嵌入讨价还价博弈的经营者报酬对公司绩效影响研究

文章研究表明:董事会与CEO之间的权力博弈是影响CEO报酬和公司绩效关系的重要因素.中国国有上市公司董事会与CEO之间的博弈扭曲了CEO报酬机制,损害了CEO报酬对公司绩效的促进作用,应当从博弈的制度环境入手矫正上述博弈机制,理顺CEO报酬机制的作用机理.     

The Link Between CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: Does Simultaneity Matter?

In order to combat the principle-agent problem, directors of public companies use incentive-based contracts to align the interests of CEOs and shareholders. Some studies suggest that these contracts are an inefficient use of resources, and that they do not motivate CEOs to do what is best for the firm. In this study, the author estimates a regression to find the relationship between CEO Compensation and market value of a firm. In order to address persistence, endogeneity and firm-specific effects the author uses the first-differenced and system GMM regression techniques first used by [Arellano, M.; Bover, O. “Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable Estimation of Error-Component Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 68, 1995, pp. 29–51] and [Blundell, R. W.; Bonds, S. R. “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models,” Journal of Econometrics, 87, 1998, pp. 115–43; Blundell, R. W.; Bond, S. R., Windmeijer, F. “Estimation in Dynamic Panel Data Models: Improving on the Performance of the Standard GMM Estimators,” Institute for Fiscal Studies Working Paper W00/12, London, England, 2000]. These regressions report a positive relationship between CEO compensation and market value of a firm. This study concludes that incentive based contracts are effective, due to the positive pay-to-performance link, when controlling for simultaneity. First place winner of the Undergraduate Best Paper Award Competition at the 60th International Atlantic Economic Conference in New York, NY, October 6–9, 2005.     

CEO Compensation and Stakeholders' Claims*

The traditional view that a corporation exists solely to serve the interests of the firm's shareholders has given way to a changing view that recognizes the importance of corporate constituents in addition to shareholders. Prior studies demonstrate a significant association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation and a firm's stock prices. However, the association between CEO compensation and the claim of other primary stakeholders (customers, employees, suppliers) has not been examined. The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the adoption of long‐term incentive plans aligns the interest of the CEO with the interest of the primary stakeholders in the firm. Using the fixed‐effect regression, our results indicate a significant association between the change in CEO compensation and the claims of the customers, shareholders, and employees. We contribute to the literature by demonstrating that the managers are accountable not only to the shareholders but also to primary stakeholders.     

Discretionary Accounting Choices and CEO Compensation*

This paper makes four contributions to the literature relating accounting choices to CEO compensation. First, it shows that discretionary accruals are associated with CEO cash compensation, a result that holds after controlling for both the nondiscretionary components of income and increases in shareholder wealth. Although significant, the coefficient on discretionary accruals is significantly lower than that on nondiscretionary accruals, which in turn is significantly lower than the coefficient on operating cash flows. Second, the paper shows a differential reaction to positive and negative discretionary accruals —- the association between positive discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation is significantly greater than the association between negative discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation. Third, the paper shows the association between discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. In particular, when positive discretionary accruals allow the firm to reduce or avoid a loss, the association between CEO cash compensation and discretionary accruals is significantly greater. Finally, this paper shows that the association of CEO cash compensation with reported income generally increases with the level of discretionary accruals, consistent with management responding to the incentives provided.     

The Impact of Mandated Disclosure on Performance‐Based CEO Compensation*

Regulators argue that mandated compensation disclosure improves corporate governance by permitting shareholders to enjoin boards of directors to reward executives in ways that are consistent with shareholder value creation. We posit that mandated compensation disclosure, or the absence thereof, has a greater impact on the CEO compensation practices of widely held firms than of closely held firms. More specifically, we expect that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO compensation is likely to be less performance‐contingent among widely held firms than among closely held firms. Moreover, we also expect that the advent of mandated disclosure leads widely held firms to increase the extent to which CEO compensation is performance‐contingent, much more so than closely held firms would. We use a unique data base resulting from the Ontario Securities Commission amendment of regulation 638 in October 1993. For the first time, this amendment required firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange to provide detailed executive compensation data similar to those required by the Securities and Exchange Commission, for the current year as well as retroactively for the previous two years. We find that, in the absence of mandated disclosure, CEO cash compensation in widely held firms is less performance‐contingent than in closely held firms. With the imposition of mandated disclosure, performance‐contingent cash compensation increases more in widely held firms than in closely held firms. Results with respect to stock option grants are mixed, with both closely held and widely held firms reacting to the advent of mandated disclosure.     

