跨国企业母国创新网络对国际化创新绩效的影响——高管国际化背景与企业数字化的调节作用

在国际形势复杂多变、新冠肺炎疫情肆虐的全球背景下,我国跨国公司国际化创新发展需要国内创新资源支撑,但当前研究主要关注国际创新资源对跨国企业国际化创新的影响。基于国际化创新内外双循环格局,选取2010—2019年我国电子信息产业上市公司为研究样本,通过Tobit回归探究母国企业创新网络对国际化创新绩效的影响,结果表明,母国企业创新网络规模正向影响国际化创新,而高管国际化和企业数字化具有正向调节作用。结论对我国跨国企业利用国内技术创新资源构建国际化创新双循环格局具有重要现实意义：一是在宏观政策上,政府要加强国内创新网络建设以支撑企业国际化创新发展;二是在跨国企业内部,要重视国际化人才引进和企业内部数字化建设,通过积累国际化创新人力资源促进国际创新资源吸收,并为创新效率提升奠定数字化基础。     

海归高管与企业国际化——基于我国高科技上市公司的实证研究

海归高管对企业国际化的影响具有资源效应和文化冲突效应,两种效应的高低决定了海归高管对企业国际化的最终影响。本文以2011—2017年中国高科技上市公司为研究样本,针对海归高管如何影响企业国际化和企业吸收能力以及CEO两职兼任的调节效应进行实证分析,检验结果显示:(1)海归高管与企业国际化显著正相关,资源效应大于文化冲突效应;(2)企业吸收能力增强了海归高管与企业国际化的正向关系;(3)CEO两职兼任减弱了海归高管与企业国际化之间的正向关系;(4)既具有海外工作经历又具有海外教育经历的高管对企业国际化的促进作用最强,仅具有海外教育经历的高管对企业国际化的促进作用最弱;(5)东部地区海归高管与企业国际化表现为显著的正相关,中西部地区海归高管与企业国际化的正向关系不显著;(6)在完全竞争市场,海归高管与企业国际化显著正相关,在垄断竞争市场,海归高管与企业国际化的系数为正,但是统计上不显著。     

高管团队社会资本与企业发展韧性:团队心理资本与风险承担能力的链式中介作用

企业发展韧性能够使企业对动荡环境起到一定免疫作用的基础上逆势成长,在后疫情时代及乌卡（VUCA）时代背景下,企业如何在外界拉力压力频发下不发生脆性断裂并提高发展韧性是管理的重难点。本文基于社会网络理论、弹性风险理论构建高管团队内、外部社会资本对企业发展韧性的作用机制,并深入考察了团队心理资本与风险承担能力的中介作用,利用对中小企业调研获得的329份配对数据进行实证研究。研究结果显示：(1)高管团队的内、外部社会资本分别对企业发展韧性有显著正向影响。(2)团队心理资本与风险承担能力分别在高管团队内、外部社会资本对企业发展韧性的影响中起到中介作用。(3)团队心理资本与风险承担能力在高管团队内、外部社会资本对企业发展韧性的影响中起到链式中介作用。     

高管团队行为整合对商业模式创新的影响

为检验高管团队行为整合对商业模式创新的影响作用及其路径机制,提出了高管团队行为整合的3个维度(合作行为、信息交换、联合决策)与商业模式创新间层次关系的研究假设,并利用177家企业的问卷调查数据通过层次回归分析进行检验。研究结果表明:合作行为、信息交换和联合决策对商业模式创新具有显著的正向影响;合作行为和信息交换能够通过联合决策的中介作用影响商业模式创新。     

高管团队异质性、断层线与创新战略——注意力配置的调节作用

以2011—2015年中国沪深A股129家上市公司为研究样本,检验了高管团队异质性和高管团队断层线强度对企业创新战略的影响,以及高管团队的注意力配置在其中的调节作用。研究结果表明:高管团队的任期异质性和职能背景异质性正向影响企业的创新战略;高管团队的断层线负向影响企业的创新战略;高管团队的注意力配置对其异质性、断层线与企业创新战略的关系起调节作用。     

高管团队垂直对特征与企业创新研究

以我国A股上市公司为研究样本,从管理者背景特征视角,考察了高管团队垂直对这一结构特征对企业创新的影响。研究结果表明：高管团队性别垂直对特征对企业创新的影响不显著;高管团队年龄垂直对特征与发明专利、实用新型专利、专利总额以及创新投入均呈显著负相关关系;高管团队学历垂直对正向影响外观设计专利、专利总额以及创新投入;高管团队任期垂直对未对企业创新产出产生显著影响,但对创新投入产生了显著负向影响。区分产权性质后,上述关系在国有与非国有公司间存在显著差异。     

高管团队异质性对企业绩效的影响研究

在理论分析的基础上建立高管团队异质性对企业绩效影响的概念模型，通过问卷调查进行数据的收集，再利用实证方法研究异质性与企业绩效之间的关系，结果表明高管团队成员良好的归属感可强化团队异质性与企业绩效之间的相关性，而任期的延长将有利于良好归属感的建立。这样就可从全新角度“培养成员良好的团队归属感。保持高管团队的稳定性”。     

高管团队断裂带对二元创新的影响——基于中国上市医药企业的实证研究

基于团队断裂带理论,运用多元层级回归方法,以中国医药制造业上市公司为研究对象,以股权集中度为调节变量,实证检验了高管团队断裂带对二元创新(探索性创新和利用性创新)的影响,以及股权集中度对上述影响的调节作用。结果表明:生理特征断裂带与探索性创新和利用性创新均有显著的负相关关系;任务相关断裂带与利用性创新之间存在显著的正相关关系;公司股权集中度对生理特征断裂带与利用性创新的关系起负向调节作用。     

