Cost efficiency,economies of scale,technological progress and productivity in Indonesian banks

This study estimates cost efficiency, economies of scale, technological progress, and productivity growth among Indonesian banks from 1993 to 2000. Average cost efficiency for the banking sector over this period was 70%. However, there is a marked difference in cost efficiency before and after the Asian economic crisis. The banking sector cost efficiency was 80% prior to the crisis and 53% after the crisis. Moreover, results indicate that private-owned banks and joint venture/foreign banks were more efficient than public-owned banks. Furthermore, the relationship between cost efficiency and total assets suggests an optimum bank asset size. Cost reductions attributed to technological progress and economies of scale were greater prior to the Asian economic crisis. Larger decreases in total factor productivity are evident in the post-crisis period.     

Were Information Intermediaries Sensitive to the Financial Statement‐Based Leading Indicators of Bank Distress Prior to the Financial Crisis?

In this paper, we address two questions that emerged in the aftermath of the 2008 financial/banking crisis. First, did the financial statements of bank holding companies provide an early warning of their impending distress? Second, were the actions of four key financial intermediaries (short sellers, equity analysts, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and auditors) sensitive to the information in the banks’ financial statements about their increased risk and potential distress? We find a significant cross‐sectional association between banks’ 2006 Q4 financial information and bank failures over 2008–2010, suggesting that the financial statements reflected at least some of the increased risk of bank distress in advance. The mean abnormal short interest in our sample of banks increased from 0.66 percent in March 2005 to 2.4 percent in March 2007 and the association between short interest and leading financial statement indicators also increased. In contrast, we observe neither a meaningful change in analysts’ recommendations, Standard and Poor's credit ratings, and audit fees nor an increased sensitivity of these actions to financial indicators of bank distress over this time period. Our results suggest that actions of short sellers likely provided an early warning of the banks’ upcoming distress prior to the 2008 financial crisis.     

Responding to financial crisis: Bank credit expansion with Chinese characteristics

China has sustained a high rate of economic growth even after the outbreak of global financial crisis around 2008 and 2009. Much of the growth stemmed from consistently high levels of lending after this period. Using a unique large dataset from all banking institutions in 90 counties across 14 provinces of China from 2005 to 2013, this paper examines the patterns of credit expansion by Chinese banks. Our study results reveal a clear pattern of counter-cyclical credit expansion by Chinese banks in response to the outbreak of global financial crisis. We find that ownership structure and bank governance do impact on bank lending: the large state-owned banks have responded more to political pressure to lend while the joint-stock banks and city commercial banks have been more profit oriented. The latter had increased their lending more to increase their presence at the county markets. Overall, compared with county-based small banks, cross-regional banks have expanded their lending much more aggressively. Differences in liquidity and deposit growth, risk management strategies, or legal enforcement cannot explain these results.     

Competition in Turkish Banking: Impacts of Restructuring and the Global Financial Crisis

This paper investigates the evolution of competition in the Turkish banking industry by taking into account the transformation in the sector in the aftermath of the country's financial crisis of 2000 to 2001 and the global financial crisis. The results demonstrate that the level of competition in the system did not increase despite the restructuring that was undertaken and the increased foreign bank participation. In addition, the level of competition in the sector deteriorated during the global crisis. There is also some evidence that the market power of banks with different ownership characteristics varied and did not converge over time.     

Comparison of Bank Profitability in China and the USA

This paper examines and compares the profitability of banks in the USA and China. The USA has the largest market‐based banking system and the financial system of China is still bank‐based. Our analysis indicates that in terms of profitability, banks in China outperformed those in the USA during our study period (2008–2014). Real estate loans had an adverse effect on US bank profitability during the financial crisis and no effect after the crisis but consistently improved the profitability of Chinese banks. Interest margins have no effect on US bank profitability but a consistently positive effect on Chinese banks, confirming that China is a traditional bank‐based economy. Interbank loans have a positive and significant effect on Chinese bank profitability, while interbank domestic loans have a negative effect on US bank profitability. Finally, size had a positive effect on US banks after the financial crisis period, confirming the scale economies of large US banks, but a negative effect on Chinese banks, indicating diseconomies of scale.     

