The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2018–2019

Review of Industrial Organization - This article highlights the economic analysis that underlay certain enforcement efforts of the Antitrust Division over the past year. The Division’s...     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2009–2010

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2009–2010. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations and other activities as an advocate for competition.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2012–2013

During 2012–2013, the Antitrust Division brought a wide range of litigated matters to successful conclusions. Litigation puts the economic analysis of an antitrust investigation to the ultimate test, and the Division continues to rely on its first-rate economic staff to help explain a wide range of matters to the courts. The four cases discussed below demonstrate the diverse set of issues the Division examines every year.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2004–2005

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG), during 2004–2005. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, appellate matters, and other activities as an advocate for competition.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2007–2008

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2007–2008. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, and in other activities as an advocate for competition. The views in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Antitrust Division.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2008–2009

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG) of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, during 2008–2009. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, and in other activities as an advocate for competition.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2013–2014

During 2013–2014, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice brought a wide range of matters to successful conclusions. The three matters that are discussed below demonstrate the diverse set of issues that the division examines every year.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division 2003–2004

This paper covers the activities of the Economic Analysis Group (EAG), during 2003–2004. It describes the economic analysis undertaken by EAG in several important investigations, litigations, and administrative and appellate matters.The authors are, respectively, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, and Economics Director of Enforcement, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division. The views contained herein are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018

This article describes some of the work of Antitrust Division economists over the past year, with a focus on modeling. It begins by illustrating the mapping from evidence to prediction using tools for assessing the effects of mergers using Bertrand, Cournot, and auction models. It then turns to two hot topics in competition policy: the implications of claims of increasing margins for merger enforcement and the validity of claims of increasing concentration. Finally, it considers how mergers affect prices in bargaining models.     

Economics at the Antitrust Division 2016–2017: Healthcare,Nuclear Waste,and Agriculture

This year the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice litigated an unprecedented number of cases. Two mergers, Anthem with Cigna and Aetna with Humana, threatened to dramatically alter the face of commercial health insurance. The Anthem case raised questions of how to evaluate a claim that competition costs billions annually in potential medical cost savings. The Aetna case raised questions of how commercial insurers compete against the public programs—specifically Medicare. The Division also litigated numerous other civil matters including a proposed merger of nuclear waste disposal facilities. In that case, economists had to explore the scope and bounds of competition within a variety of regulatory regimes. And, in a merger of two new technologies that improve the efficiency of planting seeds, the emerging nature of the market led to interesting variations in the analysis. This overview of the economic issues in these particular cases is intended to provide insights into the challenges of enforcing antitrust law and the way in which economic analysis in particular is used to address those challenges.     

The Year in Economics at the FCC, 2010–11: Protecting Competition Online

The past year in economics at the Federal Communications Commission focused on protecting competition in developing online markets. Our review discusses important economic issues that are raised by the FCC’s Open Internet rulemaking (which is commonly referred to as “net neutrality”) and its review of Comcast’s programming joint venture with General Electric’s NBC Universal affiliate. The Open Internet rule focused on established online markets, while the Comcast/NBCU transaction addressed nascent competition online along with competition in video programming and distribution offline.     

The Antitrust Division: Economic Issues Presented in 2010–2011

The Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice had a number of interesting cases during the last year. The merger between Comcast and NBC-Universal presented an interesting challenge of preserving existing competition from an emerging technology. The abandoned attempt by NASDAQ to acquire NYSE shed light on a number of competitive interactions between financial exchanges. Hospital contracts in Texas illustrated that exclusive dealing is still a violation of Section “NASDAQ’s Proposed Acquisition of NYSE” and will be pursued by the Antitrust Division. And, a number of cases as well as a new policy guide on the subject demonstrate that the Antitrust Division will work with parties and accept innovative remedies to eliminate competitive problems in ways that may better preserve efficiencies.     

Recent Developments at the CMA: 2020–2021

Review of Industrial Organization - We discuss three important projects that economists at the Competition and Markets Authority have completed over the past year. First, our work on the Funerals...     

Economics at the FCC 2018–2019: Competition,Broadband Deployment,and Transaction Review

Review of Industrial Organization - The U.S. Federal Communications Commission is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation’s non-federal...     

Economics at the FCC, 2013–2014

We present a sample of recent FCC matters of economic interest. These include nonstructural remedies in a number of wireless telecommunications transactions, econometric attempts to identify which schools are likely to have access to fiber broadband, and the implementation of “rural broadband experiments” to improve the effectiveness of subsidy programs to promote universal service. We close with some observations regarding the prominence of vertical concerns in FCC policy assessments.     

Economics at the FCC: 2007–2008

In any given year, the Federal Communications Commission confronts many issues of interest to economists. This paper summarizes four issues of interest during the last year: Spectrum Auctions, Media Ownership, Quality-Adjusted Cable Prices, and Leased Access. It highlights the role that economic analysis played in each and identifies areas where further research would be fruitful. This article was drafted while the first author was Chief Economist at the Federal Communications Commission. The opinions expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Communications Commission, its Commissioners, or its staff. We would like to thank Larry White and Tracy Waldon for helpful comments.