The Three Hurdles of Tax Planning: How Business Context,Aims of Tax Planning,and Tax Manager Power Affect Tax Expense

The question of why some companies pay fewer taxes than others is a widely investigated topic of interest. One of the well‐known explanations is a phenomenon called tax avoidance. We develop a grounded theory model of influences on corporate tax planning through a series of 19 in‐depth German tax expert interviews. Our research identifies three independent hurdles in the tax planning process, which can help to explain different levels of tax expense across companies. Those three hurdles sequentially address which tax planning methods are available (defined by business characteristics), desirable (given via aims of tax planning), and implementable (determined by tax manager power). A large part of previous research has estimated the influence of firm characteristics, which we incorporate in the broader term business characteristics, on tax expense, while the other influences that we identify have largely been left “out of the equation.” In the light of the current public debates on tax avoidance, we reveal two important findings: First, we find that companies vary widely in the aggressiveness of their aims of tax planning, which contrasts sharply with the picture often drawn by undifferentiated media reports. Second, tax managers can assume very different levels of power in their organization. The implementation of desirable tax planning methods varies depending on this level of tax manager power. In conclusion, our three‐hurdle grounded theory provides generalizable insights into important influences on corporate tax planning which help to explain the observed variation in tax expenses across firms.     

Corporate In‐house Tax Departments*

In‐house human capital tax investment is a significant input to a firm's tax decisions. Yet, due to the lack of data on corporate in‐house tax departments, there is little empirical evidence on how tax departments are associated with tax planning and compliance outcomes. We expect the size of tax departments to be positively associated with the effectiveness of tax planning and compliance. Using hand‐collected data on the number of corporate tax employees in S&P 1500 firms over the 2009–2014 period, we find that firms with larger tax departments are associated with lower and less volatile cash effective tax rates. Furthermore, using tax employees' specialization, we identify tax departments' relative focus on planning or compliance and document a trade‐off between tax avoidance and tax risk. Specifically, tax departments with more of a tax planning focus have incrementally greater tax avoidance but higher tax risk, whereas tax departments with more of a tax compliance focus have incrementally lower tax risk but higher tax rates. Overall, this paper contributes to the literature by looking inside the “black box” of corporate tax departments and shedding light on the importance of human capital tax investment for tax outcomes.     

Is Tax Avoidance Associated with Economically Significant Rent Extraction among U.S. Firms?

Two influential papers in the tax‐avoidance literature (Desai and Dharmapala 2006 ; Desai, Dyck, and Zingales 2007 ) argue that aggressive forms of tax avoidance employ technologies that complement managerial rent extraction, and provide supporting evidence from firms in Russia. Several papers rely on this theory to motivate and interpret tests in a U.S. setting, but these tests are open to multiple interpretations. This paper investigates the extent to which shareholders of U.S. companies are affected by any such rent extraction. The evidence is inconsistent with the tax‐avoidance technologies employed by U.S. firms allowing managers to extract sufficient rents to negatively affect future performance. Additional tests on poorly governed U.S. firms find no evidence that tax‐avoidance activities relate positively to either overinvestment or higher executive compensation, and no evidence that either complexity or the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act moderates the relation between future performance and tax avoidance. The evidence suggests that caution is warranted in interpreting evidence according to this theory in a U.S. setting.     

Tax Avoidance and the Implications of Weak Internal Controls

I examine whether corporate tax avoidance is associated with internal control weaknesses (ICWs) disclosed under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX). ICWs disclosed under SOX are frequently related to a firm's tax function. When pervasive ICWs exist, the likelihood increases that these frequent tax‐related ICWs spill over from financial reporting issues to tax avoidance objectives. Thus, my research helps corporate stakeholders understand the implications of internal controls beyond simply financial reporting objectives. Results indicate that, on average, firms with a tax‐related ICW have a 4 percent higher three‐year cash effective tax rate relative to firms without any such weaknesses. Further estimates reveal that this negative relation stems from pervasive, company‐level tax ICWs. Analysis of remediation suggests a causal link. I find that after remediating tax‐related ICWs, firms report higher levels of tax avoidance in the future. Broadly, these findings support that internal control quality represents a proxy for internal governance, and thus the strength of alignment between managers and shareholders. Furthermore, tax‐related internal controls represent an important underlying determinant of tax avoidance with significant cash flow effects, and implications beyond financial reporting.     