Ownership Structure and Risk‐taking Behavior: Evidence from Banks in Korea and Japan

This study analyzes the effects of managerial ownership on the risk‐taking behavior of Korean and Japanese banks during the relatively regulated period of the late 1990s to the early 2000s. It finds that managerial ownership alone does not affect either the risk or the profit levels of Korean banks. In contrast, an increase in managerial ownership adds to the total risk of Japanese banks. However, increased risk‐taking behavior does not produce higher levels of profit for Japanese banks. The coefficients of the interaction term between franchise value and managerial ownership are negative and statistically significant for both the Korean and the Japanese banking industries. This means that an increase in managerial ownership in banks with high franchise values discourages risk‐taking behavior. The results confirm the disciplinary role of franchise value on the risk‐taking behavior of banks. These results also fall in line with previous literature supporting the moral hazard hypothesis based on research into the economies of the USA and other countries.     

Asleep at the Wheel (Again)? Bank Audits During the Lead‐Up to the Financial Crisis

We present the first large‐sample empirical evidence on U.S. auditors' responses to changes in entity‐level audit risk during 2006–2007, the period leading up to the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Treating fiscal year 2005 engagements as a pre‐crisis benchmark, we find that audit attention during fiscal year 2006 and 2007 bank audit engagements shifted in line with the shifting audit risks. One implication of these findings is that auditors were able to recognize and respond to financial statement impacts of the macroeconomic shocks that unfolded during the lead‐up to the crisis. Another implication is that auditors' failure to issue advance warnings of increasing auditee riskiness during the time leading up to the financial crisis more likely reflects limitations of extant accounting and auditing rules rather than a lack of auditor awareness or attention to those risks.     

Risk Sensitivity of Bank Stocks in Malaysia: Empirical Evidence Across the Asian Financial Crisis

The present study examines the sensitivity of commercial banks' stock excess returns to their volatility and financial risk factors, measured by interest rates and exchange rates, across the recent Asian financial crisis. In general, we found that there were no significant differences among Malaysian commercial banks in their risk exposure prior to and during the Asian financial crisis. The introduction of selective capital controls, a fixed exchange rate regime and a forced banking consolidation program, however, had increased the risk exposure of both large and small domestic banks. The effects of these risk factors were significantly detected in both large and small banks.     

International banking and transmission of the 1931 financial crisis

In May to July 1931, a series of financial panics shook central Europe before spreading to the rest of the world. This article explores the role of cross‐border banking linkages in propagating the central European crisis to Britain and the US. Using archival bank‐level data, the article documents US and British banks’ exposure to central European frozen credits in 1931. Central European lending was mostly done by large and diversified commercial banks in the US and by small and geographically specialized merchant banks/acceptance houses in Britain. Differences in the organization of international bank lending explain why the central European crisis disturbed few US banks but endangered many British financial institutions.     

上市银行公司治理结构对高管薪酬影响研究

合理的薪酬方案能实现有效地激励上市银行高管,其薪酬方案由银行董事会制定,与上市银行治理结构息息相关。上市银行高管薪酬与国家股的比例、股权集中度、独立董事人数以及董事会、监事会会议成正比;而与法人股的比重成反比;至于监管代理机构的规模则基本没影响。上市银行公司治理结构中的一些约束与控制性因素需要进一步完善,从而促进银行业的健康发展。     

Bank risk and non-interest income activities in the Indonesian banking industry

The recent trend of product diversification in the Indonesian banking industry underscores the importance of non-interest income activities. This study examines the relationship between product diversification and bank risk over the period of 2002–2008. Our analysis shows clear evidence that the effect of product diversification on bank risk depends highly on the bank's asset size. Specifically, the degree of product diversification is negatively associated with bank risk for small-sized banks. Conversely, the degree of product diversification is positively related to bank risk for large-sized banks. This finding suggests that deregulation encouraging banks to become more involved in non-traditional activities may have an adverse effect on the overall banking system where large-sized banks are playing a significant role in Indonesia.     

