Hedge fund leverage

We investigate the leverage of hedge funds in the time series and cross-section. Hedge fund leverage is counter-cyclical to the leverage of listed financial intermediaries and decreases prior to the start of the financial crisis in mid-2007. Hedge fund leverage is lowest in early 2009 when the market leverage of investment banks is highest. Changes in hedge fund leverage tend to be more predictable by economy-wide factors than by fund-specific characteristics. In particular, decreases in funding costs and increases in market values both forecast increases in hedge fund leverage. Decreases in fund return volatilities predict future increases in leverage.     

对冲基金超越巴菲特

鲜为人知的博茂投资集团最近10年的年回报率不仅高于对冲基金行业的平均水平,也高于巴菲特的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司2.3个百分点,而且其风险波动率仅为6.2%,不到巴菲特公司19.9%波动率的1/3。巴菲特不仅过去十年的投资业绩不如对冲基金,在本次金融危机中的整体表现也远逊于对冲基金,这是否意味其神话的终结？     

Hedge fund pricing and model uncertainty

This article uses Bayesian model averaging to study model uncertainty in hedge fund pricing. We show how to incorporate heteroscedasticity, thus, we develop a framework that jointly accounts for model uncertainty and heteroscedasticity. Relevant risk factors are identified and compared with those selected through standard model selection techniques. The analysis reveals that a model selection strategy that accounts for model uncertainty in hedge fund pricing regressions can be superior in estimation/inference. We explore potential impacts of our approach by analysing individual funds and show that they can be economically important.     

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.     

Hedge fund incentives,management commitment and survivorship

Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.     

Portfolio manager ownership and fund performance

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Public pension fund ownership and firm performance

Equity ownership by public pension funds (PPFs) is widely used in the literature (see, e.g., Cremers and Nair 2005; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007) as a measure of the strength of shareholder monitoring/governance. This paper raises caution on such practices by illustrating an inverted-U shape relationship between PPF ownership and firms’ future performance, measured by stock returns and operating performance: during 1985–2005, future performance first increases, then declines in aggregate equity ownership by PPFs. Our results suggest that PPFs’ presence is consistent with shareholder value maximization when they have moderate influence on firm management, whereas excessive PPF ownership may facilitate PPF managers’ pursuits of political interests and destroy shareholder value. Therefore, it is important to impose an upper bound to PPF ownership when measuring the strength of shareholder monitoring/governance.     

Hedge fund marketing in an era of regulatory scrutiny

Hedge fund marketing professionals must do a better job of educating the investment industry, regulators included, in an attempt to be sure their voice is heard accurately and loudly through effective thought leadership. When more people understand the role that hedge funds play in an investment portfolio, the cloud of mystery will continue to lift and hedge fund investors will be able to make their own judgment. Hedge fund managers, financial media, investor relations professionals, and others play a key role in this process. Concurrent with this marketing focus, however, the industry must comply with the new requirements of hedge fund regulation and other legal issues. Those who fail to pay heed to the regulators may find themselves in a perilous position.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure

This study, which examines the association between board monitoring and the level of voluntary disclosure, finds new evidence that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality are not associated with voluntary disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards. Notably, we find that the presence of an external governance mechanism, the regulatory environment, enhances the strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. This association is some two to three times greater under a “disclosure-based” regulatory regime than under a “merit-based” regulatory regime.     

Causal reasoning in financial reporting and voluntary disclosure

Causal reasoning involves understanding the cause of events that have already happened (i.e., diagnosis) as well as predicting which future events will occur (i.e., prediction). Although this type of reasoning is an important part of financial reporting and voluntary disclosure, very little research has relied on it as a basis for developing and interpreting testable research ideas. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, we review key theories from psychology that pertain to causal reasoning. Second, we identify how these theories can be successfully used by behavioral researchers interested in financial reporting and voluntary disclosure.     

Hedge fund portfolio construction: A comparison of static and dynamic approaches

This article studies the impact of modeling time-varying covariances/correlations of hedge fund returns in terms of hedge fund portfolio construction and risk measurement. We use a variety of static and dynamic covariance/correlation prediction models and compare the optimized portfolios’ out-of-sample performance. We find that dynamic covariance/correlation models construct portfolios with lower risk and higher out-of-sample risk-adjusted realized return. The tail-risk of the constructed portfolios is also lower. Using a mean-conditional-value-at-risk framework we show that dynamic covariance/correlation models are also successful in constructing portfolios with minimum tail-risk.     

