Medical malpractice: an empirical examination of the litigation process

New data on medical malpractice claims against a single hospital in which a direct measure of the quality of medical care is available are used to investigate the roles of the negligence rule and incomplete information in the dispute settlement process in medical malpractice. We find that the quality of medical care (negligence) is an extremely important determinant of defendants' medical malpractice liability. More generally, we find that the data are consistent with a model in which plaintiffs are poorly informed ex ante about whether there has been negligence, file suit to gather information, and either drop the case if they find that negligence was unlikely or settle for a positive payoff if they find that negligence was likely. We also find that the cases are resolved earlier in the litigation process when the parties are more certain, one way or the other, about the likelihood of negligence.     

The impact of accelerating 20-F filing

This study examines the impact of the SEC’s decision to accelerate the 20-F filing deadline from six to four months after the fiscal year-end for foreign private issuers (FPIs). We find that only large FPIs experience a significant positive market reaction around the accelerated 20-F filing date, and such acceleration is associated with an improved reporting environment. We also find that only large FPIs benefit from further acceleration of 20-F filing deadline from four to three months after the fiscal year-end. Additionally, any further acceleration of 20-F filing does not benefit all sizes of the FPIs. Our results contribute to the debate about whether it is beneficial for the FPIs to accelerate their 20-F filing deadline to align with the 10-K filing deadlines.     

Sharing of information prior to settlement or litigation.

In this article the voluntary sharing of information prior to settlement negotiations is studied in a model where one type of litigant--plaintiffs, to be exact--possesses private information. In equilibrium, plaintiffs whose expected judgments would exceed a certain threshold will reveal their information (if they can credibly establish it) and settle for higher amounts than if they were silent; plaintiffs with lower expected judgments will remain silent and settle. The effect of the legal right of "discovery" is also examined.     

The internet as an information intermediary

The internet is an enormous and growing source of information for investors about the opinions of others. Virtually any individual with internet access can express opinions about firms and editorialize about company news. However, to date we know very little about the impact these nontraditional internet intermediaries have on markets. We develop a framework wherein internet information intermediaries fall along a spectrum of professionalism and document a nuanced relationship between coverage by these intermediaries and capital market effects. Using a novel dataset that tracks coverage of companies by individuals posting on thousands of websites, we find that coverage by professional and semi-professional intermediaries is associated with positive capital market effects but coverage by nonprofessional internet intermediaries has the opposite effect—hindering price formation. The detrimental effects of nonprofessional coverage are observed most strongly when the intermediaries have larger audiences.     

实时的社会信息与互联网产品众筹的动态性——基于大数据的采集与挖掘研究

本文使用互联网大数据实时采集工具,针对我国三家典型的互联网产品众筹平台逐日抓取了2015年10月至2016年2月共130天的在线产品众筹项目的实时大数据,基于实时的社会信息探索了产品众筹过程中的动态性。本文依据社会责任扩散效应与目标梯度效应构建了理论预期,经检验发现,在产品众筹的起始阶段,新增的支持金额(人数)与累计支持金额(人数)的回归系数显著为正且呈明显的下降趋势,而在结束阶段,两者的回归系数又重新显著为正且呈上升的趋势,但上升趋势不够明显。此外,随着日趋接近于众筹的目标金额,新增的支持金额(人数)存在显著的加速过程。这种产品众筹中体现出来的动态性意味着,众筹的起始阶段和结束阶段由实时的社会信息所决定的筹资状况以及尽快实现众筹目标金额过半的筹资是决定产品众筹成败的关键。     

How Much New Information Is There in Earnings?

We quantify the relative importance of earnings announcements in providing new information to the share market, using the R² in a regression of securities' calendar‐year returns on their four quarterly earnings‐announcement “window” returns. The R², which averages approximately 5% to 9%, measures the proportion of total information incorporated in share prices annually that is associated with earnings announcements. We conclude that the average quarterly announcement is associated with approximately 1% to 2% of total annual information, thus providing a modest but not overwhelming amount of incremental information to the market. The results are consistent with the view that the primary economic role of reported earnings is not to provide timely new information to the share market. By inference, that role lies elsewhere, for example, in settling debt and compensation contracts and in disciplining prior information, including more timely managerial disclosures of information originating in the firm's accounting system. The relative informativeness of earnings announcements is a concave function of size. Increased information during earnings‐announcement windows in recent years is due only in part to increased concurrent releases of management forecasts. There is no evidence of abnormal information arrival in the weeks surrounding earnings announcements. Substantial information is released in management forecasts and in analyst forecast revisions prior (but not subsequent) to earnings announcements.     

