The Impact of Market Structure and Learning on the Tradeoff between R&D Competition and Cooperation

This paper compares R&D competition and cooperation when firms can devote resources to a ‘safe’ investment or a risky R&D investment. When the discovery of a new product creates positive externalities on non‐discovering firms, equilibrium investment flow, ex ante investment, and welfare under R&D competition are less than or equal to what they are under research cooperation. With negative externalities, R&D cooperation results in the same or lower ex ante investment than under R&D competition, and social welfare may also be less. Our results have relevance for empirical studies of the impact of R&D cooperation on R&D outcomes.     

Agglomeration effects and performance: a test of the Texas lodging industry

While competition decreases rents for firms, the presence of competitors may create benefits. Competitors that agglomerate, that are physically proximate, may create externalities—production efficiencies or heightened demand that increases rents. When such externalities exist, then who gains from and who contributes to them? We examine how other competitors' traits affect performance in Texas's lodging industry. In rural markets, we find that chain hotels and larger hotels contribute to positive externalities. While expecting those hotels similar to the establishments creating these externalities to gain, we find the opposite. Independent hotels and smaller hotels gain the most. Interestingly, some establishments are harmed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Private contracting with externalities: Divide and conquer?

This paper considers the efficacy of divide-and-conquer strategies in principal-agent games involving contracting with externalities. We find that whereas divide-and-conquer offers can arise in equilibrium under some conditions when the principal’s offers are publicly observable, they cannot arise in equilibrium when the principal’s offers are privately observable and the agents hold passive out-of-equilibrium beliefs. This insight applies to technology and platform adoption decisions with network effects, labor relations, settlement negotiations, and input licensing, among others.     

网络外部性下的电子商务平台竞争与规制——基于双边市场理论的研究

双边市场的相关问题研究是近年来产业组织领域的前沿与热点之一,本文在已有的经典文献基础上,系统思考了网络外部性在双边市场中的作用和影响,并对电子商务平台这一典型的双边市场平台企业进行分析,研究了电子商务平台的定价与竞争机制。通过对转移成本、兼容性和模块化的研究,本文认为互联互通和模块化经营可以降低网络外部性因素引起的市场进入壁垒,减少厂商运用市场势力排斥竞争行为的可能性,在知识经济条件下,使电子商务产业形成以技术创新为主导的竞争性垄断的市场结构。     

Changing competitive dynamics in network industries: An exploration of sun microsystems' open systems strategy

An integral part of competition is to deny rivals access to proprietary technical knowledge. Yet, Sun Microsystems provides rivals easy access to its technical knowledge and encourages them to enter its workstation market. This paper employs theoretical insights on technological systems and network externalities to understand Sun's open systems strategy. The paper also explores the changing nature of competition in network industries–industries characterized by network externalities and built around technological systems.     

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES,COMPETITION AND CONSUMER CHOICE*

Consumers sometimes make choices that impose greater external costs on those who do not make the same choice. This paper examines how the selectivity of negative externalities in such situations affects the competitive equilibrium and the desirability of an externality‐reducing public policy. Selective negative externalities create network externalities, but outcomes may differ greatly from typical network effects. Price effects may cause the imposing product's sales to decline with the size of the negative externality. Consequently, a positive competitive effect may overwhelm the externality's negative direct effects on welfare, such that a policy that enlarges the externality may improve welfare.     

Shared ownership and pricing in a network switch

We observe that many wholesale switches in automated teller machine (ATM) networks are jointly owned by their members and that this tends to occur more frequently when the wholesale industry is highly concentrated. We also observe that network switches are ‘natural monopolies’, their costs being largely fixed and their demand exhibiting substantial network externalities. Motivated by these observations, we model the competition for members between wholesale switches and the role joint ownership can play in attracting members. The model analyzes both the adoption decision (which network a bank chooses to join) and the subsequent pricing of switch and ATM services. We compare competition between two solely owned switches with competition between one solely owned and one jointly owned switch. Our analysis shows that a more concentrated structure results under the latter and that retail prices are higher. This calls into question the leniency of antitrust policy toward jointly owned structures.     

Occupational Licensing in the EU: Protecting Consumers or Limiting Competition?

Occupational licensing regulations require workers in many different professions to obtain a special permit to work legally in their chosen field. Although professional associations argue that the only goal of professional licensing is to protect the public, occupational regulation may also reduce competition: for example, by reducing entry. This paper reviews the recent literature and policy developments on the subject, with a focus on the European Union.

     

Copyright Protection in the Digital Single Market: Potential Consequences for Content Platform Competition

This paper scrutinizes the effects of the European Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market on platform competition. Platforms that are online content-sharing service providers must have a license agreement with collective management organizations that control the content platform that users may – or must not – upload to the platform. The paper shows that the new directive may imply market concentration and an aggregate welfare loss. The reason is that only users of the large platform (in a dual platform setting) will be allowed to upload content if the content assets are sufficiently valuable and if network effects are strong.

     

Upward pricing pressure in two-sided markets: Incorporating rebalancing effects

In two-sided markets it is important to consider rebalancing effects following a merger, i.e. the impact of a change in margin on one side of the market, either due to a price change or to efficiency gains, on the pricing incentives on the other side. We propose modified versions for the indices of pricing pressure (UPP and GUPPI) that take this into account. We show that in two-sided markets where the cross-group externalities are positive the upward pricing pressure will typically be overstated if the rebalancing effect is ignored. Our approach explains why competition agencies should look at both sides of the market when assessing platform mergers.     

