Did the National Minimum Wage Affect UK Prices?*

One potential channel through which the effects of the minimum wage could be directed is that firms that employ minimum‐wage workers could have passed on any higher labour costs resulting from the minimum wage in the form of higher prices. This study looks at the effects of the minimum wage on the prices of UK goods and services by comparing prices of goods and services produced by industries in which UK minimum‐wage workers make up a substantial share of total costs with prices of goods and services that make less use of minimum‐wage labour. Using sectoral‐level price data matched to Labour Force Survey data on the share of minimum‐wage workers in each sector, it is hard to find much evidence of significant price changes in the months that correspond immediately to the uprating of the national minimum wage. However, over the longer term, prices in several minimum‐wage sectors – notably, take‐away food, canteen meals, hotel services and domestic services – do appear to have risen significantly faster than prices in non‐minimum‐wage sectors. These effects were particularly significant in the four years immediately after the introduction of the minimum wage.     

Unemployment and workers' compensation programmes: rationale,design, labour supply and income support

I examine the unemployment insurance (UI) and workers' compensation (WC) insurance programmes, concentrating on labour supply, insurance and income redistribution. UI and WC increase the time employees spend out of work. Elasticities of lost work time that incorporate both the incidence and duration of claims are centred at 1.0 for UI and between 0.5 and 1.0 for WC. These elasticities are larger than elasticities typically found in studies of wage effects on hours worked by men, probably because UI and WC lead to short‐run variation in wages with mostly a substitution effect and the programmes alter the participation margin. Some good evidence suggests that UI smooths the consumption of the unemployed and more clearly indicates that UI progressively redistributes resources. There is substantial evidence that injured workers suffer material hardships even with WC programmes, but research has not provided an overall picture of the insurance and redistributive aspects of WC.     

The UK National Minimum Wage in Retrospect*

This paper provides a retrospective summary of the effects of the UK national minimum wage (NMW) on labour market performance since its introduction in 1999. We use an ‘incremental differences‐in‐differences’ (IDiD) estimator to look at the effects of the NMW in each year through its differential impact across local labour markets. We find that the NMW is associated with a significant fall in wage inequality in the bottom half of the distribution. This suggests that geographical areas where the NMW ‘bites’ more have experienced larger declines in wage inequality than elsewhere. While the overall effect of the NMW on employment rates averaged over its existence is neutral, we do find small positive employment effects from 2003 onwards. Likewise, the association of the NMW with unemployment has been negative in recent years. NMW effects on hours have been mixed, but overall there is no compelling evidence to indicate that the NMW upratings have had an adverse effect on full‐time total hours of work. Notwithstanding the clarity of these results, any causal interpretation of them might be compromised by the presence of concomitant policies that might have been correlated with the ‘bite’ of the NMW.     

Welfare to Work,Wages and Wage Growth*

This paper attempts to uncover the effects of a UK welfare‐to‐work programme on individual wage growth by exploiting an expansion to this welfare programme. The conventional wisdom is that such programmes trap recipients into low‐wage, low‐quality work – this comes from the simple argument that the ‘poverty trap’, which a wage subsidy for low‐income workers induces, reduces the benefits to investments, such as on‐the‐job training, and so reduces wage growth. In fact, a wage subsidy will also reduce the costs of, at least, general training because we would normally expect workers to pay for their own general training in the form of lower gross wages. So a wage subsidy is a way of sharing these costs with the taxpayer. Thus, the net effect on wage progression depends on whether it reduces costs by more or less than it reduces the benefits.     

The New Deal for Young People Five Years On*

The New Deal for Young People is the major welfare‐to‐work programme in the UK. It is a mandatory multistage policy targeted at 18‐ to 24‐year‐old unemployed people. This paper investigates the long‐term effectiveness of the programme in terms of enhancing the (re‐)employment probability of participating men. It exploits the eligibility rule to identify a suitable counterfactual relying upon a simple regression discontinuity design. The combination of job‐search assistance, training, wage subsidies and job experience enhances employability by about 4.6 per cent and this effect lasts over different cohorts.     

Employer Health Insurance Mandates and the Risk of Unemployment

Employer health insurance mandates form the basis of many health care reform proposals. Proponents make the case that they will increase insurance, while opponents raise the concern that low-wage workers will see offsetting reductions in their wages and that in the presence of minimum wage laws some of the lowest wage workers will become unemployed. We construct an estimate of the number of workers whose wages are so close to the minimum wage that they cannot be lowered to absorb the cost of health insurance, using detailed data on wages, health insurance, and demographics from the Current Population Survey (CPS). We find that 33 percent of uninsured workers earn within $3 of the minimum wage, putting them at risk of unemployment if their employers were required to offer insurance. Assuming an elasticity of employment with respect to minimum wage increase of -0.10, we estimate that 0.2 percent of all full-time workers and 1.4 percent of uninsured full-time workers would lose their jobs because of a health insurance mandate. Workers who would lose their jobs are disproportionately likely to be high school dropouts, minority, and female. This risk of unemployment should be a crucial component in the evaluation of both the effectiveness and distributional implications of these policies relative to alternatives such as tax credits, Medicaid expansions, and individual mandates, and their broader effects on the well-being of low-wage workers.     

