European Mutual Fund Performance

This paper presents an overview of the European mutual fund industry and investigates mutual fund performance using a survivorship bias controlled sample of 506 funds from the five most important mutual fund countries. The latter is done using the Carhart (1997) 4-factor asset-pricing model. In addition we investigate whether European fund managers exhibit 'hot hands', persistence in performance. Finally the influence of fund characteristics on risk-adjusted performance is considered. Our overall results suggest that European mutual funds, and especially small cap funds are able to add value, as indicated by their positive after cost alphas. If we add back management fees, four out of five countries exhibit significant out-performance at an aggregate level. Finally, we detect strong persistence in mean returns for funds investing in the UK. Our results deviate from most US studies that argue mutual funds under-perform the market by the amount of expenses they charge.     

Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund Performance

Using a comprehensive hedge fund database, we examine the role of managerial incentives and discretion in hedge fund performance. Hedge funds with greater managerial incentives, proxied by the delta of the option-like incentive fee contracts, higher levels of managerial ownership, and the inclusion of high-water mark provisions in the incentive contracts, are associated with superior performance. The incentive fee percentage rate by itself does not explain performance. We also find that funds with a higher degree of managerial discretion, proxied by longer lockup, notice, and redemption periods, deliver superior performance. These results are robust to using alternative performance measures and controlling for different data-related biases.     

封闭式基金折价与管理绩效的实证研究

本文基于管理绩效理论,对我国封闭式基金折价现象进行实证研究。管理绩效理论认为,封闭式基金折价反映了投资者对于基金未来过低的管理能力的理性预期,未来管理绩效越差,折价越大。本文使用了多种基金绩效度量模型,分别采用引入时间哑变量和除去时间均值混合OLS回归方法以及Fama-Macbeth横截面回归方法,验证了折价率和未来管理绩效之间的关系。结果显示,封闭式基金折价和溢价反映了市场对于基金未来管理绩效的预期;当期折价率和未来管理绩效之间存在显著的正向关系,尤其在未来一个季度的时间内;这种关系不受非同步性交易效应和基金异质性的影响。本文同时发现,折价率对于未来管理绩效的解释能力强于过去的管理绩效对于未来管理绩效的解释能力。     

Conditioning Information and European Bond Fund Performance

In this paper we evaluate the performance of European bond funds using unconditional and conditional models. As conditioning information we use variables that we find to be useful in predicting bond returns in the European market. The results show that, in general, bond funds are not able to outperform passive strategies. These findings are robust to whatever model (unconditional versus conditional and single versus multi‐index) we use. The multi‐index model seems to add some explanatory power in relation to the single‐index model. Furthermore, when we incorporate the predetermined information variables, we can observe a slight tendency towards better performance. This evidence is consistent with previous studies on stock funds and comes in support of the argument that conditional models might allow for a better assessment of performance. However, our results suggest that the impact of additional risk factors seems to be greater than the impact of incorporating predetermined information variables.     

The Mismatch Between Mutual Fund Scale and Skill

I demonstrate that skill and scale are mismatched among actively managed equity mutual funds. Many mutual fund investors confuse the effects of fund exposures to common systematic factors with managerial skill when allocating capital among funds. Active mutual funds with positive factor-related past returns thus accumulate assets to the point that they significantly underperform. I also show that the negative aggregate benchmark-adjusted performance of active equity mutual funds is driven mainly by these oversized funds.     

Time‐Varying Fund Manager Skill

We propose a new definition of skill as general cognitive ability to pick stocks or time the market. We find evidence for stock picking in booms and market timing in recessions. Moreover, the same fund managers that pick stocks well in expansions also time the market well in recessions. These fund managers significantly outperform other funds and passive benchmarks. Our results suggest a new measure of managerial ability that weighs a fund's market timing more in recessions and stock picking more in booms. The measure displays more persistence than either market timing or stock picking alone and predicts fund performance.     

证券投资基金费用与管理质量实证研究

通过对证券投资基金费用与基金绩效之间关系的检验,发现对于管理质量好的基金,基金费用和绩效负相关.与此相反,对于管理质量差的基金,基金费用与绩效正相关.此外,基金费用确实存在规模经济,这反映了当前证券投资基金业中的基金数量少,便于监管,费用设置较为合理.这些结论与以下观点一致,即保护股东利益的独立董事可能起到了应有的作用.     

Managerial Ability, Compensation, and the Closed-End Fund Discount

This paper shows that the existence of managerial ability, combined with the labor contract prevalent in the industry, implies that the closed‐end fund discount should exhibit many of the primary features documented in the literature. We evaluate the model's ability to match the quantitative features of the data, and find that it does well, although there is some observed behavior that remains to be explained.     

