Market participation in delegated and intrinsic common‐agency games

We study how competition in nonlinear pricing between two principals (sellers) affects market participation by a privately informed agent (consumer). When participation is restricted to all or nothing (“intrinsic” agency), the agent must choose between both principals' contracts and selecting her outside option. When the agent is afforded the additional possibilities of choosing only one contract (“delegated” agency), competition is more intense. The two games have distinct predictions for participation. Intrinsic agency always induces more distortion in participation relative to the monopoly outcome, and equilibrium allocations are discontinuous for the marginal consumer. Under delegated agency, relative to monopoly, market participation increases (respectively, decreases) when contracting variables are substitutes (respectively, complements) on the intensive margin. Equilibrium allocations are continuous for the marginal consumer and the range of product offerings is identical to both the first‐best and the monopoly outcome.     

Competitive cross‐subsidization

Cross‐subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative advantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co‐opetition, as they offer substitutes for one‐stop shoppers and complements for multi‐stop shoppers. When intense competition for one‐stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, firms subsidize weak products with the profits made on strong products. Moreover, firms have incentives to seek comparative advantages on different products. Finally, banning below‐cost pricing increases firms' profits at the expense of one‐stop shoppers, which calls for a cautious use of below‐cost pricing regulations in competitive markets.     

Ordering,revenue and anchoring in art auctions

We estimate the effect of ordering by value on revenues in sequential art auctions held by Sotheby's and Christie's. We exploit a pre determined rotation of which of these two houses holds their auction first during auction week in New York City. When the house that goes first has relatively expensive paintings compared to the other house, we find that the sale premium for the week is around 21% higher relative to the mean sale premium, and the fraction of paintings sold during the week is around 11% higher. We provide evidence that this is due to an anchoring effect.     

Local Dividend Clienteles

We exploit demographic variation to identify the effect of dividend demand on corporate payout policy. Retail investors tend to hold local stocks and older investors prefer dividend‐paying stocks. Together, these tendencies generate geographically varying demand for dividends. Firms headquartered in areas in which seniors constitute a large fraction of the population are more likely to pay dividends, initiate dividends, and have higher dividend yields. We also provide indirect evidence as to why managers may respond to the demand for dividends from local seniors. Overall, these results are consistent with the notion that the investor base affects corporate policy choices.     

An empirical analysis of strategic competition and firm values the case of R&D competition

We operationalize a firm's competitive strategy through a new empirical measure, and develop a framework for empirical analysis of the market value of strategic behavior. Using this framework, we study announcement effects of R&D spending. The announcing firm's stock prices are positively influenced by a change in spending, and negatively by our competitive strategy measure (CSM). Competitors' stock prices are positively influenced by the interaction between the market's reaction to the announcing firm and the CSM. Our results are consistent with positive effects of ‘accommodating’ competition with strategic substitutes, and nonpositive effects of ‘tough’ competition with strategic complements.     

Optimal contracts for research agents

We study the agency problem between a firm and its research employees under several scenarios characterized by different Research and Development (R&D) unit setups. In a multiagent dynamic contracting setting, we describe the precise pattern of the optimal contract. We illustrate that the optimal incentive regime is a function of how agents' efforts interact with one another: relative performance evaluation is used when their efforts are substitutes, whereas joint performance evaluation is used when their efforts are complements. The optimal contract pattern provides a theoretical justification for the compensation policies used by firms that rely on R&D.     

Household Life Insurance Demand

Abstract

What types of households own life insurance? Who owns term life and who owns whole life insurance? These are questions of great interest to insurers that operate in a highly competitive market. To answer these questions, we jointly examine household demand of two types of insurance, term and whole life, using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, a probability sample of the U.S. population. We model both the frequency and the severity of demand for insurance, building on the work of Lin and Grace by using explanatory variables that they developed. For the frequency portion, the household decisions about whether to own term and whole life insurance are modeled simultaneously with a bivariate probit regression model. Given ownership of life insurance by a household, the amounts of insurance are analyzed using generalized linear models with a normal copula. The copula permits the bivariate modeling of insurance amounts for households who own both term and whole life insurance, about 20% of our sample. These models allow analysts to predict who owns life insurance and how much they own, an important input to the marketing process.

