EVALUATING THE COSTS,QUALITY, AND VALUE FOR MONEY OF INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW

Public?private partnerships (PPPs) are often promoted as a means to lower the costs and increase the quality and value for money (VfM) of public construction and infrastructure projects. While the increasing capital stock of PPPs warrants evaluation of their performance there has until now been limited systematic assessment of PPP versus conventional public procurement. This article contributes to the literature by presenting the findings of a systematic review of empirical peer‐reviewed studies comparing the costs, quality, and/or VfM of infrastructure PPP projects with conventional public procurement. The international literature suggests that PPPs are on average more costly and provide approximately similar VfM as conventional procurement. The number of empirical evaluations is limited, however, and evidence on the quality of infrastructure facilities is particularly scarce. While infrastructure PPPs continue to proliferate, systematic assessment of their performance is warranted to assist policy‐makers in choosing the procurement method that offers best value for taxpayers, users and society.     

IS A SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT OF PPP FOR INFRASTRUCTURE DELIVERY POSSIBLE? LESSONS FROM SOCIAL IMPACT BONDS

Social Impact Bonds (SIBs) have emerged in recent years as outcome‐based public‐private partnerships (PPP) for the delivery of welfare services, where the payment to the private operator is linked to the achievement of superior social impact. Since the traditional infrastructure‐based PPP approach seems to have failed to achieve higher level of efficiency and, above all, effectiveness, this paper discusses the extent to which the SIB model can represent a reference point to innovate the PPP model by introducing more focus on outcome achievement and social value generation.     

UNPACKING THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ON DISASTER RESILIENCE: A COMPARISON OF EXPERT PERSPECTIVES

Public managers are under increasing pressure to develop and operate physical infrastructure systems that prove resilient in the face of natural disasters. At the same time, fiscal pressures and mounting infrastructure needs are drawing more and more attention to public–private partnerships (PPP) as a mechanism for delivering infrastructure. The research question guiding this study is how can the institutional designs of PPPs influence the potential for improving infrastructure resilience? We examined the perceived relationship between infrastructure resilience and PPPs by conducting and analyzing research interviews with twenty‐four senior infrastructure experts in Washington, DC. The results reflect findings of related privatization research, indicating that market‐based incentives can advance public values such as resilience, but the responsibility for ensuring they do so rests primarily with government. We note key differences in how the infrastructure investment experts and disaster resilience experts view issues in infrastructure management, and provide suggestions for improving public‐private collaboration to improve resilience.     

How (Not) to Foster Innovations in Public Infrastructure Projects*

The government wants an infrastructure‐based public service to be provided. First, the infrastructure has to be built; subsequently, it has to be operated. Should the government bundle the building and operating tasks in a public–private partnership? Or should it choose traditional procurement (i.e., delegate the tasks to different firms)? Each task entails unobservable investments to come up with innovations. It turns out that, depending on the nature of the innovations, bundling can either stimulate or discourage investments. Moreover, we find that if renegotiation cannot be prevented, public–private partnerships might lead the government to deliberately opt for technologically inferior projects.     

THE USE OF PPP ARRANGEMENTS IN STREET LIGHTING: A WIN‐WIN OPTION?

Street lighting is a classic example of a public good, and governments are extensively involved in its provision. Adequate lighting facilitates both car traffic and personal safety while improving an urban area's character. However, many systems are mismanaged and obsolete, incurring high energy costs and emissions with relatively low lighting quality. Public authorities facing budget constraints often find retrofitting old street‐lighting systems challenging. They have two options: either direct in‐house, public‐authority renovation or contracting with a private company through a public–private partnership (PPP). Although private‐sector‐participation approaches vary, most public authorities can now enter into a street‐light modernization PPP agreement. That can be a win‐win option for both the public and private sectors. The upfront investment is small and operational expenses outweigh capital expenses, generating lower payback periods and energy‐cost reduction with light‐emitting diode (LED) technology. Little public expenditure is necessary when private partners are compensated via shared energy savings. We analyze the Detroit street‐light PPP – the United States’ first – and find that PPPs are practical for retrofitting US street lights and in other countries where they are antiquated.     

