Investor and price response to patterns in earnings surprises

As part of their model to explain short-term positive and long-term negative auto-correlation in stock returns, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny [1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of Finance 49, 307–345] suggest that investors may extrapolate trends in earnings performance. I test this portion of their model by examining investor trading patterns in firms that experience consecutive same-sign earnings surprises. Consistent with their model, after controlling for regularities in trading activity, I find that the net buying of small investors increases with the number of consecutive positive earnings surprises. I further find that purchasing activity of small investors subsequent to consecutive positive surprises is significantly negatively correlated with returns throughout the remainder of the year. These results suggest that such investors are not simply rationally updating after public news announcements. My results are robust to controlling for auto-correlation in earnings surprises.     

The effect of earnings surprises on information asymmetry

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between earnings surprises and information asymmetry are stronger when the surprises are more likely to capture investors’ attention. Examining the source of these changes, we show that decreased information search activities is the most important factor for asymmetry declining after positive surprises; for negative surprises, decreased uninformed trading plays a dominant role increasing asymmetry.     

The price and volume response to earnings announcements in the corporate bond market

We examine abnormal returns and trading activity in bond markets around earnings announcements. Previous work provides mixed evidence on the relative impact of positive and negative surprises and the degree of response in investment-grade and speculative-grade bonds. We find that these announcements convey value-relevant information for both positive and negative earnings surprises in both investment and speculative-grade bonds. We also document significant heterogeneity in the response across industries, with muted responses in both abnormal returns and trading activity for bonds of firms in the financial and utilities industries.     

Informed Trading in Corporate Bonds Prior to Earnings Announcements

This paper examines the information content of corporate bond trading prior to earnings announcements using data from both NAIC and TRACE. We find that the direction of pre‐announcement bond trading is closely related to earnings surprises. This link is most evident prior to negative news and in high‐yield bonds. Further, abnormal bond trading during the pre‐announcement period can help predict both earnings surprises and post‐announcement bond returns. Such predictive ability of bond trading largely originates from institutional‐sized trades and is concentrated in the issuer's most actively traded bond. Finally, even after accounting for transactions costs, informed bond trading can generate significant net profits, especially prior to the release of bad news.     

The Extreme Future Stock Returns Following I/B/E/S Earnings Surprises

We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time‐series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book‐to‐market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies.     

Short Interest,Returns, and Unfavorable Fundamental Information

Several months before information becomes public, the level of short interest contains value‐relevant information about publicly traded corporations. Short interest predicts future bad news, negative earnings surprises, and downward revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. This informational content is stronger for stocks that are harder to short. We also find that nearly half of the well‐known cross‐sectional relation between short interest and future stock returns is related to future changes in firms’ value‐relevant information. Our results suggest that short interest predicts future returns, in part, due to short sellers’ ability to uncover unfavorable information about firms.     

Announcing the announcement

What drives investors’ attention? We study how far in advance earnings calendars are pre-announced and find that investors are more attentive to earnings news when such details are disclosed well ahead of time. This variation in investors' attention affects short-run and long-run stock returns, thereby creating incentives for firms to strategically pre-announce the report date on short notice when the earnings news is bad. Consistent with this idea, firms pre-announce their report dates well ahead of time when earnings are good and do it at the very last moment when earnings are bad. A trading strategy that exploits such variations yields abnormal returns of 1.5% per month.     

Does Investor Sentiment Affect Earnings Management?

I hypothesize and find that earnings management via accruals is driven partially by the prevailing market‐wide investor sentiment. Managers inflate earnings in periods of higher sentiment, but report more conservatively during periods of low sentiment. Moreover, the likelihood of income‐increasing earnings management to avoid negative earnings surprises is also positively associated with investor sentiment. These results are robust to: (i) controls for time‐varying firm characteristics such as growth, investment opportunity sets, future profitability, leverage and size; (ii) macroeconomic variables such as future inflation, GDP growth, and growth in industrial production; (iii) multiple proxies for investor sentiment; and (iv) discretionary revenues as alternative measure of earnings management. Cross‐sectional analyses reveal that firms whose stock returns co‐move more with investor sentiment are more (less) likely to manage earnings upward via abnormal accruals in quarters of higher (lower) sentiment. The findings of managers’ strategic use of abnormal accruals show the need for increased attention from boards of directors, auditors and regulators to heightened managerial incentives to overstate earnings and to report optimistic earnings numbers during periods of high investor sentiment.     

