Why we aren't predicting a global recession

• ? Fears that the global economy is heading into a recession are rising. But while we cannot ignore the risks that a recession could be brewing, our baseline assumption is still for a modest growth slowdown from here.
• ? The global economy is in a similar position to 2012 and 2015, as mounting uncertainties dampen growth. This time, trade tensions are a high‐profile culprit rather than the possible collapse of the eurozone or a China hard landing.
• ? In the previous two cases global growth fell to around 2.5% ‐ around the rates seen in Q2 this year ‐ only to then rebound. Our baseline forecasts assume a similar mini cycle, albeit with only a modest growth rebound.
• ? We also assume that further major adverse shocks won't materialise, and that insurance policy moves by central banks will stop a plunge in investment and households from panicking.
• ? Still, recession fears should be taken seriously ‐ slowdowns can become self‐perpetuating. Once annual GDP growth has fallen by over 1ppt from its peak, the eventual decline typically ends up being much larger ‐ of the seven growth slowdowns since the late 1970s where annual growth slowed by over 1ppt ‐ four resulted in either a global recession or only a narrow escape from one.
• ? With US‐China tensions unlikely to recede and factors like the US yield curve inversion adding to the air of gloom, the latest downturn could gain momentum.
• ? Although reduced macro volatility and anchored inflation have made it easier for policymakers to deliver soft landings, the effectiveness of monetary policy has waned. And with China no longer acting as spender of last resort, it's vital that governments in advanced economies stand ready to pick up the slack

     

Why the MPC is unlikely to join the negative rate club

• ▀ The economic shock from the coronavirus has warmed up the MPC's long-held coolness toward negative interest rates. But we think there are a number of reasons why such a move is unlikely.
• ▀ While taking rates below zero could lower banks’ funding costs and encourage lending, the net economic effect is ambiguous. Also, ‘sticky’ deposit rates would hit banks’ already strained profitability, risking paradoxical effects.
• ▀ The MPC has better-targeted tools available to it. If the MPC wanted to lower borrowing costs, increasing the generosity of the Term Funding Scheme could deliver the benefits of negative rates while reducing adverse effects. And the present scale of fiscal support reduces the need for looser monetary policy.

     

Why big fiscal deficits and low inflation can coexist

• ▀ The surge in government debt caused by ballooning fiscal deficits is a necessary response to the coronavirus crisis. But we doubt this will lead to a burst of inflation in the advanced economies (AEs), let alone a debt crisis.
• ▀ Our fiscal forecasts assume AEs’ budget deficits averaged 20% of GDP or so in Q2. However, our deficit forecasts point to a sharp narrowing thereafter and for public debt as a share of GDP to peak in 2021.
• ▀ The risks around this forecast skew firmly towards deficits remaining wide, reflecting the balance of risks around our GDP forecasts and the possibility that governments allow some fiscal slippage.
• ▀ A slower narrowing of fiscal deficits than we forecast wouldn't automatically lead to a period of above-target inflation. Indeed, we wouldn't be surprised if larger-than-expected deficits were associated with weak inflation.
• ▀ High levels of corporate debt and weak labour markets raise the risk of private sector retrenchment ahead. In that case, large and sustained fiscal deficits may be needed to fill the vacuum and prevent GDP and inflation from falling. As has been the case in Japan over the past 25 years, large deficits over coming years could be associated with weak GDP growth and below-target inflation.
• ▀ If economies begin to overheat but governments keep fiscal policy loose, inflation could, of course, pick up. But central bank tightening would offset it. We believe the risk of sustained inflation overshoots is limited unless monetary policy were made subservient to governments’ own objectives. And we think the risk of central banks losing independence remains slim.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global stimulus reinforced by ECB QE

