How Taxes and Welfare Benefits Affect Work Incentives: A Life‐Cycle Perspective

Personal taxes and benefits affect the incentive to work over the life cycle by altering income–age profiles, insuring against adverse shocks and changing the returns to human capital. In this paper, we show how a life‐cycle perspective alters our impression of how the UK tax and benefit system affects women's work incentives. Given that actual longitudinal data conflate age effects, cohort effects and policy effects, and, in the UK, are not available covering the full life cycle, we use simulated data produced by a rich, dynamic structural model of female labour supply and human capital that incorporates family formation and fertility. We find that individuals experience considerable variability in work incentives across life that outweighs the variability across individuals. Changes in the presence of children and a partner, as well as the level of any partner's earnings, are key to explaining these patterns: work incentives vary dramatically depending on family composition and the earnings of any partner, especially for the lower‐skilled, and most women experience a number of different family types during the course of their lives.     

Household Level Economic Incentives, Unemployment Trap and Job Finding Probability

This paper considers the sensitivity of the household's disposable income with respect to the labour market states and the labour market transitions of unemployed workers. The paper analyses the following questions: (i) which are the determinants of starting wages? (ii) how many unemployed are in the unemployment trap? (iii) how do household level economic incentives affect the conditional probability of finding a job? The empirical analysis is based on individual panel data covering the years 1987–1993 in Finland, when the unemployment rate rose from about 4% to 18%. We have estimated the starting wage equation to calculate the effects of hypothetical re-employment on the household's disposable income and to evaluate the frequency of the unemployment trap. To analyse factors affecting the transition out of unemployment to employment in open labour market, we estimate unemployment duration using a semi-parametric proportional risk model. The paper shows that the impact of the economic incentives, measured by the hypothetical change in household disposable income, on employment is more important in the recession than in the boom.     

Effects of Family Policy Reforms in Norway: Results from a Joint Labour Supply and Childcare Choice Microsimulation Analysis*

Mothers of pre‐school children represent one part of the population that might be able to increase its labour supply. We discuss the effects of family policy changes that encourage the labour supply of these mothers, such as childcare fee reductions and increased availability of centre‐based care. The effects of policy changes are described by using a joint labour supply and childcare choice decision model. Detailed empirical results are provided with respect to mothers' labour supply, families' childcare choices, public expenditures, and distributions of income and money metric utility.     

Welfare to Work,Wages and Wage Growth*

This paper attempts to uncover the effects of a UK welfare‐to‐work programme on individual wage growth by exploiting an expansion to this welfare programme. The conventional wisdom is that such programmes trap recipients into low‐wage, low‐quality work – this comes from the simple argument that the ‘poverty trap’, which a wage subsidy for low‐income workers induces, reduces the benefits to investments, such as on‐the‐job training, and so reduces wage growth. In fact, a wage subsidy will also reduce the costs of, at least, general training because we would normally expect workers to pay for their own general training in the form of lower gross wages. So a wage subsidy is a way of sharing these costs with the taxpayer. Thus, the net effect on wage progression depends on whether it reduces costs by more or less than it reduces the benefits.     

Facing the Age Wave and Economic Policy: Fixing Public Pension Systems with Healthcare in the Wings*

There are two overriding problems faced by ageing societies. One is the financing of public pension (social security in US terms) programmes. The other is paying for healthcare. This paper considers the healthcare issue briefly, emphasising that the issue arises primarily because of advances in medical technology. Better medical technology will improve healthcare in the future, but more advanced technologies also cost more. The focus of the rest of the paper is on the public pension problem. The emphasis is on the early retirement incentives inherent in the provisions of most public pension programmes around the world, the reduction in the labour force participation of older people caused by these incentives, and the large fiscal implication of the inducement of older people to leave the labour force. These results are based on the Gruber–Wise ongoing international social security comparison project.     

