Window-dressing in German inter-war balance sheets

German accounting rules value assets and liabilities asymmetrically and thus lead to grossly distorted balance sheets. In the inter-war debate on a reform of disclosure regulation, financial experts considered the (undisclosed) tax balance sheet, which had to be drawn up separately for the corporate tax assessment, as a paradigm for adequate financial disclosure. However, due to tax secrecy they were barred from analysing tax documents. Using archival evidence, we analyse tax balance sheets as a means of assessing the reliability of disclosed balance sheets of the inter-war period. It emerges that companies overstated their profits in the mid- and late-1920s, but grossly understated them in the Nazi economy.     

递延所得税核算问题探究——解读资产、负债的计税基础

2006新准则有关所得税核算的一个重大变化,是从原来的"应付税款法"变为"纳税影响会计法",且要求企业采用"资产负债表债务法"核算其递延所得税。"资产负债表债务法"的关键问题是确定资产、负债的计税基础,资产、负债的计税基础确定了,其暂时性差异也就确定了,相应地,递延所得税资产或递延所得税负债的确认、计量也就迎刃而解了。本文结合国际上对资产、负债的计税基础的阐释,结合我国实际情况,提出了一套确定资产、负债计税基础的切实可行的程序和方法。     

Die Umstellung der Anlage der Heubeck-Richttafeln von Perioden- auf Generationentafeln und ihre Wirkung auf die Kosten von Pensionszusagen

Most German employers are using mortality tables provided by Heubeck AG, a German consultancy firm, for actuarial calculations of company pension plans. Before 2005, Heubeck AG has been publishing projected future period tables rather than cohort tables. This paper analyzes the cost of using such period tables in actuarial calculations for an individual employee’s defined benefit pension plan. Our benchmark is a plan that is fairly priced by using a cohort table. We find that the employer may incur significant costs from using a period table for calculating plan benefits. As life expectancy tends to be underestimated, benefits granted will be too generous. In contrast, using period tables for determining provisions for plan liabilities in tax accounting doesn’t carry extra costs. Although yearly tax deductions differ when using period or cohort tables, tax shields are roughly the same in NPV terms. Thus, Heubeck’s switch to cohort tables means a significant improvement for benefit calculation but won’t have tax effects, on average.     

Share prices and pension funding: An empirical test of the joint effect of pension insurance and the pension tax shield

This article examines the joint significance of the tax benefits of pension funding and the value of government sponsored pension insurance in determining the efficacy of corporate pension funding. When the pension tax shield benefits are dominant, additional funding may enhance shareholder wealth. However, additional funding is observed to have negative effects on equity prices when the value of pension insurance is dominant relative to the value of the pension tax shield. When neither the tax or insurance effects are dominant, marginal adjustments in pension funding apparently will not alter corporate share prices.     

The value relevance of deferred tax attributed to asset revaluations

Our study focuses on the incremental value relevance of the balance sheet relative to the income statement approach to deferred tax accounting and whether such value relevance is attributable to firms being required to report the deferred tax consequences of asset revaluations. Our results suggest that the increment to deferred tax balances upon adopting the balance sheet approach has value relevance, with such value relevance driven by the deferred taxes on certain asset revaluations (specifically, property, plant and equipment, and equity-accounted investments). We interpret our results as reflecting investors’ preference for the balance sheet approach to deferred tax accounting and their view that deferred taxes on asset revaluations are real liabilities.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

The Actuarial Balance Sheet for Pay‐As‐You‐Go Finance: Solvency Indicators for Spain and Sweden*

This paper provides the first estimate of the actuarial balance of the Spanish contributory pension system for the old‐age contingency, based on official data. The main accounting entries are developed from the principles of double‐entry bookkeeping. The novel entry in the balance sheet, entitled the ‘contribution asset’ or ‘hidden asset’, is at the centre of the theoretical discussion. A comparison between the official balance sheet for the Swedish notional account system and our balance sheet for the Spanish contributory pension system is also provided. The main finding is that the Spanish pension system has an insolvency rate of 31.4 per cent. The policy implication is that unless current legislation is reformed, Spanish taxpayers (the plan sponsor) should count on making transfers to the pension system with a present discounted value of 31.4 per cent of current liabilities. Moreover, a comparison of the consecutive balance sheets for 2001‐06 shows that the degree of insolvency is growing over time, even though the cash‐flow outcome has improved over the same period. Taking steps to reverse this trend and restore solvency is in Spanish taxpayers' interest, and possibly also in the interest of those in the European Union who recognise that there is a chance that they may have to support the Spanish budget in the future.     

Discretion in accounting for pensions under IAS 19: using the ‘magic telescope’?

We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005–2009 to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries. We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and company-specific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective ‘management’ of the three assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be determined. We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions.     

Do Managers of U.S. Defined Benefit Pension Plan Sponsors Use Regulatory Freedom Strategically?

