Implications of parent brand inertia for multiproduct pricing

This paper explores and quantifies the importance of parent brand state dependence to forward looking pricing outcomes in the area of umbrella branding and multi-product firms. We show through numerical simulations that loyalty (inertia) to the parent brand can decrease prices and reduce profits, as well as mitigate or even reverse the benefits of joint profit maximization relative to sub-brand profit maximization. These effects are mediated by brand asymmetries and the relative magnitude of sub-brand state dependence effects. Empirically, we focus on the Yogurt category, where we consider parent brands with several sub-brands. Using household level scanner data, we estimate the parameters that characterize consumer demand while flexibly accounting for consumer heterogeneity. We also estimate unobserved product costs based on a forward looking price setting game. Through counterfactual analysis, we study the overall effect of parent brand state dependence on prices and profits, as well as the empirical impact of joint profit maximization and changes in firms’ beliefs regarding consumer inertia. Our findings have implications for markets where demand is likely characterized by parent brand dynamics.     

Fee or free? How much to add on for an add-on

Sellers often provide complimentary “no extra charge” add-ons (e.g., free Internet connection) to consumers who buy their primary products (e.g., a hotel stay), but recently add-ons that used to be free are offered for a fee. The conventional wisdom is that unadvertised add-ons for high fees help competitors increase profits that are competed away by advertising low prices for the basic products. This theory cannot explain why complimentary add-ons are still offered by some sellers. We show that providing complimentary add-ons can be profitable for sellers with monopoly power under certain demand conditions. If these demand conditions are not met, it is optimal to charge a supplementary fee for the add-on. We also show how pricing policy can be designed to selectively target or deter different consumer segments from purchasing the add-on to boost sellers’ profits, providing a strategic role for selling add-ons at either below-cost or at exorbitantly high prices. Yet such behavior may have repercussions for economic welfare when it results in socially inefficient giveaways when consumers would be better served with a lower price on the basic product without the add-on or, with the other extreme, when it results in excessively high prices for an add-on that restricts sales and leads to its under-provision from a societal perspective. The paper also provides managerial insights on the design and use of add-ons.     

Compete in Price or Service?—A Study of Personalized Pricing and Money Back Guarantees

Retailers use both pricing and service strategies to respond to intensified competition. Here we develop a duopoly model to investigate the impact of the increasingly popular personalized pricing strategy (PPS) and the widely used Money Back Guarantee (MBG) customer returns policy. We consider two retailers who differ in customer satisfaction rates. Each retailer chooses a pricing strategy, PPS or uniform pricing, and a product return strategy, MBG or ‘no returns.’ We show that both PPS and MBG are dominant strategies, but their impact on retailers’ prices and profits are different; while PPS intensifies price competition and may lead to a prisoner’s dilemma in which both retailers may lose profit, MBG mitigates price competition and may result in a Pareto improvement in both retailers’ profits. Both PPS and MBG increase the size of the overall market, but not the total duopoly profit. The total customer surplus and social welfare may increase under either strategy. In addition, we obtain some interesting observations as to how our results may change if the product quality/customer satisfaction rate is endogenously chosen in the duopoly. Some of our findings are in contrast to related results reported in the literature.     

Why offer lower prices to past customers? Inducing favorable social price comparisons to enhance customer retention

Price discrimination policies vary widely across companies. Some firms offer new customers the lowest price; others give preferential prices to their past customers. We contribute to the literature on price discrimination in behavior-based pricing by exploring how customers’ social price comparisons, i.e., comparing one’s price to that received by similar peers, impact the optimal structure of price discrimination. Social price comparisons have a negative (positive) impact on customers’ transaction utility if the price charged to past customers is higher (lower) than a new customer’s price. Using an analytical model with vertically differentiated firms, we show that a firm with relatively large market share will reward its past customers with relatively low prices when social price comparisons have a sufficiently large impact on utility. Furthermore, we find that social price comparisons lead to a relaxation of the price competition for new customers. Thus, both firms can earn higher profits when such comparisons are made than when they are absent. We also examine how other factors, such as horizontal competition and strategic customers, interact with social price comparison concerns to impact pricing strategies. Finally, we show how pricing behavior differs when price comparisons are based on historic reference prices rather than on peers’ prices.     