Aversion to Student Debt? Evidence from Low-Wage Workers

We combine state minimum wage changes with individual-level income and credit data to estimate the effect of wage gains on the debt of low-wage workers. In the three years following a $0.88 minimum wage increase, low-wage workers experience a $2,712 income increase and a $856 decrease in debt. The entire decline in debt comes from less student loan borrowing among enrolled college students. Credit constraints, buffer-stock behavior, and other rational channels cannot explain the reduction in student debt. Our results are consistent with students perceiving a utility cost of borrowing student debt arising from mental accounting.     

最低工资与企业创新

本文考察了最低工资对企业创新的影响。研究发现,最低工资显著促进了企业创新,通过相邻样本分析、双重差分策略以及其他一系列稳健性检验发现,结论基本稳健。最低工资改善了企业的物质资本,降低了低技能工人就业,提高了高技能工人就业,促进了企业人力资本优化,从而为企业创新提供了硬件和软件条件。企业实现创新的方式有自创和引进技术两种,最低工资提高了企业的创新效率。进一步研究发现,最低工资改善了企业的要素结构和全要素生产率。异质性分析发现,最低工资对劳动密集型企业、平均工资较低的企业、行业竞争激烈的企业以及高市场化地区企业的创新影响更加明显。本文的研究结果表明,最低工资政策具有促进企业创新升级的作用,这与党的十九届五中全会提出的"坚持创新驱动发展"的战略目标相一致。     

最低工资与企业创新

本文考察了最低工资对企业创新的影响。研究发现,最低工资显著促进了企业创新,通过相邻样本分析、双重差分策略以及其他一系列稳健性检验发现,结论基本稳健。最低工资改善了企业的物质资本,降低了低技能工人就业,提高了高技能工人就业,促进了企业人力资本优化,从而为企业创新提供了硬件和软件条件。企业实现创新的方式有自创和引进技术两种,最低工资提高了企业的创新效率。进一步研究发现,最低工资改善了企业的要素结构和全要素生产率。异质性分析发现,最低工资对劳动密集型企业、平均工资较低的企业、行业竞争激烈的企业以及高市场化地区企业的创新影响更加明显。本文的研究结果表明,最低工资政策具有促进企业创新升级的作用,这与党的十九届五中全会提出的“坚持创新驱动发展”的战略目标相一致。     

Insurance and opportunities: A welfare analysis of labor market risk

Using a model with constant relative risk-aversion preferences, endogenous labor supply and partial insurance against idiosyncratic wage risk, this paper provides an analytical characterization of three welfare effects: (a) the welfare effect of a rise in wage dispersion, (b) the welfare gain from completing markets, and (c) the welfare effect from eliminating risk. The analysis reveals an important trade-off for these welfare calculations. On the one hand, higher wage uncertainty increases the cost associated with missing insurance markets. On the other hand, greater wage dispersion presents opportunities to raise aggregate productivity by concentrating market work among more productive workers. Welfare effects can be expressed in terms of the underlying parameters defining preferences and wage risk or, alternatively, in terms of changes in observable second moments of the joint distribution over individual wages, consumption and hours.     

Search Frictions,Financial Frictions,and Labor Market Fluctuations in Emerging Markets

This article examines the role of the extensive and intensive margins of labor input in the context of a business cycle model with a financial friction. We document significant variation in the hours worked per worker for many emerging-market economies using manufacturing data. Both employment and hours worked per worker are positively correlated with each other and with output. We show that a search-theoretic context in a small open-economy model requires a small wealth effect to explain these regularities at the expense of a smaller wage response. On the other hand, introducing a financial friction in the form of a working capital requirement can explain the observed movements of labor market variables such as employment and hours worked per worker, as well as other distinguishable business cycle characteristics of emerging economies. These include highly volatile and cyclical real wages, labor share, and consumption.     

Who Will Pay for Long‐Term Care in the UK? Projections Linking Macro‐ and Micro‐Simulation Models

The long‐term care funding system continues to attract much debate in the UK. We produce projections of state and private long‐term care expenditure and analyse the distributional impact of state‐financed care, through innovative linking of macro‐ and micro‐simulation models. Variant assumptions about life expectancy, dependency and care costs are examined and the impact of universal state‐financed (‘free’) personal care, based on need but not ability to pay, is investigated. We find that future long‐term care expenditure is subject to considerable uncertainty and is particularly sensitive to assumed future trends in real input costs. On a central set of assumptions, free personal care would, by 2051, increase public spending on long‐term care from 1.1 per cent of GDP to 1.3 per cent, or more if it generated an increase in demand. Among the care‐home population aged 85 or over, the immediate beneficiaries of free personal care would be those with relatively high incomes.     