• The ECB announced a QE programme in January involving buying some €60 billion of assets per month, of which around €40 billion are likely to be government bonds.
• As a result, despite the end of QE in the US, major central banks' ‘non‐standard’ policy support (asset purchases plus loans to banks) is set to be higher in 2015–16 than last year, supporting world growth.
• Moreover, major central banks' purchases of government bonds will by 2016 be close to the net issuance of bonds by governments – indirectly, full ‘monetisation’ of fiscal deficits is arriving.
• This prospect is likely to have been partly behind the further compression of bond yields this year, which remarkably has seen German 10‐year yields trade below those of Japan in recent weeks. And largescale bond purchases are likely to prevent any sharp uptick in yields over the next year at least.
• Other policy settings are also becoming more positive for global growth. We estimate that fiscal policy will be broadly neutral in the US and Eurozone this year – and also in Japan after the postponement of the second consumption tax rise. On top of this, the collapse in oil prices since mid‐2014 can be seen as equivalent to a substantial ‘tax cut’ for consumers in the major economies.
• Meanwhile, a stronger dollar will restrain US exports modestly, but the flipside will be an improved export outlook for the likes of Japan and the Eurozone. We now expect the euro to decline to near‐parity with the dollar by end‐2015 (from 1.13 now) while the yen/$ rate reaches 127 (from 119).
• The main drag to global growth continues to be the sluggish performance of the main emerging markets. Brazil is set to stagnate again this year while Chinese growth still seems to be slowing and there are serious problems in some oil exporters – both Russia and Venezuela are forecast to see GDP fall 6%. But there are some brighter spots – including an improved picture in India.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Dollar surge brings mixed consequences

• The strengthening dollar is now becoming a significant factor for global growth and our forecasts. The tradeweighted dollar is up 2.5% over the last month and over 12% on a year ago.
• Driving the latest rise are growing expectations of US rate hikes while monetary policy in many other major economies is headed in the opposite direction.
• The beginning of ECB QE has prompted a further slide in bond yields and the euro – which at 1.06/US$ is on course to fulfill our forecast of near‐parity by year‐end. Weak data in Japan also raises the chance of a further expansion of QE there later this year.
• We remain relatively positive about the advanced economies: we forecast G7 GDP growth at 2.2% for 2015 and 2.3% next. This month we have revised up German growth for 2015 to 2.4% – a four‐year high.
• Robust US growth and a strong dollar are good news for the advanced economies. US import volume growth firmed to over 5% on the year in January, while the dollar surge potentially boosts the share of other advanced countries in this growing market.
• But for the emerging economies the picture is mixed. A stronger US may boost exports, but rising US rates are pulling capital away: there has been a slump in portfolio inflows into emergers in recent months. Emerging growth may also suffer from higher costs of dollar funding and a rising burden of dollar debt as currencies soften – the more so if US rates rise faster than markets expect.
• Moreover, emergers are also under pressure from a slowing China. Chinese import growth has been weak of late and commodity prices remain under downward pressure. A notable casualty has been Brazil, which we have downgraded again this month – GDP is expected to slump 1.1% this year.
• Emerging GDP growth overall is expected to slip to 3.7% this year, the lowest since 2009. And excluding China, emerging growth will be only 2.2% – the same as the G7 and the worst performance relative to the advanced economies since 1999.

     

Fiscal policy options ahead of the Autumn Statement

• In our view the case for a fiscal stimulus is incontrovertible. The vote to leave the EU has dampened the outlook for growth, while there is limited scope for monetary policy to offer more support. The existing fiscal plans will exert a sizeable drag on growth and with borrowing costs so low, there is a strong case for relaxing the squeeze.
• Scenarios run on the Oxford Global Model suggest that raising capital spending by 1% of GDP in each of the next two fiscal years could boost GDP growth by 0.7% a year over that period. We also find that the package would, in some respects, pay for itself, with the public sector net debt‐to‐GDP ratio peaking at a lower level. The main bar to this package would be whether there are sufficient ‘shovel ready’ projects available.
• Political considerations might encourage the government to opt instead for packages geared towards boosting current spending – perhaps on the NHS – or cutting taxes. But our modelling suggests that this would offer a smaller boost to activity and would also generate poorer fiscal outcomes than an infrastructure‐led package.
• While the case for a stimulus package is very strong, our expectations for delivery are fairly low. The Conservatives have enjoyed electoral success on the back of a strong austerity message and suggestions that they might loosen fiscal policy appear to be aimed at averting a worst‐case scenario, rather than a conviction that this would be a positive policy to boost both short‐ and long‐term growth prospects. So if the economic data remains firm, the prospects of a sizeable stimulus package will recede. And if a package is implemented, the temptation to favour crowd‐pleasing tax cuts over higher investment may prove to be irresistible. Therefore, we view a large, infrastructure‐focused, stimulus package as an upside risk to our forecast, not a core assumption.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: A weaker dollar and slightly faster growth

