Are IPO investors rational? Evidence from closed-end funds

Why buy a closed-end fund at IPO, when it is likely to trade at a discount in a few months’ time? One theory suggests that buying a new fund is justified by an initial period of investment outperformance. A second theory is that new funds are launched to provide access to assets that are temporarily illiquid and to exploit the subsequent liquidity gain while a third theory asserts that buyers of new issues are not fully rational but are influenced by time-varying sentiment. This paper tests the three theories using data from UK-traded closed-end equity-fund IPOs over 1984–2006. The empirical results provide strong support for the influence of sentiment but provide little or no support for the two other theories.     

Are investors always compensated for information risk? Evidence from Chinese reverse-merger firms

Using a data sample of 93 Chinese reverse-merger (CRM) firms listed in the U.S. over the period from 2000 to 2011, we find supporting evidence of poorer financial reporting quality exhibited by CRM firms relative to their respective US counterparts. Our main result indicates that while poor financial reporting quality induces information risk/asymmetry, higher (lower) information risk fails to be associated with higher (lower) expected returns. In contrast with prior studies that document information risk as non-diversifiable and a priced risk factor, the value relevance of the CRM firms’ financial reporting quality, in terms of information asymmetry-based premiums, is found to be remote.

     

Are individual investors liquidity providers around earnings announcements? Evidence from an emerging market

We first document that both buying and selling by individual investors before earnings announcements are negatively correlated with post-event abnormal returns using a unique dataset that allows us to precisely identify individual investor trading. Next, we show that both buying and selling by individual investors before earnings announcements not only are positively associated with contemporaneous returns, but also respond positively to past returns. This is consistent with the idea that individual investors act as liquidity providers (demanders) when they sell (buy) before earnings announcements. Individual investor buying and individual investor selling after earnings announcements confirm this point.     

Does personal experience with COVID-19 impact investment decisions? Evidence from a survey of US retail investors

This paper explores the link between personal experience with COVID-19 and US retail investors’ financial decision-making during the first COVID-19 wave. Do retail investors that have personally experienced COVID-19 change their investments after the pandemic outbreak, and if so, why? We use a cross-sectional dataset from an online survey of US retail investors collected in July and August 2020 to assess if and how respondents change their investment decisions after the COVID-19 outbreak. On average retail investors increase their investments during the first wave of COVID-19 by 4.7%, while many of them decrease their investments suggesting a high heterogeneity of investor behaviours. We provide the first evidence that personal experience with the virus can have unexpected positive effects on retail investments. Investors who have personal experience with COVID-19, who are in a vulnerable health category, who tested positive, and who know someone in their close circle of friends or family who died because of COVID-19, increase their investments by 12%. We explain our findings through terror management theory, salience theory and optimism bias, suggesting that reminders of mortality, focussing on selective salient investment information, and over-optimism despite personal vulnerable health contribute to the increase in retail investments. Increased levels of savings, saving goals and risk capacity are also positively associated with increased investments. Our findings are relevant to investors, regulators, and financial advisors, and highlight the importance of providing retail investors with access to investment opportunities in periods of unprecedented shocks such as COVID-19.     

Are family and friends the wrong investors? Evidence from U.S. start-ups

This paper investigates the effects of funding from family and friends (i.e., informal funding) on subsequent access to venture capital for start-up firms. We retrieve information on financing activity of young U.S. firms from a novel dataset based on private placements filings (Form Ds). To address potential endogeneity issues, we use an instrument that hinges on the family size of founders as an exogenous constraint on the supply of informal funds. Our results show that informal finance significantly reduces the probability of future financing events. We provide suggestive evidence that this is due to conflicts of interests between informal stakeholders and professional investors.     

Do investors find carbon information useful? Evidence from Italian firms

The usefulness of carbon disclosures has been questioned in the literature because they do not truly reflect firm’s carbon performance, suggesting that they may not be useful for risk evaluation and investment decisions. This study empirically tests the usefulness of carbon information voluntarily disclosed by the Italian firms. Our results based on the price model show that there is a positive association between the stock price and carbon disclosures, suggesting that investors find carbon information useful for their investment decisions. We find similar results based on the market valuation model. Additionally, the results reveal that the positive association is especially strong for firms that have established environmental committees on a voluntary basis and also for firms from the highly polluting industries defined by the EU_ETS program, confirming that investors’ positive response is especially strong to carbon disclosures by firms from the highly polluting industries. We also find that the market reacts positively to carbon disclosures by firms with a higher percentage of independent directors on their corporate boards, but the positive association is marginally significant.     

