Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?

This paper examines market discipline in the credit default swap (CDS) market and the potential distortion of CDS spreads which arises when a bank is thought to be too-big-to-fail. Overall, we find evidence for market discipline in the CDS market. However, CDS prices are distorted by a size effect when a bank is considered to be too-big-to-fail. A 1 percentage point increase in size reduces the CDS spread of a bank by about 2 basis points. We further find that some banks have already reached a size that makes them too-big-to-be-rescued. While the price distortion for these banks decreases, the existence of banks that are considered to be too-big-to-rescue raises important new issues for banking supervisors.     

Does the executive labor market discipline? Labor market incentives and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of outside options in the executive labor market on earnings management decisions. To proxy for executives’ outside options, we use the number of times other firms cite the executive’s firm as a compensation peer. We find that executives with more citations conduct less earnings management. Exploiting the 2006 SEC requirement for compensation peer disclosure as a quasi-natural shock to executives’ awareness of outside options, we show that the executives who should be more responsive to outside options significantly reduce earnings management. Cross-sectional tests support a labor market discipline channel of outside options. Finally, we exploit state-level recognition of Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and enforcement of non-compete agreements as cross-sectional restrictions on labor mobility and show that the impact of peer citations on reducing earnings management is stronger when there are fewer restrictions on mobility.     

Does bank market power affect SME financing constraints?

This paper examines the extent to which bank market power alleviates or magnifies SME credit constraints using a large panel dataset of more than 118,000 SMEs across 20 European countries over the period 2005–2008. To our knowledge, this is the first study to examine bank market power and SME credit constraints in an international, developed economy setting. Moreover, our study is the first to address a number of econometric considerations simultaneously, in particular by controlling for the availability of profitable investment opportunities using a structural Q model of investment. Our results strongly support the market power hypothesis, namely, that increased market power results in increased financing constraints for SMEs. Additionally, we find that the relationship exhibits heterogeneity across firm size and opacity in a manner that suggests that the true relationship between bank market power and financing constraints might not be fully explained by the existing theory. Finally, we find that the effect of bank market power on financing constraints increases in financial systems that are more bank dependent.     

Does fair value accounting for non-financial assets pass the market test?

The choice between fair value and historical cost accounting is the subject of long-standing controversy among accounting academics and regulators. Nevertheless, the market-based evidence on this subject is limited. We study the choice of fair value versus historical cost accounting for non-financial assets in a setting where market forces rather than regulators determine the outcome. In general, we find a very limited use of fair value accounting. However, the observed variation is consistent with market forces determining the choice. Fair value accounting is used when reliable fair value estimates are available at a lower cost and when they convey information about operating performance. For example, with very few exceptions, firms’ managers commit to historical cost accounting for plant and equipment. Our findings contribute to the policy debate by documenting the market solution to one of the central questions in the accounting literature. Our findings indicate that, despite its conceptual merits, fair value is unlikely to become the primary valuation method for illiquid non-financial assets on a voluntary basis.     

Does market power discipline CEO power? An agency perspective

We examine how product market competition (PMC) shapes chief executive officer's (CEO) power. Using various measures to capture both PMC and CEO power, our analyses, which include a quasi‐natural experiment, find evidence that CEOs have less power when the product market is more competitive. Furthermore, the impact of PMC on CEO power is more pronounced for firms with entrenched management, lower CEO ownership, lower analyst coverage, and for firms experiencing good ‘luck’ (windfall performance). Our results suggest that market power can act as a substitute for corporate governance in disciplining CEO power, particularly when prone to agency problems.     

Does deregulation induce competition in the market for corporate control? The special case of banking

Using a sample of 936 acquisitions of commercial banks, we examine the relation between the probability to engage in value-reducing acquisitions and corporate governance structures, as well as the relation between acquirer announcement-period abnormal stock returns and antitakeover indices and measures, and how these relations were affected by the change in the market for corporate control, caused by deregulation due to the implementation of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 and the Financial Service Modernization Act of 1999. We find that prior to deregulation there is no relation between probability to engage in value destroying acquisitions or acquirer returns and antitakeover indices, whereas after the adoption of the FSMA, probability to engage in value destroying acquisitions and the stock market reaction to bidder M&A announcements are both significantly related to governance indexes and measures. Our findings further confirm the linkage between the market for corporate control, antitakeover indices and firm value.     

