The implied cost of equity capital,corporate investment and chief executive officer turnover

This study investigates how the cost of equity capital, along with corporate investment, affects chief executive officer (CEO) turnover decisions. We hypothesize that the cost of equity conveys information about firm performance uncertainty that is informative of CEO talent. Consistently, our empirical results show that the likelihood of CEO turnover is positively associated with the implied cost of equity, after controlling for earnings and stock performance measures and risk factors. Additional analysis of reverse causality supports the causal effect of the high cost of equity on CEO dismissals. We also find that the positive association is more pronounced for firms that are more likely to suffer from underinvestment problems. These results suggest that the cost of equity plays a more important role in assessing CEO performance when the firm needs more external equity capital to pursue investment opportunities.     

The chief strategy officer

They're nominally and ultimately responsible for strategy, but today's CEOs have less and less time to devote to it. As a result, CEOs are appointing "chief strategy officers"--executives specifically tasked with creating, communicating, executing, and sustaining a company's strategic initiatives. In this article, three authors from Accenture share the results of their research on this emerging organizational role. The typical CSO or top strategy executive is not a pure strategist, conducting long-range planning in relative isolation. Most CSOs consider themselves doers first, with the mandate, credentials, and desire to act as well as advise. They are seasoned executives with a strong strategy orientation who have usually worn many operations hats before taking on the role. Strategy executives are charged with three critical jobs that together form the very definition of strategy execution. First, they must clarify the company's strategy for themselves and for every business unit and function, ensuring that all employees understand the details of the strategic plan and how their work connects to corporate goals. Second, CSOs must drive immediate change. The focus of the job almost always quickly evolves from creating shared alignment around a vision to riding herd on the ensuing change effort. Finally, a CSO must drive decision making that sustains organizational change. He or she must be that person who, in the CEO's stead, can walk into any office and test whether the decisions being made are aligned with the strategy and are creating the desired results. When decisions below the executive suite aren't being made in accordance with strategy, much of the CSO's job involves learning why and quickly determining whether to stay the course or change tack.     

Government integrity and corporate investment efficiency

We explore the relation between government integrity and firms’ investment efficiency in the context of China’s deepening reforms and its strengthening the social credit system. We find that government integrity is positively associated with the investment efficiency of listed companies in China. Government integrity is negatively related to corporate underinvestment, but insignificantly related to corporate overinvestment. Higher government integrity reduces underinvestment in non-state-owned firms, but this relation is not significant in state-owned firms. Furthermore, we find that the negative relation between government integrity and underinvestment is only significant for firms in industries that receive supportive government policies. This study enriches research on corporate investment by adopting the perspective of government integrity, and supplements the literature on government integrity and its economic consequences. Our study also provides micro-level empirical evidence that strengthening government integrity will promote the economic transformation of China.     

Political connections,financial constraints,and corporate investment

This study investigates whether firms politically connected to the ruling party can mitigate financial constraints and increase their investments. Data on Taiwan-listed companies from 1991 to 2010 are used to answer the preceding issue. Results indicate that firms connected to the ruling party that transitioned into power can mitigate financial constraints, but results do not hold for firms connected to the opposition party that transitioned out of power. Firms connected to both parties have similar results with those connected to the ruling party, but the diminishing effect is weaker than those connected to the ruling party. Results further indicate that financially constrained firms can increase their investment when they have political connections to the ruling party. Finally, firms with strong connections can reduce financial constraints more effectively.     

Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies

French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.     

The influence of foreign equity and board membership on corporate strategy and internal cost management in Portuguese banks

This study examines the influence of foreign equity and board membership on corporate strategy and the management of internal costs of banks headquartered in Portugal using proprietary data maintained by the Central Bank. The findings reveal that foreign equity reduces both total and operating costs, and foreign board membership reduces domestic banks’ dependence on revenues from traditional areas of business and enhances the potential for generating revenues from non-traditional areas of business. These results are controlled for a variety of standard accounting ratios used in the literature. We argue that foreign equity and board membership forces banks to redirect corporate strategy and to reduce internal costs.     