CEO Power and Relative Performance Evaluation

We model relative performance evaluation (RPE) when a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) has the power to opportunistically influence the design of RPE by choosing the weight on an index‐based peer group or by customizing the selection of peers comprising a peer group. A powerful CEO compares the benefits of reducing common risk affecting his compensation with the benefits of receiving a higher bonus by economizing on expected peer‐group performance. As a consequence, the Board of Directors (BoD) is less likely to use RPE. Our analytical model yields hypotheses predicting that powerful CEOs choose to reduce common risk only partially and that BoDs choose to not implement RPE if expected peer performance is sufficiently high. Our model has further empirical implications in (i) providing new interpretations of tests for detecting strong‐form and weak‐form RPE in the presence of powerful CEOs, and (ii) suggesting a new empirical measure of CEO power with a focus on the delegation of RPE decision rights.     

The Shielding of CEO Compensation from the Effects of Strategic Expenditures*

This study investigates whether and why compensation committees shield CEO compensation from income‐decreasing effects of strategic expenditures. We document that firms do shield recurring strategic expenditures such as research and development and advertising expenditures. We also find that firms shield research and development expenditures more than advertising expenditures. Our results are consistent with prior findings that suggest that compensation committees shield CEOs from nonroutine transactions such as restructuring charges and extraordinary losses. Using a two‐task principal‐agent framework, we show that such shielding improves the efficiency of the contract by making the shielded income measure more congruent with the principal's objectives.     

CEO魅力与组织绩效关系研究综述

CE0魅力与组织绩效之间存在着复杂的关系,成为领导学研究的热点.文章从相关关系、因果关系两个方面对其相关理论和实证研究结果进行了回顾,并指出研究的不足和未来进一步研究的方向.     

CEO薪酬与公司绩效关系研究综述

CEO薪酬与公司绩效关系的研究在学术界与现实管理中吸引着越来越多的关注,主要原因在于该主题的研究一直未有统一定论。而国外由于资本市场较发达,股权激励推行的时间较长等原因,研究较我国而言系统而深入。论文通过对国内外文献进行梳理,认为大多数研究进行的是现金薪酬、股权、期权三方面各自的或综合的高管薪酬与公司绩效之间关系的探讨,并对此进行系统综述,文末对比国外研究,提出了国内未来研究应注意的问题,以期为后续研究提供有益的借鉴。     

中国燃料油期货的套期保值比率与绩效研究

文章首次对自2004年上市以来的SHFE燃料油期货的多期限合约的套期保值比率与绩效进行研究.给出了一个寻求多期限合约的最优套期保值比率的新方法.为克服数据量较小的困难,文章运用新技术--协整序列分解模型进行研究,采用更一般的数据选取方法,发现不同的燃料油期、现货价格序列(日、周和二周)均存在显著的协整关系,在此基础上得到任意期限的最优套期保值比率.结果发现:中国SHFE燃料油期货市场发展良好,其套期保值效果比SHFE铜期货差、比SHFE天然橡胶要好,有望成为世界燃料油定价中心之一.     

Accounting Information and CEO Compensation: The Role of Cash Flow from Operations in the Presence of Earnings*

We examine the role of cash flow from operations (CFO) in chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation. We predict that CFO is contract‐relevant in the presence of earnings, and more so when (1) the quality of earnings relative to the quality of CFO as a measure of performance is low and (2) the need for CFO as a financing source is high. Our analysis is motivated principally by normative arguments and anecdotes from financial disclosures linking CFO to managerial effort and contracts, notwithstanding the traditional role of earnings in performance measurement. We find that the weight of CFO in the compensation model is positive and significant in the presence of earnings and stock returns. We also find that the relative quality of CFO compared with that of earnings has a positive (negative) impact on the weight of CFO (earnings). We further find that the relative weight of CFO is enhanced substantially when enterprise activities crucially depend on internally generated cash flow. These findings are unaltered when we include CEO age, firm size, and risk in the model and allow the coefficients to vary across industries.     