Moreover, our findings suggest that household demand for term and whole life insurance is jointly determined. After controlling for explanatory variables, there exists a negative relationship for a household’s decision to own both whole and term life insurance (the frequency part) and a positive relationship for the amount of insurance purchased (the severity part). This indicates that the greater the probability of holding one type, the smaller the probability of holding the other type of life insurance. However, higher demand for both types of insurance exists when a household decides to own both. This mixed effect extends prior work that established a negative relationship, suggesting that term life insurance and whole life insurance are substitutes for one another. In contrast, our findings reveal that the ownership decision involves substitution, but, for households owning both types of insurance, amounts are positively related. Therefore, term and whole life insurance are substitutes in the frequency yet complements in the severity.     

Timing of bids at pooled real estate auctions

When many similar properties are being auctioned, auctioneers often resort to the pooled design. The winning bidder of a given round is given a choice among all the unclaimed (pooled) properties. Bidding strategy depends on expectations of rival bidders' behavior as well as personal valuation. Anecdotal evidence from condominium auctions suggests that bidding decisions can produce price anomalies. This study develops a simple theoretical model with three active bidders and three units for sale to show how such anomalies may emerge. Estimation is then made of a hedonic price model using data from a condominium auction of 53 units on three separate dates. The empirical results support the view that the best buys are found in the middle of the auction with overpayments at the beginning and end.     

Does regulation substitute or complement governance?

We examine whether firms utilize governance systems and increased monitoring mechanisms when information asymmetry and managerial discretion are limited. Given that such monitoring is costly, we expect regulated firms to use less monitoring if regulation substitutes for governance. Using data from initial public offerings, we document that regulated firms have greater proportions of monitoring directors and larger boards as well as use similar amounts of equity-based compensation as non-regulated firms. Further, regulated and unregulated firms are analogous in terms of observed trade-offs between traditional monitoring mechanisms and insider ownership. Finally, regulated firms appear to decrease monitoring following a period of deregulation. These findings support the hypothesis that regulation and governance are complements and are consistent with the notion that regulators pressure firms to adopt effective monitoring structures.     

Product market competition,competitive strategy,and analyst coverage

This paper examines how product market competition and strategic interactions among peer firms influence analyst coverage. First, we hypothesize that product market competition increases both the demand and supply of analyst coverage. Using three variations of industry concentration ratios and a firm specific measure of competition, we test and find a positive and significant effect of market competition on analyst coverage. Second, we explore an information transfer channel through which product market affects analyst coverage. We hypothesize that information flows more freely among firms selling similar products. Such information flows lowers analyst information collection and processing costs, which in turn increases analyst coverage. Using product similarity index developed by Hoberg and Phillips (J Polit Econ 124(5):1423–1465, 2016) to capture the effect of information transfer, we find that analyst coverage increases with product similarity. Third we examine the role of competitive strategy in analyst coverage. We split our sample into markets of strategic complements and strategic substitutes. We find that the effect of market competition and analyst coverage is more pronounced in markets where firms compete as strategic complements.     

Migration and Trade: Complements or Substitutes? Evidence from Turkish Migration to Germany

This study investigates whether migration and trade can be regarded as complements or substitutes using the data on Turkish migration to Germany for the period 1963-2004. In contrast to previous studies that investigated this question using gravity equations, we conduct our analysis using the cointegration framework. In line with the previous literature, our results support the view that migration and trade are complements.     

Estimating product market competition: Methodology and application

In oligopolies, firms behave strategically and commit to actions that elicit favorable responses from rivals. Firm actions consequently are a function of the nature of these strategic interactions. In this paper, we develop a methodology for the empirical estimation of strategic interactions in product markets. We then apply our measure of strategic interactions to CEO compensation. We use quarterly data on profits and sales from Compustat to estimate the slope of firm’s reaction function. When the slope is negative and marginal profits decrease with an increase in the rival’s actions the firm is classified as a strategic substitute. When the slope is positive and marginal profits increase with an increase in the rival’s actions the firm is classified as a strategic complement. As predicted by theory, we find significant evidence that strategic substitutes decrease the pay for performance incentives of their CEOs. On the other hand, strategic complements significantly increase CEO pay for performance incentives. The empirical measure developed can be used to test a wide variety of strategic models.     

