首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
相似文献
 共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 78 毫秒
1.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z4):1-29
Overview: Growth resilient to protectionist concerns
  • ? Despite the mounting threat of more protectionist trade measures, we expect the impact on global growth and trade to be mild. Given this, and the still fairly solid underlying economic picture, we have left our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 unchanged at 3.2% and 3.0% respectively.
  • ? Although economic data in Q1 painted a pretty solid picture, there are signs that the global expansion may lose momentum in Q2. Most notably, the global PMI fell sharply in March, more than offsetting the gains of the previous three quarters or so. Some of the decline may reflect an over‐reaction to recent trade threats and could be reversed in April and despite the drop, the surveys still point to strong growth. But the fall highlights the risk that lingering trade tensions could damage confidence and prompt firms and consumers to delay investment and major spending plans.
  • ? On a more positive note, China's economic growth picked up markedly in early 2018, which could provide a fillip to global trade growth in the near term. Given the betterthan‐expected start to the year, we have made no change to our 2018 China GDP growth forecast (of 6.4%) despite the probable negative effects of trade measures.
  • ? Meanwhile, most advanced economies remain in the late expansionary stage of the cycle. And those that show signs of slowing, such as the Eurozone, are doing so from multi‐year highs. While we have nudged down our 2018 Eurozone GDP growth forecast slightly to 2.2%, the pace is expected to remain well above trend. We judge the impact of US tariffs and counter‐measures on the US economy to be subdued and have lowered our GDP growth forecasts for 2018 and 2019 by just 0.1pp.
  • ? For now, we see further solid growth for the world economy this year even in the environment of rising protectionism. While there is a risk that a further escalation of trade tensions could trigger a sharper slowdown in global GDP growth, we still see the risks of a full‐blown and damaging trade war as limited and the chances of protectionism leading to recessions as smaller still.
  相似文献   

2.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z3):1-33
Overview: Global growth in 2019 revised down again
  • ? In response to continued weakness in global trade and signs that the softness has spread to other sectors, we have cut our 2019 world GDP growth forecast to 2.5% from 2.7% last month (after 3.0% in 2018). But we see growth accelerating in H2 due to fiscal and monetary policy changes and as some temporary negative forces unwind. While revised fractionally lower, global growth is still expected to tick up to 2.7% in 2020 – but the risks lie to the downside.
  • ? The latest tranche of trade data points to another poor quarter in Q1. While the weakness in Chinese trade is partly related to the impact of US tariffs, the causes of the trade slowdown are rather broader. Reflecting this, we have again lowered our world trade growth forecast – we now see it slowing from 4.8% in 2018 to just 2.5% in 2019, only a little above the previous low of about 2% in 2016.
  • ? One source of comfort is that the February global services PMI rose to its highest level since November. But retail sales in the advanced economies as a whole have been weak recently and, while consumer confidence bounced in February, it has trended lower over recent months. Reflecting this, we have cut our global consumer spending forecast for this year.
  • ? We expect ongoing policy loosening in China and dovish central banks – either in the form of delays to rate hikes and liquidity tightening or via renewed easing – to boost the global economy in H2 and beyond. Some recent temporary drags on growth (such as auto sector weakness) should also wane, providing further modest support.
  • ? But the modest rise seen in GDP growth in 2020 exaggerates underlying dynamics due to sharp rebounds in a few crisis‐hit economies such as Turkey, Venezuela and Argentina. And downside risks for 2020 are probably larger than in 2019; benign financial conditions and the weaker US$ assumed in our baseline may not materialise, while the build‐up of debt in EMs could act as a larger‐than‐expected drag on growth.
  相似文献   

