Monetary Policy and Borrowers’ Loan Defaults: Research Based on Data from Renrendai

This paper uses Renrendai data to study the relationship between monetary policy and the default behavior of borrowers, and analyzes the transmission channels. The research shows that tight monetary policy will lead to a significant increase in a borrower's probability to default, and this effect will continue for several months. There may be two transmission channels: (i) monetary policy changes a debtor's liquidity through credit and balance sheet channels, which directly affects their current repayment behavior; and (ii) monetary policy may affect a borrower's investment, production and profitability, thus changing their long‐term solvency. The paper also finds that the repayment behavior of productive borrowers is more susceptible to monetary policy than consumptive borrowers, and that the default behavior of borrowers in coastal provinces is more susceptible to monetary policy than of borrowers in inland provinces. These findings provide new evidence for understanding how monetary policy affects individual behavior and its transmission mechanisms.     

Hedge Fund Intervention and Accounting Conservatism

Hedge fund intervention has been associated with many positive corporate changes and is an important vehicle for informed shareholder monitoring. Effective monitoring has also been positively associated with accounting conservatism. Building upon these prior results, we predict an increase in accounting conservatism after hedge fund intervention. We use a large sample of hedge fund activist events and identify control firms with similar likelihoods of being targeted using the propensity score matching method to apply difference‐in‐difference tests. We find that when hedge fund activists have relatively large ownership and sufficient time to exert their monitoring power, target firms experience significant increases in conditional conservatism. CFO turnovers, upward/lateral auditor switches, and improvements in audit committee independence after intervention are accompanied by greater increases in conditional conservatism. Finally, we find greater increases in conditional conservatism when there is a lack of monitoring by dedicated institutional investors before the intervention. Our study suggests that hedge fund activists improve accounting monitoring tools and thus adds important new evidence on the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring on accounting practices.     

Accounting Accruals and Auditor Reporting Conservatism*

Accounting accruals are managers' subjective estimates of future outcomes and cannot, by definition, be objectively verified by auditors prior to occurrence. This causes audits of high-accrual firms to pose more uncertainty than audits of low-accrual firms because of potential estimation error and a greater chance that high-accrual firms have undetected asset realization and/or going concern problems that are related to the high level of accruals. One way that auditors can compensate for this risk exposure is to lower their threshold for issuing modified audit reports, an action that will increase modified reports and, therefore, lessen the likelihood of failing to issue a modified report when appropriate. We call this auditor reporting conservatism and test if high-accrual firms in the United States, are more likely to receive modified audit reports for asset realization uncertainties and going concern problems. Empirical results for a large sample of U.S. publicly listed companies support the hypothesis that auditors are more conservative, that is, more likely to issue both types of modified audit reports for high-accrual firms. Further analyses show that income-increasing accruals are somewhat more likely to result in reporting conservatism than income-decreasing accruals, and that only the Big Six group of auditors show evidence of reporting conservatism. These findings add to our understanding of the audit report formation process and the potentially important role played by accounting accruals in that process.     

Accounting Conservatism and Stock Price Crash Risk: Firm‐level Evidence

Using a large sample of U.S. firms during 1964–2007, we find that conditional conservatism is associated with a lower likelihood of a firm's future stock price crashes. This finding holds for multiple measures of conditional conservatism and crash risk and is robust to controlling for other known determinants of crash risk and firm‐fixed effects. Moreover, we find that the relation between conservatism and crash risk is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that conditional conservatism limits managers’ incentive and ability to overstate performance and hide bad news from investors, which, in turn, reduces stock price crash risk.     

Targets' Accounting Conservatism and the Gains from Acquisition*

We present evidence on the effects of target firms' accounting conservatism in a merger and acquisition transaction. Conservatism is distinct from other accounting or accrual quality constructs examined in prior work. Its unique features can lead to potential benefits for both the targets and the acquirers. The use of conservatism by targets reduces acquirers' risks of acquiring underperforming assets or overpaying for well-performing assets. In addition, targets' conservatism results in greater production of verifiable information that can help the acquirers better estimate and realize synergies of the combined firm. Consistent with these arguments, we find that firms with greater accounting conservatism are more likely to receive a bid. We also find that targets' conservatism increases the deal premium and the announcement returns of both the targets and the acquirers, respectively. Overall, these results indicate that conservatism provides benefits to both sellers and buyers of equity in an acquisition transaction.     