An analysis of changes to a team-based incentive plan and its effects on productivity,product quality,and absenteeism

Using data from three production units of a large manufacturing plant that employs production teams in its assembly operations, this paper examines how changes made to an existing team-based incentive plan affects labor productivity, product quality, and worker absenteeism. The firm switched from a piece-rates contract and an attendance bonus and instituted a two tier incentive plan comprising two different but complementary performance-based bonus schemes: one tier based on individual team performance and the other tier on plant-wide performance. The incentives were introduced concurrently with management control initiatives intended to facilitate cooperation and monitoring among the teams. I find significant productivity gains and improvements in quality and absenteeism associated with the new incentive plan. These findings underscore two important points that have not been emphasized in existing empirical studies of incentive pay: incentive contracts for teams generate superior performance using combination of incentives, and the need to introduce organizational changes to facilitate cooperation and peer monitoring in tandem with incentive pay to capture greater incentive effects in team production.     

Extensive and Intensive Margins of Labour Supply: Work and Working Hours in the US,the UK and France*

This paper provides a new analysis of the main stylised facts underlying the evolution of labour supply at the extensive and intensive margins in three countries: the United States, the United Kingdom and France. We propose a definition of the extensive and intensive margins corresponding respectively to the employment rate and to hours when employed. This definition is robust to the choice of the reference period and we develop a new statistical decomposition that provides bounds on changes at these margins. We focus on longer-run labour supply changes over the period 1977 to 2007 and abstract from the shorter-run impact of recessions. Examining secular changes over this period, we show that both margins matter in explaining changes in total hours. We then provide a detailed analysis across countries and across time by demographic type. Given the large systematic differences we uncover in the importance of these margins by age and gender, it is unlikely that a single explanation will suffice to account for the macroeconomic evolutions in the three countries.     

Do UK Higher Education Students Overestimate Their Starting Salary?*

The wage expectations of university students have relevance for human capital theory, models of student enrolment, and public policy on the provision of higher education. However, these expectations have been the subject of relatively little research in European countries, with no contemporary evidence available in the UK. There has also been little consideration in the literature thus far of how much estimates may be biased by non‐response and sample selection. This paper thus makes an original contribution to the literature by comparing UK undergraduate students' wage expectations with the actual wages earned by the same cohort on graduation, after attempting to correct for the aforementioned statistical issues in terms of observable characteristics. In contrast to other European studies, I conclude that, on average, full‐time students overestimate their starting salary. Yet I also find substantial variation in the extent of overestimation between different subgroups.     

Decomposition analysis of distributive policies using behavioural simulations

For policy makers and analysts, it is important to isolate the redistributive impact of tax-benefit reforms from changes in the environment in which policies operate. When actual reforms are motivated by work incentives, it is also crucial to evaluate behavioural responses and the distributional consequences thereof. For that purpose, I embed counterfactual simulations in a formal decomposition framework to quantify the relative roles of (i)?direct tax-benefit policy changes, (ii)?indirect policy effects due to labour supply responses to the reforms and (iii)?all other factors affecting income distribution over time. An application to the UK shows that the redistributive reforms of the 1998–2001 period have offset much of the rise in market income inequality and contributed to a strong decline in child poverty and poverty amongst single parent households. In the latter group, a third of the headcount poverty reduction (and half of the reduction in the depth of poverty) is on account of the very large incentive effect of the policy changes.     

Decomposing Inequality Changes: Allowing for Leisure in the Evaluation of Tax and Transfer Policy Effects

In this paper, we present two alternative methods of accounting for changes in leisure time in decomposing the inequality effects of tax and transfer policy changes. Three components are identified: tax policy, labour supply responses to tax policy changes and other population effects. The methods are used to decompose inequality changes in Australia between 2001 and 2006. Inequality is first defined in non‐welfarist terms as a function of disposable income: the independent judge places no value on leisure. Then, this is modified to allow for evaluations using a weighted geometric mean of disposable income and leisure. This is seen to modify the evaluation of changes in important ways. The results are found to differ from those obtained using a ‘welfarist’ evaluation in terms of money metric utility, where separate labour supply effects cannot be isolated.     