The Relation between Strategy,CEO Selection,and Firm Performance

We examine whether a firm's strategic priorities influence its selection of a new CEO and what conditions enable such an appointment to add value to the firm. More specifically, this study investigates the value‐adding effect when prospector firms (i.e., those pursuing a prospector‐type strategy) select a CEO with high social capital. We argue that uncertainty, driven by a firm's strategy, will determine the decision to select a CEO with high social capital; such CEOs can use their networks to mitigate the uncertainty and thus can be valuable to the firm. However, prior research indicates that CEOs with high social capital can engage in behavior detrimental to firm value. To mitigate the potential for this to occur, we assess whether corporate governance can play a role in prospector firms who appoint CEOs with high social capital. Drawing on archival data of CEO successions over a 14‐year period, we find that prospector firms have greater incentives to appoint CEOs with high social capital. We also find that prospector firms who appoint a CEO with high social capital improve their performance. Furthermore, the value‐adding effect of this selection choice is stronger in prospector firms with good corporate governance.     

分析师预测、同行相对绩效对国企高管变更影响的研究

文章利用2003年-2012年A股非金融国有上市公司高管的变更数据,分别考察证券分析师预测误差以及同行相对绩效对我国国企高管晋升、平调与降职变更的影响。研究结果证明,分析师预测误差作为来自资本市场的社会监督机制,对我国国企高管的平调与降职有显著的负向影响,即企业绩效高于分析师预测绩效越多,国企高管降职和平调的概率越小,反之亦然。且与较低的同行相对绩效相比,同行相对绩效较高时,证券分析师预测误差对高管降职的负相关关系越强。以上结果在稳健性检验中仍然成立。     

管理层权力、薪酬差距与绩效

已有研究发现,中国上市公司管理层的薪酬差距总体上具有锦标赛作用,即薪酬差距有利于提升绩效。但是,本文的进一步研究发现,相对于其他企业,在管理层权力大的企业中,高管团队内部的薪酬差距以及核心高管与全体员工的薪酬差距都更大。但业绩并没有更好。这些证据表明管理层权力会降低薪酬激励绩效,有必要重视管理层权力问题。研究还发现,高管团队内部的薪酬差距有利于提升绩效,但核心高管与全体员工的薪酬差距没有带来业绩的显著提升,说明公司总体薪酬差距过大可能因失去公平而影响绩效。     

企业负责人经营业绩考核复合模型构建及应用研究

文章提出一种复合考核方法,以科学确定考核目标值为切入点,在全面考虑影响目标确定和完成的内在和外在因素的基础上,以管理有效性为基准,构建了包含业绩改善对标考核和目标完成度考核双要素的复合考核模型。并且对此模型进行应用检验,结果显示,该方法不仅有效避免了博弈,而且能够使业绩目标设定更合理、考核结果更公平、考核引导更有效。     

Compensation in the Post‐FIN 48 Period: The Case of Contracting on Tax Performance and Uncertainty

Academic and anecdotal evidence indicates that incentive systems often provide short‐term payouts without regard for long‐term consequences. New detailed disclosures mandated by FIN No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes, enable us to use a tax setting to investigate whether boards adjust performance‐based pay for uncertainty. We find managers’ bonus payouts are positively associated with tax performance; however, bonus payouts are lower when measures of ex ante tax uncertainty are higher. Our results are robust to tests of alternative explanations including financial reporting aggressiveness, overall firm risk, and other forms of compensation. Further, we document that the relation between bonus compensation and tax performance has changed in the post‐FIN No. 48 period. Specifically, we identify a significant association between bonus payout and GAAP ETR only in the pre‐FIN No. 48 period and a significant association between bonus payout and cash ETR only in the post‐FIN No. 48 period, suggesting that the relation between compensation and tax avoidance should be examined carefully with particular attention to the post‐FIN No. 48 period.