Cost and benefits from infrastructure competition. Estimating welfare effects from broadband access competition

Competition between parallel infrastructures incorporates opposing welfare effects. The gain from reduced deadweight loss might be outweighed by the inefficient duplication of an existing infrastructure. Using data from broadband Internet access for western Europe 2000–04, this paper investigates which effect prevails empirically. Infrastructure competition between DSL and cable TV had a significant and positive impact on the broadband penetration. However, comparing the additional social surplus attributable to cable competition with the cable investments, it can be concluded that, in the absence of significant positive externalities, infrastructure competition has probably not been welfare enhancing.     

Competition Policy and Trade Barriers: Empirical Evidence from China

This paper examines the impact of competition policy on inter-regional trade barriers among provinces in China. Using data from 28 Chinese provinces for the period 1994–2013, we show that the implementation of competition policy—as measured by a number of indices that we construct—can effectively reduce inter-regional trade barriers. We provide results that are based on both fixed effects and instrumental variables estimators to support the causal nature of the established link. The effect is found to be more salient for provinces with a less corrupt political environment. The results are also shown to be robust across alternative specifications, alternative measures of competition policy, and inter-regional trade barriers.

     

财政外溢下的地方政府公共服务提供——以教育为例

主流财政分权和公共服务提供理论在强调地方政府竞争效率的同时,较少考虑联邦体制与单一集权体制的制度差异,而且忽视了地方政府在提供一些公共服务时面临着巨大的财政外溢。考虑到我国单一集权的政体背景,应用多任务代理框架来构建理论模型,可以发现。地方政府会忽视产出不易测量的文教卫生等社会民生类公共服务的提供。在人口大规模迁移使得教育支出具有显著财政外溢情况下,地方政府将进一步削减教育支出,并向居民转嫁。未来的政策调整方向是,淡化地方政府经济活动激励的同时,加大对社会民生类公共服务的激励强度,并增加对具有财政外溢的教育的专项转移支付,使其经费负担主体逐步上移。     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

Competition,governance, and relationship‐specific investments: Theory and implications for strategy

This paper uses biform games to examine the endogenous decision to invest in relationship‐specific assets. It addresses the questions of how competition affects suppliers' decisions to produce a general‐purpose product or a relationship‐specific product for a buyer and under what circumstances a governance arrangement designed to share investment costs between the transacting parties increases the investment in relationship‐specific assets. We offer a balanced perspective that emphasizes both the superior transaction value of relationship‐specific products and their high transaction costs while considering the competition effects generated by alternative investment plans. The model and its extensions generate new insights into investment decisions regarding relationship‐specific assets. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: Theory and applications

This paper presents a tractable model of network competition with many firms, elastic subscriber demand, off-net price discrimination, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. We characterize stability in expectations and equilibrium under firm- and market-level network effects. The model is applied to simulate the effects of termination rates, market maturity, and retail pricing strategies. We show that predictions based on duopoly models can be misleading, in particular concerning the effects of termination rates.     

Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities

We study competition in two-sided markets with a common network externality rather those than with the standard inter-group effects. This type of externality occurs when both groups benefit, possibly with different intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality is relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satisfies a homogeneity condition then platforms’ profits and price structures have some specific properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to the other, according to the homogeneity degree. Prices are affected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. In the specific but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms’ profits do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This result differs from those of the two-sided models, which deal with standard positive inter-group network externality.     

Merger Control and Economic Growth of LDCs: Some Observations and Recommendations

The aim of this paper is to evaluate merger control as a segment of competition policy in less developed countries (LDCs) and to propose desirable regimes, using economic growth as the evaluation standard. Three regimes of merger control are recommended, depending on the level of institutional and economic development: for LDCs with low levels of both, the absence of merger control is suitable; for LDCs with intermediate levels of both, very restricted merger control is recommended; this should evolve into somewhat restricted merger control for the remaining LDCs. Advocacy is recommended as the main substitute activity of the national competition authorities.

     

Negative externalities of close guanxi within organizations

In this conceptual article we present a critical analysis of close guanxi, i.e., close personal connections, in terms of their negative externalities on organizations. We adopt a social dilemma perspective and examine how close guanxi parties, while cooperative toward each other, may nevertheless defect against the organization, causing negative externalities. We contend that relationalism exacerbates such negative effects of close guanxi and propose various institutional mechanisms and individual variables that can reduce them. Finally, we discuss research and practical implications of solving social dilemmas of close guanxi in Chinese organizations and strong ties in Western organizations.

Local network externalities and market segmentation

This paper models interaction between groups of agents by means of a graph where each node represents a group of agents and an arc represents bilateral interaction. It departs from the standard Katz–Shapiro framework by assuming that network benefits are restricted only amongst groups of linked agents. It shows that even if rival firms engage in Bertrand competition, this form of network externalities permits strong market segmentation in which firms divide up the market and earn positive profits. The analysis also shows that some graphs or network structures do not permit such segmentation, while for others, there are easy to interpret conditions under which market segmentation obtains in equilibrium.