The construction of calculative expertise: The integration of corporate governance into investment analyses by sell-side financial analysts

This study analyses an emerging form of economic calculation in financial markets, namely, the integration of corporate governance into investment analyses undertaken by sell-side financial analysts. It examines how the expertise of these analysts in corporate governance integration is constructed, with particular attention to the calculative ideas and calculative devices through which it is achieved. Corporate governance integration is shaped by certain ‘calculative ideas’. These relate to ideas about the potential link between corporate governance and financial performance and the ideal of incorporating governance criteria into the investment process. This paper suggests that these calculative ideas have constituted the discursive conditions under which analysts sought to build their expertise in a new domain. The paper also shows that at a time when the quality of traditional sell-side research was scrutinised, the investment professional association and constituents of the investing public, through their arguments and discourses, constructed analysts as the ‘specialists’ having the imperative and credibility to perform corporate governance integration. Furthermore, as the paper demonstrates, analysts have sought to ‘theorize’ calculative ideas. They have normatively deployed certain ‘calculative devices’ to make corporate governance integration operational. Corporate governance integration is conducted in ways that make it receptive to the claims of a particular form of expertise, that of analysts. This paper suggests that it is through the assemblage formed over time between the ideas and aspirations on the one hand, and the tools and devices on the other, that the expertise of analysts in corporate governance integration has gradually been formed.     

金融危机后的泰国银行业公司治理

本文在简要回顾1997年东南亚金融危机爆发后泰国政府和银行业为加强银行公司治理而采取的措施基础上,分析了泰国银行业公司治理的现状与不足,并应用制度经济学的相关理论对泰国银行业公司治理的改革前景进行了展望。     

金融企业文化的推动力

代表先进化的前进方向，具体到金融企业，就是要建设独具自身特色的金融企业化。这既是学习贯彻“三个代表”重要思想的需要，也是增强金融企业核心竞争力，使金融企业走可持续发展之路的客观要求。金融企业化是社会化的一个重要组成部分，它是以为人中心的现代管理理论，通过运用各种化的力量和手段来实施金融企业管理、增强金融企业的     

The impact of foreign board membership on firm value

This study examines the effect of foreign (Anglo-American) board membership on corporate performance measured in terms of firm value (Tobin’s Q). Using a sample of firms with headquarters in Norway or Sweden the study indicates a significantly higher value for firms that have outsider Anglo-American board member(s), after a variety of firm-specific and corporate governance related factors have been controlled for. We argue that this superior performance reflects the fact that these companies have successfully broken away from a partly segmented domestic capital market by “importing” an Anglo-American corporate governance system. Such an “import” signals a willingness on the part of the firm to expose itself to improved corporate governance and enhances its reputation in the financial market.     

Second in command: the misunderstood role of the chief operating officer

Asking the question,"What makes a great COO?" is akin to asking "What makes a great candidate for U.S. vice president?" It all depends on the first name on the ticket--the CEO. New research sheds light on this most contingent, and most mysterious, of C-suite jobs. After in-depth conversations with dozens of executives who have held the position and with CEOs who have worked with COOs, the authors have concluded that different views of the COO role arise from the different motives behind creating the position in the first place. There are seven basic reasons why companies decide to hire a COO: to implement the CEO's strategy; to lead a particular initiative, such as a turnaround; to mentor a young, inexperienced CEO; to complement the strengths or make up for the weaknesses of the CEO; to provide a partner to the CEO; to test out a possible successor; or to stave off the defection of a highly valuable executive, particularly to a rival. This tremendous variation implies that there is no standard set of great COO attributes, which makes finding suitable candidates difficult for companies and recruiters alike. Still, certain common success factors came up consistently in the interviews, the most important being building a high level of trust between CEO and COO. Trust comes from meeting obligations on both sides: The COO must truly support the CEO's vision; keep ego in check; and exhibit strong execution, coaching, and coordination skills. The CEO must communicate faithfully, grant real authority and decision rights, and not stymie the COO's career. It's surprising that COOs are not more common. They would be, the authors contend, if there were less confusion surrounding the role. As we continue to demystify that role, more companies will benefit from more effective leadership.     