Does the director labor market offer ex post settling-up for CEOs? The case of acquisitions

We examine the rewards for experience and ability in the director labor market. We show that large acquisitions are associated with significantly higher numbers of subsequent board seats for the acquiring CEO, target CEO, and the directors. We also find that, in the case of acquisitions, experience is more important than ability. Both value-destroying and value-increasing acquisitions have significant and positive effects on a CEO's future prospects in the director labor market. In addition to increasing our understanding of the director labor market, these results suggest that the ex post settling-up incentives thought to exist in the director labor market are weak for acquisitions.     

Does competition for capital discipline governments? The role of fiscal equalization

This paper examines how a fiscal equalization system affects the disciplining effect of competition for capital among heterogeneous regions in a decentralized economy. I build a model in which regions that are heterogeneous in initial endowments try to attract capital by competing public input that enhances the productivity of capital; meanwhile, a fiscal equalization system is imposed by the central government to reduce regional disparities in fiscal capacity. The key prediction, borne out in data from the German equalization system, is that while competition for capital strengthens discipline in the well-endowed regions, it weakens discipline in the poorly endowed regions. However, a conventional equalization transfer scheme, common to many countries, can be effective in correcting the distortion driven by the heterogeneity of initial endowments across competing regions.     

Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity prices

This paper analyzes the relationship between employee satisfaction and long-run stock returns. A value-weighted portfolio of the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America” earned an annual four-factor alpha of 3.5% from 1984 to 2009, and 2.1% above industry benchmarks. The results are robust to controls for firm characteristics, different weighting methodologies, and the removal of outliers. The Best Companies also exhibited significantly more positive earnings surprises and announcement returns. These findings have three main implications. First, consistent with human capital-centered theories of the firm, employee satisfaction is positively correlated with shareholder returns and need not represent managerial slack. Second, the stock market does not fully value intangibles, even when independently verified by a highly public survey on large firms. Third, certain socially responsible investing (SRI) screens may improve investment returns.     

Does Basel compliance matter for bank performance?

The global financial crisis underscored the importance of regulation and supervision to a well-functioning banking system that efficiently channels financial resources into investment. In this paper, we contribute to the ongoing policy debate by assessing whether compliance with international regulatory standards and protocols enhances bank operating efficiency. We focus specifically on the adoption of international capital standards and the Basel Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision (BCP). The relationship between bank efficiency and regulatory compliance is investigated using the Simar and Wilson (2007. J. Econ. 136 (1), 31) double bootstrapping approach on an international sample of publicly listed banks. Our results indicate that overall BCP compliance, or indeed compliance with any of its individual chapters, has no association with bank efficiency.     

Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix

While bank capital requirements permit a bank to freely substitute between equity and subordinated debt, lenders and investors view debt and equity as imperfect substitutes. It follows that, after controlling for the level of regulatory capital, the mix of debt in capital isolates the role that the market plays in disciplining banks. I document that the mix of debt in capital affects bank behavior, but only when investors can impose real constraints. In particular, the mix of debt reduces the probability of failure and future distress for BHC-affiliated institutions (where the investor has control rights through an equity position) and for stand-alone banks before the Basel Accord (when debt issues included restrictive covenants). However, substituting equity for subordinated debt at the bank holding company level or in stand-alone banks since the Basel Accord (where the investor has few protections) only increases the probability of distress and failure.     

Is bank diversification a linking channel between regulatory capital and bank value?

This study investigates the interrelationship between bank regulatory capital and bank diversification. We argue that regulatory capital might act as a substitutive mechanism of diversification to alleviate a bank's default risk. As a result, regulatory capital is likely to discourage firms from excessive diversification, which might in turn indirectly improve bank value. Using a sample of listed banks in developed countries from 2011 to 2017, we find that total regulatory capital is inversely associated with bank diversification. Narrower regulatory capital ratios only have a significant association with income-based but not with asset-based diversification. Our results also reveal an indirect effect of regulatory capital on bank value mediated by bank diversification (i.e. indirect-only mediation). Overall, our study provides novel insights into the complementarity of the institutional and strategic domains so as to understand the far-reaching implications of regulation reforms for the strategic behaviour of banking companies.     

Does the stock market influence investor everyday decisions? The case of parking violations

We explore in this study whether stock market returns influence investor decisions in their everyday life. We find that past and contemporaneous US stock market returns are related negatively to the registered number of parking violations in New York City between 2014 and 2020. We support as the channel of this relationship the level of investor anxiety. These results support extensions of the utility theory demonstrating the significance of emotions on individuals' decisions. Overall, this study shows evidence of the societal impact of finance.     

Does cyber tech spending matter for bank stability?