3.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(Z4):1-35
Overview: A weaker dollar and slightly faster growth
  • ? We have raised our world GDP growth forecasts this month, to 2.7% for 2017 and 3.0% in 2018 (from 2.6% and 2.9% previously). Similarly, we have lifted our inflation forecast for this year to 3.1%.
  • ? Surveys continue to suggest buoyant global activity, driven by manufacturing in several countries. This, in turn, is helping pull world trade from its 2016 lows. However, this partially reflects factors such as stimulus measures in China, which is boosting construction and manufacturing and bolstering trade in the region, and also benefitting major capital goods exporters such as Germany and Japan.
  • ? But there are reasons for caution given there are still underlying factors holding back demand and the likelihood that the fiscal stimulus promised by President Trump will not be as big as expected.
  • ? The most important forecast change this month is that we see a weaker US dollar ahead as monetary policy tightening in the US has already been largely priced in. This means our EURUSD and GBPUSD forecasts are now $1.10 and $1.32 by year‐end, while the short‐term outlook for many EM currencies against the US$ has also firmed.
  • ? We still expect the Fed to raise rates on another two occasions this year, followed by three hikes in 2018. However, we have brought forward by one quarter to Q4 2017 our forecast of when the Fed will begin to taper reinvestment of its portfolio holdings.
  • ? Meanwhile, we think the ECB is still a long way from policy normalisation. We expect QE to be tapered from January until June 2018. Then, the ECB will consider lifting the deposit rate from its negative levels in the final part of 2018, and only in 2020 will it start raising the main refinancing rate.
  • ? Emerging markets' prospects have improved amid a strong batch of high frequency indicators and a pick‐up in trade. Given low valuations, we see positive momentum for EM currencies and think that they may have entered a long cycle of strength.
  相似文献   

4.
Japan          下载免费PDF全文
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(2):41-42
An acceleration in global trade helped to boost Japanese GDP growth to 1.7% in 2017. But an expected slowdown in demand from China in 2018 means that the contribution from external trade will be lower this year. And while we expect growth to continue to become more broad‐based, with investment playing a prominent role, given the recent increase in protectionist tensions, we have revised down our forecast for GDP growth in 2018 to 1.5% (from 1.7% three months ago). With an expected slowdown in construction and a planned consumption tax hike in 2019, we forecast that GDP growth will ease further to 0.9% next year. The short‐term outlook is influenced by the following factors:
  • Export growth easing over 2018 : exports grew by 6.6% y/y in yen terms in January–February 2018 combined, down from 13% growth in Q4 2017. While the slowdown was less marked in volume terms, with real exports up 5.2% y/y and imports 7.8% higher (in January–February), we see a smaller contribution to growth from net trade in 2018 than in 2017, as external demand cools. The recent easing in export growth is in line with our expectations following last year's acceleration. Our baseline is for trade momentum to ease through 2018 as Chinese import demand moderates. While US protectionist measures threaten the outlook, we believe that the overall impact of the likely US tariffs will be limited, as Japanese trade continues to shift towards Asia.
  • Solid investment growth to continue : we expect the momentum behind business investment to remain solid in 2018, with growth of 2.9% little changed from the 3% recorded in 2017. Overall investment will be supported by strong corporate profits, construction for the 2020 Tokyo Olympics and high levels of confidence. Although dropping among large enterprises recently, overall business sentiment (and among SMEs) remains healthy and planned capex for fiscal year 2018 got off to a good start. Protectionism is also a downside risk to the investment outlook, but we believe that the actual impact on Japan will be limited.
  • Weak wage growth to weigh on consumer demand : monthly data suggest that consumption has continued to edge higher this year. Moreover, rising employment in Q1 may provide additional upside momentum. However, despite a tight labour market, wage growth has been disappointing and we expect sluggish wage growth to constrain household demand and inflation going forward.
  相似文献   

5.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(1):18-28
  • ? We head into 2018 in a fairly optimistic mood. The current upswing is more broadly based than any other since the global financial crisis, and – unusually by recent standards – we have entered the new year without any major crisis looming. We see world GDP growth accelerating from 3.0% last year to 3.2% in 2018, which would be the best year for the global economy since the post‐global financial crisis rebound .
  • ? There are four key reasons why 2018 is going to be a good one globally: (i) strong trade growth; (ii) muted inflation keeping monetary policy accommodative; (iii) emerging markets staying robust; (iv) resilience to political uncertainty.
  • ? The near‐term risk of an abrupt slowdown in China looks limited, while the Eurozone economy continues to stage robust growth which is underpinned by strong fundamentals. A potential fiscal loosening, a weaker dollar and business investment revival bode well for the US. The outlook is bright for economies that are heavily integrated into global manufacturing supply chains or reliant on commodity exports.
  • ? Granted, soaring debt is a cause for concern, particularly in some emerging markets, along with high asset price valuations. They warrant close monitoring and are plausible triggers for the next global slowdown. Nonetheless, while such risks could linger or indeed escalate further before correcting, we don't see them as 2018 issues.
  • ? The most obvious trigger for any such correction would be a widespread and more aggressive monetary policy normalisation. However, in our view, inflation pressures look set to build only slowly. Add the fact that high debt will make the economy more sensitive to interest rate moves, we expect central banks to normalise with caution and see policymakers doing less tightening that the consensus expectation.
  相似文献   

