Effects of subsidized crop insurance on crop choices

This study focuses on how subsidized crop insurance affects crop choices. Crop insurance may change farm investments by reducing risks and providing subsidies. First, actuarially fair insurance reduces risks in crop production and marketing, holding the expected return constant. Second, insurance subsidies encourage farms to purchase crop insurance, which increases the expected return to insured risky crops. Farms also have many self‐insurance mechanisms such as crop diversification or working off the farm. We derive conditions under which (1) unsubsidized and actuarially fair crop insurance or (2) insurance premium subsidies lead to more investment in a risky higher return crop. We then examine the role of self‐insurance for these conditions. The impact of premium subsidies is decomposed into a direct profit effect and an indirect coverage effect. These effects are explained by substitutions between market insurance and self‐insurance and between a risky crop and a safe crop. We discuss each effect as a combination of subsidy and risk effects. Numerical illustrations show that an insurance subsidy has a larger impact on risky crop investments compared to that of an input subsidy when farms are more risk‐averse and have high costs of self‐insurance. The framework provides a novel way to evaluate subsidized crop insurance programs.     

Actuarial Fairness of Crop Insurance Rates with Constant Rate Relativities

Increased availability and demand for low-deductible crop insurance policies have increased focus on crop insurance rating methods. Actuarial fairness cannot be achieved if constant multiplicative factors are used to determine how premiums change as coverage levels increase. A comparison of premium rates generated by the factors used by the two most popular crop insurance products with those generated by a standard yield distribution shows that the popular insurance products overcharge for low-deductible policies in most counties. This overpricing may explain why large premium subsidies were required to induce farmers to move from low-deductible to high-deductible policies beginning in 2001.     

Warming temperatures will likely induce higher premium rates and government outlays for the U.S. crop insurance program

Likely climate change impacts include damages to agricultural production resulting from increased exposure to extreme heat. Considerable uncertainty remains regarding impacts on crop insurance programs. We utilize a panel of U.S. corn yield data to predict the effect of warming temperatures on the mean and variance of yields, as well as crop insurance premium rates and producer subsidies. While we focus on corn, we demonstrate that the subsidy impacts are likely to carry over to other major program crops. We find that warming decreases mean yields and increases yield risk on average, which results in higher premium rates. Under a 1°C warming scenario, we find that premium rates at the 90% coverage level will increase by 39% on average; however, there is considerable statistical uncertainty around this average as the 95% confidence interval spans from 22% to 61%. We also find evidence of extensive cross‐sectional differences as the county‐level rate impacts range from a 10% reduction to a 63% increase. Results indicate that exposure to extreme heat and changes in the coefficient of variation are large drivers of the impacts. Under the 1°C warming scenario, we find that annual subsidy payments for the crop insurance program could increase by as much as $1.5 billion, representing a 22% increase relative to current levels. This estimate increases to 3.7 billion (57%) under a 2°C warming scenario. Our results correspond to a very specific counterfactual: the marginal effect of warming temperatures under current technology, production, and crop insurance enrollments. These impacts are shown to be smaller than the forecasted impacts under a commonly used end‐of‐century general circulation model for even the most optimistic CO₂ emissions projection.     

森林保险保费补贴政策林业产出激励效应评估

基于开展森林保险保费补贴政策的23个省(市、自治区)2014—2018年面板数据,在分析正向激励效应与负向抑制效应下的森林保险保费补贴政策产出效应传导机制的基础上,运用柯布-道格拉斯生产函数与面板数据模型从林业产出视角分别对全国层面、东部地区和中西部地区的森林保险保费补贴政策实施效果进行评估。结果表明:森林保险保费补贴政策存在产出激励效应,且存在1期滞后;同时,森林保险保费补贴对林业产出的促进效果受影响于林业风险,风险水平的上升会抑制保费补贴政策对林业产出的促进作用;森林保险保费补贴政策产出激励效应及林业风险对补贴政策产出激励效应的影响均存在区域差异性。最后,提出实施保费补贴差异化、逐步提升保障水平等建议。     

Demand for Crop Insurance in Developing Countries: New Evidence from India

Determining farmers’ real demand for crop insurance is difficult, especially in developing countries, where there is a lack of formal financial sector integration and a high reliance on informal risk mitigation options. We provide some new estimates of farmers’ willingness‐to‐pay for insurance in the context of a large‐scale subsidised programme in India. We conducted a discrete choice experiment with agricultural households across four states in India, enabling us to estimate preferences for specific insurance policy attributes such as coverage period, method of loss assessment, timing of indemnity payments and the cost of insurance. Our results suggest that farmers do value crop insurance under certain conditions and some are willing to pay a premium for such coverage in excess of the subsidised rates they are currently required to pay under this programme. In particular, farmers value the assurances that they will receive timely payouts when they incur losses, and may not have a strong preference for the method with which losses are assessed. On the other hand, farmers are quite sensitive to coverage periods. Our baseline assessment shows that when optimised to farmer requirements, there can be a sizeable demand for crop insurance by developing country farmers.     

