公开竞标的贷款定价方式对P2P借贷平台的优化作用

P2P借贷是一种金融创新模式,将互联网技术与民间借贷相结合。互联网信贷的巨大需求推动P2P借贷平台的爆发式发展,而P2P借贷发展核心的两个问题是信用评级和风险定价。由于我国未完全实现利率市场化,P2P平台采用的是量化借款人信息的方式计算贷款利率。信息不对称导致P2P平台的贷款利率不能充分反映借款人风险,同时造成信誉良好的借款人不能获得低成本的贷款。文章利用拍卖机制模型对公开竞标的贷款定价方式进行探究,认为公开竞标方式可以改善信息披露,降低借款人的成本,借款人和投资人在公开竞标的贷款定价方式下都可以获得灵活的选择空间,从而提高借贷成功的比例。     

Rating manipulation and creditworthiness for platform economy: Evidence from peer-to-peer lending

Credit rating provides essential information on a project's credit risk to both lenders and borrowers. On exploring over five million lending listings from a leading peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform, a mismatch phenomenon was observed between credit rating and default probability of P2P listings across different credit rating groups, despite controlling for common credit-related characteristics. Further looking into the misevaluation of credit risk, it was found that this phenomenon was more pronounced when an unexpected intervention was likely to be applied in rating projects, such as listings with high credit ratings, large loan amounts, and less personal information. The study results question the credibility of related research that uses internal credit ratings, because this variable is likely to be manipulated by the platform.     

The inefficiency of refinancing: Why prepayment penalties are good for risky borrowers

This paper provides a theoretical analysis of the efficiency of prepayment penalties in a dynamic competitive lending model with risky borrowers and costly default. When considering improvements in the borrower's creditworthiness as one of the reasons for refinancing mortgages, we show that refinancing penalties can be welfare improving and that they can be particularly beneficial to riskier borrowers in the form of lower mortgage rates, reduced defaults, and increased availability of credit. Thus, a high concentration of prepayment penalties among the riskiest borrowers can be an outcome of efficient equilibrium in a mortgage market. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the key predictions of our model.     

Capital Requirements,Monetary Policy,and Aggregate Bank Lending: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Capital requirements linked solely to credit risk are shown to increase equilibrium credit rationing and lower aggregate lending. The model predicts that the bank's decision to lend will cause an abnormal runup in the borrower's stock price and that this reaction will be greater the more capital-constrained the bank. I provide empirical support for this prediction. The model explains the recent inability of the Federal Reserve to stimulate bank lending by increasing the money supply. I show that increasing the money supply can either raise or lower lending when capital requirements are linked only to credit risk.     

Credit rationing in P2P lending to SMEs: Do lender-borrower relationships matter?

This paper studies the role of individual P2P investors that are acquainted with the borrower in mitigating credit rationing in P2P lending to SMEs. I use proprietary data provided by one of the biggest Dutch P2P lending platforms, on which personal acquaintances of the borrower are able to invest before other P2P investors do. I find that P2P investors invest more in loans of borrowers to whom they are personally acquainted. More initial investment by investors acquainted with the borrower is subsequently associated with a higher likelihood of obtaining a second loan from the P2P lender, larger investments by other P2P investors and lower ex post defaults. These results are consistent with informal lenders having superior information or monitoring skills and rational herding following informal investors' investment decisions.     

The Debt-Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure

We investigate how both the ownership structure and explicit contractual structure of syndicated loan deals are shaped by the debt‐contracting value (DCV) of borrowers' accounting information. DCV captures the inherent ability of firms' accounting numbers to capture credit quality deterioration in a timely fashion. We hypothesize and document that when a borrower's accounting information possesses higher DCV, information asymmetry between the lead arranger and other syndicate participants is lower, allowing lead arrangers to hold a smaller proportion of new loan deals. Further, we document that the influence of DCV on the proportion of the loan retained is conditional on the lead arranger's reputation, the existence of a credit rating, and the lead arranger's previous relationships with the same borrower. Finally, we find that when loans include performance pricing provisions, the likelihood that the single performance measure used is an accounting ratio, rather than a credit rating, is increasing in DCV.     

Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.     

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.     

论加强P2P网络借贷平台的监管

P2P网络借贷,即在网上实现借贷,借入者和借出者均可利用这个网络平台实现借贷的在线交易,一切认证、记账、清算和交割等流程均通过网络完成,满足了人们对资本便利快捷的需求.本文阐述了P2P网络借贷的基本概念、发展情况和积极意义,分析了其业务流程可能引发的风险,认为应将网络借贷纳入监管体系,制定监管原则、模式、内容以及安全与技术指标,引导其健康发展.     

Bank Branch Presence and Access to Credit in Low‐ to Moderate‐Income Neighborhoods

Banks specialize in lending to informationally opaque borrowers by collecting soft information about them. Some researchers claim that this process requires a physical presence in the market to lower information collection costs. This paper provides evidence in support of this argument in the mortgage market for low‐income borrowers whose access to credit is limited by their inadequate credit histories. Mortgage originations increase and interest spreads decline when there is a bank branch located in a low‐ to moderate‐income neighborhood.     

The mechanism of credit risk contagion among internet P2P lending platforms based on a SEIR model with time-lag

The credit risk contagion of Internet peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platforms is an important part of Internet financial risk management and supervision. This study analyzes the contagion path of credit risk in Internet P2P lending. Based on complex network theory and the theory of infectious disease dynamics, the characteristics of Internet P2P lending development are combined to construct a SEIR model of credit risk transmission among Internet P2P lending platforms with time lag, and the robustness of the model is analyzed and proven. The influence of platform correlations, the susceptible immune rate, the platform elimination rate, contagion latency, the saturation coefficient, and the susceptibility input rate on credit risk contagion behavior among Internet P2P lending platforms is analyzed, using the equilibrium point and threshold value. The impact of each variable is analyzed by simulation. Corresponding countermeasures and suggestions are proposed to prevent and control credit risk contagion among these platforms.     

Lending Booms and Lending Standards

We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.     

我国P2P网络借贷信用风险影响因素研究——基于排序选择模型的实证分析

P2P(peer-to-peer)网络借贷是一种借助网络平台,由个人与个人间互为借贷双方的小额借贷交易。它作为互联网与民间借贷相结合的新兴金融模式,具有较高的信用风险。采用排序选择模型,基于 ex-celVBA 数据挖掘技术截取多个 P2P 网站数据,对平台信用风险的影响因素进行实证分析,结果表明：个人特征、信用变量、历史表现、借款信息分别对网络借贷信用风险存在正向影响,由此发现网站提供的信息对投资者避免信用风险没有起到实质作用。     

The Impact of House Prices on Consumer Credit: Evidence from an Internet Bank

This paper shows that house price fluctuations can have a significant impact on credit availability. Data from Prosper.com, a peer‐to‐peer lending site that matches borrowers and lenders to provide unsecured consumer loans, indicate that homeowners in states with declining house prices experience higher interest rates, greater credit rationing, and faster delinquency. We find especially large effects for subprime borrowers whose balance sheets are likely most exposed to asset price declines. This evidence suggests that asset price fluctuations can play an important role in determining credit conditions and are thus a potentially significant mechanism for propagating macroeconomic shocks.     

Information Sharing in Credit Markets

We present a model with adverse selection where information sharing between lenders arises endogenously. Lenders' incentives to share information about borrowers are positively related to the mobility and heterogeneity of borrowers, to the size of the credit market, and to advances in information technology; such incentives are instead reduced by the fear of competition from potential entrants. In addition, information sharing increases the volume of lending when adverse selection is so severe that safe borrowers drop out of the market. These predictions are supported by international and historical evidence in the context of the consumer credit market.     

