Exchange Rate Regime,Financial Market Bubbles and Long‐term Growth in China: Lessons from Japan

Since 2014, capital inflows into China have turned into capital outflows, reversing the gradual appreciation path of the renminbi against the US dollar into an erratic depreciation path. The paper explains the current capital outflows by comparing China and Japan with respect to the impact of exchange rate expectations on speculative capital flows. It is argued that both in China and Japan, given benign liquidity conditions in the USA, policy‐induced appreciation expectations have generated capital inflows that have contributed to overinvestment and financial market bubbles. The current reversal of capital flows is seen as a signal that the bubble in China has burst. To stabilize growth in China and to discourage speculative capital outflows a fixed exchange rate to the dollar is recommended. Given Japan's experience and given that China's foreign assets remain high, the depreciation pressure on the Chinese renminbi can be expected to abate.     

Rebalancing China's Economy: Domestic and International Implications

This paper considers interactions between China's domestic and external imbalances and their global implications. We present scenarios detailing how a rebalancing of China's growth pattern from investment‐driven growth towards more consumption‐driven growth may occur in practice. Using input–output tables for 2012, we illustrate the knife‐edged nature of Chinese rebalancing, the linkages between expenditure‐side and production‐side rebalancing, and how an internal rebalancing could exacerbate external imbalances. A policy implication for China is that for rebalancing to be fast, consumption must be exceptionally resilient and the efficiency of investment must increase sharply. If rebalancing is too slow, the capital‐to‐output ratio will rise to potentially unsustainable levels and consumption will fail to attain levels of contemporary upper middle‐income economies by 2030. Global input–output tables (1995–2011) suggest that the patterns of Chinese rebalancing considered in our scenarios may generate substantial headwinds for exports to China by its trading partners.     

International Trade and R&D Investment: Evidence from Chinese Manufacturing Firms

A current concern for China's long‐term growth prospect is whether China can become an innovative economy and achieve industrial upgrading to compensate for the gradually declining competitiveness resulting from low‐cost labor. The present study examines this issue by exploring how trade participation impacts on the R&D investment of manufacturing firms through various channels. Merging China's Annual Manufacturing Survey Dataset and the Chinese Customs Dataset allows us to study such a relationship at the individual firm level. The empirical results suggest that channels such as geographical diversification of export markets, share of imports from high‐income countries, average unit value of imports, number of intermediate goods and capital goods imports, and the trade regime are significant factors that influence firm‐level R&D investment. The study discusses the policy implications of the empirical findings in relation to industrial and trade policies that may be potentially beneficial for China's transition towards an innovative economy.     

Foreign direct investment in China: Policy,recent trend and impact 1

One of the most important elements of China's economic reform has been the promotion of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflow. Government polices on FDI have gone through different stages in their main objectives since the late‐1970s, from gradually opening to foreign investors, to actively encouraging inward investment, directing FDI in accordance with domestic industrial restructuring, and complying with China's World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations. FDI in China has experienced rapid growth especially since the mid‐1990s, as well as structural change. Most of the earlier investments were small scale, labor‐intensive and export‐oriented. In recent years, more investment has been large scale and more capital and technology intensive, aiming at both domestic and export markets. Moreover, increasingly more investment has come from the industrial world, and has located along the eastern coastal regions, in additional to the two southeastern provinces. FDI has played a crucial role in China's rapid growth, economic transition, and, mostly importantly, integration with the world. China's recent accession to the WTO provides more incentives to foreign investors. At the same time, it will also result in more intense competition for domestic firms.     

Corporate innovation in China and its implications

China's current economic transition policies focus on shifting from export‐driven manufacturing towards high‐end, high‐tech research and development (R&D), and domestic consumption. Since the early 2000s the government has issued a series of policies and guidelines to encourage innovation. Both in‐house R&D investment and the number of patent grants/applications have seen considerable growth in recent years. More specifically, industry‐funded R&D was responsible for more than three quarters of total in‐house R&D investment. Despite the rapid growth in R&D expenditure and the number of patents, China's corporate innovation still faces many obstacles and challenges. To further stimulate corporate innovation, the government may need to create an environment of fair competition for domestic enterprises, encourage the growth of institutional investors and their active participation in corporate governance, and improve the efficiency of financial systems. The experience of China in promoting innovation provides policy approaches and implications from which other emerging economies can learn.     