U.S. Farm Safety Nets and the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act

Although crop insurance programs have been an important part of U.S. agricultural policy since the 1930s, the "safety net" matra has taken on new relevance and importance in recent policy deliberations and rhetoric. This paper contains a non technical review of issues underlying the safety net concept in U.S. agricultural policy. We outline recent changes in U.S. crop insurance programs and review provisions of the 2000 Agricultural Risk Protection Act (ARPA), which had a significant impact on U.S. risk management programs by expanding crop and revenue insurance subsidies and stimulating new product development. A simple empirical analysis of how these changes may have affected program participation is considered. We then outline points relevant to 2002 Farm Bill deliberations. As is pointed out, the safety net concept seems pervasive to all policy discussions. Countercylical payments, even when provided on an ad hoc basis, may distort production and trade conditions.     

Demand for area crop insurance among litchi producers in northern Vietnam

This study examines the need for crop insurance for litchi production in northern Vietnam and how farmers might participate in such a program. Hypothetical insurance programs were developed which proposed all‐risk coverage based on area yields. This coverage was offered to farmers to determine both their interest in the program and how insurance features and farmer characteristics affected their decision to buy insurance. Farmers were also surveyed regarding their production practices, price and yield expectations, and financial and personal characteristics. Even before considering other program costs and government budget constraints, there is not a strong case for establishing a crop insurance program here. Results indicate that while farmer participation would be significant, crop insurance is not needed to achieve policy goals like raising farmer income or guaranteeing subsistence levels of income. Crop insurance is not needed to promote litchi production, which is already expanding rapidly due to its high profitability relative to other farm enterprises. In their choice of coverages, farmers preferred higher yield guarantee levels and lower indemnity prices. Estimated premiums were quite low when expressed as a percent of expected revenue, and farmers were not responsive to changes in premiums. Econometric analysis indicated that high income farmers were more likely to participate, but other farmer characteristics seemed to matter little. Anecdotal evidence suggested that farmers believed the expected area yields used to set insurance coverage levels were too low. Because litchi productivity varies significantly by tree age and the litchi planted area is expanding rapidly, determining appropriate values for expected area yields and insurance coverage levels appeared to be the biggest challenge in program design. It is hypothesized that additional farmer education about the relationship between area and farm yields and other aspects of area insurance could improve such a program's operation. Published by Elsevier Science B.V.     

Farmers' Preferences for Alternative Crop and Health Insurance Subsidy

In addition to production risks, farmers desire to balance personal risks of health care. A theoretical framework is developed for holistic health and crop insurance products that provide the opportunity to switch a portion of existing crop insurance subsidy for greater health coverage. A random utility discrete choice experiment is used to assess farmers' stated preferences for holistic insurance products. Farmers prefer higher levels of coverage and are price sensitive. A sample of farmers did not prefer the subsidy switch. However, the subsidy switch is preferred by older farmers, those with higher health care spending, and farmers who have experienced major health problems.     

An empirical analysis of the factors influencing farmer demand for forest insurance: Based on surveys from Lin’an County in Zhejiang Province of China

The lack of effective farmer demand is a major factor that restricts the development of China's forest insurance. To solve this problem, this study uses a Logit model to conduct an empirical analysis of relevant factors in the farmers’ demand for forest insurance, based on field survey data of Lin’an County, Zhejiang Province. The results show that the farmers’ understanding of forest insurance, the proportion of forestry revenues in the total household income, forest size, forest disaster frequency, forest insurance liability, insurance amount setup, and the farmers’ satisfaction regarding the premium subsidy policy, are the main factors that affect the farmers’ demand for forest insurance. Therefore, we propose to expand forest insurance promotion, raise the farmers’ income, rationally design insurance products, and optimize the forest premium subsidy policy to enhance the farmers’ willingness to participate in forest insurance.     