Internal reference price response across store formats

Reference price models have a long tradition in marketing and consumer research. Pricing strategies can utilize consumer response to gains and losses relative to internal reference prices, which are price expectations developed from past-observed prices. Consequently, many previous studies have been devoted to analyzing differences in internal reference price response across product categories and consumer characteristics. However, knowledge about internal reference price response across different store formats is missing. Our study aims to fill this research gap. To do so, we estimate a reference price model for the same set of brands and the same sample of consumers across two store formats (discount chain vs. supermarket chain). The prices for the brands in our model are similar across store formats. Results from our proposed model show that the same consumers are loss-averse at the discount chain while gain-seeking at the supermarket chain. Predicted by previous literature, we attribute the difference in internal reference price response to the different price image of the store formats. Overall, our research contributes to the reference price literature and provides important implications for pricing strategies at stores with different price image.     

Retail channel price discrimination

This paper examines price differentials of identical items across retail channels. Many consumer packaged goods are sold through both grocery and drug stores. Liquor is unique in that in much of the country there is a third retail channel of distribution, liquor stores. If consumers in each retail channel differ in their willingness to pay for certain items, then sellers can exploit those differences and charge different prices for the same items in each channel. We examine a unique data set of pooled cross sectional retail scanner data on wine to test whether sellers use retail channel to identify heterogeneous consumer market segments and engage in price discrimination. We begin by presenting a model of price discrimination by retail channel along with behavioural assumptions regarding shoppers in each channel. Next we examine sales by retail channel and find persistent price differentials for the same item across retail channel after controlling for sample selection bias and seasonality. Lastly, we estimate the price elasticity of demand correcting for endogeneity and find differences across channel consistent with the price differentials. The extent of price differential, however, differs significantly with respect to price point.     

Decomposing the effect of advertising: What happens in the retail channel?

The diverging interests of manufacturers and retailers famously give rise to the double marginalization problem but have consequences far beyond pricing. Advertising is another marketing instrument that is under the control of the manufacturer but its ultimate effect on consumer demand also depends on retailers’ pricing decisions. We decompose the effect of advertising in the channel and highlight an additional route through which advertising affects sales, namely via the changes in the retail price that a strategic retailer makes in response to changes in demand following manufacturer advertising. The total demand effect of advertising thus comprises the direct effects of advertising on market shares, and the indirect effects coming through adjustments that the retailer makes to the in-store prices of all the brands in a given product category in response to the shifted demand due to advertising. We match advertising data for four different categories (both food and non-food) to store-level scanner panel data, which also include information on wholesale prices. Controlling for wholesale prices, we establish in a reduced-form model that the retailer reacts to manufacturer advertising by changing retail prices instead of simply imposing a constant markup on the wholesale price. To further explore the role of the strategic response of the retailer in a systematic fashion and quantify the effects derived in the decomposition, we estimate a discrete-choice model of demand and determine the magnitude of the direct and indirect effects. We find that the indirect effect of advertising through retailer prices is about half the size of the direct effect, and thus substantively affects advertising effectiveness.     

Profit-Maximising Rigid Prices and Vertical Integration

This article explores profit-maximising rigid pricing for a price-setting firm and relates the results to vertical integration, which is an important area of corporate strategy and antitrust policy. The setting of a profit-maximising rigid price is investigated in the face of a known distribution of short-run demand levels as a compromise between the flexible prices that would be appropriate in the short run at different levels of demand. The price and level of capacity are therefore set to maximise expected profits across varying levels of demand. With the help of computer simulations, it is shown that price rigidity increases the incentives for vertical integration, particularly where upstream production is capital intensive, due to the increased importance of rationing. The incentives will also be particularly strong for more efficient and more capital-intensive downstream production with low short-run marginal costs.     

Market share response and competitive interaction: The impact of temporary, evolving and structural changes in prices

Managing pricing is a challenging task due to the significant impact on shares and the likelihood of strong consumer and competitor reaction. The major contributions of this paper are to assess comprehensive share response to temporary, evolving and structural changes in prices and to determine the level of market share as a function of levels of prices. For the empirical analysis, we examine two consumer product categories and find that it is valuable to distinguish among temporary, evolving and structural changes in prices, as their impact on market shares tends to differ. Further, we find that subsequent competitive reaction will influence predictions of price response. Accordingly, it is important for managers to use conjectures regarding competitive price reactions in assessing the impact of policy changes. We conclude with the strategic implications of the findings and discuss a number of opportunities for future research.     