Money,Bonds, and the Liquidity Trap

This paper examines a search model of money and public bonds in which coordination frictions lead to multiple, Pareto ranked equilibria. Whether money and bonds are substitutes or complements, is not a primitive of the economy, but an equilibrium outcome. There exists an equilibrium resembling a liquidity trap, in which money and bonds are perfect substitutes, interest rates are zero, and monetary policy is ineffective; and a superior equilibrium in which money and bonds are complements, interest rates are positive and monetary policy has a liquidity effect. On this view, the liquidity trap is a belief-driven phenomenon.     

Laffer effect, gross substitution, marginal cost of public funds and the level property of public good provision

This paper examines the Laffer effect in the Ramsey tax-model with linear consumption taxes and a representative consumer. It is assumed that the private goods and the public good are weakly separable. It is demonstrated that if all of the private goods are weak gross complements to each other, then the Laffer effect does not exist, in other words, higher tax rates can always achieve more tax revenue. In contrast, if all of the private goods are strict gross substitutes, then the Laffer effect does exist. Moreover, if all of the private goods are weak gross substitutes, then the government cannot fully acquire the leisure endowment through taxes on consumption goods. We also show that gross substitution works to raise the marginal cost of public funds.     

Public trust,the law,and financial investment

How does trust evolve in markets? What is the optimal level of regulation and how does this affect trust formation and economic growth? In a theoretical model, we analyze these questions, given the value of social capital and the potential for growth in the market. When social capital is valuable, regulation and trustfulness are substitutes. In this case, regulation may cause lower aggregate investment and decreased economic growth. When the social capital is less valuable, regulation and trustfulness may be complements. In the paper, we analyze the optimal level of regulation and highlight the novel predictions of the model.     

The demand for stocks: an analysis of IPO auctions

We analyze a unique dataset that includes the full demand schedulesof 27 Israeli IPOs that were conducted as nondiscriminatory(uniform price) auctions. To the best of our knowledge, thisis the first time the whole demand schedule for any asset isdescribed. The demand schedules are relatively flat around theauction clearing price: The average elasticity is 27. The elasticityis low when the return distribution contains a large uniquecomponent. We also find a significant average abnormal returnof 4.5% on the first trading day and a positive correlationbetween the abnormal return and the elasticity of demand.     

Designing electricity auctions

Motivated by the new auction format in the England and Wales electricity market, as well as the recent debate in California, we characterize bidding behavior and market outcomes in uniform and discriminatory electricity auctions. Uniform auctions result in higher average prices than discriminatory auctions, but the ranking in terms of productive efficiency is ambiguous. The comparative effects of other market design features, such as the number of steps in suppliers' bid functions, the duration of bids, and the elasticity of demand are analyzed. We also consider the relationship between market structure and market performance in the two auction formats.     

Incentives,wages, employment,and the division of labor in teams

We develop a theory of incentives, wages, and employment in the context of team production. A central insight is that specialization and division of labor not only improve productivity but also increase effort and the sensitivity of effort to incentives under moral hazard. We show that employment and incentives are complements for the principal when the positive effects of specialization and division of labor outweigh the increase in risk associated with additional employment and are substitutes otherwise. We provide new characterizations of the partnership, the firm, and the role of the budget‐breaker that are quite different from the classical literature.     

Linking wealth and labour income with stock returns and government bond yields

In this paper, I assess the predictive ability of the ratio of asset wealth to labour income for both stock returns and government bond yields. Using data for 16 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, I show that when the wealth-to-income ratio falls, investors demand a higher stock risk premium. A similar link can be found for government bond yields when agents behave in a non-Ricardian manner or see government bonds as complements for stocks. In contrast, when investors display a Ricardian behaviour or perceive stocks and government bonds as good substitutes, a fall in the wealth-to-income ratio is associated with a fall in future bond premium.     

Do leases expand debt capacity?

Theoretically and empirically, debt and leases have been shown to be both substitutes and complements. To explore the relation, we divide our sample into two subsets: those that exhibit a complementary relation (43% increase debt after increasing leases), and those that exhibit a substitutionary relation (57% decrease debt after increasing leases). For complement firms, we find a significant negative relation between leasing and the firm's size, marginal tax rate, and z-score, consistent with “complementary” theories. For substitute firms, we find a positive and significant relation between leasing, the marginal tax rate and changes in cash. We also find a significant positive stock market reaction to the announcement of the SLB, which is stronger for the complement subset of firms.