6.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z1):1-33
Overview: Market falls overstate loss of momentum
  • ? Financial market moves in recent months suggest that there is increasing concern about a substantial global growth slowdown or even a recession. But we continue to see this as an over‐reaction to the weakening economic data; while the downside risks to the global GDP growth outlook have clearly risen, our baseline forecast for 2019 is little changed at 2.7%, down from 3% in 2018.
  • ? Recent economic news confirms that the Q3 economic soft patch appears to have spilled over into Q4, particularly in the industrial sector which has seen a broad‐based loss of momentum in many economies coinciding with a further slowdown in global trade growth. But while surveys of service sector activity have also moderated, the falls have been rather less abrupt, suggesting that overall global GDP growth is slowing albeit not alarmingly so.
  • ? On balance, we think that the weaker data do not provide compelling evidence that global growth is slowing more sharply than our December forecast. Although the financial market sell‐off and associated tightening in financial conditions will impinge on growth, this may at least be partly offset by weaker inflation in response to lower oil prices, now seen at US$61pb in 2019. This, combined with the continued strength of labour markets and the likelihood of further moderate wage growth, points to a further period of solid household spending growth.
  • ? Nonetheless, the risk of a sharper slowdown has risen. Cyclical risks have increased over the past couple of years as spare capacity has diminished. And uncertainty over the economic and financial market impact of the unwinding of central balance sheets have added to the risk of policy mistakes.
  • ? Although our central view is that the recent financial market correction will not morph into something rather nastier, further sustained weakness (particularly if accompanied by dollar strength) would have more significant implications for activity and could see world growth falling below the 2016 post‐crisis low of 2.4%.
  相似文献   

7.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z1):1-29
Overview: entering 2018 with plenty of momentum
  • ? Further evidence that the global economy ended last year on a high note is consistent with our view that world GDP growth in 2018 will be around 3.2%, a little better than the likely rise of 3% in 2017 and the best annual outturn since 2011.
  • ? The global economy has entered 2018 with plenty of momentum. In December, the global composite PMI continued to trend upwards, rising to its highest level of 2017. This was primarily down to developments in the manufacturing sector, with several emerging markets recording especially strong gains.
  • ? While the strength of the manufacturing PMI bodes well for global trade, other timely trade indicators, particularly from Asia, have been less positive. On balance, though, we have nudged up our forecast for world trade growth iwn 2018 to 4.8%. But this would still be a slowdown after last year's estimated rise of 6%.
  • ? This partly reflects the change in the drivers of GDP growth from 2017. We still expect a modest slowdown in China, triggering a sharper drop‐off in import growth there. Eurozone GDP growth is also likely to slow slightly, to 2.2%, which is still well above our estimate of potential growth. By contrast, we have nudged up our US GDP growth forecast for this year to 2.8% – 0.5pp higher than the probable 2017 outturn – as looser fiscal policy will not be fully offset by tighter monetary policy. The recent rise in commodity prices, further dollar weakness and still‐strong global trade growth all bode well for prospects in many emerging markets.
  • ? Some commentators have questioned the durability of the global economic expansion, reflecting the long period of uninterrupted GDP growth and concerns that a financial market slowdown could eventually impinge on growth. But economic expansions do not die of old age. And while equity markets look expensive on many metrics, we expect strong earnings growth to push equity prices higher over the coming months. Meanwhile, although various geopolitical risks remain, more generally economic uncertainty has diminished.
  相似文献   