The impact of credit scoring on consumer lending

We study the adoption of automated credit scoring at a large auto finance company and the changes it enabled in lending practices. Credit scoring appears to have increased profits by roughly a thousand dollars per loan. We identify two distinct benefits of risk classification: the ability to screen high‐risk borrowers and the ability to target more generous loans to lower‐risk borrowers. We show that these had effects of similar magnitude. We also document that credit scoring compressed profitability across dealerships, and provide evidence consistent with the view that credit scoring may have substituted for varying qualities of local information.     

Beyond the Transaction: Banks and Mortgage Default of Low‐Income Homebuyers

We evaluate the effects of the lending institution and soft information on mortgage loan performance for low‐income homebuyers. We find that even after controlling for the propensity of a borrower to get a loan from a local bank based on observable characteristics, those who receive a loan from a local bank branch are significantly less likely to become delinquent or default than other bank or nonbank borrowers, consistent with an unobserved information effect. These effects are most pronounced for loans originated to borrowers with marginal credit, where soft information may have a stronger effect. These findings support previous research on information‐driven lending, and provide additional explanation for observed differences in mortgage loan performance between bank and nonbank lenders.     

Do Declines in Bank Health Affect Borrowers’ Voluntary Disclosures? Evidence from International Propagation of Banking Shocks

I examine whether declines in banks’ financial health affect their borrowers’ disclosures. Prior studies indicate that, in relationship lending, banks and borrowers rely on private communication, rather than public disclosures, to resolve information asymmetries. When banking relationships are threatened, borrowers must turn to new funding sources, inducing them to reconsider their disclosure policies. This paper predicts that borrowers, whose banking relationships are threatened by declining bank health, change their public disclosures of forward‐looking information. Using the emerging‐market financial crises in the late 1990s as shocks to the health of certain U.S. banks, I find that affected banks’ U.S. borrowers increase both the quantity and informativeness of their management forecasts following these shocks compared to borrowers of unaffected banks. The results are similar using conference calls or the length of the Management's Discussion and Analysis section as alternative proxies for voluntary disclosure. Overall, these results provide new insights into the impact of availability of relationship lending on firms’ disclosure choices.     

Rare event risk and emerging market debt with heterogeneous beliefs

In a setting where the lender and the borrower have heterogeneous beliefs about the likelihood of a disastrous shock to the borrower's economy, we study the debt contract that defaults at the occurrence of that shock, as proposed by Barro (2006). We find that a higher belief by the lender compared to the borrower can lead to countercyclical interest rates and credit spreads in non-default times, and to an increase in the borrower's indebtedness in default times, as often observed in emerging market economies. When calibrating the model to prices in the credit default swap market, we show that heterogeneous beliefs can account for more than 40% of the variation in CDS spreads associated with shocks to the borrower's economy in non-default times.     

The cost of private debt over the credit cycle

We identify global and regional fluctuations in international private debt flows to emerging and developing countries using data on cross-border loans and international bond issuance over 1993–2009. We use micro-level data on syndicated cross-border loans and international bond placements to estimate the effects of individual borrower characteristics as well as macroeconomic conditions on the cost of foreign borrowing and test whether these effects differ across phases of the lending cycle. First, we find that borrower characteristics associated with lower loan spreads are not necessarily associated with lower bond spreads. Second, we find differential effects of borrower characteristics between cycle phases for loans and bonds separately. Third, we find strong reductions in the cost of debt finance during periods when international debt flows are more than one standard deviation above their mean, but not for expansionary periods, when the growth rate of debt flows is increasing. We also find that higher trade ratios in the borrower's home country raise loan spreads more in periods of high credit flows but have no effect on bond spreads. At the same time, borrowers residing in countries with high investment ratios pay lower spreads on bond issuance particularly during periods of high credit flows, but we find no similar effect for loan spreads. Inflation rates, real exchange rates and previous banking crises have small impacts on loan and bond spreads.