The Role of State‐Owned Enterprises in an Artificial Monopoly Market: The Case of Turkey

State‐owned enterprises (SOEs) benefit from many privileges based on their unique structure, their substantial capital, and their position in the economic system. Like all business corporations, they have no fixed duration, which makes them effectively immortal. In addition, they are adjuncts of the state, which enables them to survive in noncompetitive markets with little effort. Therefore, under today's ruthless global market conditions, SOEs engage in unfair competition with privately financed businesses. By relying on their identity as state operations, they do not follow the rules of the market—they define those rules. In addition to SOEs, which are direct arms of the state, some privately financed businesses dominate markets in which the state allows them to develop an artificial monopoly and thus increase their power day by day. These artificial monopolies distort market processes and create conditions that frequently give rise to corruption. This study examines the problems associated with monopolies, with a special emphasis on establishing more efficient market structures for SOEs in Turkey. The original mission of SOEs was to balance markets through regulation and to be transparent and accountable to the public. Simply striving to meet those criteria would go a long way toward preventing the abuse of power and unfair competition. In addition, SOEs and artificial monopoly markets distort public institutions by promoting rent‐seeking behavior that corrupts politics and blocks innovation from potential competitors. Privatization has been employed by international financial institutions in recent decades, but it has mostly transferred monopolies from the public sector to private owners, which has made the problem worse and done little to enhance competition. Establishing genuinely competitive economies will require a new political culture around the world.     

Organizational differences in managerial compensation and benefits in Chinese firms

More than two decades of economic reforms have brought profound changes in human resource management practices in both the state and non-state sectors in China. This study focuses on the impact of organizational factors on compensation and benefits for Chinese managers in state-owned enterprises (SOEs), publicly listed firms (PLFs), and foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). The empirical investigation of 465 firms located in three major Chinese cities, Shanghai, Nanjing and Guangzhou, provides evidence that organizational factors, such as ownership, firm size, firm age, location and industrial sector, have significant impacts on the variances in Chinese managers' compensation levels, compensation structures and benefits. The trends in the development of compensation and benefits for Chinese managers are also discussed as the Chinese economy moves closer to a more globalized, highly dynamic economy after China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001.     

Rewriting China’s Recent History: Fluctuations in State Economic Control, 1949–1984

China's political and economic systems are often discussed in combination. It is generally believed that under the political system of centralization, the economic system had to be a state monopoly. This article challenges that view by providing an economic perspective. The period 1949–1984 is selected to explore the causes of successive periods of strengthening and weakening of the state's monopoly power over the economy. Scholars have generally assumed that the period of state monopoly originated from socialist ideology or the personal will of the leaders. But economic conditions severely limited the options available. After the new China was established, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did not try to create a fully socialist economy in the short run. Instead, the CCP formulated a New Democracy platform that pragmatically allowed many types of enterprise to function side by side, including private industry, household ventures, and state‐owned enterprises. The original plan of the CCP was to allow private enterprise to develop in order to build up capital to rebuild the war‐damaged economy so that a strong foundation could be established for creating a socialist economy. But the Korean War from 1950 to 1953 and an influx of Soviet capital caused a shift from a mixed economy to state capitalism by 1956. From that point on, Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders had to change course again and again as fiscal crises limited available options. A reversal occurred in 1958 when the Soviets withdrew both their advisors and their capital subsidies, leaving the state capitalist system weakened. The crisis in the Chinese economy from 1959 to 1961 required decentralization of economic authority and efforts to promote rural capital formation. The next shift occurred after 1963 as the economy was organized to prepare for a possible military invasion. The required mobilization of industrial resources in remote regions of China inevitably reinforced state management of the economy. The final reversal occurred in the late 1970s, when imports of Western technology and equipment created another fiscal crisis for the central government, which then had to shift the burden of capital formation from the state to private entities. The reform of the rural household contract system, the adjustment of economic structures, and an increase in exports to gain foreign exchange all took place as part of “de‐monopolization” reforms. The reforms that occurred after 1979 were not an aberration or a radical break from the past. They were part of a pattern that evolved from 1949 to 1984, with fluctuations dependent on the weakening and strengthening status of state finances. The shifts that occurred during this period have either been ignored by observers, or they have been misinterpreted as being motivated by ideology. In fact, new policies were created to enable the government to adjust to changes in the internal and external environment.     