8.
Japan     
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(1):47-48
Our outlook for domestic demand remains reasonably optimistic, notwithstanding recent financial market turmoil. A tight labour market and a pick‐up in wages will bolster consumption and incentivise investment in labour‐saving technology. Meanwhile, firms continue to expand capacity and raise R&D expenditure for new technologies, boosting investment. While growth in 2018 was set back by weather‐related contractions in Q1 and Q3, we expect demand to have rebounded in Q4 and look for GDP to have grown by 0.8% in 2018 as a whole. We expect growth of 1.0% in 2019 but just 0.3% in 2020, with the key drivers being:
  • ? Robust labour market to support consumption: as the labour market continues to tighten, we expect household spending to continue to support growth in 2019. We project consumption to accelerate ahead of the scheduled rise of the consumption tax in Q4 2019, before falling back as the tax hike feeds through. However, given the stimulus measures planned by the government to soften the impact of the tax rise, we then expect consumption to show a faster recovery relative to previous consumption tax increases.
  • ? Solid investment intentions despite rising uncertainty: business sentiment and investment intentions remain above historical averages and firms continue to expand capacity and increase R&D for new technologies, despite rising uncertainty over the durability of global economic momentum. And although softening recently, machinery orders remain high. Looking ahead, we expect investment growth to lose some momentum as the investment cycle begins to turn and global trade continues to ease.
  • ? Low export growth to carry over into 2019: export volume growth has been weak of late, reflecting the softening in external demand. Import volumes have continued to grow at a robust pace, given solid domestic momentum. We expect export growth to remain weak going into 2019, in line with slowing global trade.
  • ? Industrial production to continue growing: industrial output has recovered of late, after weather‐related disruption had weighed on growth earlier in 2018, while the PMI has remained stable at 52–53. We expect industrial production to continue growing in line with domestic demand, but slower than in previous years given less buoyant external prospects.
  • ? No fiscal consolidation without economic revitalisation: the government is planning measures to support growth after the consumption tax rise in Q4 2019 including a diverse range of policies to incentivise consumption and an expansion of free childcare and education. It has also signalled that it stands ready to provide additional stimulus if needed.
  • ? Monetary policy to stay put amid low inflation and falling bond yields: inflation has remained stagnant while 10‐year government bond yields fell into negative territory for the first time in two years, putting an end to speculation about monetary policy tweaks. With the consumption tax rise drawing closer, we do not expect the BoJ to move again any time soon.
  • ? Equity sell‐off to prove temporary, but yen strength will persist: we expect current equity weakness to be temporary, but market volatility and more cautious Fed tightening indicate a stronger yen in 2019. Ongoing trade frictions and political attention on the exchange rate will also support the yen, which we see averaging 107 yen per US dollar in 2019.
  相似文献   

9.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(Z3):1-37
Overview: Reflation enthusiasm is tempered
  • ? We have kept our world GDP growth forecasts unchanged this month, at 2.6% for 2017 and 2.9% in 2018. But our outlook for inflation has been lowered to 3.0% this year (from 3.3% last month) as inflation is close to a peak in several economies and oil prices have fallen recently.
  • ? Global indicators continue to point to buoyant activity, driven by manufacturing. The global manufacturing PMI rose to its highest level in almost six years in February, which in turn is boosting world trade. Despite the exuberance shown by the surveys, we remain cautious. We continue to expect a slowdown in consumer spending as households are squeezed by higher prices.
  • ? Although we still see GDP growth in the US accelerating this year, we have lowered our forecast to 2.1% as economic data have been weaker than expected at the start of the year. Large uncertainties around our central forecast persist given the unpredictability of President Trump's policies, and markets have tempered their initial enthusiasm regarding the success of ‘Trumponomics’.
  • ? With the Federal Reserve now close to meeting its dual mandate, the pace of policy normalisation will accelerate. We now expect the Fed to raise interest rates this month and three times overall this year. This means that US bond yields are likely to continue to rise and the euro will remain under pressure due to the widening interest rate differential between the US and the Eurozone.
  • ? The Eurozone economy remains resilient ahead of key elections in France, the Netherlands and Germany. Our view remains that populist fears are overstated and that Emmanuel Macron is still favourite to become the next French president.
  • ? Many emerging markets have started 2017 with positive momentum, but caution remains the name of the game as the Fed prepares to raise rates faster than previously expected and the future of US trade policy remains uncertain.
  相似文献   

