Do managers listen to the market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll [Roll, R., 1986, “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 97–216.] argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers' propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers' propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities.     

Do Chinese managers listen to the media?: Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

This study investigates whether listed companies in China are sensitive to public media coverage when making investment decisions regarding mergers and acquisitions (M&As). We find that the likelihood of abandoning a proposed M&A transaction is positively associated with negative media coverage, and this association is stronger with lower announcement abnormal returns. Our analysis demonstrates that the negative information effect is amplified for glamour acquirers. We argue that negative media reactions drive the external feedback mechanism of M&A attempts and help guard against managerial hubris.     

When do managers listen to the market? Impact of learning in acquisitions of private firms

We study the influence of market signals and agency problems on the decision to cancel an announced acquisition. We find major differences between deals involving private vs. public targets. First, controlling for the value of expected synergies, acquisitions are less likely to be cancelled when the target is private rather than public. This finding supports learning rather than the alternative common-information hypothesis. Second, better manager-shareholder interest alignment makes the cancellation of a “bad” deal more likely only when the target is a private firm. This suggests bidder agency problems have a greater influence on acquisition outcome (i.e., learning) when the target is private. Third, cancellation is more likely for private targets when their post-announcement abnormal returns are low, especially if the method of payment includes stock. This indicates that it is important to control for bidder overvaluation when testing the managerial learning hypothesis. Overall, both the learning and agency hypotheses help explain observed differences in deal completion by target type.     

Institutional trading and stock resiliency: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We examine the impact of institutional trading on stock resiliency during the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We show that buy-side institutions have different exposure to liquidity factors based on their trading style. Liquidity supplying institutions absorb the long-term order imbalances in the market and are critical to recovery patterns after a liquidity shock. We show that these liquidity suppliers withdraw from risky securities during the crisis and their participation does not recover for an extended period of time. The illiquidity of specific stocks is significantly affected by institutional trading patterns; participation by liquidity supplying institutions can ameliorate illiquidity, while participation by liquidity demanding institutions can exacerbate illiquidity. Our results provide guidance on why some stocks take longer to recover in a crisis.     

Rumors and pre-announcement trading: why sell target stocks before acquisition announcements?

We track trading activity in the days preceding acquisition announcements for target firms and find that abnormally high trading volume precedes significant price movement. Using additional intraday data, we find increased active-selling in target stocks before acquisition announcements that offsets increased active-buying. This is unexpected because sellers often lose money when an acquisition is announced. After ruling out alternative explanations, we find evidence that sellers are rational investors who trade on the market??s perceived overreaction to takeover rumors. While sellers lose money when a rumor precedes an actual announcement, in most cases rumors fail to materialize into public announcements. We provide evidence that the significant pre-announcement volume we document reflects the market??s processing of highly uncertain information in takeover rumors.     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

Is high-frequency trading tiering the financial markets?

Some academic research has identified the possibility of High-Frequency Trading (HFT) creating a two tier market, in which the fast traders mostly deal with each other at most favourable prices and spread, leaving the slower investors to share the least profitable deals. Yet, although intriguing, this view has been seldom quantitatively investigated − and that is the gap found in previous research. A computer simulation has been produced to mimic the behaviour of both slow and fast traders, each category showing characteristics consistent with their behaviour on the markets. In particular, High-Frequency (HF) traders show their preference for aggressive orders when the bid-ask spread is tight and are less aggressive when spread is wide. The Low-Frequency (LF) traders are then forced to live with the remaining deals, hoping to profit from longer term price movements. The purpose of this piece of research is to verify whether HF traders (HFTs) tend to deal with each other and, something not investigated by previous studies, if LF traders also mainly restrict their trading with other slow traders.The results show some tendency toward markets actually splitting into two-tiers: they confirm previous findings of HF traders' tendency to deal with their similar counterparts in case of thin bid-ask spread (which means higher probability of profits for the aggressive side), leaving mostly LF traders to deal amongst themselves when the spread is wider, so aiming at long-term gain (which makes trading inherently riskier).     

Should you take your brand to where the action is?

When markets turn hostile, it's no surprise that managers are tempted to extend their brands vertically--that is, to take their brands into a seemingly attractive market above or below their current positions. And for companies chasing growth, the urge to move into booming premium or value segments also can be hard to resist. The draw is indeed strong; and in some instances, a vertical move is not merely justified but actually essential to survival--even for top brands, which have the advantages of economies of scale, brand equity, and retail clout. But beware: leveraging a brand to access upscale or downscale markets is more dangerous than it first appears. Before making a move, then, managers should ascertain whether the rewards will be worth the risks. In general, David Aaker recommends that managers avoid vertical extensions whenever possible. There is an inherent contradiction in the very concept because brand equity is built in large part on image and perceived worth, and a vertical move can easily distort those qualities. Still, certain situations demand vertical extensions, and Aaker examines both the winners and the losers in the game. Managers may find themselves facing a situation that presents both an emerging opportunity and a strategic threat, and alternatives to vertical extensions may have even higher risks and costs. Furthermore, a number of brands have been extended vertically with complete success. If after assessing the risks and rewards you conclude that a vertical extension is on the horizon, proceed with caution. And keep in mind that your challenge will be to leverage and protect the original brand while taking advantage of the new opportunity.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.     