政策性森林保险开展状况的评价与分析——基于福建林农问卷调查的实证研究

基于福建林农问卷调查,对目前政策性森林保险的开展状况进行评价与分析。分析表明:林农对政策性森林保险开展状况的总体满意程度较高,但林农对森林保险的保险责任、保险金额和灾后理赔的评价不高,林农对森林保险的购买意愿并不强烈。针对这些问题,本文提出了完善目前政策性森林保险运行机制的对策建议。     

PREMIUM RATEMAKING IN AN ALL RISK CROP INSURANCE PROGRAM1

Fluctuation in farm incomes resulting from variation in crop yield is one of the most significant features in agriculture. Crop insurance is a feasible method by which the farmer can protect his income and his investment from the disastrous effects of crop losses due to natural hazards. This study has attempted to cover two parts. First, it has examined the most important-factors influencing crop yields in connection with the premium rate scheme (i.e. the long-run average yield and the level of coverage). These factors include resource inputs, technology, weather, and stochastic variable. Second, it has developed a refined method of approximating the premium rate. The data used in testing normality were based on the Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation's annual yield survey covering the years 1916 to 1964. The test shows that none of the annual yield distributions within the area surveyed was normally distributed, revealing that a cartful and exact delineation of a crop risk area is necessary. The findings also show that the cyclical pattern of weather and the upward trend in crop production due to technology were evidently important for the adjustment of the level of coverage and premium rate over time. Additional research relating the effects of weather and technology on crop yields would help to establish a more realistic insurance program. Other aspects should not be overlooked. These include (a) other possible levels besides the existing level of coverage and (b) a livestock or a combined crop-livestock insurance program along with the crop insurance program. The purpose of these additional aspects is to provide farmers with a fuller measure of protection.     

Insurance for Technology Adoption: An Experimental Evaluation of Schemes and Subsidies with Maize Farmers in Mexico

For farmers in developing countries, the combination of both risk aversion and the lack of insurance is often a major impediment to adoption of productivity‐enhancing technologies, such as higher yielding hybrid seed. In a framed field experiment with Mexican maize farmers, we investigate whether bundling hybrid seed with an insurance scheme can increase its adoption, while also controlling for risk aversion. We test insurance schemes with different levels of risk coverage and premium subsidies and find that (1) all schemes significantly increase the degree of adoption of the higher yielding seed, (2) partial insurance schemes perform worse than full insurance, (3) weather index insurance with geographical basis risk performs no worse than indemnity insurance, and (4) premium subsidies significantly increase the adoption effect of indemnity insurance, but not that of index insurance.     

Does crop insurance influence agrochemical uses under current Chinese situations? A case study in the Manasi watershed,Xinjiang

Government subsidy to crop insurance has been advocated as a policy alternative to support growth of agricultural production and farmers' income in China since the country joined the WTO. However, cautions have been raised as the crop insurance program may impact the environment negatively. This study tries to explore farmers' behaviors with regard to agrochemical use with household data applied to a simultaneous equation system consisting of disaggregated input models. It is found that decisions on fertilizer, pesticides, and agro‐film applications do have different impacts on crop insurance participation, and are influenced by the latter in different ways. It is also implied that encouraging farmers' participation in crop insurance under current low‐premium and low‐indemnity terms does not have a significantly negative impact on the environment.     

Input use under cost-of-production crop insurance: Theory and evidence

There have been a number of previous studies that examined the effects of yield- or revenue-based crop insurance products on input use of farmers. However, no study has specifically investigated the input use impacts of a cost-of-production (COP) crop insurance policy, even though this type of crop insurance is the predominant one used in several other countries outside of the United States (such as the Philippines and China). This article aims to theoretically and empirically examine the effect of a COP crop insurance product on farmers’ chemical input use. Our theoretical model suggests that the effect of COP insurance on input use can either be positive or negative, with the resulting impact depending on the strengths of (a) the traditional moral hazard effect of insurance (i.e., an input use decreasing effect); versus (b) the marginal incentives to apply more inputs due to input levels being the main determinant for expected indemnity amounts in this type of insurance (i.e., an input use increasing effect). A survey data set from corn farmers in the Philippines is then used to empirically illustrate how a particular COP insurance product influences input use in a real-life context. In this case, we find that COP insurance increases the use of chemical inputs (e.g., fertilizers and total chemical expenditure), implying that the positive marginal incentive to apply more inputs dominates the negative moral hazard effect.     

Implications of the US Farm Bill of 2002 for agricultural trade and trade negotiations

The US Farm Bill of 2002 is the latest in a 7-decade history of farm subsidy laws that transfer funds to farmers and regulate and subsidize production of selected commodities. Fruit, tree nut, ornamental and vegetable crops, hay and meats remain outside scope of main subsidy programs. The new law continues many innovations of the 1996 Act, such as removal of authority for annual land idling and crop price floors accompanied by government stockholding. Government payments remain the primary focus of commodity programs. The total amount of these payments are likely to remain similar to the amount paid in the period 1999–2001, but with some changes in the form of the programs. For example, allowing owners to update acreage and yield payment bases creates additional incentives for farmers to link current planting decisions to anticipated farm subsidies. Similarly, the new program that ties "counter-cyclical" payments to the price of a specific crop also has production stimulus. A new program, estimated to add about 5–10 per cent to marginal milk revenue for smaller farms, makes 'deficiency' payments to dairy farms when milk prices are low. Despite the new programs with added links to stimulating production, new USA programs stimulate production only marginally more than the subsidies of the 1999–2001 period, which were replaced. Furthermore, the USA has flexibility to avoid explicitly violating its WTO commitments. Nonetheless, this US Farm Bill of 2002 has curtailed the previous trends toward lower farm subsidies and smaller production stimuli, and the negative publicity surrounding it has made negotiating reductions of farm trade distortions more difficult.     