We use historical particularities of pension funding law to investigate whether managers of U.S. corporate defined benefit pension plan sponsors strategically use regulatory freedom to lower the reported value of pension liabilities, and hence required cash contributions. For some years, pension plans were required to estimate two liabilities—one with mandated discount rates and mortality assumptions, and another where these could be chosen freely. Using a sample of 11,963 plans, we find that the regulated liability exceeds the unregulated measure by 10% and the difference further increases for underfunded pension plans. Underfunded plans tend to assume substantially higher discount rates and lower life expectancy. The effect persists both in the cross‐section of plans and over time and it serves to reduce cash contributions. We further show that plan sponsor managers use the freed‐up cash for corporate investment and that credit risk is unlikely to explain the finding.     

Do a firm's equity returns reflect the risk of its pension plan?

This paper examines the empirical question of whether systematic equity risk of US firms as measured by beta from the capital asset pricing model reflects the risk of their pension plans. There are a number of reasons to suspect that it might not. Chief among them is the opaque set of accounting rules used to report pension assets, liabilities, and expenses. Pension plan assets and liabilities are off-balance sheet and are often viewed as segregated from the rest of the firm, with its own trustees. Pension accounting rules are complicated. Furthermore, the role of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation clouds the real relation between pension plan risk and firm equity risk. The empirical findings in this paper are consistent with the hypothesis that equity risk does reflect the risk of the firm's pension plan despite arcane accounting rules for pensions. This finding is consistent with informational efficiency of the capital markets. It also has implications for corporate finance practice in the determination of the cost of capital for capital budgeting. Standard procedure uses de-leveraged equity return betas to infer the cost of capital for operating assets. But the de-leveraged betas are not adjusted for the risk of the pension assets and liabilities. Failure to make this adjustment typically biases upward estimates of the discount rate for capital budgeting. The magnitude of the bias is shown here to be large for a number of well-known US companies. This bias can result in positive net present value projects being rejected.     

Determinants of Actuarial Valuation Method Changes for Pension Funding and Reporting: Evidence from the UK

This study examines various factors that potentially explain cross‐sectional variations in UK corporate managerial discretion to switch towards a market‐based actuarial pension valuation method for pension funding and reporting purposes. Evidence is based on accounting, actuarial and share market data for an industry‐matched pair sample of 90 UK firms. Consistent with our hypotheses we find that companies have a greater propensity to switch actuarial methods if they use lower discount rates, lower flow funding ratios and sponsor larger pension plans in the pre‐switch valuation year. These findings are consistent with the traditional perspective, which implies that UK corporate switching decisions are explained by characteristics of their defined benefit pension funds. The results run contrary to the findings of earlier US based studies that find that such choices can be explained from an alternative corporate financial perspective.     

风险分散与中国混合型基本养老保险制度改革研究

本文从参保人养老投资风险分散角度研究混合型基本养老保险制度设计。通过构建一个两期消费模型,综合考虑参保人所面临的人口结构、工资增长率、养老基金投资等风险因素,本文研究了混合型基本养老保险制度中现收现付制与基金积累制的最优比例,并利用中国数据进行了测算与敏感性分析。研究发现:引入小规模个人账户基金积累制可以分散人口老龄化给现收现付制所带来的风险,中国实行混合型基本养老保险制度有其合理性;但如果要维持40%～45%的养老金替代率水平,中国基本养老保险制度的财务可持续性会面临较大挑战。     

Allocating Shareholder Capital to Pension Plans

This article discusses the corporate challenge of providing retirement income to employees while limiting the costs and risks of pension plans to the companies themselves by addressing five main questions:

• ? What are the major issues and challenges surrounding pensions? Although the pension shortfalls have been the focus of attention, the author argues that the more serious concern is the risk stemming from the mismatch between pension assets and pension liabilities— that is, the funding of debt‐like liabilities with equity‐heavy asset portfolios.
• ? To what extent do the equity market and equity prices reflect the shortfall in value and the mismatch in risk? While the author describes some evidence of the market's ability to capture pension risk, analysts' P/E multiples and management's assessments of cost of capital may still be distorted by failure to take full account of the risks associated with pension assets.
• ? How should management analyze and formulate strategic solutions? Without offering specific solutions, the author presents a framework for analyzing the problem from a strategic perspective that can be used in formulating a company's pension policy. In particular, the article recommends that companies take an integrated perspective that views pension assets and liabilities as parts of the corporate balance sheet, and the pension asset allocation decision as a critical aspect of a corporate‐wide enterprise risk management program.
• ? If a company chooses to make a major change in its pension policy, such as a partial or complete immunization accomplished by substituting bonds for stocks, how would you communicate the new policy to the rating agencies and investors?
• ? What are the major issues to be thinking about when contemplating a change from a DB plan to a defined contribution, or DC, plan? The author argues that DC plans without some corporate oversight or responsibility for results are not a long‐term solution.

     

Contrasting the information demands of equity- and debt-holders: Evidence from pension liabilities

In the setting of defined-benefit pension liabilities, we hypothesize that equity and debt investors value these liabilities differently. As expected, we find that investors' valuations of equity more closely align with a going concern perspective that emphasizes the long-term funding needs of pension plans. In contrast, as expected, we find that investors' pricing of short-term and unsecured debt more closely aligns with a settlement perspective that emphasizes pension termination costs. For both equity and debt securities, the settlement (going concern) perspective dominates for short-duration (long-duration) pensions. Overall, our evidence suggests that equity and debt investors perceive complex liabilities in predictably different ways that are consistent with their differing information demands, which in turn vary with the characteristics of the obligation.     