CyberTech has drawn academic attention in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (GFC) as banks were forced to embrace CyberTech more aggressively to cope with market competition after the crisis. Banks can improve their operational efficiency and quality of service by relying on CyberTech, but they become more vulnerable to cybersecurity. Thus, increasing investment in CyberTech becomes a strategic necessity for banks to combat cybersecurity hazards. The study investigates how disruptive digital transformation affects bank stability. In particular, it examines whether the law of diminishing marginal returns from overspending on CyberTech affects bank stability. Based on a global sample from 43 countries, we find that an increase in CyberTech spending above the threshold level adversely affects the stability of banks. The main reason behind the adverse effect of CyberTech spending on the stability of banks is that banks take more than the proportional risk for every dollar they spend on disruptive CyberTech after they cross a threshold level of spending. While results persist across sub-samples, our results indicate two important channels of technological regimes – a diminishing returns regime and an increasing returns regime. The diminishing returns regime improves bank stability through more aggressive spending on technology, and the increasing returns regime makes banks more unstable due to excess spending on disruptive CyberTech. The study has implications for cybersecurity and sustainable CyberTech spending for banks.     

Policy uncertainty and bank’s funding costs: The effects of the financial crisis,Covid-19 pandemic,and market discipline

This paper examines the impacts of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank funding costs using the 2001–2021 data of US banks. We document consistent evidence of a negative relationship between EPU and bank funding costs, implying lower bank funding costs during a time of high EPU, consistent with the hypothesis that economic agents tend to reallocate their assets into safer investments, such as bank deposits during high uncertainty. Large banks are likely to benefit most during high EPU when experiencing lower costs of funds compared with other banks, suggesting the “too-big-to-fail” perception of depositors. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that depositors require safer banks to pay lower rates, indicating the existence of market discipline. The cost-decreasing effects of policy uncertainty are less pronounced during the global financial crisis than the Covid-19 crisis.     

Corporate transparency and firm value: Does market competition play an external governance role?

We investigate whether market competition affects the relationship between corporate transparency and firm value in the United States using a sample of 12,665 firm-year observations, representing 1,644 individual firms for the period 1996–2018. The results show that stronger transparency enhances firm value, and market competition has a significantly positive effect on that relationship. More importantly, we use hierarchical linear models further to explore the cross-level interaction impact of market competition, and we find evidence suggesting that the industry-level competition has a significant cross-level moderating effect. Additionally, consistent with the substitute perspective, we also find that the disciplinary power of competition on the relationship between transparency and value is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, our evidence supports the “bright side” of the competition view and highlights the active external governance role that competition plays in the value promotion effect of corporate transparency at both the individual and the industry levels.     

Deriving value or risk? Determinants and the impact of emerging market banks’ derivative usage

This paper examines the determinants of the emerging market banks’ derivative usage and the impact of derivative usage on bank value, total risk and bank stability. Our empirical evidence first suggests that derivative usage is driven primarily by net interest margin, bank concentration and institutional strength. In addition, although derivative usage appears to reduce emerging market bank value, it does not affect total risk. Moreover, emerging market banks can reduce bank instability using derivatives. Our findings have important implications for investors and policy makers focusing on emerging derivatives markets.     

The market reaction to cross-listings: Does the destination market matter?

This paper examines (i) whether market reactions to cross-listings differ across destination markets and (ii) to what extent the following explanations for value creation around cross-listings can account for differences in market reactions across cross-listings on various destination markets: overcoming market segmentation, increased market liquidity, improved information disclosure, and better investor protection (“bonding”). We analyze 526 cross-listings from 44 different countries on eight major stock exchanges and document significant announcement returns of 1.3% on average for cross-listings on US exchanges, 1.1% on London Stock Exchange, 0.6% on exchanges in continental Europe, and 0.5% (not significant) on Tokyo Stock Exchange. We find evidence consistent with improved disclosure and bonding creating value for cross-listings on US exchanges, while overcoming segmentation and bonding are associated with higher announcement returns on the London Stock Exchange. The evidence is mixed for continental European exchanges and for Tokyo. Our results highlight the role of the destination market in value creation around cross-listings.     

How do designated market makers create value for small-caps?

A poor liquidity level and a high liquidity risk significantly raise the required return for small-cap stocks. Euronext allows these firms to hire designated market makers (DMMs) who guarantee a minimum liquidity supply for a lump sum annual fee. In an event study based on 74 DMM stocks, we find that the contract improves liquidity level, reduces liquidity risk, and generates an average abnormal return of 3.5%. DMMs participate in more trades and incur a trading loss on high quoted-spread days (days when their constraint is likely to bind). Finally, DMMs reduce the size of pricing errors.