10.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z2):1-29
Overview: Financial turmoil will not derail expansion
  • ? The further run of broadly positive economic news has been overshadowed by the recent financial market turmoil. We do not expect the latter to be the catalyst for any notable economic slowdown and have left our world GDP growth forecast for 2018 unchanged at 3.2%, which would be the strongest result since 2011, up from an estimated 3.0% in 2017.
  • ? January survey data continued to strike a positive tone. Indeed, the global composite PMI rose to its highest level during the current upswing and points to a further acceleration in global GDP growth. Meanwhile, less timely world trade data showed strong growth in November after a weaker performance in September and October.
  • ? Of course, these developments predate recent financial market developments. The key issue is whether the equity market sell‐off triggers significant spillovers to the wider economy. If the market reversal is to have notable repercussions, it will need to morph from a tantrum into a full‐blown crisis. For now, we still expect interest rates generally to edge higher, with three rate hikes still seen in the US this year.
  • ? Despite the recent fall, equity prices are still up sharply compared with a few months ago and earnings growth remains solid. Against this backdrop, further weakness would probably require an additional trigger, such as a sustained rise in bond yields in response to a reassessment of the inflation and monetary policy outlook. Although inflation concerns have risen recently, our view remains that price pressures will rise only gradually in the advanced economies and that the upside risks to both inflation and bond yields remain well contained.
  • ? The upshot is that recent events have not prompted us to reassess the outlook for this year or beyond. We continue to expect world GDP growth to pick up to 3.2% this year, reflecting strong growth in both the advanced economies and the emerging markets. And our forecast for 2019 is also unchanged at 2.9%. In turn, world trade growth remains quite strong, helped by the weaker US$, but is seen slowing to 5% this year from just over 6% in 2017, with a further modest easing to 4.3% in 2019.
  相似文献   

11.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(Z4):1-33
Overview: Some glimmers of hope start to appear
  • ? Prospects for early‐2019 remain downbeat, but latest data offer some glimmers of hope that growth is beginning to stabilise. We continue to expect easier financial conditions and other policy support to trigger a modest acceleration in global GDP growth in the latter part of 2019.
  • ? On the face of it, our latest forecasts suggest that we have become more upbeat about the outlook for the global economy. We now forecast world GDP will rise by 2.7% this year and 2.9% in 2020, after last year's 3.2% gain, upward revisions of 0.2pp for both 2018 and 2019 and 0.1pp for next year. But these revisions largely reflect a change in the GDP base year from 2010 to 2015. This has increased the weights of faster‐growing economies such as China at the expense of slower‐growing economies, in turn boosting world GDP growth.
  • ? There are plenty of reasons to remain cautious in the near term. For instance, trade indicators have continued to weaken recently, while the global manufacturing PMI has fallen to only just above the 50 no‐change level.
  • ? However, there are some signs that both trade and manufacturing data (at least outside the eurozone) may be beginning to stabilise. Just as importantly, the global services PMI has picked up in the early stages of this year. In the past, sustained global slowdowns have tended to see the services PMI follow the manufacturing PMI down. Meanwhile, European retail sales have continued to expand in early‐2019.
  • ? Beyond the short term, we remain cautiously optimistic that GDP growth will pick up again. Chinese credit data, which leads hard activity data, has recently improved and, although uncertainties over US‐EU trade relations remain, global trade tensions seem to be waning. Last but not least, more dovish central banks — we no longer expect the Fed to hike rates again in this cycle — and the resultant loosening in financial conditions should support growth in both the advanced and emerging economies.
  相似文献   