Does ETF trading affect the efficiency of the underlying index?

This study finds that both contemporaneous and lagged ETF trading volumes in both absolute and relative terms are significant contributors to the price efficiency of the underlying index. The variation in ETF shares outstanding is also positively associated with the index efficiency but it weakens the effect of ETF trading on the index efficiency. Moreover, the synthetic ETF price dominates the index in information share and the dominance increases in ETF trading. However, the relation between an individual ETF's information share and its trading volume varies, which is significantly positive for the leading ETF but ambiguous for other ETFs.     

Insurance companies’ trading behaviour during the European sovereign debt crisis: Flight home or flight to quality?

This paper empirically investigates if insurers exhibited a flight home or flight to quality during the European sovereign debt crisis and other stages of the financial crisis. Our dataset consists of over sixty insurance companies, for which we separately observe trading behaviour and portfolio revaluations at a quarterly frequency during 2006–2013. When explaining insurers’ trading behaviour we explicitly control for country risk and momentum strategies. The results show that insurers exhibited a flight to quality during the European sovereign debt crisis, while we find no evidence of a flight home. The flight to quality was not present before the European sovereign debt crisis and disappeared after ECB chairman Draghi's speech mid-2012. Interestingly, supervisory data suggests that the observed flight to quality was not driven by regulatory solvency constraints.     

Is trading in the shortest-term index options profitable?

Review of Derivatives Research - The aim of this study is to examine the return rates of the TAIEX options with at most 8 calendar days to maturity using a buy-and-hold strategy. Although our...     

Activity in futures: does underlying market size relate to futures trading volume?

This study investigates the determinants of trading volume in the futures markets and focuses on underlying market characteristics as an explanation for futures trading volume. Four major futures contracts traded on the Sydney Futures Exchange are investigated: the stock price index (SPI); the 90-day bank accepted bill (BAB); the 3-year bond; and the 10-year bond. An important outcome of this study is an identification of the fundamental drivers of trading volume in the futures markets, which have largely gone undocumented in prior research. We find evidence that futures trading volume is related to underlying market characteristics: the size of the Australian superannuation fund investments in equities (for the SPI), short term treasury notes (for the BAB), non-government bonds on issue (for the 3-year contract) and government bonds on issue (for the 10-year contract).     

Profitability of technical stock trading: Has it moved from daily to intraday data?

This paper investigates how technical trading systems exploit the momentum and reversal effects in the S&P 500 spot and futures market. When based on daily data, the profitability of 2580 technical models has steadily declined since 1960, and has been unprofitable since the early 1990s. However, when based on 30-minutes-data the same models produce an average gross return of 7.2% per year between 1983 and 2007. These results do not change substantially when trading is tested over eight subperiods. In particular, there is no clear trend of a declining profitability of technical stock trading based on 30-minutes-data. Those 25 models which performed best over the most recent subperiod produce a significantly higher gross return over the subsequent subperiod than all models. Between 2001 and 2007 the 2580 models perform worse than over the 1980s and 1990s. This result could be due to stock markets becoming recently more efficient or to stock price trends shifting from 30-minutes-prices to prices of higher frequencies.     

Unit Trust Investment Products: Is the rate of return reported by fund managers to investors reliable and comparable?

Funds under management in retail unit trust investment products have grown tenfold in the past decade and now represent the savings of some 1.5 million retail investors. These investors cannot specifically command the infomation they require and consequently rely on what the market provides. This paper provides some evidence that because of a lack of independent verification and mandated standards the investing public cannot be certain that reported rates of return are either reliable or comparable.     

What Motivates a Developer to Sell before Completion?

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Presale, or selling before completion, is a very common phenomenon in the housing market. However, not all developers presell their units and the...     

Does program trading contribute to excess comovement of stock returns?

Daily returns of stocks with high program trading comove more with each other but less with others. This significant comovement is disconnected with market movements and news of fundamentals and becomes stronger when market uncertainty is higher. It can be explained by neither the hypotheses of gradual information diffusion and liquidity provision nor the effects of quantitative trading signals, earnings announcements and index fund trading. Its non-fundamental nature is further demonstrated by the observation of program trading stimulating return reversals. Underlying this comovement is the high persistence of program trading. Our findings support the theory of habitat investing and demonstrate program trading creates a distinct source of excess return comovement.     

Did CDS trading improve the market for corporate bonds?

Financial innovation through the creation of new markets and securities impacts related markets as well, changing their efficiency, quality (pricing error), and liquidity. The credit default swap (CDS) market was undoubtedly one of the salient new markets of the past decade. In this paper we examine whether the advent of CDS trading was beneficial to the underlying secondary market for corporate bonds. We employ econometric specifications that account for information across CDS, bond, equity, and volatility markets. We also develop a novel methodology to utilize all observations in our data set even when continuous daily trading is not evidenced, because bonds trade much less frequently than equities. Using an extensive sample of CDS and bond trades over 2002–2008, we find that the advent of CDS was largely detrimental. Bond markets became less efficient, evidenced no reduction in pricing errors, and experienced no improvement in liquidity. These findings are robust to various slices of the data set and specifications of our tests.