Identity and the Self-Reinforcing Effects of Norm Compliance

When making political and economic decisions (e.g., voting, donating money to a cause), individuals consider the expectations of groups with which they identify. These expectations are injunctive norms, shared beliefs about appropriate behavior for identity group members, and individuals' choices reflect trade-offs between adherence to these norms and other preferences. We show that when those who identify moderately/strongly with the group pay a cost as a consequence of avoiding a norm violation, they subsequently view the norms as stronger than those that paid no cost. This is evident in their greater willingness to pay an additional cost to punish/reward other group members for violating/complying with the norm. They also view other norms associated with the identity as stronger. In this way, costly norm compliance may be self-reinforcing.     

【学界视点】腐败何以持续：基于社会规范视角的实验研究

为什么在各种高强度、持续性惩罚之下,腐败现象依然存在？通过一个改进的贿赂博弈实验,文章将命令性规范与描述性规范引入到实验情境中,首次在实验室中系统考察了这两类社会规范对腐败行为的影响。实验结果显示,社会规范对腐败行为的影响表现为框架效应与从众效应两个方面：一方面,避免使用明确的“腐败”语言会消解框架效应抑制腐败的积极作用,显著增加腐败行为的发生率;另一方面,当腐败成为一种流行现象之后,消极的从众效应会进一步增强个体的腐败倾向,而若不腐败是当前的流行规范,积极的从众效应则会强化框架效应。来自第三方合宜性评价的结果表明,这两种效应的作用模式完全符合一般人的预期。我们认为,腐败行为的这种规范基础可能正是现实中不管反腐力度多大、腐败行为仍持续存在的重要原因之一。这意味着,反腐制度与政策的设计需要考虑腐败的社会性基础,在发挥社会规范积极作用的同时,减少其消极作用。     

Enforcement,Socioeconomic Diversity,and Tax Filing Compliance in the United States

In this article, we examine the determinants of tax filing compliance in the United States. We use county‐level data on non‐filing rates for the tax year 2000, obtained directly from the Internal Revenue Service. We include explanatory variables identified in the “rational compliance” framework, including an enforcement index against identified non‐filers, the audit rate of filers, and the average penalty rate for both filers and non‐filers. We also examine the role of socioeconomic diversity on tax compliance, testing whether within‐county heterogeneity in household income, language, race, and religion can help explain variation in non‐filing rates. We find that non‐filing is increasing with heterogeneity by race, although not by income or language, and that non‐filing is decreasing with heterogeneity by religious membership. As for enforcement variables, we find that non‐filing rates tend to fall with the enforcement index. Other variables have somewhat mixed results.     

Emotions,Sanctions, and Cooperation

We use skin conductance responses and self‐reported hedonic valence to study the emotional basis of cooperation and punishment in a social dilemma. We argue that the availability of sanctions sets in motion a “virtuous emotional circle” that accompanies cooperation. Emotional reaction to free riding leads cooperators to apply sanctions. In response, and in addition to the monetary consequences of receiving sanctions, the negative emotions experienced by the free‐riders when punished lead them to increase their subsequent level of cooperation. The outcome is an increased level of cooperation that becomes a new norm. Therefore, emotions sustain both the use of altruistic punishment and cooperation.     

Motivation of Parent–Child Co‐residence Behavior: Evidence from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study

This paper examines the motivations of parent‐child co‐residence behavior in China using data from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study. We test three possible motives: social norms, self‐interest and altruism. We find that social norms play an important role in household co‐residence behavior, showing that the belief that “sons take care of parents” is strong, and children in different birth orders take different responsibilities. Taking the one‐child policy as a natural experiment, we compared co‐residence behavior between only‐child and multi‐child families. This allowed us to test whether children in multi‐child families with wealthier parents more often co‐reside in order to compete for a bequest. We find that parents' wealth is more appealing to children in multi‐child families. The results support the life cycle theory that co‐residence decisions are motivated by self‐interest. We also find some evidence of altruism when parents and children make co‐residence decisions. These findings provide some insights for designing future elder‐support policies in China.     

Evaluating the Economic Effects of Flat Tax Reforms Using Synthetic Control Methods

Tax reforms are often motivated by their potential to improve economic performance. However, their actual impacts are difficult to quantify. We analyze the impact of flat tax reform on incomes using “synthetic control” methods. We identify the eight Eastern and Central European countries that adopted flat tax systems between 1994 and 2005, and then compare post‐reform GDP per capita of “treated” countries with a convex combination of similar but “untreated” countries, while accounting for the time‐varying impact of unobservable heterogeneity. We find positive impacts in all eight countries, with seven out of eight cases significant at the conventional level.     