Betriebliche Altersversorgung durch Direktversicherungen – Die Folgen der Unternehmensteuerreform 2008 für die Verhandlungsposition von Arbeitgebern und Arbeitnehmern – Aktualisierung des Beitrags in Heft 3/2007, S. 375 ff. –

This paper discusses the consequences of the new German tax regime on the attractiveness of life insurance policies as a possible corporate pension scheme. We analyze those insurances both from the perspective of an employer and from the perspective of an employee. The tax reform decreased their attractiveness, but still it is possible to find agreements which are valuable for both parties.     

Pension Funding Regulations and Actuarial Gains and Losses

With pervasive pension funding deficits, Korean firms have been under pressure to improve their funding levels. We examine whether firms have incentives to set obligation‐decreasing pension assumptions when they have large pension deficits (pension obligations in excess of plan assets) and when they make insufficient contributions to external pension funds. We find that firms report larger actuarial gains (or smaller actuarial losses) associated with the remeasurement of pension liabilities when their pension funding ratio (the ratio of the fair value of plan assets to defined benefit obligations) is lower and when contributions to plan assets relative to pension service costs are smaller. Next, upon the introduction of a minimum pension funding guideline, we find that the effect of the funding ratio and contributions to pension funds on actuarial gains and losses is more pronounced for firms whose funding ratios are slightly below the minimum funding ratio than it is for firms whose funding ratios exceed or fall short of the minimum by a large margin. Our results indicate that firms opportunistically exercise discretion regarding corporate pension accounting under International Financial Reporting Standards to comply with pension funding regulations, thereby reducing perceived pension deficits.     

The Displacement Effect of Public Pensions on the Accumulation of Financial Assets*

The generosity of public pensions may depress private savings and provide incentives to retire early. While there is plenty of evidence supporting the latter effect, there remains considerable controversy over whether public pensions crowd out private savings. This paper uses international micro‐data sets collected over recent years to investigate whether public pensions displace private savings. The identification strategy relies not only on cross‐country differences in generosity but also on differences in the progressivity or non‐linearity of pension formulas across countries. We estimate that an extra dollar of pension wealth depresses accumulated financial assets around the time of retirement by 22 cents. An extra 10,000 dollars in public pension wealth reduces the average retirement age by roughly one month, which implies an elasticity of years of retirement with respect to pension wealth of 0.15.     

The Many Challenges of Pension Accounting

Accounting for defined benefit pension plans has long been a major issue in accounting. Standard‐setters are grappling with revisions to pension accounting standards, and much change has already occurred in the United Kingdom. This paper identifies and discusses most of the major issues that standard‐setters must confront in developing new approaches to financial reporting for pensions. Key issues concern how to report the impact of changes in assumptions, how to recognize pension costs on the balance sheet and income statement, and how to reconcile the differences between accountants' and actuaries' approaches to pensions. Current standards assume that accounting estimates are independent of actuarial assumptions, and yet require a direct comparison of the accounting liability with the pension plan assets, when in fact they are incompatible measures based on differing assumptions and differing methodologies. As well, accounting has been complicit in managers' wishes to hide the volatility inherent in a pension plan investment strategy that focuses on higher‐risk equities to fund estimated monetary liabilities that have been discounted at low‐risk interest rates. Drawing on studies and research done largely in Europe, this paper attempts to consolidate some of the current thinking on the topic and to propose some preferred approaches to dealing with the problems of pension accounting.     

The Information Content of Corporate Pension Funding Status in Japan

This paper tests if a firm's pension funding ratio (pension assets/PBO) reveals the management's private information about the firm's operation when the firm can exercise discretion in pension funding. The lax enforcement of pension funding rules and the prevalence of management forecasts make Japanese firms an ideal testing ground. We show that, among firms with large business uncertainty, large accruals, or high effective tax rates, the pension funding ratio predicts the firm's management forecast errors significantly beyond conventional control variable and the effects of pension accounting management. However, the stock market does not appear to incorporate this information immediately.     

Ageing and the tax implied in public pension schemes: simulations for selected OECD countries

A key figure suited to measuring intergenerational imbalances in unfunded public pension schemes is given by the ‘implicit tax rate’ imposed on each generation's lifetime income. The implicit tax arises from the fact that, quite generally, pension benefits fall short of actuarial returns to contributions paid to these systems while actively working. Under current pension policies, implicit tax rates will increase sharply for younger generations in most industrialised countries. In this paper, this is illustrated for the cases of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the UK and the USA. Nevertheless, there are remarkable differences across countries regarding both the level of implicit taxes and their development over successive age cohorts, which can be attributed to differences in ageing processes and in the institutional features of national pension systems. In addition, we can demonstrate how effective different approaches to pension reform are in smoothing the intergenerational profile of implicit tax rates.