Optimal strike prices of stock options for effort-averse executives

This paper evaluates the common practice of setting the strike prices of executive option plans at-the-money. Hall and Murphy [Hall, Brian, Murphy, Kevin J., 2000. Optimal exercise prices for executive stock options. American Economic Review 90 (2), 209–214] claim this practice to be optimal since it maximizes the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance. However, they do not incorporate effort and the possibility that managers are effort-averse into their model. We revisit this question while explicitly introducing these factors and allowing the reward package to include fixed wages, options, and stock grants. We simulate the manager’s effort choice and compensation as well as the value of shareholders’ equity under alternative compensation schemes, and identify schemes that are optimal. Our simulations indicate that, when abstracting from tax considerations, it is optimal to award managers with options that will most likely be highly valuable (i.e., substantially in-the-money) on their expiration date. Prior to 2006, the tax code and financial reporting standards provided incentives to award options that are closer to the money when issued than the options that were optimal in the absence of these considerations. Recent tax and reporting changes voided these incentives and thus we predict that these changes will induce firms to issue options with lower strike prices than those that were issued prior to 2006.     

The savings multiplier

A theory of macroeconomic development based on the novel concept of savings multiplier is developed. Capital accumulation changes relative prices, amplifying incentives to save as the economy grows. The savings multiplier hinges on two mechanisms. First, accumulation raises wages and leads to redistribution from the consuming old to the saving young. Second, higher wages raise the price of old-age care and, in anticipation of this, the young save more. Our theory captures important aspects of China׳s development and suggests new channels through which the one child policy and the dismantling of social benefits have fueled China׳s savings rates.     

The Labour Market Impact of the Working Families' Tax Credit

In October 1999, the working families' tax credit (WFTC) replaced family credit as the main package of in‐work support for families with children. Among a range of stated aims, the WFTC is intended to‘… improve work incentives, encouraging people without work to move into employment'. In this paper, we consider the impact of WFTC on hours and participation. To simulate labour supply responses, we use a discrete behavioural model of household labour supply with controls for fixed and childcare costs, and unobserved heterogeneity. In simulation, we experiment with a number of scenarios regarding the take‐up of the credit, entry wage level and hourly childcare price. We find participation rates among single mothers to increase by around 2.2 percentage points for the base‐case scenario, while for married women participation rates are modelled to fall. Our simulation results indicate a small increase in overall participation of around 30,000 individuals.     

Disability Insurance: Theoretical Trade-Offs and Empirical Evidence*

Disability insurance provides protection against health shocks that limit the ability to work. In most countries, these programmes are large and growing, both in expenditure and in number of recipients. We discuss the traditional trade-off between insurance and incentives in providing this insurance, with a focus on the US and UK experiences. There is substantial evidence on the extent of the labour supply incentive costs of disability insurance, but there has been a lack of evidence on the insurance value until very recently. Further, evidence on errors in the disability insurance process suggests false rejections of genuine claimants is a substantial problem, and these are more serious than false acceptances of healthy applicants. We provide a life-cycle framework for understanding the trade-offs and to evaluate the welfare implications of policy reforms. We argue that reforms should be focused on reducing false rejections and supporting labour market attachment. The difficulty in considering reform is that the design of disability insurance has many aspects that interact and impact on outcomes.     

Comparing in‐work benefits and the reward to work for families with children in the US and the UK

The income transfer systems for low‐income families in the US and the UK try both to reduce poverty and to encourage work. In‐work benefits are a key part of both countries' strategies through the earned income tax credit and the working families' tax credit (and predecessors) respectively. But tax credits are only one part of the whole tax and welfare system. In‐work benefits, taxes and welfare benefits combine in both countries to provide good financial incentives for lone parents to do minimum‐wage work, but poorer incentives to increase earnings further. But direct comparisons of budget constraints hide important points of detail. First, not enough is known about what determines take‐up of in‐work benefits. Second, the considerable differences in assessment and payment mechanisms and frequency between EITC and WFTC mean that low‐income families in the US and the UK may respond very differently to apparently similar financial incentives.     