Do community-sanctioned social pressures constrain microenterprise growth? Evidence from a framed field experiment

We conduct a framed lab-in-field experiment to explore the hypothesis that a number of stylized facts about microenterprise behaviour in developing countries – including product market homogeneity and lack of growth and innovation – can be explained by a social institution in which microentrepreneurs share the market to “buy a job.” 280 present or prospective market trader women across four communities in rural Vietnam are anonymously randomized into pairs to play three “market game” treatments. The interactions are framed to simulate real-world retail market competition. The participants compete in an effort task, with performance determining market returns. A highly incentivized individual round allows us to extract a measure of individual “ability” in the effort task. The subjects then compete in successive treatments, where in the final treatment the losing participant in a round can elect to “burn” their competitor’s output, which is framed as the application of social pressure. The behavioural responses are significant and fitting with a theoretical model of the social institution we have in mind: even though subjects are from the same community they are willing to punish (“apply social pressure”), the probability of punishment is increasing in the gap in ability in the pair, and this leads to a decrease in performance from higher-ability individuals. The study provides an example of the use of framed lab experiments to shed light on market behaviour in developing countries, for which full-blown RCTs may face serious feasibility or ethical challenges.     

On labor incentives and work norm in Japanese firms

In this paper, we argue that social/corporate norms play an important role in achieving higher productivity and better economic welfare. We define “social norm” to be a standard of behavior suggested by a social custom, i.e., a customary choice of actions in each social situation. We reinterpret the well-known Nash equilibrium as a “norm equilibrium.” A norm equilibrium is a stable social norm, stable in the sense that there is no incentive to deviate from the behavior suggested by the prevailing social norm. This interpretation requires less information than the traditional interpretation. Moreover, we need not be concerned with the problem of refinement because it is the social norm itself which refines the equilibria. We apply this concept to the labor market. The key assumption is that the level of an individual worker's effort is private information known to workers as a whole; i.e., all workers' efforts are known to their fellow workers as well as to the workers themselves. We show that different work norms may emerge in different corporations at an equilibrium. In “prestigious” firms cooperation is the prevailing work norm, while in “nonprestigious” firms noncooperation is the norm. Thus, the efficiency wage hypothesis holds without the existence of unemployment. Some implications of this interpretation for the Japanese labor markets are discussed.     

THE REVENUE-EXPENDITURE NEXUS: HISTORICAL EVIDENCE FOR SOUTH AFRICA

Results from unit root and cointegration tests suggest that, allowing for structural breaks, government revenue and expenditure in South Africa during 1895‐2005 were I(1) series and cointegrated. Results from Granger‐type causality tests suggest that a bidirectional Granger‐causal relation existed between revenue and expenditure for the full sample period and for sub‐periods up to the 1960s, consistent with the so‐called “fiscal synchronisation hypothesis”. However, in the 1960s the causal relation appears to have shifted to run from expenditure to taxation, consistent with Peacock and Wiseman's “displacement effect”. In the context of the recent fiscal consolidation literature, the South African fiscal experience would appear to be generally consistent with either revenue‐ or expenditure‐led fiscal consolidation efforts, but with the more recent evidence favoring expenditure‐led consolidations.     

AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION DISPUTES IN TAIWAN: CASES OF “SELF‐RELIEF”

During the late 1980s and early 1990s in Taiwan, people's protests against environmental pollution often took the form of “self‐relief,” meaning that they attempted to fight polluters using their own resources, without relying on legal or administrative procedures. Why did such an extreme form of dispute become so widespread? What institutional changes did these movements bring about? These questions are analyzed using the analytical framework of “law and economics.” Our research shows that self‐relief functioned to a certain extent as a means of realizing quick compensation for victims, and for reflecting the opinions of local people concerning development projects; in addition, it served to promote the formulation of law and administrative systems. However, as it was based on direct negotiations between the parties concerned, the outcome of each dispute only reflected the transient balance of forces, and the experience gained in negotiations was not accumulated as a social norm.     

Nosy Preferences,Benevolence, and Efficiency

We explore the implications of “nosy” preferences—when individuals have rankings over the specific actions of others—using recent theoretical results in the behavioral economics literature. Our model jointly captures preference interdependence over utilities (benevolence) and actions (nosiness). We apply the model to two well‐known environments. The first is a classic social choice problem; the second is a model of relative consumption concerns. For the former we characterize the existence of the impossibility once the social choice problem has been modeled as a behavioral game. For the latter we characterize when the negative externality arising from relative consumption concerns can be overcome without a policy intervention.     

A few bad apples: Communication in the presence of strategic ideologues

I propose a very simple model of strategic communication. The motivation is to help explain widespread persistent disagreement about objective facts. In the model, there is a message sender and a receiver, and two possible states of the world, left or right. The sender is one of three types: honest, or a leftist or rightist “ideologue.” The honest type observes a private signal in , with higher values implying stronger support for the right state, and reports the observed value truthfully. Ideologues strategically choose any message from this set to maximize the receiver's belief in their preferred state, ignoring any private information they may have. I show that a small presence of ideologues can have a large effect on communication: while we might expect ideologues to just send extreme messages, in most equilibria ideologues use “strategic understatement,” and in many cases actually mix over all non‐neutral (non‐N∕2) messages to mimic honest types and gain credibility. This distorts the interpretation of these messages such that all messages on a side of the spectrum (above or below N∕2) have the same effect on receiver beliefs. This coarsened communication is less informative than even the weakest non‐neutral messages in the absence of ideologues. I show by example how ideologues can cause large delays in the time required for receiver beliefs to converge to truth.     