Does governance travel around the world? Evidence from institutional investors

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.     

Are Short Sellers Informed? Evidence from REITs

This paper uses intraday short sale data to examine whether short sellers of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are informed. We find strong evidence that short selling predicts future returns of REITs. Heavily shorted REITs significantly underperform lightly shorted REITs by approximately 1% over the following 20 trading days. This predictive relation holds for both small and large trades, but is stronger for large short trades. We also document a positive relation between shorting activity and volatility. Our results are consistent with the view that short sellers of REITs are informed and contribute to market efficiency by impounding information into prices.     

What factors affect behavioral biases? Evidence from Turkish individual stock investors

This paper investigates behavioral biases among Turkish individual stock investors during 2011. Using transaction data, we analyze how common disposition effect, familiarity bias, representativeness heuristic, and status quo bias are, what factors affect these biases and how these biases relate to each other including overconfidence and return performance. We find that biases are common among investors. Male, younger investors, investors with lower portfolio value, and investors in low income, low education regions exhibit more familiarity bias. Female, older investors and investors with high portfolio values are more subject to disposition effect and representativeness heuristic. Individuals in the opposite edge of overconfidence are subject to status quo bias. Overconfidence is positively correlated with familiarity bias. Representativeness heuristic deteriorates wealth while status quo bias results in higher trade performance. Familiarity bias has a nonmonotonic effect on return; lower (higher) levels of familiarity bias have a negative (positive) effect on return. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the few studies that focus on nationwide data and analyze the biases simultaneously. Using a unique dataset, we extend the findings of the behavioral finance literature to emerging markets. Besides, analysis of multiple biases helps us better understand the relationship among biases.     

Do investors prefer round stock prices? Evidence from Israeli IPO auctions

We find round number clustering in orders submitted by investors in Israeli IPO auctions. Explanations offered for price clustering, such as dealer collusion or implicit agreement to simplify negotiations, cannot explain price clustering in this market. Therefore, this is direct evidence that investors prefer round numbers.     

Do investors affect financial analysts’ behavior? Evidence from short sellers

We examine how short sellers affect financial analysts’ forecast behavior using a natural experiment that relaxes short-sale constraints. We find that increased ease of short selling improves analyst earnings forecast quality by reducing forecast bias and increasing forecast accuracy. The improvements can be explained by both the disciplining pressure from short sellers and increased price efficiency from incorporating information in a timely manner. Although it is well documented that financial analysts can affect investors, our paper provides novel evidence on how sophisticated investors, short sellers, can affect analysts.     

Are Pricier Houses Less Risky? Evidence from China

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - Houses are the largest component of most households’ wealth and their risk is important. Recent research shows that pricier houses have...     

Do Sukuk provide diversification benefits to conventional bond investors? Evidence from Turkey

We investigate the contribution of Sukuk in diversification of bond portfolios. We do so by comparing Turkish bond funds that invest exclusively in conventional bonds (pure conventional bond funds), in Sukuk (pure Islamic bond funds), and in both (mixed bond funds) among each other for the period of 2014–2019. We employ tests of differences in means and variances of various risk-return measures as well as mean-variance spanning and intersection tests in order to uncover the diversification potentials of Sukuk in the portfolio management industry. Our results suggest that bond funds, of which the portfolios are composed of a combination of Sukuk and conventional bonds (i.e. mixed bond funds), have a relatively “lower risk-higher return” profile. Moreover, including Sukuk to conventional bond portfolios theoretically offers significant diversification opportunities for investors, particularly when the economy worsens.     

Did investors outsource their risk analysis to rating agencies? Evidence from ABS-CDOs

Based on a sample of 3254 floating rate tranches from 617 ABS-CDOs (collateralized debt obligations backed by asset-backed securities), this paper tests the “rating overdependence” hypothesis – i.e., that ratings of structured products are a sufficient statistic (in terms of predicting future credit performance) for yield spreads at origination. The paper’s findings are fourfold. First, yield spreads at issuance predict future performance of ABS-CDO tranches even after controlling for the information contained in ratings. Second, the ability of yield spreads to predict future performance, however, is driven exclusively by ratings below AAA (and, to a lesser extent, also by the lowest priority AAA tranches), whereas spreads of super senior AAA tranches show no information content. Third, the predictive ability of yield spreads is lower for tranches from later vintages and for tranches from deals with more complex collateral pools. Fourth, the conditional correlation between ratings and spreads, in turn, is increasing in time and higher for tranches from complex deals. In sum, the evidence indicates that investors in (especially AAA) tranches from later and more complex deals have avoided performing costly due diligence on the securities they bought.     