Investment Horizon and Repo in the Over‐the‐Counter Market

This paper presents a three‐period model featuring a short‐term investor in the over‐the‐counter bond market. A short‐term investor stores cash because of a need to pay cash at some future date. If a short‐term investor buys bonds, then a deadline for retrieving cash lowers the resale price of bonds for the investor through bilateral bargaining in the bond market. Ex‐ante, this hold‐up problem explains the use of a repo by a short‐term investor, the existence of a haircut, and the vulnerability of a repo market to counterparty risk. This result holds without any uncertainty about bond returns or asymmetric information.     

DOES IT PAY TO DISCLOSE MANAGERIAL EARNINGS INFORMATION EARLY?

Does it pay to voluntarily disclose the manager's private information about the firm's earnings prospects before the mandatory announcement date? This question has been a subject of much debate because prior research establishes both benefits and costs of early information disclosure. We provide evidence on the net effect of such disclosure by examining its impact on firm value. Using a large sample and correcting for self‐selection bias, we find that early disclosure of the manager's private earnings information enhances the end‐of‐period value of the firm.     

What Determines Collection Rates of Debt Collection Agencies?

We contribute to the literature on debt collection agencies in two ways: First, we present an estimation of the collection rates. The distribution of collection rates exhibits a mean of about 65% and a strong bimodality with peaks at the very ends of the distribution. Second, we investigate potential determinants of the collection success. We find that collection rates are positively related to the exposure at default and to prior debtor‐specific collection rates. In contrast, the age of the account and—if applicable—prior experience with the debtor have a negative impact on collection rates.     

THE FUNDAMENTAL DETERMINANTS OF TRADING VOLUME REACTION TO FINANCIAL INFORMATION: EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL CAPITAL MARKET RESEARCH

Prior empirical research indicates that trading volume reaction to new information increases with the heterogeneity of investors’ prior beliefs. We examine three potential factors that theoretical models of financial economists show determine trading volume reaction to new information: heterogeneous prior beliefs, differential interpretation, and the consensus effect—the extent to which the information causes their beliefs to converge or diverge. We find that these three factors have a distinct and significant incremental effect on trading volume, thereby suggesting that empirical trading volume models that exclude or fail to control for any of these determinants are misspecified with biased estimated coefficients.     

The effects of information order and hypothesis-testing strategies on auditors' judgments

This research examined the effects of information order and hypothesis-testing strategies on audit judgements. Auditors started with high or low prior beliefs about an internal control system and then reviewed both positive and negative evidence. The results suggest that, unless specifically requested to do so, auditors do not generally seek confirming evidence. We also found that prior beliefs have an effect on the importance of information order: with high prior beliefs, subjects' judgements were unaffected by information order, while low prior beliefs were associated with a recency effect.     

What Do FAS 157 “Fair Values” Really Measure: Value Or Risk?

FAS 157, the U.S. accounting standard that prescribes how fair values of assets and liabilities are to be measured when other U.S. GAAP standards require fair valuation, stipulates that fair values be measured as the exit values of assets and liabilities—the proceeds for assets hypothetically sold on the date of the financial report, and, correspondingly, the amount required to settle liabilities on the date of the financial report. This conceptual article argues that exit values do not reflect the value of the net assets of the firm to shareholders, which is best reflected by discounted cash flows to maturity. Moreover, exit values—biasing fair values downward when markets are illiquid—have a pernicious, systemic risk effect; specifically, they give rise to write‐downs that in turn cause contagion: prices of equities and other financial instruments of peers react negatively, leading to further write‐downs by those peers. This may have aggravated the recent financial crisis. However, while exit values are not proper measures of value to shareholders, they are useful measures of downside risk when prospects turn sour for a firm. Thus, both exit values and discounted cash flows should be presented in financial statements.     

Investigating the Valuation Effects of Announcements of Voluntary Corporate Selloffs

While there has been an abundance of empirical research on the subject of mergers and acquisitions, little research exists on a closely related topic—voluntary corporate selloffs. This study examines the effect on shareholder wealth of the announcement by management of an investment decision to voluntarily sell part of its operations to another firm. Positive abnormal returns are found to occur on the announcement date. However, it is found that such selloffs generally occur after a period of abnormally negative returns, suggesting the announcement is preceded by the release of negative information about the firm.     