BIDS AND COSTS IN COMBINATORIAL AND NONCOMBINATORIAL PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS—EVIDENCE FROM PROCUREMENT OF PUBLIC CLEANING CONTRACTS

Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand‐alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand‐alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found. (JEL D44, H57, L15)     

The determinants of tendering periods for PPP procurement in the UK: an empirical analysis

The procurement of infrastructure projects via public–private partnerships (PPPs) is rising globally. PPPs are, however, often characterized by lengthy tendering periods, defined as the difference between contract notice and financial close. Tendering periods are important because they account for a significant proportion of overall project delivery time. Slow tendering deters bidders and thus reduces competition for contracts. We source data on 670 PPP projects in the United Kingdom and use a duration analysis model to empirically examine factors that impact tendering period duration. Our results reveal significant sectoral variation with projects in the health and housing sectors taking significantly longer to reach financial close. We also show that, after controlling for other factors, projects with higher capital values and projects that overlap with the timing of general elections are associated with significantly longer tendering periods. We further examine the impact of the competitive dialogue procurement method and find evidence that tendering periods have increased since 2006; the year competitive dialogue was introduced. We do, however, observe a significant reduction in the time between appointment of preferred bidder and financial close post-2006. This suggests that competitive dialogue is effective in reducing the scope for negotiations by preferred bidders holding quasi-monopoly advantages.     

COMPARING PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS

This article contrasts two auction formats often used in public procurement: first price auctions with ex post screening of bid responsiveness and average bid auctions (ABAs), in which the bidder closest to the average bid wins. The equilibrium analysis reveals that their ranking is ambiguous in terms of revenues, but the ABA is typically less efficient. Using a data set of Italian public procurement auctions run alternately under the two formats, a structural model of bidding is estimated for the subsample of first price auctions and used to quantify the efficiency loss under counterfactual ABAs.     

Public budget composition,fiscal (de)centralization,and welfare

Abstract We study the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a dynamic federal economy where governments decide on budget size and its allocation between public education and infrastructure spending. We find that full centralization of tax and expenditure policies is optimal when infrastructure productivity is similar across regions. When differences are not too large, partial centralization is optimal. With strong differences, full decentralization becomes optimal. National steady‐state output tends to be highest under full decentralization. We provide a justification for the mixed evidence regarding the Oates conjecture by showing that full dominates partial decentralization, despite being inferior to complete decentralization.     

Public expenditure, international specialisation and agglomeration

It is widely recognised that public-sector purchasers tend to favour domestic suppliers. We study the consequences of such home-biased public procurement on international specialisation. Using a general-equilibrium model with a monopolistically competitive sector, we find that a country will specialise in that sector if it has relatively large home-biased procurement (the “pull” effect). Furthermore, home-biased procurement can counter agglomeration forces in that sector and thereby attenuate the overall degree of international specialisation (the “spread” effect). Our empirical analysis, conducted on input-output data for the European Union, yields supporting evidence for the pull effect and some support for the spread effect.     

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INFRASTRUCTURE PUBLIC‒PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND INNOVATION

While the contemporary academic discourse regards innovation as an inherent feature of infrastructure public?private partnerships (PPPs), the conceptual link between infrastructure PPPs and innovation is narrowly understood. While most existing studies conceptualize the innovation processes and effects within the context of PPP projects, we argue that the relevance of innovation in infrastructure PPPs goes beyond specific projects. In this conceptual article, we examine why and how infrastructure PPP innovations can shape the evolution of the involved private and public sector organizations – and therefore the respective sectors – more broadly. We show that innovation in the context of PPPs has much broader implications and potential outcomes than as emphasized in the literature so far.     

Long-Run Links among Money, Prices and Output: Worldwide Evidence

Abstract. Starting from the quantity theory of money we analyse the dynamic relationships between money, real output and prices for an unbalanced panel of 110 economies. Complementary to trivariate analyses we also adopt a P-star model explaining inflation via an equilibrium price level (P-star), which in turn depends on potential output and money. A key issue of the paper is the cross-sectional stability of estimation and inference results. We find cointegration among the considered variables. Particularly for high inflation countries homogeneity between prices and money cannot be rejected. Given homogeneity we find evidence for an error-correction mechanism linking current price changes and the lagged price gap. Parameter estimates indicating the adjustment towards the price equilibrium are larger in absolute value for high inflation countries. The latter results indicate that central banks, even in high inflation countries, can improve price stability by controlling monetary growth.     

城市公共自行车系统建设模式研究——基于低碳视域下的实践与比较

城市公共自行车系统的建设模式主要有民营企业建设模式、传统政府采购模式、PPP模式等三种.不同的建设模式会产生不同的实施效果.通过比较研究显示,在建设公共自行车系统的三种主要模式中,PPP模式具有很大优势,它有利于降低企业经营风险,减轻政府负担,保证项目实施效率,促进民营企业的发展.     