12.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(2):15-19
  • ? We expect CPI inflation to slow markedly this year, dropping below the 2% target by the autumn. The inflationary impulse from the 2016 depreciation is fading and should partially reverse, while global food and energy prices are expected to stabilise. Base effects will become increasingly important.
  • ? CPI inflation reached a five‐and‐a‐half‐year high of 3.1% in November, up from a little over 1% a year earlier. The 2017 pick‐up in inflation was the result of a perfect storm of a weaker pound, higher oil prices and sharp rises in domestic electricity bills. But inflation has subsequently slowed, reaching 2.5% in March. And, after a brief hiatus, we expect the downward trend to continue as we move through the year.
  • ? The key driver of lower inflation will be weaker core pressures. In line with the literature, there is already evidence that the impact of sterling's depreciation is fading, and we think that the pressures could partially reverse if sterling continues to strengthen. We see little prospect of an offsetting escalation in domestic cost pressures. The recent pick‐up in wage growth has been muted and a further acceleration above 3% looks unlikely while there remains slack in the labour market.
  • ? The food, petrol and energy categories contributed 0.8 ppt to CPI inflation last year, compared with a drag of 0.5 ppt in 2016, as stronger global pressures combined with the weaker pound. But as global prices have been more subdued of late, by the end of 2018, we expect these categories to be contributing 0.5 ppt to CPI inflation.
  • ? The final element behind the expected slowdown in inflation is base effects. The comparison with last year's strong price pressures will depress the 2018 inflation rate, and we see the base effects being at their strongest mid‐year.
  • ? We think it unlikely that such a slowdown in inflation would derail the MPC from hiking interest rates twice this year. But it could temper its hawkishness in 2019.
  相似文献   

13.
《Economic Outlook》2020,44(Z2):1-33
Overview: Coronavirus to cut global growth to new lows
  • ▀ The rapid spread of coronavirus will weaken China's GDP growth sharply in the short term, causing disruption for the rest of the world. We now expect global GDP growth to slow to just 1.9% y/y in Q1 this year and have lowered our forecast for 2020 as a whole from 2.5% to 2.3%, down from 2.6% in 2019.
  • ▀ Prior to the coronavirus outbreak, there had been signs that the worst was over for both world trade and the manufacturing sector. However, this tentative optimism has been dashed by the current disruption.
  • ▀ While the near-term impact of the virus is uncertain, the disruption to China will clearly be significant in Q1 – we expect Chinese GDP growth to plunge to just 3.8% y/y. Even though growth there will rebound in Q2 and Q3, it will take time for the loss in activity to be fully recovered and we now expect GDP growth of just 5.4% for 2020 as a whole, a downward revision of 0.6pp from last month.
  • ▀ Weaker Chinese imports and tourism and disruption to global supply chains will take a toll on the rest of the world, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. And the shock will exacerbate the ongoing slowdown in the US and may result in the eurozone barely expanding for a second quarter running in Q1.
  • ▀ Weaker oil demand in the short term has prompted us to lower our Brent oil price forecast. We have cut our projection for growth in crude demand in 2020 by 0.2m b/d to 0.9 mb/d and now forecast Brent crude will average $62.4pb in 2020, down from about $65pb in our January forecast.
  • ▀ Quarterly global growth is likely to strengthen a little in H2 this year as the disruption fades and firms make up for the lost output earlier in the year and the effect of China's policy response starts to feed through. But for 2020 overall, global growth is now likely to be just 2.3%, 0.2pp weaker than previously assumed as a result of the epidemic.
  相似文献   

14.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(3):13-16
  • ? Policymakers, most notably in the US, have been expecting wage growth to pick up for some time as job markets tighten. But the data over the last six months have shown few indications of wage lift‐off. Our review of the latest evidence suggests that although labour markets are, on the whole, still tightening, we see increased downside risks to our forecasts for faster global wage growth in 2018–19.
  • ? Rates of “churn” in labour markets – a possible precursor to faster wage growth – have continued to rise in the US and parts of Europe.
  • ? But other structural factors may still be holding wages down. A recovery in prime‐age participation in the US may be helping to cap wage rises, as may a pool of “underemployed” workers in the US and UK (though this pool is shrinking fast).
  • ? Productivity growth also remains weak, running at a 0.5%–1% annual pace in Q1 2017 across the US, UK, Germany and Japan. This compares with a G7 average pace of 1.5% per year in 1985–2006.
  • ? Overall, the risks to our baseline forecast of faster wage growth in the major economies in 2018 look skewed to the downside. We expect wage growth to firm in 2018 by 0.5–1 percentage points in the US, UK, Germany and Japan. We would give this modal forecast a probability of around 60%, but with a 25% chance that wage growth is somewhat slower than this and only a 15% chance that it is higher.
  相似文献   

