Responses by Australian auditors to the global financial crisis

We examine the impact of the global financial crisis (GFC) on auditor behaviour in Australia. Using a sample of listed companies, we examine whether the GFC impacted the propensity of auditors to issue going concern modifications and increased audit effort as reflected in audit fees and audit reporting lag. Controlling for client characteristics, we find an increase in the propensity to issue going concern opinions during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007 and that Big N auditors responded to the GFC earlier than non‐Big N auditors. In relation to audit effort, we find evidence of increased audit fees during the period 2008–2009 compared with the period 2005–2007. There is, however, no evidence of increased audit reporting lags during the GFC.     

Auditors’ going‐concern‐modified opinions after 2001: measuring reporting accuracy

An important change in auditors’ reporting behaviour in the period after the high‐profile corporate collapses in 2001 is that auditors were more likely to issue going‐concern (GC)‐modified audit opinions. Comparing company failure rates subsequent to receiving a first‐time going‐concern (FTGC)‐modified audit opinion in the pre‐ and post‐2001 periods, we find a consistent type 1 error (misclassification) rate (the rate of survival among companies issued an FTGC opinion). Results are indicative of auditors maintaining GC reporting accuracy when comparing the 1995–1996 and 2004–2005 periods. This conclusion is supported after considering the impact of mitigating circumstances surrounding companies that received an FTGC‐modified audit report and survived.     

The civil justice system and going concern audit reports: Comments on “Auditors’ decision-making under going concern uncertainties in low litigation risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong”

Lam and Mensah [Lam, K., Mensah, Y.M., 2006. Auditors’ decision-making under going concern uncertainties in low litigation risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong. J. Account. Public Pol. 25 (6), this issue] provide some valuable insight on auditors’ choice of going concern audit reports in an environment where the civil justice system affords, from the standpoint of the plaintiff, fewer remedies and is more difficult to file a complaint than it is in the US. Hence, from the auditor’s standpoint, this environment can appropriately be described as a “low litigation risk environment”. In this comment, I first question whether a disclaimer of an opinion is any indication of either a quality audit or professionalism. Secondly, three alternative explanations for the empirical regularities are discussed. The Gatekeeper Story suggests auditors are simply not willing to risk reducing their reputational capital by acquiescing to clients that are not likely to survive their own financial distress. The Herding Story suggests that, when auditors are faced with uncertainties or a gap in the authoritative literature, auditors will herd together to form a common response that mimic one-another. The Value of Incumbency Story holds that as the value of incumbency declines with the client’s inability to survive, auditors will have fewer incentives to incur the incremental costs to gather sufficient competent evidential matter necessary to support an unqualified opinion.     

Earnings quality: Some evidence on the role of auditor tenure and auditors’ industry expertise

Prior studies suggest that auditors with short tenure are associated with lower earnings quality because of the lack of client-specific knowledge and/or low balling. In this study, we examine whether industry specialization of auditors and low balling affect the association between auditor tenure and earnings quality. We find that the association between shorter auditor tenure and lower earnings quality is weaker for firms audited by industry specialists compared to non-specialists. In addition, we do not find results consistent with the low balling explanation.     

The global financial crisis: Explaining cross-country differences in the output impact

What explains differences in the crisis impact across developing countries and emerging markets? Using cross-country regressions to assess the factors driving the growth performance in 2009 (compared to pre-crisis forecasts for that year), we find that a small set of variables explain a large share of the variation in the growth impact. Countries with more leveraged domestic financial systems, stronger credit growth, and more short-term debt tended to suffer a larger effect on economic activity, although the relative importance of these factors differs across country groups. For emerging markets, this financial channel trumps the trade channel. For a broader set of developing countries, however, the trade channel seems to have mattered, with more open countries affected more strongly and those exporting food commodities being less hard hit. Exchange-rate flexibility helped in buffering the impact of the shock, particularly for emerging markets. There is also some evidence that countries with a stronger fiscal position prior to the crisis were impacted less severely. We find little evidence for the importance of other policy variables.     