The Effect of Sequential Information Arrival on Asset Prices: An Experimental Study

A complete understanding of security markets requires a simultaneous explanation of price behavior, trading volume, portfolio composition (ie., asset allocation), and bid-ask spreads. In this paper, these variables are observed in a controlled setting—a computerized double auction market, similar to NASDAQ. Our laboratory allows experimental control of information arrival—whether simultaneously or sequentially received, and whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We compare the price, volume, and share allocations of three market equilibrium models: telepathic rational expectations, which assumes that traders can read each others minds (strong-form market efficiency); ordinary rational expectations, which assumes traders can use (some) market price information, (a type of semi-strong form efficiency); and private information, where traders use no market information. We conclude 1) that stronger-form market models predict equilibrium prices better than weaker-form models, 2) that there were fewer misallocation forecasts in simultaneous information arrival (SIM) environments, 3) that trading volume was significantly higher in SIM environments, 4) and that bid-ask spreads widen significantly when traders are exposed to price uncertainty resulting from information heterogeneity.     

Arbitrage-free pricing of multi-person game claims in discrete time

We introduce a class of financial contracts involving several parties by extending the notion of a two-person game option to a contract in which an arbitrary number of parties is involved and each of them is allowed to make a wide array of decisions at any time, not restricted to simply exercising the option. The collection of decisions by all parties then determines the contract’s termination date as well as the terminal payoff for each party. We provide sufficient conditions under which a discrete-time multi-person game option has a unique arbitrage-free price, which is additive with respect to any partition of the contract. Our results are illustrated by the detailed study of a particular multi-person contract with puttable tranches.     

The influence of information presentation order and evaluation time horizon on the outcome effect

The outcome effect occurs when an evaluation is influenced by knowledge of the outcome, even when it is unclear that the outcome provides additional information about the evaluatee's performance. This phenomenon has received considerable attention in the accounting and psychology literatures, which rely on cognitive or motivational factors to account for the outcome effect. However, prior research has not considered the impact of information presentation order or the evaluation time horizon. We evaluate prior research in accounting and conclude that information presentation order could have significantly impacted the outcome effect observed in these studies. We then report the results of an experiment that provides evidence that information presentation order plays a significant role in the existence and magnitude of the outcome effect. In addition, we find that the length of the evaluation time horizon is positively related to the magnitude of the outcome effect when conditions favor a recency effect.     

Do women managers keep firms out of trouble? Evidence from corporate litigation and policies

We find that firms where women have more power in the top management team, measured by female executives’ plurality and pay slice, face fewer operations-related lawsuits. This effect is robust to several treatments of endogeneity and does not appear to be driven by female executives' greater willingness to settle the cases. Evidence from a simultaneous equations approach suggests that firms where women executives have more power avoid lawsuits partly by avoiding some risky but value-increasing firm policies, such as more aggressive R&D, intensive advertising, and policies inimical to other parties.     

Private monitoring,collusion, and the timing of information

When a principal's monitoring information is private (nonverifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent's wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources—the so‐called burning of money. A more realistic and efficient outcome is feasible when the private information arrives in time to rescale the agent's effort. Rescaling is more effective than pure monetary penalties because effort has different values to different parties whereas money is equally valuable to all parties. Furthermore, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion.     

Are CEOs’ purchases more profitable than they appear?

Little is known about why CEOs voluntarily purchase shares of their firm other than to earn direct profits. Since CEOs are risk-averse, undiversified, and face litigation costs from trading on private information, direct profits are unlikely to be the sole motive—especially since many purchases are ultimately unprofitable. We find that CEOs who have recently purchased shares are less likely to be terminated following poor performance and that this relation varies predictably with (i) their cost of purchasing shares, (ii) the profitability of their prior purchases, and (iii) their board's access to alternative sources of information about them. We find that some CEOs voluntarily purchase shares despite the cost of foregone diversification—and, sometimes outright unprofitability—to indirectly benefit by prolonging their tenure. Our estimates imply that the average abnormal returns that CEOs earn from their purchases increases from 3% to 58% after incorporating the indirect benefit of prolonged tenure.     

Limits of private firms’ disclosure avoidance – Evidence from enforcing financial statements publication in Germany

In 2006 Germany strengthened the enforcement of mandatory financial statement disclosure for private firms. Since the law enforced disclosure but not its quality, we examine whether firms forced to disclose reduced financial reporting quality, for example to prevent competitors and other parties from inferring profitability, liquidity and other negotiation relevant information in time. We use proprietary data by the Deutsche Bundesbank, which covers information about firms that did not disclose financial statements before the law. Analyses based on differences-in-differences, regression discontinuity and PSM extend prior studies and suggest that firms did not significantly reduce financial reporting quality. These findings are potentially relevant for regulators as they document limits of private firms’ disclosure avoidance and emphasize the benefits of disclosure.