Corporate Tax Aggressiveness and Insider Trading

We examine the association between corporate tax aggressiveness and the profitability of insider trading under the assumption that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism. We document that insider purchase profitability, but not sales profitability, is significantly higher on average in more tax aggressive firms. We also find that the positive association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability is attenuated for firms with more effective monitoring and is accentuated for firms with a more opaque information environment. In addition, we provide empirical evidence that tax aggressiveness is significantly associated with greater insider sales volume in the fiscal year prior to a stock price crash. Finally, we find that the association between tax aggressiveness and insider purchase profitability weakens after the introduction of FIN 48, consistent with the increased transparency of tax positions under the new disclosure requirement reducing insiders' information advantage and hence their ability to profit from insider trading. To the extent that insider trading profits reflect managerial opportunism, our results are consistent with managers exploiting the opacity arising from tax aggressive activities to extract rent from shareholders, particularly those shareholders who sold their shares to the managers. Our findings are particularly important in light of the number of studies relying on the agency view of tax avoidance to develop arguments or to draw inferences.     

How Quickly Do Firms Adjust to Optimal Levels of Tax Avoidance?

The trade‐off literature asserts that managers weigh the direct benefits of tax avoidance against the associated nontax costs. This literature implies each firm has a unique optimal level of tax avoidance that balances these costs and benefits. Our study is the first to document how quickly the average firm moves toward its optimal level of tax avoidance. We find that the typical firm converges toward its optimum at a rate that ranges from approximately 69 to 84 percent over a three‐year period, depending upon model specifications. Consistent with asymmetric levels of frictions across the tax avoidance distribution, we find the speed of adjustment is greater for firms below their optimal level of tax avoidance than for firms above. We perform additional cross‐sectional analyses to provide insight into some of the frictions that prevent firms from adjusting completely to their optimal level of tax avoidance. We generally find growth firms exhibit slower adjustment speeds and provide limited evidence that both multinational firms and income‐mobile firms exhibit faster adjustment speeds.     

How Aggressive Tax Planning Facilitates the Diversion of Corporate Resources: Evidence from Path Analysis

In measuring tunneling with intercorporate loans disclosed by Chinese listed companies, we analyze the underlying channels through which aggressive tax planning facilitates the diversion of corporate resources by firm insiders. Using path analysis, we document that the path from tax aggressiveness to related loans is mediated by both the additional cash flows from tax savings and the increased financial opacity from tax planning, and that additional cash flows plays a much more important role than opacity in helping controlling shareholders to divert corporate resources under the guise of tax aggressiveness. Beyond the two mediated paths, we also detect a residual, direct path from tax aggressiveness to related loans. After an exogenous shock from the government crackdown on diversionary related loans, we find the direct path is fully mediated by the two indirect paths, suggesting that tunneling via related loans only occurs at firms where insiders can mask tunneling under the cover of opacity or can justify related loans on grounds of abnormal cash flows from tax savings. Our evidence supports the notion that greater outside scrutiny increases the hurdle for, but does not entirely eradicate, diversion facilitated by tax aggressiveness. Collectively, our research lends some support to recent theory on the importance of taxes to corporate governance by demonstrating how the agency costs of tax planning allow certain shareholders to benefit from firm activities at the expense of others.     

Financial Accounting Effects of Tax Aggressiveness: Contracting and Measurement

This study examines a setting in which a tax‐reporting decision is delegated to a firm's tax manager. Using financial accounting measures of tax expense to evaluate the tax manager allows the firm to efficiently attain the level of tax avoidance it prefers, despite the fact that the consequences of the tax‐reporting decision will occur in the future. The study also examines how well two accounting measures of tax aggressiveness — cash taxes paid and the unrecognized tax benefit — distinguish between conservative and aggressive firms.     

Deciphering Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Credit Rating Disagreements

This study investigates the role of tax avoidance in the credit‐rating process and whether differences exist in how rating agencies account for the risk relevance of tax avoidance. Using a sample of initial credit ratings assigned to public debt issuances during 1994–2013, our evidence is consistent with Moody's Investors Service and Standard & Poor's assessing the costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance differently from one another, resulting in more frequent and pronounced rating agency disagreement. Rating agency disagreement over tax avoidance is most evident when it is accompanied by relatively high levels of uncertain tax positions, foreign activities, research and development activities, or tax footnote opacity. We also find evidence that decreases (increases) in tax avoidance or tax footnote disclosure opacity are positively (negatively) associated with the convergence of split ratings. This suggests that firms can exacerbate or mitigate rating agency disagreement subsequent to bond issuance. Our study complements prior research by examining why sophisticated information intermediaries disagree about the risk relevance of tax avoidance. It also sheds light on how firms can influence rating agencies’ understanding of tax avoidance.     