The Calm before the Storm

I provide evidence that stocks experiencing unusually low trading volume over the week prior to earnings announcements have more unfavorable earnings surprises. This effect is more pronounced among stocks with higher short‐selling constraints. These findings support the view that unusually low trading volume signals negative information, since, under short‐selling constraints, informed agents with bad news stay by the sidelines. Changes in visibility or risk‐based explanations are insufficient to explain the results. This evidence provides insights into why unusually low trading volume predicts price declines.     

Information of Unusual Trading Volume

This article investigates the information content of stock unusual trading volume from the aspect of firm fundamental information revealed by both earnings formal announcements and preannouncements. By using the stock market data of China from the second quarter of 2003 to the end of 2015, this article provides evidence that, in general, stocks that experience unusually low trading volume over the week prior to earnings announcements have more unfavorable earnings surprises. However, because of the feature of mandatory pre-disclosure policy in China, this article further finds that the relation between unusually low trading volume and unfavorable earnings surprises only exists in the stocks without earnings preannouncements, because fundamental information is incorporated in the stock prices timely around preannouncements date. In addition, unusually low trading volume signals negative fundamental changes revealed by preannouncements, and this effect is more pronounced among stocks with higher short-selling constraints, but unusually high trading volume is value-irrelevant.     

A Temporal Analysis of Earnings Surprises: Profits versus Losses

I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are "a little bit of good news," and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an "extreme amount of bad news." My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider—namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report "a little bit of good news" in every year.     

Informed trading before positive vs. negative earnings surprises

This paper investigates whether institutional investors trade profitably around the announcements of positive or negative earnings surprises. Using Korean data over the period of 2001–2010, we find that information asymmetry is larger before negative earnings surprises (earnings shock) among investors and that the trading volume decreases only before earnings shock announcements due to the severe information asymmetry. We also find that institutions sell their stocks prior to earnings shock announcements whereas individual and foreign investors do not anticipate bad news. Finally, we find that institutional trade imbalance is positively related to the post-announcement abnormal returns of negative events. This study complements and extends prior literature on informed trading around earnings announcements by documenting evidence that domestic institutions exploit their superior information around particularly earnings shock announcements.     

Short-horizon incentives and stock price inflation

Do managerial incentive horizons have capital market consequences? We find that they do when short-sale constraints are more binding. Firms experience significant stock price inflation when their CEOs have short horizon incentives. The short-horizon CEOs sell more shares at inflated prices and generate greater abnormal trading profits. The stock price inflation is partly explained by greater earnings surprises and more positive investor reaction to the surprises. To inflate stock prices, short-horizon firms are more likely to employ income-increasing discretionary accruals. Consistent with theoretical predictions, all these effects are attenuated or statistically insignificant when short-sale constraints are less binding.     

Audit committee accounting expertise,expectations management,and nonnegative earnings surprises

We investigate whether accounting expertise on audit committees curtails expectations management to avoid negative earnings surprises. Controlling for the endogenous choice of an accounting expert, we find that firms with an accounting expert serving on the audit committee exhibit: (1) less expectations management to avoid negative earnings surprises; (2) less nonnegative earnings surprises through expectations management; and (3) more nonnegative earnings surprises that are less susceptible to manipulations of both realized earnings and earnings expectations. We find, however, that the inclusion of an accounting expert on the audit committee curtails expectations management only in the interim quarters. While Brown and Pinello (2007) find a greater magnitude of downward revisions in analysts’ forecasts in the fourth quarter, they also document a lower incidence of nonnegative earnings surprises. Together, this suggests that with an accounting expert, audit committees likely view the fourth quarter downward revisions as driven more by guidance than by manipulation, thus focusing on curbing only expectations management in interim quarters.     

Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News

Recent studies propose that limited investor attention causes market underreactions. This paper directly tests this explanation by measuring the information load faced by investors. The  investor distraction hypothesis  holds that extraneous news inhibits market reactions to relevant news. We find that the immediate price and volume reaction to a firm's earnings surprise is much weaker, and post-announcement drift much stronger, when a greater number of same-day earnings announcements are made by other firms. We evaluate the economic importance of distraction effects through a trading strategy, which yields substantial alphas. Industry-unrelated news and large earnings surprises have a stronger distracting effect.     

Misvaluation and Insider Trading Incentives for Accrual‐based and Real Earnings Management

We investigate the incentives that misvaluation creates for: (1) insider trading; and (2) concurrent earnings management through both accruals and real activities. Managers of overvalued firms have an incentive to sustain overvaluation through income increasing earnings management and, at the same time, to sell their shares (Jensen, 2005 ). Managers of undervalued firms benefit from buying their firm's shares, however the negative effects of downward earnings management may offset incentives to enhance trading advantages. The results indicate that managers of both over‐ and under‐valued firms act opportunistically, managing earnings upward (downward) with accruals while selling (buying) shares. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) has been largely ineffective in eliminating trading motivated earnings management. Finally, we do not find evidence of a relationship between managerial trading and real earnings management.     

Does the Stock Market See a Zero or Small Positive Earnings Surprise as a Red Flag?

This study shows that firms collectively incur a cost for managing earnings and analyst expectations to meet earnings forecasts. We compare the coefficient in the regression of abnormal stock returns on earnings surprise (the earnings response coefficient [ERC]) across ranges of earnings surprises. The ERC for earnings surprises in the range [0, 1¢] is significantly lower than ERCs for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges for firm-quarters in the early and mid 2000s, but not for those in the 1990s. The results are robust to controlling for the sign of estimated discretionary accruals and the trajectory of analyst earnings forecasts. We further find that investors are right to be skeptical about earnings surprises in the range [0, 1¢]. The relation of future earnings surprise with current earnings surprise is more negative for current earnings surprises in that range than for those in any other range. Evidence also suggests analysts react negatively to earnings surprises in that range.     

Options trading volume and stock price response to earnings announcements

We examine the effect of options trading volume on the stock price response to earnings announcements over the period 1996–2007. Contrary to previous studies, we find no significant difference in the immediate stock price response to earnings information announcements in samples split between firms with listed options and firms without listed options. However, within the sample of firms with listed options stratified by options volume, we find that higher options trading volume reduces the immediate stock price response to earnings announcements. This conforms with evidence that stock prices of high options trading volume firms have anticipated and pre-empted some earnings information in the pre-announcement period. We also find that higher abnormal options trading volume around earnings announcements hastens the stock price adjustment to earnings news and reduces post-earnings announcement drift.     

Religious holidays,investor distraction,and earnings announcement effects

We examine price reactions to U.S. firms’ earnings announcements during Easter week in order to analyze whether and how the religious holiday calendar impacts investors’ information processing. We find that there is an asymmetric pattern of immediate and delayed responses to earnings surprises experienced during Easter, entailing similar immediate reactions to both good and bad news and a stronger delayed response to bad news. Moreover, local religious characteristics affect investor’s response to firm news. The results are consistent with a religion-induced distraction effect on investors’ information processing ability. We also show that this effect can form the basis for a profitable trading strategy. The findings highlight the importance of religion for firms’ information environment and for the local component of stock prices.     

Cross‐border information transfers: Evidence from profit warnings issued by European firms

This paper reports evidence on cross‐border accounting information transfers associated with profit warning announcements. Using a sample of firms from 29 European countries, we find that negative earnings surprises disclosed by firms in one country affect investors’ perceptions of comparable non‐announcing firms in other countries. The form and magnitude of cross‐border effects is consistent with domestic transfers. Tests explaining variation in cross‐border information transfers provide some (albeit rather limited) evidence that effects vary according to a range of firm‐, industryand country‐level characteristics.