Shareholder protection and bank executive compensation after the global financial crisis

We use a hand-collected international database to analyze the change in the risk-taking incentives embedded in bank executive compensation after the onset of the global financial crisis. Our results reveal a reduction in both the risk sensitivity of stock option grants (vega) and total and cash pay-risk sensitivities in countries suffering systemic banking crises. This reduction is greater in countries with strong shareholder protection, especially in banks with good corporate governance, solvent banks, and banks that suffered a reduction in their specific investment opportunity set. The regressions control for government intervention, banking development, and crisis intensity. Our results confirm that the contracting hypothesis is more relevant in countries with stronger shareholder protection, and provide support for measures improving shareholder rights in the approval of bank executive compensation.     

Exploring attitudes to financial reporting in the Australian not‐for‐profit sector

The current level of satisfaction among different stakeholders about the current approaches and practises of financial reporting of not‐for‐profit (NFP) entities is underexplored ( Christensen and Mohr, 2003 ; Lee, 2004 ; Gray et al., 2006 ; Parker, 2007 ). This paper uses content analysis to examine submissions to the 2008 Australian Senate Economics Standing Committee for its inquiry into the disclosure regimes of charities and NFP organisations, which aimed to explore attitudes about financial reporting in the NFP sector. Financial reporting is viewed as an important part of accountability, but the sector identifies deficiencies in the current regime in terms of consistency, efficiency and transparency. Respondents to this inquiry believed that a sector‐specific accounting standard was important. Financial reporting standards, regulations and legal structures should be uniform across the entire sector, but with some variation allowed for smaller NFPs. The cost of complying with standards was a significant issue for smaller NFPs.     

Bank soundness and bank lending to new firms during the global financial crisis

This paper examines how the soundness of financial institutions affected bank lending to new firms during the 2008 financial crisis by using a unique firm–bank match‐level dataset of 1,467 unlisted small and medium‐sized enterprises incorporated in Japan. We employ a within‐firm estimator that can control for unobserved firms’ demand for credit through firm ? time fixed effects. The major findings of this paper are the following four points. First, sounder financial institutions may be generally less likely to provide financing to new firms. Second, our results suggest that sounder financial institutions were less likely to provide loans to new firms during the 2008 financial crisis. Third, financial institutions were less likely to provide financing to new firms during such crisis as compared to those with the same soundness during non‐crisis periods. Finally, such lending relationships to new firms that are established during the financial crisis by sounder financial institutions are more likely to be continued than such lending by less sound financial institutions.     

The interest rate pass-through in the Euro area during the global financial crisis

This paper uses panel vector autoregressive (VAR) models for euro area member countries to explore the widening of retail bank interest rate spreads that emerged in the course of the global financial crisis. We find that the interest rate pass-through was generally complete on impact before the outbreak of the financial crisis, but became significantly distorted in the period thereafter, which hampered the effectiveness of monetary policy. Empirical evidence suggests that the decrease in the interest rate pass-through can be related to a change in the structural parameters characterizing the economies and a substantial increase in the average size of structural shocks. DSGE model simulations show that an increase in the frictions that banks are subject to can explain the decrease in the retail bank interest rate pass-through.     

The genesis of the 2008 global financial crisis and challenges to the neoclassical paradigm of finance

In the first step, this paper briefly discusses the macroeconomic background of the 2008 financial crisis. Next, we take a wider approach and we look at systemic changes that global economics, and financial markets in particular, had undergone. We wonder if these transformations, and their effects so dramatically demonstrated in 2008, give grounds to modify the theoretical background of finance. The neoclassical paradigm might be seen as an idealized normative benchmark. On the other hand, behavioral approach helps explain deviations from this benchmark, however itself it lacks the normative character. We conclude that in contemporary circumstances an interdisciplinary approach is needed in the search for an adequate theory, as the financial world is getting more and more complex and dynamic.     