Information and channel profits

New marketing information technologies, associated with point-of-purchase scanner systems, have increased the potential information available to manufacturers and retailers. In this paper, we explore the pricing and profit implications of this technology within a channel setting. We find that improved information about demand always results in greater absolute profits, as well as a claim on greater division of channel profits for the informed channel member. The greater profitability is due to the informed channel member's ability to “fine tune” prices in response to changes in demand conditions. However, total channel profits are highest when only one channel member acquires information. We also show that fine-tuning of price has the effect of smoothing sales, as informed firms charge higher prices during high demand periods and charge lower prices during low demand periods. Lastly, we show that an equilibrium where both channel members acquire information does not lead to a prisoners' dilemma.     

人工智能时代个性化定价行为的反垄断规制--从大数据杀熟展开

人工智能时代,数据规模显著扩张,算法能力持续优化。科技实力雄厚、市场力量强大的经营者凭借大数据与算法工具的紧密结合,收集和分析能够反映消费者特征和行为的相关信息,以无限接近消费者购买能力和支付意愿上限的方式对消费者实施个性化定价。个性化定价行为涉及对条件相同的交易相对人在交易价格上实施差别化待遇,可能构成反垄断法所禁止的价格歧视行为。但与以往反垄断实施重点关注的排他性价格歧视不同,个性化定价突出表现为直接针对终端消费者实施的剥削性价格歧视,且在具体情形下呈现出不同的限制竞争效果,引发消费者选择能力与选择范围的双重限制。鉴于此,个性化定价行为的反垄断规制需要准确识别涉案行为,综合判断竞争效果,慎重选择福利标准。对于同时降低消费者剩余和社会总福利的个性化定价行为,可认定其具有限制竞争效果且不具备正当理由,从而构成违法价格歧视;对于降低消费者剩余却提高社会总福利的个性化定价行为,如果选择消费者福利标准则可认定其构成违法价格歧视,如果选择社会总福利标准则可认定其具备正当理由;对于同时提高消费者剩余与社会总福利的个性化定价行为,因涉及消费者之间的剩余转移,对其竞争效果的评价仍待反垄断实施予以明确。     

Monopoly Prices versus Ramsey-Boiteux Prices: Are they “Similar”, and: Does it Matter?

Ramsey-Boiteux prices and monopoly prices are frequently regarded as being similar. This might suggest that sometimes monopoly pricing is close to the Ramsey-Boiteux second best and welfare superior to imperfectly regulated prices. This paper tries to specify what is meant by “being similar”. Both sets of prices are similar in a theoretical sense but differ not only with respect to price levels but can even lead to different price orders. The paper discusses the impact of competition and stresses the difference between market and residual demand, which are important for the Ramsey-Boiteux and the monopoly problem, respectively. JEL classification  L33, L50, L94     

OBSERVABLE MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION

In this paper we investigate the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives within a circular city model with observable agency contracts. With respect to the case of unobservability studied by Raith (2003 ), we find that optimal managerial contracts provide lower incentives, and that equilibrium expected prices and profits are higher. Changes in competition fundamentals have ambiguous effects, but observable contracts alleviate their impact on incentives. Finally, observability involves three major implications: managerial incentives are higher under price regulation than under competition; prices may increase with the number of firms; consumer welfare may diminish when competition increases.     

Digital distribution and the prohibition of resale markets for information goods

An existing theoretical literature finds that frictionless resale markets cannot reduce profits of monopolist producers of perfectly durable goods. This paper starts by presenting logical arguments suggesting this finding does not hold for goods consumers tire of with use, implying the impact of resale is an empirical question. The empirical impact is then estimated in the market for video games, one of many markets in which producers may soon legally prevent resale by distributing their products digitally as downloads or streamed rentals. Estimation proceeds in two steps. First, demand parameters are estimated using a dynamic discrete choice model in a market with allowed resale, using data on new sales and used trade-ins. Then, using these parameter estimates, prices, profits, and consumer welfare are simulated under counterfactual environments. When resale is allowed, firms are unable to prevent their goods from selling for low prices in later periods. The ability to do so by restricting resale outright yields significant profit increases. Renting, however, does not raise profits as much due to a revenue extraction problem.     

Complementary Goods: Prices and Consumer Welfare Under Duopoly and Monopoly

We examine prices, profits, and consumer surplus for differentiated complementary goods under duopoly and a multi‐product monopoly. We find that little can be said about the relative magnitudes of prices of the components of a system of complementary goods under the alternative market structures. Although demand complementarity can lead to lower prices for either the primary or the secondary good under monopoly, both prices are not necessarily lower. The results unique to this paper are that, when two complementary goods form a system, the system price is unambiguously lower and consumer surplus and profits are higher under a multi‐product monopoly.     