15.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(1):29-33
  • ? Most leading indicators of world trade point to growth remaining robust in the next few months, but there are some headwinds, especially from Asia. Overall, we expect trade growth to decelerate this year, yet the outlook has improved since August. We see world trade rising by 6.1% in 2017 and by 4.8% this year, up from our previous forecasts of 5.7% and 3.8%, respectively .
  • ? The latest trade volume data for the major economies support our forecasts, as does our survey‐based export indicator, which leads trade by around three months. This indicator and the main measure of global freight volumes are consistent with world trade continuing to grow by around 6% y/y in the near term.
  • ? World trade growth is likely to be supported by emerging markets (EMs), which made a large contribution to the trade recovery last year. Another factor that may be supportive – especially for EMs – is the slippage in the US dollar last year, as there is some evidence of a negative correlation between dollar strength and world trade.
  • ? The recovery of demand in the Eurozone and expected fiscal stimulus in the US add to the positive constellation of factors supporting world trade growth. Business sentiment indicators remain positive and imply upside risks to our forecasts. Yet it is not obvious that they have a strong leading relationship with trade – and the statistical relationship has become weaker since 2007–2009. This reinforces our view that there has been a structural change in the relationship between world trade and world GDP.
  • ? The main near‐term downside risks to world trade come from Asia. Freight indicators for Shanghai and Hong Kong have slowed markedly, as have semiconductor billings. Although Chinese activity indicators have also moderated, China's trade volume growth remains surprisingly strong.
  相似文献   

16.
《Economic Outlook》2018,42(Z3):1-29
Overview: Outlook bright despite fears of protectionism
  • ? President Trump's decision to impose tariffs on some steel and aluminium imports has increased the downside risk of a surge in protectionist measures. But for now, our view is that the direct impact of the US move will be small. Our global GDP growth forecasts for 2018 is unchanged at 3.2% while we have nudged up 2019 from 2.9% to 3.0%.
  • ? Available data suggest that the healthy pace of world GDP growth in Q4 has been maintained into Q1. The global composite PMI rose again in February, to its highest level in almost three and a half years. And in the first two months of the year, Chinese import growth remained solid, suggesting that, for now, it is still an important support for world trade. Although our advanced economy leading indicator has fallen back a touch since the turn of the year, it remains consistent with robust growth.
  • ? Another plus is that the recent equity market sell‐off has not yet morphed into a fullblown correction. As with other ‘tantrums’ over recent years, we do not expect this to have any notable spill‐overs for growth.
  • ? But the bigger concern is now the potential for a sharp increase in economic protectionism. While the imposition of tariffs on some US steel and aluminium imports will have repercussions for foreign producers and worsen US cost competitiveness, the sector is too small to have major knock‐on implications for global growth. The main worry is if this triggers retaliation that spins into a damaging trade war. Although this downside risk has grown, in our view it remains a tail risk. Neither the US nor its trading partners will benefit from a raft of tariffs being imposed. And the political gains for Trump may prove illusory if retaliatory measures disproportionately affect US regions where he and the Republican party are politically vulnerable.
  • ? In all, our baseline view remains little changed and we still see another year of healthy GDP growth. Although downside risks to the outlook have risen since the start of the year, they are still lower than two or three years ago.
  相似文献   

17.
《Economic Outlook》2019,43(4):18-21
  • ? Although world growth has slowed sharply, we are still some way from global recession territory. Additional shocks, probably in combination, would be needed to tip the global economy into recession.
  • ? Of the range of possible shocks, we consider five plausible candidates: rising oil prices, a sharp slump in equities, tightening credit standards, a financial shock to emerging markets, and further escalation in trade tensions.
  • ? By themselves, each would need to be very large to trigger a recession. However, a combined set of plausibly‐sized shocks could well be enough. Historically it is common for different shocks to coincide or overlap, and there is a risk of a slowdown feeding on its own momentum.
  • ? In our view, the risk of these shocks occurring is not insignificant, as we've seen in recent oil price volatility and given factors such as high equity valuations.
  相似文献   