Market power in CEE banking sectors and the impact of the global financial crisis

The aim of this study is to undertake an up-to-date assessment of market power in Central and Eastern European banking markets and explore how the global financial crisis has affected market power and what has been the impact of foreign ownership. Three main results emerge. First, while there is some convergence in country-level market power during the pre-crisis period, the onset of the global crisis has put an end to this process. Second, bank-level market power appears to vary significantly with respect to ownership characteristics. Third, asset quality and capitalization affect differently the margins in the pre-crisis and the crisis periods. While in the pre-crisis period the impacts are similar for all banks regardless of ownership status, in the crisis period non-performing loans have a negative effect and capitalization a positive effect only for domestically-owned banks.     

Board monitoring and covenant restrictiveness in private debt contracts during the global financial crisis

We examine the association between board independence and restrictiveness of covenants in U.S. private debt contracts around the global financial crisis (GFC). We show that board independence is associated with less restrictive covenants suggesting lenders willingness to delegate some monitoring of firms with independent boards. More nuanced analysis between the pre-GFC, GFC and post-GFC periods shows mixed results and we suggest that, during the GFC and its aftermath, lenders place more emphasis on ex ante screening relative to ex post monitoring. We contribute to the literature by providing evidence on covenant use and lenders choices in periods of credit rationing.     

Fiscal policy in Korea: Before and after the financial crisis

This paper examines the role of fiscal policy in the Korean financial crisis and the subsequent recovery from it. We specifically address three questions: Was Korea’s fiscal policy prior to the crisis conservative, or were there large hidden contingent liabilities not captured in the official budget balance? What were the main characteristics of fiscal policy in stimulating and restructuring the economy under the IMF stabilization program in Korea? How effective were the financial guarantee and public investment programs as part of the counter-cyclical fiscal policy in the recovery process from the crisis? To address these questions, we re-estimate the consolidated budget deficits in Korea by incorporating the quasi-fiscal activities of public funds and public enterprises using their micro balance-sheet data from 1972 to 2003.     

Post‐financial crisis changes in financial system structure: An examination of the J.P. Morgan & Co. Syndicates after the 1907 Panic

In the post‐2008 crisis period, policy makers debate the implications of banking system concentration. To shed light on this debate, we study a postcrisis period in which less banking regulation existed than in the present period, reasoning that an examination of a less regulated market might reveal useful insights about present day market agents' postcrisis actions. The years immediately following the Panic of 1907 merit study because the period shares important features with the post‐2008 crisis financial system: increasing interconnectedness, the growing complexity accompanying the rise of new industries, the rapid deployment of new communications technologies, and substantial innovation in financial instruments. Because the 1907 crisis preceded the Clayton Anti‐Trust Act of 1914, it also provides a window into studying market agents' behavior before legislation was enacted to discourage banking system concentration. We find evidence that the market share of corporate bond underwritings at J.P. Morgan & Co. increased in the post‐1907 crisis period. We suggest a mechanism by which market share increased: a more concentrated configuration of corporate bond underwriting syndicates. We also indicate that Morgan's increased share may have been a proxy for increased certification value of underwriter reputation because of systemic knowledge Morgan gained during the resolution of the Panic of 1907 rather than for increasing bargaining power. We do not find evidence that Morgan used market power to extract rents from issuers despite increased market share and more concentrated syndicate organization. While our results must be interpreted cautiously due to data limitations, possible lessons for present‐day policy makers are that consolidations in the financial system after a financial crisis are complex. Some consolidations may come about from information and reputational gains produced during the crisis. Others may be moves by some firms to concentrate market power and still others from efforts to improve efficiencies in intermediation.     

Market response to syndicated loan announcements from high-profile failed and acquiring banks during the global financial crisis

Previous studies that have examined the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on syndicated loans have ignored potential differences between lending banks by explicitly or implicitly aggregating all lenders together and focusing on borrower characteristics. One must jointly consider both borrower and lender to fully understand the complex role of the syndicate during this period. We consider the identity of the lender, with a focus on five major US banks that failed and their five corresponding acquirers. Our results highlight the distinct roles of investment and commercial banks and facilitate an understanding of relationship and transactional-based lending.     