A theory of voluntary disclosure and cost of capital

This paper explores the links between firms’ voluntary disclosures and their cost of capital. Existing studies investigate the relation between mandatory disclosures and cost of capital and find no cross-sectional effect but a negative association in time-series. In this paper, I find that when disclosure is voluntary firms that disclose their information have a lower cost of capital than firms that do not disclose, but the association between voluntary disclosure and cost of capital for disclosing and nondisclosing firms is positive in aggregate. I further examine whether reductions in cost of capital indicate improved risk-sharing or investment efficiency. I also find that high (low) disclosure frictions lead to overinvestment (underinvestment) relative to first-best. As average cost of capital proxies for risk-sharing but not investment efficiency, the relation between cost of capital and ex ante efficiency may be ambiguous and often irrelevant.     

Equity fund ownership and the cross-regional diversification of household risk

We explore the link between portfolio home bias and consumption risk sharing among Italian regions using household-level information on consumption, income and portfolio holdings. Since equity funds are typically diversified at the national or international level, we use data on equity fund ownership to proxy for regional home bias. Cross-regional patterns of equity fund ownership are qualitatively consistent with simple portfolio theory: regions with more asymmetric business cycles are more diversified because they have higher fund participation rates (the extensive margin of diversification) and higher average holdings of equity funds (diversification’s intensive margin). Also, fund holdings increase with the exposure of non-tradable income components (such as labor or entrepreneurial income) to regional shocks. Finally, interregional consumption risk sharing increases with fund holdings and this effect seems strongest when participation is widespread. Increased equity market participation could substantially improve interregional risk sharing.     

Impression management: dual language reporting and voluntary disclosure

The presentation of corporate disclosure may be explained by impression management. The relative extent of corporate disclosure may be related to information costs. This paper links these two theoretical perspectives by comparing the extent of voluntary disclosure in companies that have chosen to present a dual language approach to reporting, relative to the disclosure provided by companies choosing to report only in one language. The analysis shows that voluntary disclosure is higher in companies that have higher visibility through dual language reporting and whose investors face higher information costs. The analysis also shows that voluntary disclosure by companies reporting only in one language is associated with domestic visibility in market listing and type of industry, while that of companies reporting in two languages is associated with responding to market pressures.     

A comparison of voluntary and mandated climate change-related disclosure

This study draws on legitimacy theory to investigate the relationship between mandatory disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions by companies that are subject to specific environmental legislation (the Australian National Greenhouse Energy Reporting Act 2007) and the level of voluntary environmental disclosures. Using a sample of 535 observations, we find that i) Overall, legislation-affected companies increase their disclosures compared with non-affected companies, ii) As many companies reduce their disclosures as increase them, iii) there is an increase in the level of emissions volume disclosures in legislation-affected companies compared with the same company pre-implementation, iv) legislation-affected higher emitters have higher levels of voluntary disclosures. These findings are consistent with legitimacy theory, which predicts differential disclosures in circumstances to avoid scrutiny.     

论企业核心能力信息的自愿披露

核心能力信息是区别于其他企业,反映企业持续竞争优势源泉的信息,是企业信息披露战略的重要内容。由于核心能力信息已经超越了传统财务信息的范畴,具有“非规范性”的总体特征,通过自愿性披露揭示企业核心能力信息成为允当选择。本文在分析核心能力信息自愿披露动因的基础上,从资产角度探讨了核心能力的确认方法,并对核心能力自愿披露的实现方式进行了研究,认为核心能力信息的自愿披露应该遵循循序渐进的原则,以非财务报告披露为起点,逐步过渡到管理层讨论与分析(MD&A)披露,最终实现核心能力报告的披露目标。     

The effect of globalization and legal environment on voluntary disclosure

We examine how interactions with foreign capital, product, and labor markets affect the disclosure practices of non-U.S. multinational firms. Drawing on literature related to multinationals, country-level legal institutions, and accounting disclosures, we expect that the relation between globalization and voluntary disclosure will be conditioned by the legal environment in a firm's home country. Specifically, while firms from countries with a strong legal environment (e.g., common-law countries) already face pressure for good disclosure, globalization can increase the benefits associated with good disclosure to firms from weak legal environments (e.g., civil-law countries). We use a self-constructed voluntary disclosure index and hand-collected disclosure and foreign activity data for 643 non-U.S. firms from 30 countries for 2003. We find a significant interaction between globalization and the legal environment. This indicates that for the same level of globalization, there is more voluntary disclosure for firms based in weak legal environments. Our results suggest that globalization is an important variable that has been overlooked in much of the previous cross-country research.