18.
《Economic Outlook》2020,44(Z4):1-33
Overview: World GDP now seen falling 2.8% in 2020
  • ▀ With much of the global economy now in some form of lockdown due to the coronavirus pandemic, we expect world GDP to contract by about 7% in H1 2020. Activity is expected to rebound sharply in H2, but even so the severity of the shock is likely to lead to a permanent GDP loss for the global economy.
  • ▀ While Chinese activity picked up in late-Q1 as lockdown restrictions were unwound, we expect Q1 GDP to have fallen 12% q/q before rebounding sharply in Q2. But this Q2 boost looks set to be swamped by the collapse in activity caused by the rest of the world going into lockdown.
  • ▀ Although shutdown restrictions elsewhere are less severe than those imposed in China, business survey and labour market data still point to sharp falls in activity in most countries in Q2. Quarterly GDP declines of 8% or more in the US and eurozone seem likely. Overall, world GDP could fall by about 7% in H1, roughly double the size of the contraction during start of the global financial crisis in 2009.
  • ▀ In those economies subject to some form of lockdown, we expect restrictions to begin to be lifted during Q2. As a result, growth should resume in Q3 as sectors that have been forced to shut down see some pick-up. But despite this rebound, world GDP is now seen shrinking 2.8% in 2020 overall — in 2009, the global GDP fall was 1.1%.
  • ▀ The H2 pick-up, followed by a return to more normal conditions next year, will result in world GDP growth rising to almost 6% in 2021, helped also by the recent collapse in oil prices to about $30pb. But the scale of the disruption means that we expect a permanent loss of output from the shock. We expect global GDP in the medium term to be some 1.5% below the level we had anticipated before the coronavirus outbreak.
  • ▀ The risks around this forecast are large and broadly balanced. But were stringent lockdowns or widespread disruption, perhaps due to renewed outbreaks of the virus, to extend into Q3, global GDP could fall by as much as 8% this year.
  相似文献   

19.
《Economic Outlook》2020,44(Z1):1-33
Overview: World growth still seen at just 2.5% in 2020
  • ▀ Although recent developments suggest that the risks of an escalation in US-China trade tensions have eased, we doubt this will deliver a significant boost to the global economy. We still expect world GDP growth of just 2.5% this year, the weakest since the global financial crisis, after an estimated 2.6% in 2019. But the risks around the forecast now seem less skewed to the downside.
  • ▀ While our view remains that global GDP growth is likely to have softened further around the turn of the year, the decline remains gradual. And latest survey-based measures of activity and sentiment show tentative signs that prospects are beginning to improve, consistent with our long-standing view that the low point for global growth will be in Q1 2020.
  • ▀ Just as importantly, the likelihood of the US and China formally signing off a phase one trade deal in mid-January has reduced the chances of a further flare-up in trade tensions between the two economies. However, this has to some degree been offset by the troubling events recently unfolding between the US and Iran.
  • ▀ We remain sceptical that the global economy is set for a major growth boost. Any healing in US-China relations may quickly be unwound and a full reversal of the tariffs already implemented remains a distant prospect. Furthermore, some of the associated growth boost is likely to be offset by less policy support. As a result, we have raised our 2020 GDP growth by just 0.1pp in the US but by a more significant 0.3pp in China.
  • ▀ Meanwhile, although the ongoing and broad-based monetary policy loosening in both AEs and EMs should start to feed through to growth this year, we doubt this will be a game-changer. Not only is policy loosening at a global level set to be fairly muted, limited spare capacity, the rising stock of global debt and elevated asset prices are likely to reduce the positive impulse from policymakers' actions.
  相似文献   

20.
《Economic Outlook》2017,41(4):20-24
  • ? This year advanced economies have enjoyed a rare positive supply surprise: output is higher than expected and inflation is lower. The initial China‐related boost not only proved to be a great antidote to secularly weak global demand, but it has also engendered unexpected global momentum and a benign inflation response. As a result, 2016–17 resembles a mini‐reprise of the “nice” 1990s, a non‐inflationary, consistently expansionary decade.
  • ? The global momentum has been propelled by a strong international trade multiplier. This has contributed to strength in several advanced economies, particularly the Eurozone. We expect global growth in 2018 to be bolstered by US fiscal stimulus as the impulse from China fades.
  • ? It will remain “nice” in 2018, albeit in the context of weak secular trend growth. We expect the benign output‐inflation trade‐off to continue. Several of the factors that are underpinning low inflation and unemployment as well as weak wage growth are likely to be present for some time.
  相似文献   

设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号