• ? We have raised our world GDP growth forecasts this month, to 2.7% for 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 (from 2.6% and 2.9% previously). Similarly, we have lifted our inflation forecast for this year to 3.1%.
• ? Surveys continue to suggest buoyant global activity, driven by manufacturing in several countries. This, in turn, is helping pull world trade from its 2016 lows. However, this partially reflects factors such as stimulus measures in China, which is boosting construction and manufacturing and bolstering trade in the region, and also benefitting major capital goods exporters such as Germany and Japan.
• ? But there are reasons for caution given there are still underlying factors holding back demand and the likelihood that the fiscal stimulus promised by President Trump will not be as big as expected.
• ? The most important forecast change this month is that we see a weaker US dollar ahead as monetary policy tightening in the US has already been largely priced in. This means our EURUSD and GBPUSD forecasts are now $1.10 and $1.32 by year‐end, while the short‐term outlook for many EM currencies against the US$ has also firmed.
• ? We still expect the Fed to raise rates on another two occasions this year, followed by three hikes in 2018. However, we have brought forward by one quarter to Q4 2017 our forecast of when the Fed will begin to taper reinvestment of its portfolio holdings.
• ? Meanwhile, we think the ECB is still a long way from policy normalisation. We expect QE to be tapered from January until June 2018. Then, the ECB will consider lifting the deposit rate from its negative levels in the final part of 2018, and only in 2020 will it start raising the main refinancing rate.
• ? Emerging markets' prospects have improved amid a strong batch of high frequency indicators and a pick‐up in trade. Given low valuations, we see positive momentum for EM currencies and think that they may have entered a long cycle of strength.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Markets rally but risks still to the downside

• Our growth forecast for 2016 is steady this month at 2.3% but the forecast for 2017 has been cut again, to 2.7% from 2.9%.
• The near‐term growth outlook has been supported by a decent rally in financial markets. Since mid‐February, world stocks have gained around 8%, US high yield spreads have narrowed around 140 basis points and a number of key commodity prices – including oil – have also risen.
• Another supportive trend is still‐healthy consumer demand in advanced economies including the US and Eurozone. Although there has been some slippage in consumer confidence, it has been modest compared to either 2012–13 or 2008–09.
• So overall, the global economy still looks likely to avoid recession and strengthen a touch next year. But risks to the outlook remain skewed to the downside.
• Despite the recent market rally, world stocks still remain below their levels at end‐2015 and well below last May's peak. Financial conditions more broadly also remain significantly tighter than in mid‐2015, and inflation expectations somewhat lower.
• And there are still negative signals from incoming data. The global manufacturing PMI for February showed output flat while the services PMI showed only very modest growth – both were at their lowest since late 2012.
• Economic surprise indices for both the G10 and emerging markets also remain in negative territory, and our world trade indicator suggests no improvement from the dismal recent trends.
• Notable growth downgrades this month include Germany, Japan, the UK, Canada and Brazil.
• In our view, policymakers still have scope to improve the outlook. The latest ECB moves – more negative rates and more QE – will help a little. Widening of QE to corporate bonds also hints that more radical policy options are coming into view. But policies such as central bank equity purchases or money‐financed fiscal expansions will probably require global growth to weaken further before they become likely.

     

Don't expect a big lift from central bank policy easing

• ▀ During the current global slowdown, the world's central banks have delivered a broad-based policy easing that has been larger than during the previous two mini-downturns of the current cycle.
• ▀ We expect this to halt the downward momentum in the early part of this year and is a key factor behind our baseline view of no global recession in 2020.
• ▀ But limited further central bank wriggle room or a reluctance to use it adds a question mark over the efficacy of monetary policy and means we doubt it will deliver a big growth bounce, particularly in the advanced economies. In addition, fiscal support is likely to be limited in 2020.

     

World Economic Prospects Monthly

Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again

• ? In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside.
• ? The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016.
• ? One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year.
• ? We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support.
• ? But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.