Employment Quota System and Labour Market Outcomes of Individuals with Disabilities: Empirical Evidence from South Korea

To date, only a few studies have attempted to evaluate the effectiveness of disability employment quota systems using structural changes in policies. This study exploits the structural changes in South Korea's disability employment quota system that took place in 2004 and 2006 to expand the current disability policy evaluation literature. We separate the effect of these changes in the quota system into their effect on the probability of labour force participation and their effect on the probability of employment (after controlling for selection into the labour market). We also study the extent to which the changes – which included increasing the number of employers covered by the quota system, the number of jobs available to individuals with disabilities and the financial incentives for employing individuals with disabilities – have affected job satisfaction among individuals with disabilities. Our results suggest that the changes in the quota system may have increased labour force participation but have had a limited positive impact on the probability of employment among people with disabilities in South Korea. Further, compulsory hiring and expanded opportunities have not substantially affected the level of job satisfaction observed among employees with disabilities relative to their non‐disabled counterparts.     

Measuring Selection Incentives in Managed Care: Evidence From the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance Program

Capitation gives insurers incentive to manipulate their offerings to attract the healthy and deter the sick. We calculate the incentives for such service-specific quality distortions using managed care medical and pharmacy spending data for fiscal years 2001 and 2002 from the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance Program. Services most vulnerable to stinting are cardiac care, diabetes care, and mental health and substance abuse services. Empirically, the financial temptation to distort service quality increases nonlinearly with supply-side cost sharing. Our empirical results highlight how selection incentives work at cross-purposes with efforts to reward excellent chronic disease management. Initiatives coupling pay-for-performance with risk adjustment and mixed payment hold promise for aligning incentives with quality improvement.     

Removing Homeownership Bias in Taxation: The Distributional Effects of Including Net Imputed Rent in Taxable Income

The income tax systems of most countries entail a favourable treatment of homeownership, compared to rental‐occupied housing. Such ‘homeownership bias’ and its consequences for a wide range of economic outcomes have long been recognised in the economic literature. Although a removal of the homeownership bias is generally advocated on efficiency grounds, its distributional implications are often neglected, especially in a cross‐country perspective. In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by investigating the first‐order effects, in terms of distribution of income and work incentives, of removing the income tax provisions favouring homeownership. We consider six European countries – Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK – that exhibit important variation in terms of income tax treatment of homeowners. Using the multi‐country tax benefit model EUROMOD, we analyse the distributional consequences of including net imputed rent in the taxable income definition that applies in each country, together with the removal of existing special tax treatments of incomes or expenses related to the main residence; thus, we provide a measure of the homeownership bias. We implement three tax policy scenarios. In the first, imputed rent is included in the taxable income of homeowners, while at the same time existing mortgage interest tax relief schemes and taxation of cadastral incomes are abolished. In the two further revenue‐neutral scenarios, the additional tax revenue raised through the taxation of imputed rent is redistributed to taxpayers, through either a tax rate reduction or a tax exemption increase. The results show how including net imputed rent in the tax base might affect inequality in each of the countries considered. Housing taxation appears to be a promising avenue for raising additional revenues, or lightening taxation of labour, with no inequality‐increasing side effects.     

Unemployment and workers' compensation programmes: rationale,design, labour supply and income support

I examine the unemployment insurance (UI) and workers' compensation (WC) insurance programmes, concentrating on labour supply, insurance and income redistribution. UI and WC increase the time employees spend out of work. Elasticities of lost work time that incorporate both the incidence and duration of claims are centred at 1.0 for UI and between 0.5 and 1.0 for WC. These elasticities are larger than elasticities typically found in studies of wage effects on hours worked by men, probably because UI and WC lead to short‐run variation in wages with mostly a substitution effect and the programmes alter the participation margin. Some good evidence suggests that UI smooths the consumption of the unemployed and more clearly indicates that UI progressively redistributes resources. There is substantial evidence that injured workers suffer material hardships even with WC programmes, but research has not provided an overall picture of the insurance and redistributive aspects of WC.