Accounting Conservatism and Performance Covenants: A Signaling Approach

This study examines the relation between performance covenants in private debt contracting and conservative accounting under adverse selection. We find that under severe adverse selection (i.e., high information asymmetry), accounting conservatism and performance covenants act as complements to signal that the borrower is unlikely to appropriate wealth from the lender. No such relation obtains in a low information asymmetry regime. We further show that in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants generally enjoy lower interest rate spreads than borrowers with low levels of conservatism and loose performance covenants. Consistent with our signaling theory, in the high information asymmetry regime, borrowers with high levels of conservatism and tight performance covenants are less likely to make abnormal payouts to shareholders. Our empirical results are robust to alternative measures of conservatism and covenant restrictiveness.     

The Application of Accounting Conservatism Principle in China

The accounting conservatism principle is a key principle observed in the enterprises＇ accounting and publishing information. The conservatism principle has been widely used in the accounting principles and the accounting systems. This paper aims at analyzing and discussing the practical application of the conservatism principle in China by combining the theory with practice.     

关于委托贷款核算的修正

委托贷款，是指由政府部门、企事业单位以及个人等委托人提供资金，由贷款人（受托人）根据委托人确定的对象、用途、金额、期限、利率等代为发放、监督、使用并协助收回的贷款。新的企业会计制度仍然将委托贷款视为投资，但在具体核算时又有别于短期和长期债权投资。     

Accounting Discretion and Managerial Conservatism: An Intertemporal Analysis*

Accounting discretion and the principle of conservatism are two salient features embedded in financial reporting systems. Arguably, the practice of conservative accounting choices can never be well understood without incorporating their effect on future periods (the intertemporal effect). This paper provides one explanation for managerial conservatism in a two‐period agency model with hidden information (a binary project type) and hidden actions (the agent's efforts). A piece‐wise linear incentive scheme with accounting earnings as the performance measure is employed. The agent's discretion is the choice of a depreciation method. Discretion is valuable if and only if the agent's marginal productivity of a “bad” project is greater than that of a “good” project, but not to an extreme degree. A conservative depreciation method decreases current compensation in exchange for a “bet” on future compensation and, hence, serves as a commitment device for the agent to signal that the prospect is indeed good. The accounting mechanism replicates the performance of the optimal direct mechanism.     

制度变迁、投资者保护与会计稳健性

文章试图揭示伴随资本市场制度变迁以及投资者保护力度的加大,一种重要的会计信息质量特征———会计稳健性历史演变的内在逻辑。研究发现,在2007年之前,随着我国资本市场制度变迁及投资者法律保护力度的加大,我国上市公司会计稳健性相应呈现出阶段递增的特征;但是随着新的企业会计准则在上市公司施行,自2007年开始会计稳健性不再显著,公允价值应用范围的扩大可能对会计稳健性起到了消极作用。因此,提出的政策建议是,在修订会计准则内容,提高会计信息相关性的同时,会计信息的其他质量特征也是需要关注的问题;提高会计信息质量不但有赖于会计制度改革,法律、公司治理等基础制度设施的建设也是不可缺少的。     

Accounting Conservatism and the Temporal Trends in Current Earnings’ Ability to Predict Future Cash Flows versus Future Earnings: Evidence on the Trade‐off between Relevance and Reliability*

This research reports that an increasing level of accounting conservatism over the 1973–2005 period is associated with: (1) an increase in the ability of current earnings to predict future cash flows and (2) a decrease in the ability of current earnings to predict future earnings. We also find that usefulness of earnings for explaining stock prices over book values is positively related to reliability but not to relevance. Our results hold for the constant and full samples in both in‐sample and out‐of‐sample analyses and are robust to the use of alternative measures for relevance, reliability, earnings usefulness, and conservatism. Our findings about the relations among conservatism, relevance, reliability, and usefulness suggest a trade‐off between relevance and reliability and seem to indicate that the adoption of an increasing number of conservative accounting standards has a possible adverse impact on earnings usefulness through a negative effect on reliability.