Asymptotics for LS,GLS, and feasible GLS statistics in an AR(1) model with conditional heteroskedasticity

We consider a first-order autoregressive model with conditionally heteroskedastic innovations. The asymptotic distributions of least squares (LS), infeasible generalized least squares (GLS), and feasible GLS estimators and $t$ statistics are determined. The GLS procedures allow for misspecification of the form of the conditional heteroskedasticity and, hence, are referred to as quasi-GLS procedures. The asymptotic results are established for drifting sequences of the autoregressive parameter ${\rho }_n$ and the distribution of the time series of innovations. In particular, we consider the full range of cases in which ${\rho }_n$ satisfies $n(1?{\rho }_n)\to \infty$ and $n(1?{\rho }_n)\to h_1\in [0,\infty )$ as $n\to \infty$, where $n$ is the sample size. Results of this type are needed to establish the uniform asymptotic properties of the LS and quasi-GLS statistics.     

The cointegrated vector autoregressive model with general deterministic terms

In the cointegrated vector autoregression (CVAR) literature, deterministic terms have until now been analyzed on a case-by-case, or as-needed basis. We give a comprehensive unified treatment of deterministic terms in the additive model $X_t=\gamma Z_t+Y_t$, where $Z_t$ belongs to a large class of deterministic regressors and $Y_t$ is a zero-mean CVAR. We suggest an extended model that can be estimated by reduced rank regression, and give a condition for when the additive and extended models are asymptotically equivalent, as well as an algorithm for deriving the additive model parameters from the extended model parameters. We derive asymptotic properties of the maximum likelihood estimators and discuss tests for rank and tests on the deterministic terms. In particular, we give conditions under which the estimators are asymptotically (mixed) Gaussian, such that associated tests are ${\chi }^2$-distributed.     

Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies

This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality $(r,s)$, $0\le r,s$, in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and item prices that guarantee certain stability properties parametrized by the numbers $r$ and $s$. The quality $(r,s)$ measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the larger $r$ and $s$ the closer the fit. For $r,s\le 1$ this notion provides a graceful degradation for the conditional equilibria of Fu, Kleinberg and Lavi (2012) which are exactly the local equilibria of quality $(1,1)$. For $1<r,s$ the local equilibria of quality $(r,s)$ are more stable than conditional equilibria. Any local equilibrium of quality $(r,s)$ provides, without any assumption on the type of the agents’ valuations, an allocation whose value is at least $\frac{rs}{1+rs}$ the optimal fractional allocation. In any economy in which all agents’ valuations are $a$-submodular, i.e., exhibit complementarity bounded by $a\ge 1$, there is a local equilibrium of quality $(\frac{1}{a},\frac{1}{a})$. In such an economy any greedy allocation provides a local equilibrium of quality $(1,\frac{1}{a})$. Walrasian equilibria are not amenable to such graceful degradation.     

Well-posedness of measurement error models for self-reported data

This paper considers the widely admitted ill-posed inverse problem for measurement error models: estimating the distribution of a latent variable $X^1$ from an observed sample of $X$, a contaminated measurement of $X^1$. We show that the inverse problem is well-posed for self-reporting data under the assumption that the probability of truthful reporting is nonzero, which is supported by empirical evidences. Comparing with ill-posedness, well-posedness generally can be translated into faster rates of convergence for the nonparametric estimators of the latent distribution. Therefore, our optimistic result on well-posedness is of importance in economic applications, and it suggests that researchers should not ignore the point mass at zero in the measurement error distribution when they model measurement errors with self-reported data. We also analyze the implications of our results on the estimation of classical measurement error models. Then by both a Monte Carlo study and an empirical application, we show that failing to account for the nonzero probability of truthful reporting can lead to significant bias on estimation of the latent distribution.     

Random mechanisms for house allocation with existing tenants

We study the house allocation problem with existing tenants: $n$ houses (stand for “indivisible objects”) are to be allocated to $n$ agents; each agent needs exactly one house and has strict preferences; $k$ houses are initially unowned; $k$ agents initially do not own houses; the remaining $n-k$ agents (the so-called “existing tenants”) initially own the remaining $n-k$ houses (each owns one). In this setting, we consider various randomized allocation rules under which voluntary participation of existing tenants is assured and the randomization procedure either treats agents equally or discriminates against some (or all) of the existing tenants. We obtain two equivalence results, which generalize the equivalence results in Abdulkadiroğlu and Sönmez (1999) and Sönmez and Ünver (2005).