Market Performance Implications of the Transfer Price Rule

The “transfer price rule” (TPR) defines a vertical price squeeze as an input price, output price combination set by a vertically‐integrated firm monopoly producer of an essential input that would not allow the firm's downstream unit to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment in the “as‐if” case that it had to purchase the input at the price charged independent firms. In its 2009 linkLine decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the TPR for the purpose of enforcing the anti‐monopolization prohibition of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In contrast, a vertical price squeeze, defined by a TPR‐like standard, is an abuse of a dominant position under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In this article, we model the impact of the TPR on market performance. We find that the TPR increases consumer surplus and net social welfare if all firms remain active in the downstream market. It sometimes induces the upstream firm to refuse to supply the downstream firm, and in such cases, consumer surplus and net social welfare are reduced. The impact of the TPR on market performance thus depends on whether or not an upstream firm can refuse to supply downstream firms on terms that would offer it at least a normal rate of return on investment.     

企业社会责任行为对顾客公民行为的影响研究

文章基于社会学视角,实证了企业社会责任履行行为对顾客公民行为的影响。研究结果表明,企业社会责任行为——社会的"好公民"行为,总体上正向影响顾客公民行为的产生——成为企业的"好战士"。更进一步,企业慈善责任行为主要通过顾客感恩的中介对顾客公民行为形成正向影响,企业道德责任行为则通过顾客-企业认同的中介对顾客公民行为形成正向影响。研究揭示出企业慈善责任、道德责任行为是以价值为导向的知识创造行为。最后文章提出:企业不仅要利用知识创造满足顾客需要的好产品和好服务,更应利用知识创造满足企业发展需要的顾客好战士。     

"SIN" TAXES AND POOR HOUSEHOLDS: UNANTICIPATED EFFECTS

This paper presents several hypotheses relating to the effects that tax hikes on tobacco and alcohol products may have on poor households. Its focus is limited to patriarchal households in which the head is “egoistic” and/or addicted (to alcohol and tobacco) and is also in control of the household budget. It is argued that “sin” tax hikes may adversely affect the welfare of household members other than the head, either directly through a re‐allocation of the household budget, or indirectly through higher health expenses caused by the substitution of cheaper and lower quality alcohol and tobacco products for higher quality products.     

The Diffusion of a Medical Innovation: Is Success in the Stars?

This paper relates the diffusion of the coronary stent to the presence of prominent or “star” physicians within a local peer group. The paper uses panel data on coronary care in Florida covering the period immediately following the 1995 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of the stent, a significant improvement in coronary angioplasty. Adoption timing and utilization varied considerably across doctors between 1995 and 2001. We consider the role of asymmetric social influence among physicians based on professional status. Defining “star” status as having completed residency at a top-ranked hospital, we find that the diffusion of stents by non-stars depends positively on the number of stars practicing contemporaneously at the same hospitals, while we find no social influence in the opposite direction. The findings indicate that lack of local exposure to star physicians may slow adoption, and clustering of stars in a small number of hospitals may entail welfare costs.     

Welfare receipt and the intergenerational transmission of work‐welfare norms

This article investigates the role of welfare receipt in shaping norms regarding work and welfare using unique Australian data from the Youth in Focus Project. We begin by incorporating welfare into a theoretical model of the transmission of work‐welfare norms across generations. Consistent with the predictions of this model, we find evidence that youths' attitudes toward work and welfare may be influenced by socialization within their families. Young people are more likely to oppose generous social benefits and to believe that social inequality stems from individual characteristics if (i) their mothers support these views; (ii) their mothers were employed while they were growing up; and (iii) their families never received welfare. Finally, youths' work‐welfare norms appear to be unrelated to their neighbors' welfare receipt suggesting that socialization occurs primarily within families rather than within neighborhoods.     

Learning the “Craft” of Auditing: A Dynamic View of Auditors' On‐the‐Job Learning

We investigate how auditors learn the technical aspects of their professional role while performing client engagements, and how that learning process has been shaped by changes in societal, economic, and regulatory forces. Prior studies explicitly recognize that auditors need social skills and demeanor consistent with professional norms as well as requisite knowledge, but those studies generally focus on the processes through which new auditors are molded toward consistency with social norms. In contrast, we focus on forces affecting the transfer of technical knowledge from supervisor (guide) to subordinate (learner) in the everyday work setting. Our evidence derives from semi‐structured interviews with 30 relatively new and more experienced audit partners at one Big 4 firm, thus spanning multiple “generations” of experience. Results confirm that auditors primarily acquire technical knowledge on the job, through the interactions among individual engagement team members. However, partners express concern about changes in the practice environment that may limit effectiveness of on‐the‐job learning, including characteristics of personnel, the approach to formal training at induction, supervisors' reluctance to provide candid feedback, regulatory and economic pressures, and the increased distraction, and reduced interpersonal contact associated with the use of information technology. At the end of the day, our findings raise implications for practice regarding the difficulty of developing effective learning conditions for auditors in the face of these challenges.