央行高官谈金融热点

两会"为中国官员们提供了一个发布各自重要信息的重要平台和绝佳机会,此间,政府官员们有关人民币汇率、证券市场等的最新表态及相关信息披露,哪怕是只言片语,也会被海内外媒体广泛报道,更别说专题新闻发布会了.     

The impact of corporate governance on Internet financial reporting

This study examines the association between corporate governance mechanisms and disclosure transparency measured by the level of Internet financial reporting (IFR) behavior. We measure corporate governance by shareholder rights, ownership structure, board composition, and audit committee characteristics. We develop a disclosure index to measure the extent of each sample firm’s IFR by presentation format, information content, and corporate governance disclosures. Results indicate that firms with weak shareholder rights, a lower percentage of blockholder ownership, a higher percentage of independent directors, a more diligent audit committee, and a higher percentage of audit committee members that are considered financial experts are more likely to engage in IFR. The findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms influence a firm’s Internet disclosure behavior, presumably in response to the information asymmetry between management and investors and the resulting agency costs. Additional exploratory analysis indicates that the association between corporate governance and IFR varies with firm size. Our results suggest that new regulatory guidance in corporate governance leads to improved disclosure transparency via IFR.     

The effect of financial constraints,investment policy,product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.     

The impact of assets-in-place on corporate financing and investment decisions

In a dynamic setting with asymmetric information we consider firms’ debt-equity choice and investment timing. We extend recent research by adding an abandonment option and assets-in-place and we show that these extensions make debt more attractive. This implies, e.g., that mature firms (with larger assets-in-place) mainly use debt financing, whereas young high-growth firms (without assets-in-place) frequently use equity financing and signal their type by early investment. Simulation analyses confirm this and our model is thus able to explain empirical patterns which contradict the static pecking order theory.     

The effect of financial reporting quality on corporate dividend policy

This study examines how financial reporting quality affects corporate dividend policy. We find that higher quality reporting is associated with higher dividends. This positive association is more pronounced among firms with more severe free cash flow problems and among firms with higher ownership by monitoring-type institutional investors. Further analysis of the relation between reporting quality and under?/over-payment of dividends suggests that reporting quality largely mitigates underpayment of dividends. Additionally, both a granger causality test and a difference-in-difference analysis of dividend changes around a quasi-exogenous reporting event yield evidence consistent with the direction of causality going from financial reporting to dividends. Overall, these findings are consistent with financial reporting quality acting as a governance mechanism that induces managers to pay dividends by disciplining free cash flow problems. Our findings support the view that dividends are the result of enhanced monitoring (Jensen 1986; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 2000).     

The Sarbanes-Oxley act and corporate investment: A structural assessment

We assess the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on corporate investment in an investment Euler equation framework. We allow a dummy for the passage of the Act to affect the rate at which managers discount future investment payoffs. Using generalized method of moments estimators, we find that the rate U.S. firm managers apply to discount investment projects rises significantly after 2002, while the discount rate for U.K. firms remains unchanged. The effects of the legislation on corporate investment are asymmetric, and are much more significant among relatively small firms. We also find that well-governed firms, firms with a credit rating, and accelerated filers of Section 404 of the Act have become more cautious about investment.     

The informational efficiency and the financial crashes

The evolution of the daily informational efficiency is measured for different stock market indices (Japanese, Malaysian, Russian, Mexican, and the US markets) by using the local entropy and the symbolic time series analysis. There is some evidence that for different stock markets, the probability of having a crash increases as the informational efficiency decreases. Further results suggest that the latter probability also increases for jumping to a less efficient market. In addition, the US stock market seems to be the most structurally efficient and the Russian is the most inefficient, maybe because is a young market, recently established in 1995.