Investment Decisions and Managerial Performance Evaluation

This paper considers incentive provisions for a manager who makes investment decisions. The manager's performance measure can be based on current accounting information: cash flow, depreciation, book value, and current investment. We argue that Residual Income is the unique (linear) performance measure that achieves goal congruence, i.e., the manager accepts all positive NPV projects, and only those. If the manager has the same discount rate as the owner, the depreciation rules remain indeterminate. However, if the manager's discount rate assumes potentially a whole range of values, then a particular depreciation policy combined with Residual Income is the unique way to achieve goal congruence.     

政府创业投资引导基金运作管理模式研究

本文从政府创业投资引导基金的扶持对象和扶持方式、组织机构和职能、利益分配和退出方式、监督和风险防范等方面设计政府创投引导基金的运行管理模式,探讨建立引导基金的运行机制、内部控制和激励机制,完善公司治理,加强监督和风险防范,防止内部人控制和道德风险,以保证政府引导基金的功能、效率和安全,确保国有资本的保值增值和再投资的良性循环。     

Managerial Entrenchment and Corporate Social Performance

Abstract:  We examine empirically the relationships amongst managerial entrenchment practices, social performance, and financial performance. We hypothesize that entrenched managers may collude with non-shareholder stakeholders in order to reinforce their entrenchment strategy; this is particularly so in firms that have efficient internal control mechanisms. Moreover, we prove that the combination of entrenchment strategies and the implementation of socially responsible actions have particularly negative effects on financial performance. We test these contentions with a sample of 358 companies, from 22 different countries, for the period 2002–2005.     

基金管理公司股权结构与基金绩效研究

本研究采用2004～2010年期间的开放式股票型基金为样本,应用Carhart的四因子模型作为衡量基金投资质量与绩效的评价指标,以基金管理公司的股权结构为切入点,研究基金管理公司组织与股权结构对旗下基金绩效的影响。在控制了基金特征和基金经理特征后,我们发现国有控股和中外合资基金管理公司旗下的基金绩效较好。表明我国基金行业存在国有资本的帮助之手效应;此外,外资参股有利于提高基金业绩。     

Reassessing False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Skill,Luck, or Lack of Power?

Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers propose the false discovery rate (FDR) to separate skill (alpha) from luck in fund performance. Using simulations with parameters informed by the data, we find that this methodology is conservative and underestimates the proportion of nonzero‐alpha funds. For example, 65% of funds with economically large alphas of $\pm 2\%$ are misclassified as zero alpha. This bias arises from the low signal‐to‐noise ratio in fund returns and the resulting low statistical power. Our results question FDR's applicability in performance evaluation and other domains with low power, and can materially change the conclusion that most funds have zero alpha.     

Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance

We study standard mutual fund performance measures, using simulated funds whose characteristics mimic actual funds. We find that performance measures used in previous mutual fund research have little ability to detect economically large magnitudes (e.g., three percent per year) of abnormal fund performance, particularly if a fund's style characteristics differ from those of the value-weighted market portfolio. Power can be substantially improved, however, using event-study procedures that analyze a fund's stock trades. These procedures are feasible using time-series data sets on mutual fund portfolio holdings.     

基金业绩归因与投资者行为

本文以2006年1月至2016年12月中国64家股票型主动管理基金为样本,从基金净资金流变化的角度,检验了投资者决策与基金业绩结构的关系,以期更好地理解投资者行为。本文结论有:(1)整体上,投资者在衡量基金经理能力时,更关注原始超额收益率或只基于市场风险调整风险敞口,这可能与中国市场投资工具仍然不够充分、风险难以有效对冲有关;(2)机构投资者相比个人投资者对风险敞口的识别更严格;(3)简单模型的优势集中在市场波动低、投资者情绪高的时期;(4)除基金经理能力外,净资金流变化对市场风险报酬也很敏感;(5)从alpha的角度,我国基金市场仍存在“赎回异象”,可能与“处置效应”有关,仍需提升投资者对风险的认知,引导市场形成更加科学的投资观念。     

Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They Hide

This paper studies the “confidential holdings” of institutional investors, especially hedge funds, where the quarter‐end equity holdings are disclosed with a delay through amendments to Form 13F and are usually excluded from the standard databases. Funds managing large risky portfolios with nonconventional strategies seek confidentiality more frequently. Stocks in these holdings are disproportionately associated with information‐sensitive events or share characteristics indicating greater information asymmetry. Confidential holdings exhibit superior performance up to 12 months, and tend to take longer to build. Together the evidence supports private information and the associated price impact as the dominant motives for confidentiality.     

基金规模对基金投资行为和绩效的影响研究

本文利用2005年至2010年的积极偏股型基金的数据分析了基金规模对基金行为和基金绩效的影响,实证结果显示规模大的基金存在较高的正反馈交易策略,并且其交易活动在牛市中呈现出更高的羊群行为,由此可见规模大的基金并没有提高理性投资的功能;在基金的绩效方面,随着基金规模的增大,基金的选股能力得到了增强,但是择时能力却逐渐减弱。     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。