Factor‐biased public infrastructure and wage inequality

This paper analyzes how factor‐biased public infrastructure affects the skilled–unskilled wage inequality. In the basic model with a full employment economy, we find that when the weighted dependence of skilled labor and capital in the urban skilled sector on public infrastructure is large enough relatively to that of unskilled labor and capital in the urban unskilled sector, the wage inequality will be expanded. We also discuss labor‐biased and capital‐biased public infrastructure in our framework, and find that the relative dependences of relevant labor or capital on public infrastructure are important determinants of wage inequality. In the extended models, we analyze separately the issue of wage inequality in the economy with unemployment and the totally open capital market, and find the results of the basic model almost still hold.     

Court Efficiency and Procurement Performance

Disputes over penalties for breaching a contract are often resolved in court. A simple model illustrates how inefficient courts can sway public buyers from enforcing a penalty for late delivery in order to avoid litigation, thereby inducing sellers to delay contract delivery. By using a large dataset on Italian public procurement, we empirically study the effects of court inefficiency on public work performance. Where courts are inefficient, we find the following: public works are delivered with longer delays; delays increase for more valuable contracts; contracts are more often awarded to larger suppliers; and a higher share of the payment is postponed after delivery. Other interpretations receive less support from the data.     

TWO DECADES OF DBFO ROADS IN THE UK AND SPAIN: AN EVALUATION OF THE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Road schemes are of major importance in the global PPP market. We focus on Design‐Build‐Finance‐Operate (DBFO) arrangements covered by shadow toll or availability payment mechanisms, where the UK and Spain are key players. Now that a good number of DBFO schemes in the UK and Spain have been operational for well over half the contract period, there is scope for a detailed ex post evaluation of DBFO performance in both countries and an analysis of how the DBFO model has evolved. Preliminary results show that these contracts continue to be very expensive for public administrations, especially in the UK, where the financing costs and fee per kilometre are high. On the other hand, they are an easy source of revenue for the parent companies of the concessionaires, where the increased use of subordinated debt rather than equity seeks to reduce risk. However, despite circumventing the controversial hard‐tolling, some projects in both Spain and the UK present poor outcomes. Several other problems around these projects are identified, including lack of public accountability and transparency or poor governance, raising long‐term questions around affordability and opportunities for further study.     

基础设施PPP模式融资结构优化研究

公私合作模式（PPP模式）越来越多地应用于基础设施建设当中,并逐渐成为解决大型准营利性基础设施融资难题的有力方式。本文首先对PPP辛莫式内涵、应用范围、融资过程进行了剖析,肯定PPP;fJ~式融资优势的同时提出了其应用问题。其次建立了基于蒙特卡洛技术的融资结构优化模型,并对主要影响因素及其作用机理进行了分析。最后通过一个简化算例展示了模型的使用过程,证明了仿真模型的有效性。该模型在融资初期即考虑风险的合理分担,为融资谈判提供了一个较好的基准点,有利于缩短谈判时间、降低融资费用、提高PPP模式的使用效率。同时,通过仿真模型优化GPPP项目融资结构,有利于决策者找到满意的融资结构。     

Determinants of adaptation costs in procurement: an empirical estimation on Italian public works contracts

It is widely agreed that rules governing public procurement should be designed to achieve value for money. However, in the public works sector, ‘…?the good being procured is usually complex and hard to be exactly specified ex ante, …?[and] alterations to the original project might be needed after the contract is awarded. This may result in considerable discrepancies between the lowest winning bid and the actual costs that are incurred by the buyer’ (Bajari et al., 2006). There is now a wide body of literature focusing on cost escalation during the execution of contracts and their estimates reveal that it can be often quite large. This article is aimed at offering an empirical test of the determinants of adaptation costs in the public works procurement. Using a detailed data set on Italian public works contracts, we run an empirical analysis, grounded on the main conclusions reached in the literature, to test for the main drivers of adaptation costs.     

The impact of public capital on the US private economy: new evidence and analysis

This paper presents new evidence on the impact of public capital on the productivity of the US private sector. Using a production function approach, we estimate the impact of public investment on private capital productivity, specifically addressing the empirical critiques of earlier studies. We find evidence of a cointegrating relationship in a dynamic specification of an empirical model that includes public infrastructure as a factor of production, indicating the existence of a long‐run relationship between the US public capital stock and the productivity of the private capital stock. The results are used to explore how the decline in the growth rate of the public capital stock would have affected the performance of the private sector.     

State-owned enterprises going public The case of China

Public listing is a key reform measure for large state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. We find evidence that public listing lowers state ownership significantly, lessens firms’ reliance on debt finance, and allows firms to increase capital expenditure, at least temporarily. We also find that ownership structure affects post‐listing performance. However, we find no statistical evidence of a positive effect of public listing on firms’ profitability. We suggest alternative interpretations of the last finding.