Producer Experience, Learning by Doing, and Yield Performance

Current crop insurance rating procedures consider only performance for the individual crop in question. Recent farm legislation has given producers considerable planting flexibility and, as a result, many have shifted to new crops. Producers without a production history for the new crop may be offered levels of insurance that do not accurately reflect their expected yields. Likewise, premium rates may not reflect a producer's actual risk for a new crop. We examine the extent to which information about expected yields may be gleaned from a consideration of historical performance on other crops. We also consider the extent to which yield performance exhibits learning by doing such that yields improve with experience. Though the results are mixed, we generally find that yield performance tends to improve with experience. However, when yields are conditioned on historical yield performance for other crops, the importance of experience is diminished significantly. Yield performance is related to a number of farm characteristics. Finally, we examine the extent to which yield variability is correlated across crops for individual farmers. Implications for crop insurance rating practices are discussed. The results demonstrate robust correlation between a farm's historical yield on other crops and a newly produced crop—a factor largely ignored in current crop insurance contracts.     

An Empirical Analysis of Acreage Effects of Participation in the Federal Crop Insurance Program

The extent to which crop insurance programs have resulted in additional land being brought into production has been a topic of considerable debate. We consider multiequation structural models of acreage response, insurance participation, CRP enrollment, and input usage. Our analysis focuses on corn and soybean production in the Corn Belt and wheat and barley production in the Upper Great Plains. Our results confirm that increased participation in insurance programs provokes statistically significant acreage responses in some cases, though the response is very modest in every case. In the most extreme cases, 30% decreases in premiums as a result of increased subsidies provoke acreage increases ranging from 0.2% to 1.1%. A number of policy simulations involving increases in premium subsidies are considered.     

我国农机保险财政补贴方案研究

农机保险的正外部性与有效需求不足表明了实施农机保险财政补贴的必要性,文章结合现有补贴试点地区实践经验与数据,利用统计优化思想与系统分析方法对农机保险方案中的补贴机型、保险费率与保障金额、补贴比率与补贴金额等问题进行了研究。主要结论如下:(1)农机保险财政补贴的主要机型应该是拖拉机与联合收割机,允许部分地区开展特色农机保险;(2)补贴险种应该主要是交强险、第三者责任险、农机操作人员意外伤害险及农机损失险,综合试点地区费率水平确定了各险种的保费与保障金额;(3)基于财政收入水平、粮食产量、人均收入水平、农业保险补贴比率现状、粮食主产区划分等因素,确定了三类补贴区域及补贴比率,分别为35%、40%及45%;(4)测算了参与率分别在30%~100%情况下的补贴金额为21.7亿元与72.5亿元之间,其中最有可能参与率的补贴金额为42.7亿元。研究结果对相关部门推动农机保险开展与制定农机保险财政补贴政策,具有重要参考依据。     

The influence of direct payments on farmers’ hail insurance decisions

We analyze determinants of hail insurance use of Swiss farmers, using FADN panel data covering the period 1990–2009. Mixed effect logistic regression models are estimated to identify the most important farm and farmer characteristics that trigger insurance use. In addition, information on local hail risk is taken into account in these models. It shows that larger farms, with specialization in crop production, and with larger local hail risks are more likely to adopt the hail insurance. Moreover, insurance users are usually older and better educated. Since the early 1990s, Swiss agricultural policy has reduced price support and introduced general and ecological direct payments. This has led to a much higher importance of direct payments for farmers’ incomes. Our analysis shows that this development has contributed to decreasing hail insurance adoption rates in Switzerland over the period considered. Our results indicate that the larger the share of direct payments for total farm revenue, the less attractive is insurance as a risk management strategy for farmers. This interdependency should be explicitly considered by agricultural policy in the design of support mechanisms.     

Domestic support and the WTO negotiations

In their attempt to maximise trade benefits, agricultural trade negotiators must allocate scarce resources and consider trade-offs across issues such as liberalising foreign border measures or reducing foreign domestic subsidies. Analysis and examples support the notion that more liberalisation will be achieved in the new WTO round by emphasis on lowering border barriers and export subsidies rather than attempting to discipline domestic farm subsidies directly. Analyses of EU grain policy, Korean rice policy and US sugar policy show how reduced export subsidy or more import access have substantial trade benefits, even if farmers are compensated with payments or price supports.