North–South technology transfer in unionised multinationals

We study how incentives for North–South technology transfers in multinational enterprises are affected by labour market institutions. If workers are collectively organised, incentives for technology transfers are partly governed by firms' desire to curb trade union power. Higher union bargaining power in the North leads to more technology transfer along two different dimensions – skill upgrading of Southern workers and quality upgrading of products produced in the South – possibly to the extent that the utility of Northern workers decline. Policies to raise the wage levels of Southern workers might spur technology transfer if wages are initially very low, but have a dampening effect on North–South technology transfer once the Southern wage level has surpassed a certain threshold level. These conclusions are reached in a setting where a unionised multinational multiproduct firm produces vertically differentiated products in Northern and Southern subsidiaries.     

Geopolitics and international organizations: An empirical study on IMF facilities

There is growing awareness that the distribution of IMF facilities may not be influenced only by the economic needs of borrowers. This paper focuses on the fact that the IMF may favour geopolitically important countries in the distribution of IMF loans, differentiating between concessional and non-concessional facilities. To carry out the empirical analysis, we construct a new database that compiles a wide array of proxies for geopolitical importance for 107 IMF countries over 1990–2003, focusing on emerging and developing economies. We use a factor analysis to capture the common underlying characteristic of countries' geopolitical importance as well as a potential analysis since we also want to account for the geographical situation of the loan recipients. While controlling for economic and political determinants, our results show that geopolitical factors influence notably lending decisions when loans are non-concessional, whereas results are less robust and in opposite direction for concessional loans. This study provides empirical support to the view that geopolitical considerations are an important factor in shaping IMF lending decisions, potentially affecting the institution's effectiveness and credibility.     

CORRUPTION AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT: A PANEL GRAVITY MODEL APPROACH

This paper investigates the relationship between corruption and foreign direct investment (FDI) in the case of 15 transition countries by using a panel gravity model approach and suggests that corruption does not deter FDI.     

A SEARCH FOR CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN EAST ASIA

In recent years, growing interdependence in East Asia through trade and financial cooperation heightened the need for East Asian Economies to engage in closer regional economic relations. This paper attempts to discuss emerging economic integration efforts in East Asia with special reference to bilateral and regional free trade agreements. It discusses backgrounds for recent developments of East Asian regionalism in terms of deepening intraregional economic dependence and financial cooperation, and South Korea's position towards FTAs with major trading partners as well as East Asian economic integration. Important issues and challenges for an East Asian FTA are presented.     

The tyranny of international index rankings

International index rankings are popular, but perhaps too persuasive. They emphasize country differences where similarity is the dominant feature. Rankings based on Doing Business, the Human Development Index and Freedom House can be misleading, not because of wrong indicators, but because the estimation of the scores ignores inherent uncertainty. Re-estimated with a method that captures this uncertainty, it becomes clear that ranking every adjacent country is a rather courageous activity.     

A policy response to a downside of the integration of economies: An impossibility theorem

Recent research shows that the merger of economies increases aggregate stress. This paper shows that there is no income distribution policy which will ensure that the wellbeing of the individuals belonging to merging economies does not fall below their pre-merger level.     

Integration, social distress, and policy formation

I study the integration of regions in the form of a merger of populations, which I interpret as a revision of people’s social space and their comparison set; I illustrate the way in which a merger can aggravate social distress; and I consider policy responses. Specifically, I view the merger of populations as a merger of income vectors; I measure social distress by aggregate relative deprivation; I demonstrate that a merger increases aggregate relative deprivation; and I show that a social planner is able to reverse this increase by means of least-cost, post-merger increases in individual incomes, but is unable to counter it by relying exclusively on a self-contained income redistribution that retains individual levels of wellbeing at their pre-merger levels.     

ROLE OF RELATIVE AND ABSOLUTE PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS IN INTERGROUP COMPETITION

We investigate the moral hazard problem in which a principal delegates multiple tasks to multiple workers. The principal imperfectly monitors their action choices by observing the public signals that are correlated with each other through a macro shock. He divides the workers into two groups and makes them compete with each other. We show that when the number of tasks is sufficiently large, relative performance evaluation between the groups accompanied by absolute performance evaluation results in eliminating unwanted equilibria. In this case, any approximate Nash equilibrium nearly induces the first‐best allocation.     

The Distributional Effects of International Fragmentation

Economic globalization causes an increasing international fragmentation (disintegration) of value‐added chains, whereby firms outsource components of production to foreign markets. There is a high level of concern about unwelcome distributional effects. This paper provides a theoretical treatment of this issue within a general Heckscher–Ohlin framework, allowing for an arbitrary number of goods, factors, and fragments. It shows how a fragmented production equilibrium is disturbed by lower costs of fragmentation, and it introduces the concept of effective prices of fragments to derive general results that characterize the distributional consequences of an increase in international fragmentation occurring simultaneously in several industries.     

Disability benefit microsimulation models in the Netherlands

Disability rates in the Netherlands used to be among the highest in the world. In 2002 the number of disability recipients approached one million. However, since then the number of disability cases has dropped remarkably due to a number of policy changes, the last of which being the new 2006 disability insurance scheme. On the other hand, in recent years the number of beneficiaries in the special scheme dedicated to the young handicapped has increased rapidly.     

Micro simulations on the effects of ageing-related policy measures

In the Netherlands, like in most OECD-countries, the ageing of the population endangers the sustainability of public finances. In this paper a dynamic micro simulation model is used for calculating the financial and economic implications of the ageing problem and the policy measures considered. The model uses micro datasets of all Dutch pensions and pension entitlements. The retirement decision is modelled by using an option value approach.     

Investment in the absence of property rights; the role of incumbency advantages

In many situations the individuals who can generate some output must enter a contest for appropriating this output. This paper analyses the investment incentives of such agents and the role of incumbency advantages in the contest. Depending on the advantages, an increase in the productivity of the investment can decrease or increase the amount of investment. The results are applied to autocrats’ investment behavior and job specific investment in organizations.