Mixed oligopoly, optimal privatization, and foreign penetration

This paper examines the impact of foreign penetration on privatization in a mixed oligopolistic market. In contrast to the simple framework of single domestic market with foreign entry by entry mode of foreign direct investment (FDI) or exports, our result shows that government should increase the degree of privatization along with increasing proportion of domestic ownership of multinational firms. Furthermore, we show that an increase in domestic ownership of multinational firms raises all domestic private firms' profit and social welfare, while it may either increase or decrease public firm's profit. With the aid of numerical example, intensive competition from private firms in general will enhance the degree of privatization gradually; in particular, the degree of privatization is lower in the presence of multinational firms.     

NATIONALIZATION OR PRIVATIZATION? THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE MAINSTREAM

The 2008 global crisis brought about curiously inconsistent changes in state ownership: asset sales by governments and purchases of private stocks increased sharply and simultaneously. These concurrent instances of nationalization and privatization, on a major scale in historical terms, deserve attention. The paper examines why both now seem appropriate tools for crisis management in Europe and in the USA. It also estimates the scale of changes after 2008. The author argues that the rapid alternation, including parallel applications and mixed, ‘silent’ forms of nationalization and privatization, reflects ambiguity in political, theoretical and popular views. The uncertainty far exceeds ownership issues to include the role of the state in general, revealing fragmentation of measures in each direction: neither nationalization nor privatization has been based on any integrated, defined paradigm of economic policy.     

MARKET‐DEMAND BOOSTING AND PRIVATIZATION IN A MIXED DUOPOLY

This study incorporates demand‐boosting strategies into a mixed duopoly model in order to consider the endogenous determination of market demand. The results indicate equilibrium characteristics that differ from those found under an exogenous demand setting. As consumers become more sensitive to the demand‐boosting strategies of firms, the government must choose a lower level of privatization. This suggests that the responsiveness of consumer demand to the demand‐boosting strategies of firms constitutes a limiting factor for privatization.     

Public procurement in times of crisis: The bundling decision reconsidered

The government wants two tasks to be performed. In each task, unobservable effort can be exerted by a wealth-constrained private contractor. If the government faces no binding budget constraints, it is optimal to bundle the tasks. The contractor in charge of both tasks then gets a bonus payment if and only if both tasks are successful. Yet, if the government has only a limited budget, it may be optimal to separate the tasks, so that there are two contractors each in charge of one task. In this case, high efforts in both tasks can be implemented with smaller bonus payments.     

Policy competition for foreign direct investment between asymmetric countries

The present paper analyses policy competition for foreign direct investment between countries of different size and different market structure. We demonstrate how policy competition affects the location decision of the foreign investor and derive welfare implications. The key variables in our analysis are intra-regional trade costs, differences in market size, and minimum wages.     

MIXED OWNERSHIP,MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND BANK COMPETITION

We consider deposit competition between two banks, where prior to competition one bank is subjected to a nationalization decision and the other bank chooses managerial incentives. The government who maximizes a modified form of social welfare (with greater weight on profit than depositor surplus) chooses only partial nationalization, which still hurts the rival private bank. But by offering deposit‐linked managerial incentives the private bank recovers its lost profit and induces even less nationalization, leaving social welfare unchanged. However, under interest rate competition for differentiated deposits the private bank offers profit‐linked managerial incentives while the other bank may be completely nationalized.     

A constitutional theory of public enterprise

This article rationalizes public enterprise by analyzing the constitutional choice between private and public ownership of production arrangements. Arguing that results depend on who does the choosing, the article compares choices by self-governing citizens with choices by self-directed governmental officials. The resulting institutional theory identifies four conditions that cause citizens to favor public over private ownership. None of the conditions refers to the standard concept of economic efficiency, which guides most economic comparisons of public and private enterprise.     

Privatisation of utilities and the asset value problem

Privatised utilities are typically characterised by both undervaluation and underpricing. When faced with this problem, regulators have tended to employ a market-value approach to determine the regulatory asset base. This paper analyses this approach and shows that it magnifies the impact of any ‘short-lived’ error at privatisation and has the effect of entrenching relative errors forever. We then address the question whether there is an alternative mechanism that can accommodate the undervaluation problem but does not fall foul of the difficulties inherent in the market-value approach. The alternative we suggest is to use the regulatory agency's own estimate of the company's value, which we call the model-based asset value. It is shown that errors made at the time of privatisation do not have the same impact on future prices, and hence far less effect on the potential sale price.     

Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.     

Price Regulation in Australia: How Consistent Has It Been?

We assemble a database consisting of 52 regulatory decisions made by seven different regulators across five different industries. We examine how the proportion of firms' revenue requirements that were disallowed by the regulator vary by regulator, industry and time. Despite the differences in the implementation of price regulation across industries and across jurisdictions in Australia, outcomes are surprisingly consistent. For example, we show that it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that the regulatory outcomes in South Australia, New South Wales, the Australian Capital Territory and Victoria are similar despite the different regulatory approaches undertaken in these jurisdictions.     

A note on tests of sphericity and cross-sectional dependence for fixed effects panel model

This paper theoretically explains why bias correction appears in two statistics recently developed by Baltagi et al. (2011, 2012), which are designed to test the sphericity and cross-sectional dependence of the errors in the fixed effects panel model respectively. Our explanation shows that the bias correction is in fact avoidable, which is demonstrated by two corresponding statistics that are newly constructed in this paper. Simulation suggests that our statistics perform as well as the two in Baltagi et al. (2011, 2012). In addition, according to the theories underlying our explanation, we extend a new sphericity test proposed by Fisher et al. (2010) to the fixed effects model. Simulation finds that the test behaves well only if both the cross-sectional and the time series dimension are large.     

A simple panel stationarity test in the presence of serial correlation and a common factor

This paper develops a simple test à la Pesaran (2007) for the null hypothesis of stationarity in heterogeneous panel data with cross-sectional dependence in the form of a common factor in the disturbance. We also allow for serial correlation.     

Privatization, strategic foreign direct investment and host-country welfare

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between privatization and greenfield FDI. Privatization increases the incentive for FDI, which, in turn, increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry.     

THE SOURCES OF AGGREGATE PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH: US MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1958–1996

The sources of aggregate productivity growth are explored using detailed data for four‐digit US manufacturing industries during 1958–96 and a decomposition formula that allows us to quantify the contribution of structural change. Labour productivity as well as total factor productivity are considered with either value‐added or employment shares serving as aggregation weights. It is shown that structural change generally works in favour of industries with increasing productivity. This effect is particularly strong in the years since 1990, in high‐tech industries and in durable goods producing industries. The impact of the computer revolution can be clearly identified.     

Does privatization improve the environment? Revisiting the monopoly case

This note shows that the argument of Beladi and Chao (2006) [Beladi, H., Chao, C., 2006. Does privatization improve the environment? Economics Letters 93, 343-347] that privatization can harm the environment by inducing lower pollution tax is incorrect. It then modifies the model to restore their claim.     

AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION

We provide a simple theoretical model to explain the mechanism whereby the privatization of international airports can improve welfare. The model consists of a downstream (airline) duopoly with two inputs (landings at two airports) and two types of consumers. The airline companies compete internationally. We show that the outcome in which both airports are privatized is always an equilibrium, whereas that in which no airport is privatized is an equilibrium only if the degree of product differentiation is large. We also discuss airport congestion problems within the model framework.