Effects of China's Structural Change on the Exports of East Asian Economies

The Chinese economy is slowing down and is in the midst of a structural transformation from export‐led and investment‐led growth to domestic demand‐led and consumption‐led growth. While there are widespread concerns among China's trading partners about the effect of the slowdown in China's growth on their exports, China's structural changes are also likely to have a significant impact: for example, China will import fewer machines and more cosmetics. The central objective of the present paper is to empirically examine the effect of China's structural transformation on the exports of East Asian economies, which have close trade linkages with China. We find that economies that have failed to increase the share of consumption goods in their exports to China have suffered larger declines in their quantities of exports to China. In addition, economies that have suffered losses in their shares of China's parts and components imports have faced reductions in their shares in China's total imports.     

Chinese Stylized Sterilization： The Cost-sharing Mechanism and Financial Repression

This paper attempts to explain why sterilized intervention was so successful and sustainable in China during the first decade of the 21st century.We argue that the Chinese Government established a sterilization cost-sharing mechanism among the People’s Bank of China, commercial banks and the household sector.On the one hand,Chinese commercial banks have to assume some of the sterilization costs by purchasing low yield central bank bills and maintaining high levels of required reserves.On the other hand,Chinese households assume some of the sterilization costs by bearing negative real deposit interest rates.The costsharing mechanism under financial repression prevents a huge quasi-fiscal loss by the People’s Bank of China as well as high inflation.However,Chinese households have become victims of this financial repression.Faced with the pressure of changing the growth model from investment-driven to domestic consumption-driven,the interest rate will have to be liberalized eventually,which will,in turn,make sterilized intervention unsustainable.     

China's Nonfinancial Corporate Debt Dynamics

Since the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, China's nonfinancial corporate debt has been rising steadily and rapidly, posing serious threat to China's financial stability. China's rising corporate debt is mainly attributable to three factors: worsening capital efficiency, worsening corporate profitability and high funding costs. Based on a dynamic recursive model developed in the paper, we simulate the trajectories of China's corporate debt‐to‐GDP ratio, and find that if China fails to reverse the current trends in capital efficiency, corporate profitability and financing costs, China's nonfinancial corporate debt‐to‐GDP ratio will continue to rise without converging to a limit. Against most economists' intuition, given the current trends of changes in parameters, higher economic growth will not help China to escape the corporate debt trap. On the contrary, it will make China's corporate debt problem even worse. To avert a corporate debt crisis, China needs to speed up the structural reform and change the growth paradigm so as to enhance capital efficiency and firms' profitability, while reducing firms' financing costs.     

China,Like the US,Faces Challenges in Achieving Inclusive Growth through Manufacturing

For more than three decades the goal of becoming “the factory of the world” has been at the core of China's development strategy. This strategy, in combination with high rates of domestic investment and low rates of consumption, has made Chinese production the most manufacturing intensive in the world. But as its wages have risen, China's competitiveness in the most labor‐intensive manufacturing industries has eroded. Its ability to assemble products remains a major source of its exports, but it has also tried to shift toward more sophisticated value‐added production domestically. Chinese domestic spending has shifted away from investment toward consumption as citizens' income has grown. Like Americans, Chinese are also spending more on services than on manufactured goods. All of these changes are fundamentally altering the structure of China's production, reducing the role of manufacturing and increasing the skill levels of workers in manufacturing. This paper reviews the challenges posed by these developments for China's long‐term goal of achieving more inclusive growth. It presents evidence that the commonly held perceptions that Chinese manufacturing employment growth is robust are wrong. In fact, such growth has peaked and China is now following a pattern of structural change that is typical of a more mature emerging economy, in which the share of employment in manufacturing declines as workers are increasingly employed in services.     