高管团队职能背景多样性与企业创新产出间关系

基于高阶理论和关注基础观,运用我国上海证券交易所244家制造业上市公司的相关数据,实证检验了高管团队职能背景多样性对企业创新产出的影响以及创新关注的中介作用。研究结果表明,高管团队职能背景多样性与企业创新产出存在正相关关系;高管对自主创新的关注在高管团队职能背景多样性与企业创新产出关系中起中介作用;在国有企业或拥有更多冗余资源的企业,管理者对自主创新的关注与企业创新产出之间的正相关关系更强。     

Decision style and its impact on managers and management

Decision styles, defined by the primary and secondary considerations in choice making and the implementation tactics preferred by managers, are used to explain the ways in which managers with a given style take action. Examples are used to illustrate the unique approaches taken by managers with each style in their decisions concerning leadership, team building, strategic management, control, and related issues that managers grapple with to fashion a desired future. The basis for shifts in style and the potential for conflict or collaboration between individuals with particular styles is discussed.     

The impact of experience on risk taking, overconfidence, and herding of fund managers: Complementary survey evidence

Empirical research has shown that inexperienced fund managers yield significantly higher returns than their more experienced colleagues. If the portfolios of inexperienced are not more risky, this result would contradict the hypothesis of market efficiency. Therefore, it is an important question whether inexperienced fund managers tend to taker higher risks. Higher risk taking may be explained by a higher degree of overconfidence, less herding behavior, or a lower degree of risk aversion. Since the results concerning the relationship between experience and risk taking in previous studies are rather contradictory we provide complementary survey evidence of 117 German fund managers which can improve our understanding in this field. In line with the results of previous studies, we find that herding is decreasing with experience while the evidence concerning risk taking and overconfidence is mixed. Nevertheless, our results provide some support for the hypothesis that inexperienced managers do indeed take higher risks.     

机构投资者与公司管理者博弈分析

在研究公司治理时，机构投资者的作用越来越受到重视，本文通过建立一个简单的模型，分析了机构投资者参与公司治理的动机与影响因素。结论表明，机构投资者持有公司的股权比例，监督成本以及对公司价值的改善状况等因素的变动，影响着机构投资者进行监督的临界值，影响着机构投资者在短期投资与长期投资之间的选择，并对资本市场稳定产生一定的影响。     

Biased managers as strategic commitment: The relative profit approach

This paper analyzes a duopolistic model wherein each firm׳s owner can hire a biased manager for strategic reasons. We focus on the situation wherein each firm׳s owner evaluates the performance of her/his manager on the basis of her/his relative profit, which is equal to the weighted sum of her/his absolute profit and the absolute profit of her/his opponent firm. We show that in both price-setting and quantity-setting competitions, the owners of the two private firms employ aggressive managers rather than absolute profit maximizing managers regardless of the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance. Furthermore, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, as the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance increases, we show that the firms׳ owners tend to hire more aggressive managers when the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance is sufficiently low, whereas in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the firms׳ owners tend to hire less aggressive managers otherwise. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, the type of each firm׳s manager is not monotone with respect to the degree of each firm׳s relative performance. Thus, in both the price competition and the quantity competition, we find that the change in the optimal type of manager hired by each firm is non-monotone against the change of competitiveness in the market with the increase in the degree of importance of each firm׳s relative performance.     

职业经理人及其资格认证

通过分析职业经理的素质及其需要具备的能力,中国经济市场化发展的迅猛态势以及对职业经理人需求迅速增长的现实,必须尽快加强职业经理人的培养、提高职业经理人的素质,健全职业经理人认证制度。     

Biased managers with network externalities

In network industry under Cournot and Bertrand competition, we examine a model when owners of firms hire biased managers who have incorrect market demand. Contrast to previous studies, we show that (i) regardless of the strength of network externalities when consumers form the responsive and passive expectations, owners realize strategic advantage by hiring biased managers to be more aggressive under Cournot and Bertrand competition, (ii) firms prefer facing passive expectations for the weak network externalities and vice versa for the strong network exteranlities under Bertrand and Cournot competition, (iii) if the network size is sufficiently large, then the prisoner's dilemma that firms hire aggressive managers no longer exists under both competition modes. As with no delegation case, we obtain the different rankings of firms' profit depending on both network externalities and forming of expectations under Cournot and Bertrand competition.     

On the efficiency of markets for managers

Summary. This paper examines the efficiency of the outside labor market in inducing optimal managerial behavior in the presence of learning. It shows that the incentives provided by the market can be more efficient than the original analysis of Holmstr?m [6] would suggest. Moreover, under a mild additional assumption, the existence of an -efficient equilibrium can be guaranteed if a manager is patient. This result supports Fama's [4] original idea that the outside labor market can be efficient in disciplining top managers. These results also suggest that the empirically documented low levels of explicit incentives for managers might be due to the presence of implicit incentives provided by the outside market. Received: March 18, 1997; revised version: April 19, 2000     

The use of trading strategies by fund managers: some first survey evidence

A questionnaire survey has found that most fund managers rely on the strategies of buy-&-hold, momentum and contrarian trading. These strategies are typically applied mutually. Their use is rooted in the attributes and beliefs of the respective fund managers: buy-&-hold traders are fundamentally oriented, risk averse and are less (over)confident than others. Momentum traders appear as the least risk-averse professionals, going aggressively with the trend. Contrarian traders, however, show signs of overconfidence and peculiar risk aversion, both indicating difficulties in successful strategy implementation. The behavioural patterns revealed are not easily reconciled with efficient markets.