from Kenyan manufacturing to study the impact of trade liberalization on earnings, distinguishing between exporting and non‐exporting firms. In particular, it investigates whether exporting firms paid a wage‐premium to their employees. The study uses manufacturing firm survey data from a World Bank regional project. The study has three important findings: (1) There was a large and significant effect of exporting on wages in the first decade of trade liberalization. During the first half of the 1990s, workers in exporting firms earned up to 30 percent more than those engaged in non‐exporting firms. The results are robust even after controlling for individual and firm‐level characteristics such as employee demographics, productivity, firm location and occupation. (2) After a decade of trade liberalization, exporting ceased to be a significant determinant of wages in Kenyan manufacturing, after controlling for productivity and firm location. (3) During the 2000s, casual or irregular employment became a more common feature of exporting firms. The results suggest that while higher wages were important in attracting skilled labor to exporting firms at the beginning of trade liberalization in the 1990s, domestic competition has since reduced the wage premium. Cost cutting pressures are instead reflected in the substitution of casual and low wage labor for permanent and better educated labor and in increased automation.     

Bankers on the Board,Market Competition,and Conflicts of Interest

Abstract

Bankers on the board are expected to act as a fund-raiser and to help lowering financial costs, but they can impose conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors. We empirically analyse the impact of banker-directors on corporate leverage and investment, using Korean firm data during the period from 2000 to 2012. Bankers on the board turn out to play different roles depending on market competition and macroeconomic circumstance. In less competitive industries where banks are less concerned about financial distress as a creditor, the presence of bankers on the board has higher leverage and more active investment, which can align with the interest of shareholders. However, in more competitive environment where firms are more concerned about financial distress and external financing, bankers on the board do not always increase leverage and investment, which can be divergent from the interest of shareholders.     

Outside Blockholders' Monitoring of Management and Debt Financing

Corporate governance mechanisms designed to alleviate manager‐shareholder agency conflicts can worsen shareholder‐bondholder conflicts. This study examines how one such corporate governance mechanism, monitoring by large outside shareholders, influences the choice between public and private debt. I conjecture and find that firms with higher outside blockholdings are inclined to choose bank loans over public debt when they borrow, consistent with the notion that banks are better monitors than public debt markets. I also find that bank loans carry less price protection than corporate bonds against increased agency risk associated with outside blocks. Corroborating the monitoring story, I document that bank loans contain more accounting‐based covenants and dividend restriction provisions for firms with higher outside blockholdings than for those with lower blockholdings. I find no such relation for public debt covenants. This supports that banks' monitoring of their loans counters the agency risk caused by blockholders. This study extends prior research that associates governance mechanisms with agency costs of debt, by incorporating lenders' differential monitoring mechanisms in the overall corporate governance system.     

The Relation Between Earnings Management and Non‐GAAP Reporting

Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability that a company will disclose a non‐GAAP adjusted earnings metric in its earnings press release and the likelihood that it will do so aggressively. We first investigate situations where managers already meet analysts’ expectations either based on strong operating performance or after employing real and accruals management. We find that when solid operating performance alone allows firms to meet expectations, managers do not employ earnings management or non‐GAAP reporting. However, when managers meet expectations using real and accruals management, they are significantly less likely to report a non‐GAAP earnings metric. Next, we explore scenarios where companies fall short of expectations. We find that when they just miss expectations after managing GAAP earnings, they are significantly more likely to employ non‐GAAP reporting, suggesting that the timing and relatively costless nature of non‐GAAP reporting allows managers to appear to meet expectations on a non‐GAAP basis when managed GAAP earnings fall short. Moreover, we find that companies are more likely to report non‐GAAP earnings (and to do so aggressively) when (i) they are unable to use real or accruals earnings management, (ii) are constrained by prior‐period accruals management, and (iii) their operating performance is poor. Taken together, our results are consistent with a substitute relation between non‐GAAP reporting and both real and accruals management.     

Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness

This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand‐collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk‐taking tendencies induced by political connections.     

The Spillover Effect of SEC Comment Letters on Qualitative Corporate Disclosure: Evidence from the Risk Factor Disclosure

In this study we use the recently mandated risk factor disclosure to examine the spillover effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) review of qualitative corporate disclosure. We find that firms not receiving any comment letter (“No‐letter Firms”) modify their subsequent year's disclosures to a larger extent if the SEC has commented on the risk factor disclosure of (i) the industry leader, (ii) a close rival, or (iii) numerous industry peers. We refer to this effect as “spillover.” Further, we find that after SEC comments on the industry leader's disclosure, No‐letter Firms also provide more firm‐specific disclosures in the subsequent year. The increased disclosure specificity reduces these firms’ likelihood of receiving SEC risk disclosure comments on their new filings. Our evidence suggests an indirect effect of the SEC review of qualitative disclosure.     

MANAGERIAL STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS GROUPS IN TAIWAN: THE INNER CIRCLE SYSTEM AND ITS SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

This paper examined the management structure of Taiwan's business groups. The objective was to determine how independent group firms coordinate their business. Employing longitudinal data of the top 100 groups, I investigated the “inner circle” system and its evolution. I found that group leaders occupied overlapped positions at the director rather than at the manager level, which implied a separation of strategic planning and routine administration. Secondly, the dynamics of inner circle management did not hinge upon the group president as in the Korean chaebol, nor on the norm of corporate community as in the Japanese keiretsu, but on the social ties in the inner circle. Analyzing the background of the leaders indicated that family never dominated the scene even in the early years, and their significance decreased along with environmental changes. The transition in Taiwan in the late 1980s motivated business groups to introduce more “outside” talent into decision‐making.     

CSR in an Asymmetric Duopoly with Environmental Externality

We investigate a linear state differential game describing an asymmetric Cournot duopoly with capacity accumulation á la Ramsey and a negative environmental externality (pollution), in which one of the firms has adopted corporate social responsibility (CSR) in its statute, and therefore includes consumer surplus and the environmental effects of production in its objective function. If the market is sufficiently large, the CSR firm sells more, accumulates more capital, and earns higher profits than its profit‐seeking rival.     

Corporate In‐house Tax Departments*

In‐house human capital tax investment is a significant input to a firm's tax decisions. Yet, due to the lack of data on corporate in‐house tax departments, there is little empirical evidence on how tax departments are associated with tax planning and compliance outcomes. We expect the size of tax departments to be positively associated with the effectiveness of tax planning and compliance. Using hand‐collected data on the number of corporate tax employees in S&P 1500 firms over the 2009–2014 period, we find that firms with larger tax departments are associated with lower and less volatile cash effective tax rates. Furthermore, using tax employees' specialization, we identify tax departments' relative focus on planning or compliance and document a trade‐off between tax avoidance and tax risk. Specifically, tax departments with more of a tax planning focus have incrementally greater tax avoidance but higher tax risk, whereas tax departments with more of a tax compliance focus have incrementally lower tax risk but higher tax rates. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by looking inside the “black box” of corporate tax departments and shedding light on the importance of human capital tax investment for tax outcomes.