Is trading behavior stable across contexts? Evidence from style and multi-style investors

In this paper we study priming of identity within the context of inherent vs. contextual financial decision making. We use a sample of individual trading accounts in equity-style funds taken from one fund family to test the hypothesis that trading styles are inherent vs. contextual. Our sample contains investors who invest either in a growth fund, a value fund, or both. We document behavioral differences between growth fund investors and value fund investors. We find that their trades depend on past returns in different ways: growth fund investors tend towards momentum trading and value fund investors tend towards contrarian trading. These differences may be due to inherent clientele characteristics, including beliefs about market prices, specific personality traits and cognitive strategies that cause them to self-select into one or the other style. We use a sample of investors that trade in both types of funds to test this proposition. Consistent with the contextual hypothesis, we find that investors who hold both types of funds trade growth fund shares differently than value fund shares.     

Are overconfident CEOs better leaders? Evidence from stakeholder commitments

We find evidence that the leadership of overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) induces stakeholders to take actions that contribute to the leader's vision. By being intentionally overexposed to the idiosyncratic risk of their firms, overconfident CEOs exhibit a strong belief in their firms’ prospects. This belief attracts suppliers beyond the firm's observable expansionary corporate activities. Overconfident CEOs induce more supplier commitments including greater relationship-specific investment and longer relationship duration. Overconfident CEOs also induce stronger labor commitments as employees exhibit lower turnover rates and greater ownership of company stock in benefit plans.     

Why Are CEOs Rarely Fired? Evidence from Structural Estimation

I evaluate the forced CEO turnover rate and quantify effects on shareholder value by estimating a dynamic model. The model features learning about CEO ability and costly turnover. To fit the observed forced turnover rate, the model needs the average board of directors to behave as if replacing the CEO costs shareholders at least $200 million. This cost mainly reflects CEO entrenchment rather than a real cost to shareholders. The model predicts that shareholder value would rise 3% if we eliminated this perceived turnover cost, all else equal. The model also helps explain the relation between CEO firings, tenure, and profitability.     

Is conservative reporting attractive to foreign institutional investors? Evidence from an emerging market

This study investigates the relation between conservative reporting and foreign institutional ownership using a unique dataset of firms in Turkey. In doing so, we distinguish between foreign funds and corporations. Contrary to prior findings, our analysis shows that conservative reporting is not necessarily a desirable accounting feature for foreign institutional investors. We also find that the interplay between conservative reporting and ownership is significantly different between foreign funds and corporations. The estimated negative relation holds only for foreign funds. Further analysis reveals that foreign funds do not find conservative reporting desirable in low-asymmetric information firms and reduce ownership with greater accounting conservatism in such firms. The analysis sheds significant lights on the relevance of conservative reporting in alleviating the negative consequences of asymmetric information.     

Are board monitoring and CEO incentives substitutes for each other? Evidence from Australian market reaction to acquisition announcements

We examine the hypotheses that board monitoring and CEO stock incentives are effective mechanisms and substitutes for each other using the Australian acquisition market as an experimental field. The results confirm that Australian firms use board monitoring and CEO incentives as substitutes for each other, but the effects of these mechanisms on the acquirers' return do not support the notion that each can substitute for the role of the other. We find the market reaction to acquisitions made by acquirers with low monitoring-high CEO incentives is significantly higher than the reaction to those made by acquirers with high monitoring-low CEO incentives. Further analyses confirm that monitoring level does not make a difference when the CEO is granted high or low incentives but reduces the gain from M&As when used as a substitute for CEO incentives. The latter, if high enough, effectively aligns the managers' interests with those of the shareholders. Our findings hold when we control for other variables and possible endogeneity in the main variables of interest. These results suggest that Australian firms, on average, focus on the board's monitoring role at the expense of its advisory role, a setting that reduces firm value if used as a substitute for CEO incentives.     

Does auditor choice matter to foreign investors? Evidence from foreign mutual funds worldwide

This study explores whether a firm’s auditor choice affects its ability to access foreign equity capital. Using the equity holdings of 35,665 foreign mutual funds from 30 countries for the period 1998–2009, we find evidence that appointing a Big 4 auditor is associated with the increased level of foreign mutual fund ownership in firms. Our results are robust when conditioned on firm-level information asymmetries, country-level information disclosure quality, and when employing the Enron–Andersen fiasco as the natural experiment. Furthermore, appointing Big 4 auditors is particularly important for firms to attract foreign capital during the 2008 global financial crisis.