Hedge fund leverage

We investigate the leverage of hedge funds in the time series and cross-section. Hedge fund leverage is counter-cyclical to the leverage of listed financial intermediaries and decreases prior to the start of the financial crisis in mid-2007. Hedge fund leverage is lowest in early 2009 when the market leverage of investment banks is highest. Changes in hedge fund leverage tend to be more predictable by economy-wide factors than by fund-specific characteristics. In particular, decreases in funding costs and increases in market values both forecast increases in hedge fund leverage. Decreases in fund return volatilities predict future increases in leverage.     

Hedge fund politics and portfolios

Consistent with the well-documented relation between political orientation and psychological traits, hedge funds’ political orientations are related to their portfolio decisions. Relative to politically conservative hedge funds, politically liberal hedge funds exhibit a preference for smaller stocks, less mature companies, volatile stocks, unprofitable companies, non-dividend paying companies, and lottery-type securities. Politically liberal hedge funds are also more likely to enter new positions or fully exit existing positions, and make larger adjustments to their U.S. equity market exposure. Our results suggest that psychological characteristics can influence the portfolio decisions of even those at the very top of the financial sophistication ladder.     

对冲基金超越巴菲特

鲜为人知的博茂投资集团最近10年的年回报率不仅高于对冲基金行业的平均水平,也高于巴菲特的伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司2.3个百分点,而且其风险波动率仅为6.2%,不到巴菲特公司19.9%波动率的1/3。巴菲特不仅过去十年的投资业绩不如对冲基金,在本次金融危机中的整体表现也远逊于对冲基金,这是否意味其神话的终结？     

Hedge fund pricing and model uncertainty

This article uses Bayesian model averaging to study model uncertainty in hedge fund pricing. We show how to incorporate heteroscedasticity, thus, we develop a framework that jointly accounts for model uncertainty and heteroscedasticity. Relevant risk factors are identified and compared with those selected through standard model selection techniques. The analysis reveals that a model selection strategy that accounts for model uncertainty in hedge fund pricing regressions can be superior in estimation/inference. We explore potential impacts of our approach by analysing individual funds and show that they can be economically important.     

Hedge fund activism and trade credit

This study shows that trade creditors extend a negative response to hedge fund activism. Relative to control firms, target firms' accounts payable decrease by 28%, post activist intervention by hedge funds. This reduction is due to supply-side factors, highlighting suppliers' expropriation concerns. The study provides novel evidence that the repercussions of hedge fund activism extend beyond the formal debtholders, and informal debtholders such as trade creditors are not an exception. Further, target firms also offer lower trade credit to their customers after hedge fund activism. Trade receivables decrease by 12% relative to control firms. Activism-induced changes in cash flows potentially account for this reduction in trade receivables.     

Biased voluntary disclosure

We provide a bridge between the voluntary disclosure and the earnings management literature. Voluntary disclosure models focus on managers’ discretion in deciding whether or not to provide truthful voluntary disclosure to the capital market. Earnings management models, on the other hand, concentrate on managers’ discretion in deciding how to bias their mandatory disclosure. By analyzing managers’ disclosure strategy when disclosure is voluntary and not necessarily truthful, we show the robustness of voluntary disclosure theory to the relaxation of the standard assumption of truthful reporting. We also demonstrate the sensitivity of earnings management theory to the commonly made mandatory disclosure assumption.     

Hedge fund seeding with fees-for-guarantee swaps

This paper introduces a new instrument in the context of hedge fund seeding, which we call fees-for-guarantee swap, with the aim of alleviating the early-stage funds (ESF) managers' financial constraint caused by severe asymmetric information between investors and managers. The swap plays a role in enhancing the ESFs manager's credibility by swapping part of her fees for an insurance on the behalf of seeding investors, whom would be fully refunded once the fund defaults. We set up a dynamic continuous-time framework within which closed-form prices for seed capital, guarantee costs and other claims have been derived. Our numerical findings indicate that incentive compensations, managerial ownership and hedge funds liquidation risks not only inhibit ESFs managers' risk-shifting incentive but align interests among ESFs manager, seeder and insurer as well.     

Hedge fund incentives,management commitment and survivorship

Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.     

Hedge fund activism,CEO turnover and compensation

This paper examines the governance role of hedge fund activists by analyzing the impact of these activists on CEO turnover, CEO pay, and CEO pay-performance link in targeted companies. Using the difference-in-difference approach, we first find significantly higher CEO turnover following hedge fund activism. After we split target companies into the CEO-turnover and non-CEO-turnover sub-samples, we find that only new CEOs in targeted companies get more compensation following hedge fund activism while incumbent CEO pay does not significantly change. The relationship between CEO bonuses and return on assets following hedge fund activism also differs across the subsamples split by CEO turnover. Pay-performance relationship is enhanced by hedge fund activism for new CEOs, but not for incumbent CEOs. In additional analyses, we document that CEO turnover is positively associated with Tobin’s Q and shareholder votes on Say on Pay in target companies after hedge fund activism.     

