Effect of CEO power and board strength on bank performance in China

Given that a powerful CEO is more likely to overcome problems and control performance in a firm, this study first focuses on exploring whether CEO power positively affects certain measures of bank performance and which sources of CEO power have these positive impacts. Next, this study further analyzes whether the positive impact of CEO power on performance is negatively mediated by board strength. Our sample includes data on the three main types of Chinese banks for 2006 to –2016.Our results show that CEO structural power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability, risk-taking ability and lending quality, CEO ownership power significantly raises a bank’s lending quality, and CEO expert power significantly increases a bank’s overall and shareholder profitability. As considering the endogeneity, CEO prestige power significantly improves a bank’s overall profitability. Next, we use the proportion of independent directors as our measure of board strength and find that a stronger board reduces the beneficial effects of CEO structural power on a bank’s lending quality, of CEO ownership power on shareholder profitability, and of CEO expert power on lending quality. There are similar harmful mediating effects when we use the proportion of foreign investors and board size as measures of board strength. Our results can help Chinese bank authorities develop policies to appropriately raise bank CEOs’ power and reduce board supervision of CEO power.     

Compensation negotiation and corporate governance: the evidence from China

This paper examines CEO pay dispersion for the listed companies in China. We apply a two-tier stochastic frontier model to the CEO compensation framework where asymmetric information generates a surplus between the minimum wage that CEOs accept and the maximum payment that firms offer. This surplus leads to CEO pay dispersion coming from the negotiation power between the CEO and the firm. We generate the surplus extracted by each CEO-firm pair and analyze how corporate governance affects them. An empirical analysis finds that: (1) On average, CEOs are paid 23.26% more than the benchmark; (2) additionally, we examine the bargaining power in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). We find that CEOs in SOEs have less bargaining power due to compensation regulations. We then examine compensation for new CEOs hired externally and find that CEOs hired externally have less bargaining power on average; and (3) corporate governance has a significant effect on the salary bargaining power of each agent. More specifically, the CEO-Chairman dummy has a significant positive effect on the bargaining power of firms and CEOs, but the latter is larger. Board size has a negative effect on both. Independent directors help improve the bargaining power of the firms and board meeting times help enhance the bargaining power of the CEOs. Equity concentration has a significant negative effect on both sides.     

The Relation between Strategy,CEO Selection,and Firm Performance

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence its selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value‐adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector‐type strategy) select a CEO with high social capital. We argue that uncertainty, driven by a firm's strategy, will determine the decision to select a CEO with high social capital; such CEOs can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty and thus can be valuable to the firm. However, prior research indicates that CEOs with high social capital can engage in behavior detrimental to firm value. To mitigate the potential for this to occur, we assess whether corporate governance can play a role in prospector firms who appoint CEOs with high social capital. Drawing on archival data of CEO successions over a 14‐year period, we find that prospector firms have greater incentives to appoint CEOs with high social capital. We also find that prospector firms who appoint a CEO with high social capital improve their performance. Furthermore, the value‐adding effect of this selection choice is stronger in prospector firms with good corporate governance.     

Powerful Chief Executive Officers and Firm Performance: Integrating Agency and Stewardship Theory

Do agency and stewardship behaviors coexist at firms, or does one dominate the other? We use data from listed companies in China over the period 2007–2016 to show that powerful chief executive officers (CEOs) simultaneously incur self‐interested agency costs while acting as stewards to benefit the firm. In balancing the push‐and‐pull forces of stewardship and agency behaviors, powerful CEOs in Chinese firms ultimately improve short‐term and long‐term firm performance. Our results have important implications for understanding how CEOs affect firms and how cultural factors can motivate CEOs to work in the interest of the firm.     

The CEO Arms Race

This article constructs a game‐theoretic model in which high chief executive officer (CEO) pay emerges as the outcome of an arms race, with each firm hiring a highly paid CEO to protect its competitive position against rivals who also hire highly paid CEOs. For an arms race to emerge, highly paid CEOs must generate idiosyncratic, privately known internal effects on profit, and CEO pay disparities must also generate asymmetric profit differences from external effects beyond the simple differences in pay. If the distribution of internal effects satisfies a key uniformity condition, an arms race emerges as the only equilibrium of the game.     