Inflation and Innovation in a Schumpeterian Economy with North–South Technology Transfer

This study analyzes how inflation affects innovation and international technology transfer via cash‐in‐advance constraints on R&D. We consider a North–South quality‐ladder model that features innovative Northern R&D and adaptive Southern R&D. We find that higher Southern inflation causes a permanent decrease in technology transfer, a permanent increase in the North–South wage gap, and a temporary decrease in the Northern innovation rate. Higher Northern inflation causes a temporary decrease in the Northern innovation rate, a permanent decrease in the North–South wage gap, and ambiguous effects on technology transfer. Finally, we calibrate the model to China–U.S. data to perform a quantitative analysis.     

Do Some People Work Harder than Others? Evidence from Real Estate Brokerage

The decision to work and its levels of intensity are estimated for the real estate brokerage industry where workers can set their own hours. A three-stage model of the brokerage labor market is presented with decisions made recursively between full- and part-time status, wage offers and hours worked. The application is to data from a cross-sectional survey of 6,842 real estate licensees in the United States for 1999. Conditional on self-selection, an expected wage for real estate licensees is estimated given skills and personal characteristics. That expected wage enters the supply-side equation for the number of hours worked. The findings indicate that skills such as education, experience and licensee status are related to higher wages, but there is a negative self-selection in wages: part-time workers have higher unmeasured skills. Schooling and experience decreases hours worked, consistent with increasing efficiency. The resulting labor supply elasticity with respect to the wage is 0.24.

The Local Aggregate Effects of Minimum Wage Increases

Using variation in minimum wages across cities and controlling for differences in business-cycle factors and long-run local economic trends, we find that following minimum wage increases, both, prices and nominal spending rise modestly. These gains are larger for certain subcategories of goods such as food away from home and in locations where low-wage workers account for a larger share of employment. Further, minimum wage increases are associated with reduced total debt among households with low credit scores, higher auto debt, and increased access to credit.     

How Did the Elimination of the US Earnings Test above the Normal Retirement Age Affect Labour Supply Expectations?*

We look at the effect of the 2000 repeal of the earnings test above the normal retirement age on retirement expectations of workers in the Health and Retirement Study, aged 51 to 61 in 1992. For men, we find that those whose marginal wage rate increased when the earnings test was repealed, had the largest increase in the probability to work full-time past normal retirement age. We do not find significant evidence of effects of the repeal of the earnings test on the probability to work past age 62 or the expected claiming age. On the other hand, for those reaching the normal retirement age, deviations between the age at which Social Security benefits are actually claimed and the previously reported expected age are more negative in 2000 than in 1998. Since our calculations show that the tax introduced by the earnings test was small when accounting for actuarial benefit adjustments and differential mortality, our results suggest that although male workers form expectations in a way consistent with forward-looking behavior, they misperceive the complicated rules of the earnings test. Results for females suggest similar patterns but estimates are imprecise.     

New Keynesian perspectives on labor market dynamics

We find that demand shocks play an important role for business-cycle fluctuations in unemployment and job vacancies. The reason is that those shocks give a strong incentive to demand-constrained firms to adjust production and thereby labor input. Furthermore we argue that whether real wage rigidity à la Hall [2005. Employment fluctuations with equilibrium wage stickiness. American Economic Review 95, 50–65] helps explain the remaining part of the unemployment volatility puzzle depends critically on assumptions regarding the form of the wage bargain between firms and workers. Real wage rigidity tends to generate volatility in employment only in the case in which hours are chosen efficiently. If, on the other hand, the real wage is allowed to affect firms's choices of hours directly, the feature of real wage rigidity loses its ability to increase employment volatility.     

Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance

A role for public unemployment insurance is developed based on the inability of the government to commit to a future rate of unemployment. This is illustrated using a model in which a minimum wage policy combined with unemployment insurance is welfare-improving. Unemployment insurance could be decentralized to the private sector if the government could commit to a minimum wage. However, if not, a government that acts in the interest of the workers will have an incentive to increase the minimum wage to exploit private insurers. In the absence of commitment, an equilibrium with private unemployment insurance will not exist.     

Labor market dynamics under long-term wage contracting

Recent research seeking to explain the strong cyclicality of US unemployment emphasizes the role of wage rigidity. This paper proposes a micro-founded model of wage rigidity—an equilibrium business cycle model of job search, where risk neutral firms post optimal long-term contracts to attract risk averse workers. Equilibrium contracts feature wage smoothing, limited by the inability of parties to commit to contracts. The model is consistent with aggregate wage data if neither worker nor firm can commit, producing too rigid wages otherwise. Wage rigidity does not lead to a substantial increase in the cyclical volatility of unemployment.     

Equity‐Based Incentives,Risk Aversion,and Merger‐Related Risk‐Taking Behavior

We find that post‐merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega), but is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in‐the‐money. The probability of industrial diversification also increases in vega. Additional tests show that the decline in post‐merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option‐based compensation does not necessarily increase risk‐taking behavior by CEOs.