The determinants of vulnerability to the global financial crisis 2008 to 2009: Credit growth and other sources of risk

In this paper, we identify initial macroeconomic and financial market conditions that help explain the distinct response of the real economy of a particular country to the recent global financial crisis. Using four measures of crisis severity, we examine a data set with over 90 potential explanatory factors employing techniques that are robust to model uncertainty. Four findings are of particular note. First, we find empirical evidence for the pivotal role of pre-crisis credit growth in shaping the real economy's response to the crisis. Specifically, a 1% increase in pre-crisis lending translates into a 0.2% increase in the cumulative loss in real output. Moreover, the combination of pronounced growth in lending ahead of the crisis and the country's exposure to external funding from advanced economies is shown to intensify the real downturn. Economies with booming real activity before the crisis are found to be less resilient to the global shock. Buoyant growth in real GDP in parallel with strong growth of credit particularly exacerbated the effects of the recent crisis on the real economy. Finally, we provide empirical evidence on the importance of holding international reserves in explaining the response of the real economy to the crisis. The accumulation of international reserves mitigated the harmful effects of financial stress on the real economy, in particular when domestic funding via credit is abundant. The results are shown to be robust to several estimation techniques, including those allowing for cross-country spillovers.     

A flight to Q? Firm investment and financing in Korea before and after the 1997 financial crisis

We examine investment behavior among exchange-listed Korean manufacturing firms before and after the 1997 financial crisis using firm-level panel data. Starting with the standard Q-theory of investment, we augment it by allowing for a sales accelerator and the possibility of cash constraints, categorizing firms based on their age, size and affiliation to an industrial conglomerate (i.e., chaebol). We find that Tobin’s Q is a robust determinant of investment in a pooled sample for 1992–2001, but that it became more important for small firms and less important for chaebol-affiliated firms after the crisis. Investment by chaebol firms also became more sensitive to the availability of internal cash balances after the crisis. We interpret this as reflecting a shift in the Korean economy to a stronger market orientation after the crisis and to a business climate in which the quality of potential projects became more important relative to capital market imperfections in determining the destination of investment funds.     

Economists in the 2008 financial crisis: Slow to see,fast to act

We study the economics- and finance-scholars’ reaction to the 2008 financial crisis using machine learning language analyses methods of Latent Dirichlet Allocation and dynamic topic modelling algorithms, to analyze the texts of 14,270 NBER working papers covering the 1999–2016 period. We find that academic scholars as a group were insufficiently engaged in crises’ studies before 2008. As the crisis unraveled, however, they switched their focus to studying the crisis, its causes, and consequences. Thus, the scholars were “slow-to-see,” but they were “fast-to-act.” Their initial response to the ongoing Covid-19 crisis is consistent with these conclusions.     

Demand for fair value accounting: The case of the asset revaluation boom in Korea during the global financial crisis

When the fair value accounting (FVA) option for property, plant, and equipment was introduced in the midst of the global financial crisis, a significant proportion of Korean firms elected FVA. We attribute this unusual boom in asset revaluations to the nation's culture of government intervention and civilian compliance, which was particularly espoused during this period of financial turmoil, and a foreseeable option to switch back to historical cost accounting. We find that among those firms whose debt‐to‐equity ratios are low, public firms opt for the FVA option more often than private firms, suggesting that the need to communicate fair value information with diversified equity holders is more important than the need to do so with creditors. In contrast, among those firms whose debt‐to‐equity ratios are high enough to warrant such unfavorable dispositions as new debt freezes and monitoring by regulators, we find no difference in the FVA choice between private and public firms. These findings imply that during the global financial crisis, private firms that rely heavily on debt financing have a strong incentive to utilize FVA to comply with government guidelines for the debt‐to‐equity ratio and to ease a potential hold‐up problem by influential creditors.     

The sensitivity of the credit default swap market to financial analysts’ forecast revisions

We examine the impact of analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) and cash flow per share (CPS) forecast revisions on the market for credit default swaps. We find that while the issuance of both EPS and CPS forecast revisions are inversely associated with changes in credit default swap (CDS) spreads, cash flow forecast revisions have a larger effect. We demonstrate that the relationship between CPS forecast revisions and CDS spreads tends to be stronger in cases of financial distress. We provide evidence that cash flow forecasts dominate earnings forecasts in some situations and that participants in the CDS market discriminate between analysts' forecast revisions and recommendation changes.