CEO Overconfidence and Stock Price Crash Risk

This study examines the association between chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence and future stock price crash risk. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects and misperceive negative net present value (NPV) projects as value creating. They also tend to ignore or explain away privately observed negative feedback. As a result, negative NPV projects are kept for too long and their bad performance accumulates, which can lead to stock price crashes. Using a large sample of firms for the period 1993–2010, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs have higher stock price crash risk than firms with nonoverconfident CEOs. The impact of managerial overconfidence on crash risk is more pronounced when the CEO is more dominant in the top management team and when there are greater differences of opinion among investors. Finally, it appears that the effect of CEO overconfidence on crash risk is less pronounced for firms with more conservative accounting policies.     

Female CEOs on Japanese corporate boards and firm performance

This paper examines the effects of female chief executive officers (CEOs) on firm performance. Using data on nonfinancial listed firms in Japan, we show that only 0.8% of some 42,000 firm-year observations have female CEOs. There is also little evidence that firms appoint more females as CEOs during our sample period. While the stock market reacts positively to the introduction of a firm's first female CEO, the relationship between CEO gender and firm accounting performance is generally not strong. However, when we classify the type of female CEO, the estimated coefficient for a founder female CEO and Tobin's Q is positive and significant.     

Management innovations in family firms after CEO successions: Evidence from Japanese SMEs

We examine management innovation of family and non-family firms after CEO successions by using data of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Japan. Consistent with predictions based on the resource-based view and agency theory, we find that family firms managed by non-family professional CEO successors are less innovative than those managed by family CEO successors or non-family firms. Further analyses indicate that limited access to family-based resources is a key determinant of the conservativeness of professional CEO successors. Our findings suggest the importance of the congruence of ownership and management in family firms due to CEOs’ access to family-based resources.     

CEO财务经历与企业创新——基于风险认知和融资能力的双重视角

财务行业是一个具有风险属性和资本属性的特殊行业，财务经历有助于塑造CEO良好的风险认知和融资能力。文章基于烙印理论，以2009-2018年A股上市公司为样本，从"风险认知烙印"和"融资能力烙印"双重视角研究了CEO财务经历对企业创新的影响及其机理。研究发现，CEO财务经历对企业创新有显著的正向影响；在采用PSM-DID、Heckman两阶段模型等控制内生性后，该结论亦成立。具体而言，CEO财务经历主要是通过发展CEO的"风险认知烙印"和"融资能力烙印"两种烙印效应来促进企业创新；CEO财务经历对企业创新的影响在CEO外部薪酬差距更大、CEO持股比例更高的企业中更为明显。文章的研究发现烙印效应可能是解释CEO财务经历影响企业创新的重要机制，这为上市公司制定科学合理的CEO聘任决策提供了相关理论依据。     

Making Sense of One Dollar CEO Salaries

We examine the determinants and outcomes of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) accepting a $1 salary, a compensation practice that occurs relatively frequently in high‐profile firms and is debated by regulators, investors, and the media. Using a hand‐collected sample of 93 CEOs from 91 firms between 1993 and 2011, we examine the triggers preceding the $1 salary decision, the factors associated with the decision, subsequent stock returns, and the outcomes for the CEOs. Our evidence is consistent with two explanations for the phenomenon: (i) it is a gesture of sacrifice by CEOs of firms in crisis, and (ii) it is a signal of better future performance by CEOs of growing firms. Our analyses highlight the two different circumstances and shed light on an interesting debate that has thus far been supported only by anecdotal evidence.     

Maintaining a Reputation for Consistently Beating Earnings Expectations and the Slippery Slope to Earnings Manipulation

This paper investigates whether maintaining a reputation for consistently beating analysts' earnings expectations can motivate executives to move from “within GAAP” earnings management to “outside of GAAP” earnings manipulation. We analyze firms subject to SEC enforcement actions and find that these firms consistently beat analysts' quarterly earnings forecasts in the three years prior to the manipulation period and continue to do so by smaller “beats” during the manipulation period. We find that manipulating firms beat expectations around 86 percent of the time in the 12 quarters prior to the manipulation period (versus 75 percent for control firms) and that manipulation often ends with a miss in expectations. We document that executives of manipulating firms face strong stock market and CEO pressure to perform. Prior to the manipulation period, these firms have high analyst optimism, growing institutional interest, and high market valuations, along with powerful CEOs. Further, we find that maintaining a reputation for beating expectations is more important than CEO overconfidence and is incremental to CEO equity incentives for explaining manipulation. Our results suggest that pressure to maintain a reputation for beating analysts' expectations can encourage aggressive accounting and, ultimately, earnings manipulation.     