     

Risk‐weighting debt implies more fiscal space

• ? Markets are more tolerant of fiscal expansion than governments typically fear. The composition of major economies' government debt has become safer and this is reflected in our estimates of a new indicator – risk‐weighted debt (RWD). Using RWD to measure debt provides a relatively benign indication of risks to sustainability in the major economies since 2004.
• ? Our RWD measures consist of six categories of debt holders, with weights allocated to their risk‐to‐flight potential. Debt holders range from riskier foreign banks and non‐banks (highly weighted), which would be most inclined to sell when times get tough, to safer entities such as central banks (zero weight).
• ? RWD looks less alarming than unweighted measures. Major economies' total public debt rose by 10% of GDP on average since 2011; RWD was up by just 1% of GDP.
• ? Japan and Italy show the biggest relative improvements when the focus shifts to RWD from debt‐to‐GDP. The two countries' RWD has fallen significantly since 2011.
• ? RWD improvements limit the extent to which indebtedness threatens sustainability.

     

Four reasons why 2018 will be the best post‐crisis year

• ? We head into 2018 in a fairly optimistic mood. The current upswing is more broadly based than any other since the global financial crisis, and – unusually by recent standards – we have entered the new year without any major crisis looming. We see world GDP growth accelerating from 3.0% last year to 3.2% in 2018, which would be the best year for the global economy since the post‐global financial crisis rebound .
• ? There are four key reasons why 2018 is going to be a good one globally: (i) strong trade growth; (ii) muted inflation keeping monetary policy accommodative; (iii) emerging markets staying robust; (iv) resilience to political uncertainty.
• ? The near‐term risk of an abrupt slowdown in China looks limited, while the Eurozone economy continues to stage robust growth which is underpinned by strong fundamentals. A potential fiscal loosening, a weaker dollar and business investment revival bode well for the US. The outlook is bright for economies that are heavily integrated into global manufacturing supply chains or reliant on commodity exports.
• ? Granted, soaring debt is a cause for concern, particularly in some emerging markets, along with high asset price valuations. They warrant close monitoring and are plausible triggers for the next global slowdown. Nonetheless, while such risks could linger or indeed escalate further before correcting, we don't see them as 2018 issues.
• ? The most obvious trigger for any such correction would be a widespread and more aggressive monetary policy normalisation. However, in our view, inflation pressures look set to build only slowly. Add the fact that high debt will make the economy more sensitive to interest rate moves, we expect central banks to normalise with caution and see policymakers doing less tightening that the consensus expectation.

     

Supply surprise is a ‘nice’ reprise

• ? This year advanced economies have enjoyed a rare positive supply surprise: output is higher than expected and inflation is lower. The initial China‐related boost not only proved to be a great antidote to secularly weak global demand, but it has also engendered unexpected global momentum and a benign inflation response. As a result, 2016–17 resembles a mini‐reprise of the “nice” 1990s, a non‐inflationary, consistently expansionary decade.
• ? The global momentum has been propelled by a strong international trade multiplier. This has contributed to strength in several advanced economies, particularly the Eurozone. We expect global growth in 2018 to be bolstered by US fiscal stimulus as the impulse from China fades.
• ? It will remain “nice” in 2018, albeit in the context of weak secular trend growth. We expect the benign output‐inflation trade‐off to continue. Several of the factors that are underpinning low inflation and unemployment as well as weak wage growth are likely to be present for some time.

     

The global monetary boom - no cause for panic

• ▀ Global monetary growth has been its fastest for decades over recent months, but we continue to believe inflation risks are lower than many think. A modest inflation overshoot in the coming years is possible but would not be very damaging.
• ▀ While headline money growth figures still look strong, heavy precautionary borrowing by firms in March-April is already starting to unwind in the US and UK. About 80% of the rise in borrowing by large UK firms has been repaid.
• ▀ In addition, tightened lending standards at banks are likely to weigh on future corporate borrowing and money growth. A net 70% of US banks tightened corporate credit standards in the latest Fed survey. Rising loan defaults risk exacerbating this.
• ▀ Heavy government borrowing and accompanying central bank QE have been key drivers of monetary growth and are likely to remain so, notwithstanding a slowdown in the pace of central bank bond purchases. This is the main risk factor those who fear inflation cite.
• ▀ But if credit to the private sector starts to shrink, deficit financing of this sort may be essential to prevent long-term weakness in money, credit, and economic growth. Japan's experience in the 1990s and 2000s is relevant here.
• ▀ Inflation also has room to overshoot current targets, if necessary, given the substantial undershoots of the last decade. This consideration in part explains the recent shift in Federal Reserve thinking towards targeting an average inflation rate over time