An empirical analysis of demand variations and markdown policies for fashion retailers

In this paper, using data from a leading specialty apparel retailer, we empirically examine the determinants of a retailer's dynamic pricing policy and investigate consumer response to price changes (markdowns) throughout a fashion product's selling season using a product diffusion setting. In order to do that, we first develop and estimate a markdown pricing model and a consumer demand model that capture the important characteristics of the fashion apparel market. Next, we use the estimates from these two models to design and simulate four alternative markdown pricing policies to investigate the impact of these different policies on consumer demand and retailer revenues. Our results, in line with the previous literature, show that markdowns implemented early in the season but small in magnitude generate the highest retailer revenues. Our paper not only provides a comprehensive empirical framework for fashion apparel retailers that is easy to implement, but also shows that using this framework will lead to timely decision making and will improve sale and revenue outcomes in the fast paced fashion world.     

Bayesian Analysis of Simultaneous Demand and Supply

In models of demand and supply, consumer price sensitivity affects both the sales of a good through price, and the price that is set by producers and retailers. The relationship between the dependent variables (e.g., demand and price) and the common parameters (e.g., price sensitivity) is typically non-linear, especially when heterogeneity is present. In this paper, we develop a Bayesian method to address the computational challenge of estimating simultaneous demand and supply models that can be applied to both the analysis of household panel data and aggregated demand data. The method is developed within the context of a heterogeneous discrete choice model coupled with pricing equations derived from either specific competitive structures, or linear equations of the kind used in instrumental variable estimation, and applied to a scanner panel dataset of light beer purchases. Our analysis indicates that incorporating heterogeneity into the demand model all but eliminates the bias in the price parameter due to the endogeneity of price. The analysis also supports the use of a full information analysis.     

The price is right? Guidelines for pricing to enhance profitability

Pricing is a key element of the marketing strategy. It does not require significant investments or resources, and is perhaps the most accessible lever to manage profitability. Even minor fluctuations in pricing can have a significant impact on both revenues and profitability. As such, lack of careful planning in pricing is a wasted opportunity. With this as a backdrop, we make a case for precision in pricing to enhance profitability. Since consumers vary in their preferences, motivations, and propensity to spend, they assign varying degrees of emphasis regarding price upon their purchase decisions. We argue that pricing is a creative exercise in math and behavioral economics, and companies should stay focused on profits. We also provide a series of guidelines for creating effective base prices, and then modifying them to enhance profitability. Finally, monitoring prices at the transaction level will reduce leakage in profits and further add to the bottom line.     

Can Banning Spatial Price Discrimination Improve Social Welfare?

We analyze a two-stage sequential-move model of location and pricing to identify firm’s location, output, and welfare. We consider two pricing regimes (mill pricing and spatial price discrimination) and, unlike previous literature, allow in each of them for a non-uniform population density, non-constant location costs (i.e., the setup costs, such rental costs and land prices, differ by firm’s location), and endogenous market boundaries. Under constant location costs, our results show the firm locates at the city center under both mill and discriminatory pricing, and that output is larger under spatial price discrimination. Welfare comparisons are, however, ambiguous. Under non-constant location costs, we find the optimal location can move away from the city center, and does not coincide across pricing regimes. Compared with mill pricing, spatial price discrimination generates a higher level of output. We also find that welfare is higher (lower) under mill than under discriminatory pricing when transportation rates are low (high, respectively).     

Investigating the unobserved heterogeneity in consumers’ sensitivity to the price of gasoline

We empirically examined how gasoline prices impact consumers’ shopping behaviors. Using individual panel data on gasoline transactions, we found that gasoline prices generally have a statistically and economically significant impact. However, our disaggregate analysis indicated that, across consumers, considerable heterogeneity was present in the underlying sensitivity to the price of gasoline and in the income effect, resulting from fluctuating gasoline prices. More interestingly, the significant effect of gasoline prices was largely driven by the consumers with large purchase volume, and consumers with the highest level of gasoline consumption remained almost perfectly insensitive to the price of gasoline. Such heterogeneity is also present in the effect of gasoline prices on grocery expenditures, and notably, consumers with the largest purchase volume were not associated with statistically significant changes in grocery expenditures. Theoretical background suggests that the financial constraints of consumers and primary vehicle use may explain about the differences in responses to gasoline prices. Results based on individual-level data allowed for a comprehensive understanding of how and how much gasoline prices affect consumer behaviors and showed that inelastic gasoline demand and the considerable income effect due to gasoline prices may not best describe the effect of gasoline prices.