CEO与CFO股权激励的治理效应之比较:基于盈余管理的实证研究

在西方发达国家,CFO与CEO拥有相同的法律地位,负有监督CEO的责任,在公司治理结构中拥有重要的地位。本文从盈余管理角度研究我国CFO股权激励的公司治理效应,并比较CFO与CEO股权激励的公司治理效应,发现:尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈负相关关系,而实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理的负相关关系显著变弱;尚未实施股权激励计划的公司,其CFO股权和期权占总薪酬比率对盈余管理抑制的程度显著小于CEO。这表明,正式实施股权激励会诱发盈余管理行为,其它类型的CFO持股则会抑制盈余管理行为,并且CFO股权激励的积极治理效应显著小于CEO。     

CEO Power,Internal Control Quality,and Audit Committee Effectiveness in Substance Versus in Form

During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or even eliminates the improvements in audit committee effectiveness resulting from independent and financially expert committee members. Thus, CEO power may result in an audit committee that appears effective in form but is not in substance. We construct a composite index for CEO power by combining ten CEO characteristics and employ the incidence of internal control weaknesses as a proxy for audit committee monitoring quality. Since all the firms in our sample have completely independent audit committees, we use financial expertise to examine the impact of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness. We find that, when CEO power is low, audit committee financial expertise is negatively associated with the incidence of internal control weaknesses. However, as CEO power increases, this association monotonically weakens. When CEO power reaches a sufficiently high level, this association is no longer negative. The moderating effect of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness is more prominent when the CEO extracts more rents from the firm through insider trading. Our results are not driven by the CEO's involvement in director selection. Our paper suggests that more expert audit committees in form do not automatically translate into more effective monitoring. Rather, the substantive monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is contingent on CEO power.     

The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures*

This study investigates whether and why compensation committees shield CEO compensation from income‐decreasing effects of strategic expenditures. We document that firms do shield recurring strategic expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenditures. We also find that firms shield research and development expenditures more than advertising expenditures. Our results are consistent with prior findings that suggest that compensation committees shield CEOs from nonroutine transactions such as restructuring charges and extraordinary losses. Using a two‐task principal‐agent framework, we show that such shielding improves the efficiency of the contract by making the shielded income measure more congruent with the principal's objectives.     

Accounting Information and CEO Compensation: The Role of Cash Flow from Operations in the Presence of Earnings*

We examine the role of cash flow from operations (CFO) in chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation. We predict that CFO is contract‐relevant in the presence of earnings, and more so when (1) the quality of earnings relative to the quality of CFO as a measure of performance is low and (2) the need for CFO as a financing source is high. Our analysis is motivated principally by normative arguments and anecdotes from financial disclosures linking CFO to managerial effort and contracts, notwithstanding the traditional role of earnings in performance measurement. We find that the weight of CFO in the compensation model is positive and significant in the presence of earnings and stock returns. We also find that the relative quality of CFO compared with that of earnings has a positive (negative) impact on the weight of CFO (earnings). We further find that the relative weight of CFO is enhanced substantially when enterprise activities crucially depend on internally generated cash flow. These findings are unaltered when we include CEO age, firm size, and risk in the model and allow the coefficients to vary across industries.     