我国商业银行操作风险的度量方法刍议

随着我国金融市场的全面开放,商业银行三大风险之中的操作风险越来越受到人们的重视。正确识别、度量操作风险,不仅是加强银行监管和内部管理的迫切需要,更是我国商业银行适应国际金融环境变化和风险管理趋势的必然选择。另外,面对频频发生的银行要案,我国商业银行在急需加强对操作风险度量模型研究的同时,有必要基于危机管理的角度对不可预知的操作风险采取相应的防范措施。     

Indonesia's banking crisis: a new perspective on $50 billion of losses

The Asian crisis devastated the Indonesian banking sector and led to astronomical losses, almost entirely paid for by the government, i.e. by the general public. The paper provides a new perspective on the crisis, stressing that bank losses are not the same as losses to the economy: most of the ‘losses’ of the banks are actually transfers to borrowers and depositors. It should be possible to recover part of the amounts concerned through taxation of the major beneficiaries. The paper contrasts the conventional approach, embedded in business accounting, used to manage the banking crisis, with an alternative approach that relies on national accounting concepts. It shows how the latter can provide a new perspective, elucidating the massive transfers of wealth that took place during the crisis. This suggests possible improvements in bank resolution strategies, through the identification and quantification of the main transfers of wealth, followed by their taxation.     

Why Do Banks Fail? Evidence from the 1920s

This paper examines the causes of rural bank failures during the 1920s using a newly created state-level data series. By focusing on rural banks we are able to investigate the impacts of agricultural distress and government policies on the class of banks accounting for 80% of the failures in the decade. Failure rates were highest where farm acreage and land values had increased the most before 1920 because these regions suffered the worst agricultural distress subsequently. Agricultural distress caused more bank failures in states with deposit insurance systems, suggesting that insurance encouraged banks to increase risk as their net worth declined.     

The Transmission of Monetary Policy in South Africa Before and After the Global Financial Crisis

This paper examines whether the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in South Africa has changed after the global financial crisis (GFC). We use a Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR) model with Minnesota priors and 15 monthly variables, extending the system of Christiano, Eichenbaum, with Evans (1999). The benefit of the BVAR approach is that it can accommodate a large cross section of variables without running out of degrees of freedom. To identify the change in the transmission process, we divide the sample size into two subsamples, namely the pre‐GFC period (March 2001 to August 2008) and the post‐GFC period (September 2008 to February 2016). The results indicate that a change in the transmission of monetary policy occurred after the GFC. The magnitude of the effect of a monetary policy shock on output is considerably greater in the pre‐GFC period compared to the post‐GFC period. Moreover, the impact of a policy shock on inflation is not statistically significant in the post‐GFC period. The variance decomposition shows that the interest‐rate channel has possibly weakened in the post‐GFC period.     

LIQUIDITY CREATION IN SOUTH AFRICAN BANKS UNDER STRESSED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

The financial crisis placed severe pressure on global bank liquidity. Many banks were unable to create sufficient liquidity and had to receive government support or face default. This paper attempts to determine the impact of the financial crisis on liquidity creation within South African banks using a model previously applied to US banks. Four measures of liquidity creation are discussed and applied to data spanning 2004‐2009. Although created, liquidity decreases steeply from 2007, liquidity levels in 2009 remain about 45% higher than those of 2004. The four large South African banks created about 80% of the total market liquidity. The authors are aware that the liquidity measures discussed in this paper may not accurately reflect the manner in which South African banks created liquidity before and during the financial crisis as the period under review was characterised by various other factors. These factors include the concurrent rise in securitisation, considerable changes in the South African Reserve Bank's (SARB) stance on monetary policy, historic low‐interest rates during the period and severe curtailing of local inter‐bank dealing. It remains possible that these factors may have had an impact on the way in which South African banks created and disseminated liquidity. This possibility will be the subject of future research.     