The Economic Effects of Special Purpose Entities on Corporate Tax Avoidance

This study provides the first large-sample evidence on the economic tax effects of special purpose entities (SPEs). These increasingly common organizational structures facilitate corporate tax savings by enabling sponsor firms to increase tax-advantaged activities and/or enhance their tax efficiency (i.e., relative tax savings of a given activity). Using path analysis, we find that SPEs facilitate greater tax avoidance such that an economically large amount of cash tax savings from research and development (R&D), depreciable assets, net operating loss carryforwards, intangible assets, foreign operations, and tax havens occur in conjunction with SPE use. We estimate that SPEs help generate over $330 billion of incremental cash tax savings, or roughly 6 percent of total U.S. federal corporate income tax collections during the sample period. Interaction analyses reveal that SPEs enhance the tax efficiency of intangibles and R&D by 61.5 percent to 87.5 percent. Overall, these findings provide economic insight into complex organizational structures supporting corporate tax avoidance.     

Inquiry Letters and Tax Aggressiveness

This study examined the impact of inquiry letters on corporate tax aggressiveness based on the special inquiry system in Chinese stock exchanges. It found that the receipt of inquiry letters significantly inhibited tax aggressiveness. The channel through which inquiry letters worked involved a monitoring effect on related-party transactions. The disincentive effect of inquiry letters on corporate tax aggressiveness was mainly found in firms with overseas operations, low-quality of internal control, and weak tax enforcement. Examining the textual information in inquiry letters, the results show that more questions and the demand for a specific opinion from the auditor led to a greater disincentive effect. The level of detail in firms' reply letters weakened this disincentive effect. Finally, the disincentive effect of tax aggressiveness was more pronounced when inquiry letters pointed to tax-related issues.     

A choice‐theoretic analysis of a corporate tax holiday versus a subsidy

This paper attempts to compare the effect of a corporate tax holiday with that of a subsidy on the behaviour of the individual firm. Assuming the subsidy equals the amount of tax paid by a firm operating under the subsidy system, we find that the firm's net profit will be greater under the tax holiday than under the subsidy regime. Similarly, if the subsidy exceeds the tax by an amount that would equalize the profits made by the (“marginal”) firm under the two regimes, then it is found that firms with higher than “average” unit costs would opt for the subsidy system; conversely, firms with a low cost structure would maximize profits by selecting the tax holiday. Finally, a multiperiod analysis of the particular choice facing prospective manufacturers in Ciskei, shows that the firm would normally choose the subsidy system except if the current tax exceeded the subsidy at the output level representing maximum profit under the tax holiday.     

Transfer Pricing: Strategies,Practices, and Tax Minimization

Using a survey of tax executives from multinational corporations, we document that some firms set their transfer pricing strategy to minimize tax payments, but more firms focus on tax compliance. We estimate that a firm focusing on minimizing taxes has a GAAP effective tax rate that is 6.6 percentage points lower and generates about $43 million more in tax savings, on average, than a firm focusing on tax compliance. Available COMPUSTAT data on sample firms confirm our survey‐based inferences. We also find that transfer pricing‐related tax savings are greater when higher foreign income, tax haven use, and R&D activities are combined with a tax minimization strategy. Finally, compliance‐focused firms report lower FIN 48 tax reserves than tax‐minimizing firms, consistent with the former group using less uncertain transfer pricing arrangements. Collectively, our study provides direct evidence that multinational firms have differing internal priorities for transfer pricing, and that these differences are strongly related to the taxes reported by these firms.     

Innovation and Corporate Tax Planning: The Distinct Effects of Patents and R&D*

Using a large US sample, we find a significant and positive relation between patents and corporate tax planning, and the effect is incremental to the effect of R&D on tax planning. We employ a quasi‐natural experiment based on staggered industry‐level innovation shocks to identify the positive causal effect of patents on corporate tax planning. We also find that patents are not associated with tax planning for domestic firms, but their association with tax planning is concentrated in multinational firms, which have the ability to shift domestic income to low‐tax countries. Moreover, we find that the identified effect mainly exists in the post–check‐the‐box (CTB) rule period when shifting income among affiliates becomes more flexible and convenient. Finally, we use two income‐shifting models and find that patents, rather than R&D, facilitate tax planning through an income‐shifting channel. Overall, our results suggest that R&D and patents facilitate firms' tax planning in distinct ways: R&D facilitates tax planning as intended through tax credits and deductions, whereas patents are used by taxpayers to avoid taxes aggressively through income shifting.     