江山靠谁守才不付东流?——控股家族非经济目标与经营权释出倾向实证研究

让子女接班还是将经营权释出给职业经理人,是代际传承时代背景下企业主的重要战略决策。文章基于委托代理理论,展示了家族/非家族高管在实现家族的非经济/经济目标上的各自优势,从控股家族非经济目标解释了企业CEO聘任决策,解构了能力与情感冲突的选择困境。根据全国工商联"中国非公有制经济健康状况评价"抽样调查数据发现,在家族成员与职业经理人都可兹聘任的情况下,那些更看重非经济目标的家族越不倾向于聘请职业经理人担任CEO作为企业下一代领导人。一代企业家的决策权力缺乏有效制衡将会强化非经济目标重要性与经营权释出之间的负效应;企业主与各级官员的频繁互动,加深社会联系巩固家族产权,有助于降低职业经理人的代理成本,显著地弱化非经济目标与经营权释出的负效用。文章的意义在于从控股家族所追求的目标解释为什么有的企业宁愿忍受企业绩效下降的经济后果仍然要雇佣家族成员担任CEO这个看似"非理性"现象。     

THE EFFICIENCY‐STABILITY TRADE‐OFF: THE CASE OF HIGH INTEREST RATE SPREADS IN VENEZUELA

This paper examines the determinants of the high intermediation spread observed in the Venezuelan banking sector during the 1990s (by far the largest in the Latin American region throughout the 1990s). We trace the evolution of the spread and its connection with other bank‐specific variables. A reduced‐form equation is estimated on the basis of a simple behavioral model for the banking firm previously developed by Shaffer and extended by Barajas, Steiner, and Salazar. Using different types of estimators for aggregate and pooled data of the financial system, we found that high spreads can be attributed to market power, high operating costs, and expected portfolio risk. The empirical results also suggest a trade‐off between assuring bank solvency and lowering profitability.     

The Effects of Governance on Classification Shifting and Compensation Shielding

Prior research (e.g., Dechow, Huson, and Sloan 1994 ) documents that, on average, compensation practices appear to shield CEO pay from income‐decreasing special items. In some circumstances, compensation shielding can be efficient. For example, it may encourage CEOs with earnings‐sensitive pay to take an action that reduces current earnings but nevertheless enhances value. Compensation shielding can be inefficient in other circumstances, such as when a board of directors is captured by an overly powerful CEO or the magnitude of negative special items has been overstated (e.g., by shifting core expenses into special items). This paper explores whether strong governance can explain cross‐sectional variation in compensation shielding, and whether stronger governance and auditing are associated with less shifting of expenses. We find that strong corporate governance mechanisms, as captured by board (and committee) independence, the Sarbanes‐Oxley (2002) Act (SOX) and its related governance reforms, and switches to Big 4 auditors, are all associated with less compensation shielding. While our evidence suggests that strong overall governance is associated with a reduction in manipulation of core earnings through classification shifting in the cross‐section, we find inconclusive evidence to suggest that board independence or SOX influence classification shifting.     

Common Institutional Ownership and Earnings Management*

This study examines the relation between earnings management and block ownership of same‐industry peer firms by a common set of institutional investors (common institutional ownership). This relation is important given the tremendous growth of common institutional ownership and the significant influence of blockholders on financial reporting. We hypothesize that common institutional ownership mitigates earnings management by enhancing institutions' monitoring efficiency and by encouraging institutions to internalize the negative externality of a firm's earnings management on peer firms' investments. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that higher common institutional ownership is related to less earnings management. Analyses of a quasi‐natural experiment based on financial institution mergers show that this negative relation is unlikely to be driven by the endogeneity of common institutional ownership. Cross‐sectional tests provide evidence that the negative relation is stronger among firms for which common institutional ownership is likely to generate a greater reduction in institutions' information acquisition and processing costs, and among firms whose severe financial misstatements are more likely to distort co‐owned peer firms' investments, supporting both mechanisms underlying our hypothesis. Our findings inform the ongoing debate on the costs and benefits of common institutional ownership by highlighting an important benefit: the enhanced monitoring of financial reporting.     

CEO narcissism and corporate performance in China

This study explores the relationship between chief executive officer (CEO) narcissism and corporate performance in China. Based on the Chinese institutional and cultural background, we introduce organizational innovation as a mediating variable and CEO power as a moderating variable. We find that CEO narcissism is positively related to corporate performance based on 275 companies listed on the growth enterprise market (GEM) from 2012 to 2020. Furthermore, organizational innovation plays a partially mediating role in the relationship between CEO narcissism and corporate performance, and the moderating role of CEO power is partially supported.