     

Why deflation may be a bigger risk than inflation

• ▀ Concerns about high inflation in the medium term are in our view overdone. In fact, we think the bigger risk is some economies sliding into deflation, due to the coronavirus pandemic's long-lasting negative impact on demand, which will intensify existing global disinflationary trends.
• ▀ We do not think the recent acceleration of monetary growth will lead to rapid inflation, despite the strong historic relationship between the two. The current monetary growth is taking place in extremely unusual circumstances, which may alter the usual link with inflation, and may also be temporary.
• ▀ Meanwhile, most market-based measures of deflation risk have risen recently – in some cases to historic highs. Some household surveys point to slightly higher inflation, but this may reflect short-term volatility in prices for key goods.
• ▀ A slide into deflation would have a variety of negative consequences, including feeding back into private saving, weakening growth, and potentially raising debt sustainability issues in some economies.

     

Summer Budget: calculated risk or reckless gamble?

• The Chancellor had created the expectation that his Summer Budget would be radical and he did not disappoint. The ‘rabbit from the hat’ was a compulsory ‘living wage’, expected to reach £9 per hour in 2020, which Mr Osborne hopes will help to compensate the lower paid for the slashing of in‐work benefits. This has effectively transferred responsibility for supporting low‐income households from the government to employers. The OBR expects this to have a relatively muted impact on employment, but this view looks pretty optimistic and the policy represents a major gamble.
• The reduction in welfare spending, plus an easing of the near‐term fiscal squeeze, has helped to smooth the public spending ‘rollercoaster’. But with a plethora of giveaways failing to disguise a net increase in the tax burden, the Budget is likely to weigh on growth prospects, even if the Chancellor's big gamble pays off.
• Alongside the Budget the Chancellor announced a new fiscal mandate, which will require governments to run a budget surplus in “normal times”. But meeting this mandate will require a fiscal stance very far from the historical norm and it will also force other sectors to move into deficit to compensate. It will also mean a looser monetary policy than would otherwise be the case. So a policy presented as creating room for fiscal policy to respond to future economic shocks could potentially narrow the scope for the more potent weapon of interest rate cuts.

     

World Economic Prospects

Overview: Global deflation – a genuine risk?

• The notable decline in inflation in the Eurozone, US and UK since mid-2013 has led to suggestions that a period of widespread price deflation across the major economies is a risk. Adding to these concerns has been the trajectory of producer prices – already declining in the Eurozone and China and showing very subdued growth elsewhere.
• Our global GDP forecasts do not, in isolation, point to a worldwide deflation risk. We expect growth at 2.8% this year and 3.2% next, little changed from last month.
• But the starting point for this growth matters, specifically the gap between actual and potential output last year. Even with reasonable growth, an initially large output gap would imply downward pressure on inflation over the next two years.
• Unfortunately, the size of the output gap is very uncertain. There is a wide range of estimates for the major economies, especially Japan. Part of the problem is that it is hard to know how much potential output was (or was not) permanently lost during the global financial crisis and recession.
• Assuming substantial permanent losses, output gaps might be relatively modest now, but a more optimistic view of the supply side of the economy would suggest output gaps could be quite large – and arguably this fits better with the recent evidence from inflation.
• Overall, while we see a genuine risk of deflation in the Eurozone (with around a 15% probability) we are more upbeat about the other major economies, where growth in the broad money supply and nominal GDP do not seem to be signaling deflation risks.
• But the difficulty of measuring ‘slack’ in the economy for us underlines the case for central banks to err on the side of caution when setting monetary policy, and either not tightening too soon or easing further. This month we have built in a further ECB rate cut to our Eurozone forecast. In Japan, we have revised down growth for 2014–15 with recent data strengthening the case for additional monetary easing this year.