Development in China＇s Foreign Trade： 2003-2012

China＇s foreign trade has entered a new stage, marked by some profound changes since 2003. After 5 years ＇consecutive high growth, China＇s foreign trade experienced a significant slowdown in growth following the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. The purpose of this article is to present a review of the development in China＇s foreign trade over the past l O years, and to explore important changes that have taken place during this period of time. A majorfinding of the presentpaper is that the traditional forces driving the high export growth in China, that is, low-cost labor, low-cost resources and low-cost money, have been disappearing. The policy implication is that over the next l O-15 years, the most important conditions for sustaining high export growth will be promoting the development and export of private enterprises in traditional heaw industries and high-technology industries, and relying on technological progress and high produc6vity to propel export expansion.     

China＇s FDI Net Inflow and Deterioration of Terms of Trade： Paradox and Explanation

Starting from the contradiction between China's sustained growth in foreign direct investment (FDI) net inflow and deterioration of the terms of trade, this paper analyzes the characteristics of FDI sectoral structure since the 1990. Moreover, considering the international market competitive environment, this paper gives a concrete analysis of the influence mechanism and concludes that the flowing of FDI into labor‐intensive export sectors caused the deterioration of China's terms of trade. To improve its terms of trade, China needs to direct FDI inflow into capital‐ and technology‐intensive sectors and service sectors. (Edited by Xiaoming Feng)     

The Impact of the US Interest Rate Hike on Emerging Market Economies and the Belt and Road Initiative

Since the end of 2015, the US Federal Reserve has raised its benchmark interest rate nine times. This has led to capital outflows and asset depreciation in many emerging market economies. The present paper examines the factors that determine the financial volatility of emerging markets in the face of external shocks. By calculating the capital flows of 30 emerging markets from 1990 to 2018 and conducting panel regression, this paper finds that countries with good infrastructure facilities, a sound banking system and high economic growth have significantly lower cross‐border financial risks. An implication from the empirical analysis is that emerging countries would benefit greatly by actively taking part in the Belt and Road Initiative. The framework of the Belt and Road Initiative allows emerging countries better access to China's massive consumer market to promote trade and long‐term growth. Their quality of infrastructure can be improved through cooperation with China in infrastructure investment. They can also jointly establish a cooperative financial framework to enhance regional financial stability. These strategies will reduce systematic financial risks and counteract the negative impacts of US interest rate hikes.     

China's investment and rate of return on capital revisited

We revisit China's suspected overinvestment problem by examining the rate of return on capital from two perspectives. First, we find that two existing methods of estimating the rate of return generate conflicting results, and we succeed in reconciling them. Our revised estimates show that the rate of return rose sharply from 1998 to 2014, which helps explain the strong investment drive. Second, we explore what caused the rate of return to rise. We find the explanation lies mainly with the long-term factor of rising total factor productivity but that the short-term cyclical factor of low real interest rates has also contributed.     

Vanishing of China's Twin Surpluses and Its Policy Implications

This paper argues that the twin surpluses in China's balance of payments will disappear in the future as a result of external and internal structural changes. China's current account surplus will diminish as a result of the decline in the goods trade surplus, the expanding service trade deficit and negative investment income. China's capital account might shift from surplus to deficit as a result of shrinking net direct investment inflows and more volatile short‐term capital flows. When the twin surpluses no longer exist, the normalization of the US treasury bond yields will be sped up, terminating the one‐way appreciation of the RMB exchange rate; the People's Bank of China's pressure to sterilize inflows will be alleviated, and new problems for the People's Bank of China's monetary operation will emerge; new financial vulnerabilities for the Chinese economy will arise. Finally, the present paper provides some policy suggestions for the Chinese Government to deal with the declining twin surpluses.     

China's FDI and non-FDI economies and the sustainability of future high Chinese growth

This paper presents and assesses of the contribution of inward FDI to China's recent rapid economic growth using a two stage growth accounting approach. Recent econometric literature focuses on testing whether Chinese growth depends on inward FDI rather than measuring the contribution. Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs), often (but not exclusively) are joint ventures between foreign companies and Chinese enterprises, and can be thought of as forming a distinctive subpart of the Chinese economy. These enterprises account for over 50% of China's exports and 60% of China's imports. Their share in Chinese GDP has been over 20% in the last two years, but they employ only 3% of the workforce, since their average labor productivity exceeds that of Non-FIEs by around 9:1. Their production is more heavily for export rather than the domestic market because FIEs provide access to both distribution systems abroad and product design for export markets. Our decomposition results indicate that China's FIEs may have contributed over 40% of China's economic growth in 2003 and 2004, and without this inward FDI, China's overall GDP growth rate could have been around 3.4 percentage points lower. We suggest that the sustainability of both China' export and overall economic growth may be questionable if inward FDI plateaus in the future.     