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal–agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Portfolio manager ownership and fund performance

This paper documents the range of portfolio manager ownership in the funds they manage and examines whether higher ownership is associated with improved future performance. Almost half of all managers have ownership stakes in their funds, though the absolute investment is modest. Future risk-adjusted performance is positively related to managerial ownership, with performance improving by about 3 basis points for each basis point of managerial ownership. These findings persist after controlling for various measures of fund board effectiveness. Fund manager ownership is higher in funds with better past performance, lower front-end loads, smaller size, longer managerial tenure, and funds affiliated with smaller families. It is also higher in funds with higher board member compensation and in equity funds relative to bond funds. Future performance is positively related to the component of ownership that can be predicted by other variables, as well as the unpredictable component. Our findings support the notion that managerial ownership has desirable incentive alignment attributes for mutual fund investors and indicate that the disclosure of this information is useful in making portfolio allocation decisions.     

Incentives for voluntary disclosure

Rule l0b-5 of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act allows investors to sue firms for misrepresentation or omission. Since firms are principal-agent contracts between owners – contract designers – and privately informed managers, owners are the ultimate firms’ voluntary disclosure strategists. We analyze voluntary disclosure equilibrium in a game with two types of owners: expected liquidating dividends motivated (VMO) and expected price motivated (PMO). We find that Rule l0b-5: (i) does not deter misrepresentation and may suppress voluntary disclosure or, (ii) induces some firms to adopt a partial disclosure policy of disclosing only bad news or only good news.     

Between a rock and a hard place: New evidence on the relationship between ownership and voluntary disclosure

Combining two Swedish databases with unique strengths I show that stray firms, i.e. those lacking a controlling owner, have lower voluntary disclosure in financial reports (that is, information provided beyond what is formally required). This suggests managers prefer to withhold information to maximize their discretion over corporate policies. I also show that disclosure initially increases with block ownership, reflecting increased incentives to monitor and stronger governance. However, when block ownership exceeds a certain threshold level (> 50%), disclosure starts to decrease, reflecting another conflict of interest, namely between minority and controlling owners. Evidence of this non-linear relationship is novel in the literature and may account for the mixed evidence in previous research. Moreover, I report findings on the impact of institutional, foreign, under-diversified, and controlling minority-owners, concluding that ownership structure has major implications for voluntary disclosure.     

Public pension fund ownership and firm performance

Equity ownership by public pension funds (PPFs) is widely used in the literature (see, e.g., Cremers and Nair 2005; Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith 2007) as a measure of the strength of shareholder monitoring/governance. This paper raises caution on such practices by illustrating an inverted-U shape relationship between PPF ownership and firms’ future performance, measured by stock returns and operating performance: during 1985–2005, future performance first increases, then declines in aggregate equity ownership by PPFs. Our results suggest that PPFs’ presence is consistent with shareholder value maximization when they have moderate influence on firm management, whereas excessive PPF ownership may facilitate PPF managers’ pursuits of political interests and destroy shareholder value. Therefore, it is important to impose an upper bound to PPF ownership when measuring the strength of shareholder monitoring/governance.     

The effect of voluntary disclosure,ownership structure and proprietary cost on the return–future earnings relation

This study examines the effect of voluntary disclosure on the relation between current annual return, contemporaneous annual earnings and future earnings, and the influence of both ownership structure and proprietary cost on this relation. Regression analyses reveal that firms with higher voluntary disclosure levels contain more information about future performance in their current stock return. This positive association is weaker if (1) management holds a higher proportion of share ownership in the company, (2) proprietary cost is present and (3) government ownership exists. However, the existence of outside block ownership significantly decreases managers' ability to limit voluntary disclosure. Our findings remain significant after controlling for the usual factors (size, growth, etc.) in the return–earnings regression, and a series of sensitivity and robustness checks.     

Exchange-traded fund ownership and underlying stock mispricing

In response to the increasing proliferation of exchange-traded funds (ETFs), and a warning from the Wall Street hero Michael Burry that passive investing has put the stock market into ‘bubble’ territory, we examine the relation between stock ownership by ETFs and mispricing from 2002 to 2018. We find that increased ETF ownership induces overpricing in underlying stocks. We then identify three mechanisms for this relationship: the overpricing of stocks attributable to increased ETF ownership is stronger for stocks that experience an increase in passive ETF ownership; during periods characterised by high investor sentiment; and for illiquid stocks. Our results are robust to a battery of tests including alternative measures for all key variables and are not confounded by the global financial crisis. Additional analyses show that mispricing caused by ETF ownership change is not driven by firm fundamentals and does not exacerbate stocks' information environment around earnings announcement.     

Hedge fund performance attribution under various market conditions

We investigate US hedge funds' performance. Our proposed model contains exogenous and endogenous break points, based on business cycles and on a regime switching process conditional on different states of the market. During difficult market conditions most hedge fund strategies do not provide significant alphas. At such times hedge funds reduce both the number of their exposures to different asset classes and their portfolio allocations, while some strategies even reverse their exposures. Directional strategies share more common exposures under all market conditions compared to non-directional strategies. Factors related to commodity asset classes are more common during these difficult conditions whereas factors related to equity asset classes are most common during good market conditions. Falling stock markets are harsher than recessions for hedge funds.     

Capturing hedge fund risk factor exposures: Hedge fund return replication with ETFs

We develop a new factor selection methodology of spanning the space of hedge fund risk factors with all available exchange traded funds (ETFs). We demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology with out-of-sample individual hedge fund return replication by ETF clone portfolios. This is consistent with our interpretation of ETF returns as proxies to risk factors driving hedge fund returns. We further consider portfolios of “cloneable” and “noncloneable” hedge funds, defined as top and bottom in-sample R² matches, and demonstrate that our ETF clone portfolios slightly outperform cloneable hedge funds out of sample.