     

Fixed versus floating: vulnerability to rising interest rates

• ? Looking at different economies' exposure to fixed‐ and floating‐rate private‐sector debt reveals how vulnerable they could be to rising interest rates. Our analysis finds that Hong Kong, Sweden, China and Australia are potentially most exposed via floating rates to rising debt service costs. A 150bp rise in rates would also push several other countries' debt service ratios above the peaks of 2008. Less vulnerable economies include the US and Germany.
• ? High levels of floating‐rate debt imply a large and rapid pass‐through of rising interest rates to firms and households, with negative consequences. Exposure to floating‐rate debt as a share of GDP varies greatly: the highest levels are in Hong Kong, China, Sweden, Australia and Spain, with the lowest levels in the US, France and Germany.
• ? Growing shares of fixed‐rate housing debt in the US, Eurozone and UK mean the impact of higher interest rates may be less severe than a decade ago. Private deleveraging in countries such as the US, UK and Spain could also soften the impact.
• ? A rise of 100bp in short‐term interest rates would raise the debt service ratio after one year by around 2.5% of GDP in Hong Kong, with increases of 1.5–1.7% of GDP in Sweden, China and Australia. The smallest effects would be in the US and Germany.
• ? A 100–150bp rate rise would push debt service ratios in China, Hong Kong, Canada, France and the Netherlands well above their peaks of a decade ago. A similar rate rise would take debt service ratios in Sweden, South Korea and Australia close to, or above, previous peaks.
• ? The distribution of debt within economies, which our analysis does not cover, is also important. For example, there is some evidence that the US corporate sector has a high concentration of debt among borrowers with weak finances. Countries that are highly vulnerable to interest rate rises may see their central banks normalise policy rates more slowly than they otherwise would.

     

“Whatever it takes” may not be enough

• ▀ Concerns over risks to the global economy from actual and perceived limits to fiscal and monetary policy are well-founded. A decade on from the global financial crisis, evidence highlights chronic demand deficiency, related weakness in supply and a prolonged period of underperformance among the most policy-constrained advanced economies. All lie within the eurozone.
• ▀ To gauge the risks from such policy constraints, we model a broadening of the eurozone slowdown. Despite the ECB's commitment to mitigate adverse cyclical developments, we find that - in the absence of significant accompanying fiscal support - a period of protracted eurozone weakness would ensue.
• ▀ The implications are far-reaching. Our analysis suggests that such a protracted eurozone slowdown would spill over globally, taking 0.4ppts off average global growth over the next five years.

     

G7 consumption: after the wealth rush

• ? In only one of 12 large advanced economies do we expect consumption to outstrip GDP growth in 2018. As key drivers rotate, the impact of a recovery in real incomes will be dampened by higher oil prices and waning wealth effects .
• ? Policy‐fuelled asset booms sustained the post‐crisis recovery in G7 consumption, though by historical standards the recovery was nothing special. Historically, the G7's average 5‐year recovery from troughs entailed consumption matching GDP growth, but in the five years from 2010 consumption was 0.2 ppt weaker. Its relative strength only picked up from 2015, when boosted by weak oil prices.
• ? Relatively weak G7 consumption growth is likely to continue as key drivers rotate. Strong employment growth and a modest pick‐up in wage inflation will offset waning equity and housing wealth effects.
• ? Near‐term risks are two‐way. An oil‐fuelled inflation surprise could hit consumers, wreck central bank gradualism and reveal balance sheet weaknesses. Currently, however, we see only limited pockets of credit risk and vulnerability to higher rates.
• ? Conversely, there is scope for a credit‐fuelled boost to consumption. G7 household borrowing relative to its trend is arguably close to 40‐year lows, so unless financial deepening has reached a limit, there is scope for increases in borrowing. Furthermore, G7 bank deleveraging could be over, boosting credit supply conditions.
• ? We see two positive longer‐term drivers of the global consumption share: (i) Asian economies will become more consumption‐driven; (ii) Household re‐leveraging offers scope for some debt‐fuelled consumption growth. Offsetting negatives are that demographics, interest rates and asset prices will provide little support