Chinese Investment in the US and the EU is Declining –for Similar Reasons

Since peaking in 2016, Chinese outward investment, primarily to the US but also to the European Union (EU), has declined dramatically, especially in response to changes in China's domestic rules for capital outflow. Concern over growing Chinese influence in other economies, the ascendant role of a Communist Party‐led government in Beijing and the possible security implications of Chinese dominance in the high‐tech sector have put Chinese outward investment under international scrutiny. This paper analyzes the recent trends in Chinese investment in the US and the EU and reviews recent political and regulatory changes both have adopted toward Chinese inward investment. It also explores the emerging transatlantic difference in the regulatory response to the Chinese information technology firm, Huawei. Concerned about national security and as part of the ongoing broader trade friction with China, the US has cracked down far harder on the company than the EU.     

Does China＇s Huge External Surplus Imply an Undervalued Renminbi？

A pegged exchange rate regime has been pivotal to China's export-led development strategy. However, its huge trade surpluses and massive build up of international reserves have been matched by large deficits for major trading partners, creating acute policy concerns abroad, especially in the USA. This paper provides a straightforward conceptual framework for interpreting the effect of China's exchange rate policy on its own trade balance and that of trading partners in the context of discrepant economic growth rates. It shows how pegging the exchange rate when output is outstripping expenditure induces China's trade surpluses and counterpart deficits for its trading partners. An important corollary is that given its strictly regulated capital account, China's persistently large surpluses imply a significantly undervalued renminbi, which should gradually become more flexible.     

Income and Price Elasticities of China＇s Exports

The appearance of new product varieties and improvements in the quality of goods have both played key roles in the rapid growth of China's exports. However, these two important elements have not been formally integrated into the demand equations for China's exports. As we demonstrate in this paper, income elasticity will be underestimated if new varieties of goods and quality improvements are omitted in price index and quantity index calculations, which are necessary for estimating the export demand function. Moreover, the faster new product varieties enter export markets, the greater the underestimation will be. In this paper, we develop an export demand equation that takes into account new product varieties and improvements in quality, and then calculate the demand function for China's exports using the data from 1992 to 2006. According to our estimation, the short‐term income elasticity of demand for China's exports is approximately 2.34, and the short‐term price elasticity is approximately –0.65. Our estimation predicts an increase in China's export value in the case of an RMB appreciation or export rebate rates reduction in the short term, due to the low price elasticity of China's exports, whose absolute value is less than 1. Our findings are novel and could have significant policy implications.     

Does Outward Foreign Direct Investment Facilitate China's Export Upgrading?

This paper empirically investigates the impact of China's outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) on its export sophistication. Using a provincial‐level panel dataset and applying fixed effects and instrumental variable regression techniques, the study finds that, on average, OFDI has no significant impact on China's export sophistication. However, after the full sample is divided into different regions, the study finds that OFDI has a positive and significant impact on export sophistication in the developed coastal region, but no such impact is observed in the less developed inland regions. Further investigation using a panel threshold model reveals that only when GDP, per capita GDP, human capital, and the research and development intensity of a home economy reach a certain level can OFDI promote export sophistication. The findings suggest that accelerating eco nomic development and increasing absorptive capacity can facilitate the contribution of OFDI to China's export sophistication.     

Does the Domestic Value Added Induced by China＇s Exports Really Belong to China？

Since 2001, the exports of foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) have accounted for more than 50 percent of China's total exports. As foreign capital occupies a high proportion of the total capital of FIEs, most FIEs' capital gains are foreign factor income. Although these gains are calculated as a part of China's GDP, they do not belong to China's national income. To determine the real contribution of exports to China's welfare, the present paper analyses the impact of exports on China's national income using a non‐competitive input–output model capturing processing trade. The results show that every US$1000 of China's exports generates US$506.8 of national income. The real contribution of exports to China's welfare is much smaller than what we expected. This suggests that China should endeavor to improve the gains from international markets or find another engine to maintain its economic growth.