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 and Capital‐Market Behavior: Early Evidence*

The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (“the Act”) was enacted in response to numerous corporate and accounting scandals. It aims to reinforce corporate accountability and professional responsibility in order to restore investor confidence in corporate America. This study examines the capital‐market reaction to the Act and finds a positive (negative) abnormal return at the time of several legislative events that increased (decreased) the likelihood of the passage of the Act. We interpret this finding as evidence supporting the notion that the Act is wealth‐increasing in the sense that its induced benefits significantly outweigh its imposed compliance costs. We also find that the market reaction is more positive for firms that are more compliant with the provisions of the Act prior to its enactment.     

Transparency,Information Shocks,and Tax Avoidance

This study helps provide clarity to the prior mixed findings on the association between financial reporting transparency and tax avoidance by studying the effect that transparency has on tax avoidance in a cross‐country sample through aggregate‐ and firm‐level tests. Results using firm‐ and country‐level (aggregate) measures of transparency and tax avoidance show that countries and firms with greater levels of transparency exhibit lower levels of tax avoidance and that the effect of country‐level transparency is incremental to firm‐level transparency. Furthermore, results of difference‐in‐difference tests using the adoption of IFRS and the initial enforcement of insider trading laws around the world as exogenous shocks that increase transparency find that transparency has a statistically and economically significant effect on tax avoidance and address empirical concerns regarding endogeneity and reverse causality not fully addressed in the prior research. The results of these tests as well as tests that address potential correlated but omitted variables suggest that financial transparency is an important tool which regulators can use in battling tax avoidance.     

Corporate Political Connections and Tax Aggressiveness

This study investigates the relation between corporate political connections and tax aggressiveness. We study a broad array of corporate political activities, including the employment of connected directors, campaign contributions, and lobbying. Using a large hand‐collected data set of U.S. firms' political connections, we find that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive than nonconnected firms, after controlling for other determinants of tax aggressiveness, industry and year fixed effects, and the endogenous choice of being politically connected. Our findings are robust to various measures of political connections and tax aggressiveness. These results are consistent with the conjecture that politically connected firms are more tax aggressive because of their lower expected cost of tax enforcement, better information regarding tax law and enforcement changes, lower capital market pressure for transparency, and greater risk‐taking tendencies induced by political connections.     

The Tax Paradox and Weak Tax Neutrality

We introduce the concept of weak tax neutrality that establishes that the relationship between the tax rate and the user cost of capital may be non-monotonic. We show that most existing corporate tax systems allow for weak neutrality. That is, given the tax allowances permitted by these systems, it is possible that neutrality may arise for at least one positive corporate tax rate. Moreover, we show the practical relevance of weak neutrality in realistic situations where there are several asset types and heterogeneous levels of firms' debt ratios.     

Stakeholder Orientations and Cost Management

We examine the effect of stakeholder orientation on firms' cost management as proxied by selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) cost stickiness. Using a sample of 19,783 firm‐years, we find that customer and employee orientation are associated with greater SG&A cost stickiness. Furthermore, the effect of customer orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is more prominent in firms where SG&A costs create high future value, growth firms, and firms with strong corporate governance. In contrast, the effect of employee orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is stronger in firms where SG&A costs create low future value, mature firms, and firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, the association between customer orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with efficiency considerations (i.e., adjustment costs). In contrast, the association between employee orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with agency motives such as empire building or “a preference for a quiet life.” In sum, we provide evidence that corporate orientation toward different stakeholders can have different efficiency implications in the context of SG&A resource adjustments and cost management.     

Tax and leverage: Evidence from China

This study exploits two institutional features of China to test the causal link between tax and capital structure. First, the central government exclusively determines the corporate tax rate in China, which results in changes in corporate income tax rates across different Chinese public firms over the period of 2000–2011. Such mandatory tax shifts provide a quasi-natural experimental setting for our difference-in-differences analysis investigating the impact of tax on leverage. We find evidence supporting the dynamic trade-off theory, namely that firms are unresponsive to tax cuts but increase long-term leverage when taxes rise (particularly those in low statutory tax regimes). Second, governmental intervention in capital allocation is common in China such that political connections are usually regarded as an asset for firms in accessing bank loans. Using anti-corruption events as shocks to the value of political connections over the sample period, our research is the first study to show that political connections become a liability that enables banks to recall loans from affected firms during the anti-corruption campaign periods. This change overturns the typical tax-leverage relationship observed, as we find anti-corruption affected firms reduce long-term leverage when taxes are cut and they become insensitive to tax increases. Our results reveal the importance of political ties in explaining how firms adjust their capital structure to tax changes, which is extremely relevant to policy makers and regulators when monitoring bank loan markets.