Flight‐to‐safety and the credit crunch: a new history of the banking crises in France during the Great Depression†

Despite France's importance in the interwar world economy, the scale of the French banking crises of 1930–1 and their consequences have never been fully assessed quantitatively. The lack of banking regulation severely limited the availability of balance sheet data. Using a new dataset of individual balance sheets from more than 300 banks, this article shows that the crises were much more severe than previously thought, although they did not affect the main commercial banks. By reconstructing financial flows, this study shows that the fall in bank credit was mostly driven by a flight‐to‐safety by deposits, from banks to savings institutions and the central bank. The decrease in bank deposits due to bank runs was offset by an increase in deposits with savings institutions, with the central bank, and in cash hoarding, whereas the decrease in bank credit was not offset by an increase in loans from non‐bank financial institutions. In line with the gold standard mentality, cash deposited with savings institutions and the central bank was used to decrease marketable public debt and increase gold reserves, rather than pursuing countercyclical policies. Despite massive capital inflows and rising aggregate money supply, France suffered from a severe, persistent credit crunch.     

How the German crisis of 1931 swept across Europe: a comparative view from Stockholm†

According to conventional wisdom, the fall of the Swedish currency in September 1931 was caused by the sterling crisis. This article shows that the road towards devaluation began earlier and that financial linkages with Germany proved to be more important than Sweden's economic and monetary relations with Great Britain. It all started in late 1929 when the Swedish financier Ivar Kreuger gave a loan to the German government in exchange for the match monopoly, thus tying his business ventures to Germany's solvency. In addition, a part of this loan was financed by large US dollar credits from the two largest Swedish banks that, in turn, accumulated a sizeable foreign short‐term deficit. When in June 1931 the German fiscal crisis began to escalate, international investors ceased to consider Sweden a safe haven because they knew about the linkages between the German government, Kreuger, and the Swedish banking system. This downgrading, in combination with the foreign short‐term deficit of the banking sector, proved lethal for the reserve position of the Swedish central bank, once the international liquidity crisis in mid‐July 1931 erupted. The sterling crisis only put the final nail in the coffin.     

银行业在中小企业融资服务领域的经验及启示——以成都市为例

本文立足银行信贷视角,结合全球金融危机以及成都市西部金融中心建设背景,分析成都市中小企业面临的金融环境;然后总结成都市银行业在中小企业融资服务领域的经验;最后,本文从政策性银行作用的发挥、信贷风险控制、金融机构市场定位、银行业发展战略等四方面提出了启示。     

Competitive Conditions in the Tanzanian Commercial Banking Industry

Abstract: Since 1991, Tanzania has made important improvements in reforming its financial sector, dismantling the state‐dominated banking sector and allowing foreign bank entry. Despite this, the banking industry is still concentrated with low accessibility to financial services. Large foreign banks dominate the financial landscape, preventing competitive dynamism to permeate the sector. This paper analyses the competitive nature of the Tanzanian banking industry from 2004 to 2008. Utilizing a rich bank level data set, we employ the Panzar–Rosse methodology to compute the competitive index, taking into account risk, efficiency, regulatory and macroeconomic factors. The results show that banks in Tanzania earned their income under conditions of oligopolistic conduct. Moreover, the competitive index derived from an interest revenue equation was not significantly different from that obtained using an aggregate revenue measure. This suggests that the degree of contestability from traditional intermediation activities approximates overall bank behaviour. The overall message is that greater market contestability can be achieved by adopting measures aimed at stimulating competitiveness in the banking sector, including consolidating gains on the macroeconomic front and allowing more foreign bank entry so as to increase the spread of banking services.