The Impact of Monopolies on Small Business Development in Russia

The imposition of economic sanctions on Russia by other countries has raised interest rates, diminished the working capital of small and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), and led to the restoration of state‐owned companies in many sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation continues to make efforts to develop a market‐oriented economy based on open competition. This article considers the current situation with SMEs in Russia from the standpoint of market competition and the influence of monopolies on this process. It analyzes bottlenecks in the interaction of monopolies with SMEs. For example, the wires and pipelines required to distribute energy, heat, and electricity over large geographic areas are natural monopolies: only one company can provides each service efficiently in a given area. The companies that control those natural monopolies are able to extract payments far in excess of cost from small businesses. In this and other ways, monopolies are able to dominate the Russian economy and restrict competition from SMEs.     

Overcoming liabilities of origin: Human resource management localization of Chinese multinational corporations in developed markets

Despite the rapid growth of Chinese outward foreign direct investment in developed markets, many Chinese multinational corporations (MNCs) suffer from liabilities of origin (LOR)—capability‐ and legitimacy‐based disadvantages associated with the country of origin. This study identifies localization as a strategic mechanism through which Chinese MNCs overcome their LOR. With a specific focus on human resource management (HRM), we examine how factors associated with firms' perceived LOR, including springboard intent, local competition, and host country regulatory pressures, affect Chinese MNCs' adoption of local HRM practices in developed markets. We differentiate HRM practices that managers intend to adopt from those that are actually implemented and explore how state ownership affects the intention–implementation gap. Based on a sample of Chinese MNCs in the United States, we find that springboard intent, local competition, and host country regulatory pressures are positively associated with intended, but not implemented, HRM localization. Further examination demonstrates that springboard intent and local competition have significant effects on implemented HRM localization among private businesses but not in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs). The managerial constraints and resource endowment of Chinese SOEs may hinder their overseas subsidiaries from implementing local HRM practices to address LOR.     

Monopoly Manacles the Capital Market

The 'political' purpose of privatisation has been said to be to raise finance to offset government borrowing and to facilitate tax reduction. Cento Veljanovski, of University College, London, argues that the essential aim is rather to change from state monopoly to private competition, butthat the maintenance of monopoly inhibits this market process.     

反价格垄断法律的国际比较及启示

对价格垄断的法律体系进行国际比较,并结合中国反价格垄断法律体系的特点,梳理出前者对完善我国反价格垄断法律体系的立法启示与执法借鉴。     

The challenges of global capitalism: unemployment and state workers' reactions and responses in post-reform China

As China enters the twenty-first year of reform, the success of its economic policies has been widely recognized. But what is also true is that economic reforms initiated in the past decades, particularly the restructuring of state-owned enterprises, have inevitably marginalized state workers - the 'masters of socialist China'. Workers in private and non-state sectors might have benefited from the economic reforms but state workers of most state-owned enterprises feel bitterly left behind. The aim of this article is to examine the perception of state workers of the causes of organizational difficulties, their worries in face of redundancy and their coping strategies. Observations made in this study are based on field interviews and questionnaire survey of 649 state workers in Beijing, Shenyang and Zhejiang from 1996 to 1999.     

Economic growth and multi-tasking by state-owned enterprises: An analytic framework and empirical study based on Chinese provincial data

By preventing large-scale unemployment during China's economic transition, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) helped maintain social stability, which supported the development of non-state sectors through a positive externality. Yet this burden reduced the productive efficiency of SOEs. Using a simple framework with two sectors, our paper decomposes the conflicting contributions of SOEs (lower efficiency but enhanced stability) to regional economic growth during 1992–2007. We find that productive efficiency in the state sector was lower than in other sectors and identify a significant positive externality that supported non-state sectors. Since these two effects offset each other, the contribution of SOEs to economic growth in China during our sample time frame was not significantly different from that of non-state enterprises.     

Strategic human resource management,firm performance,and employee relations climate in China

We examined strategic human resource management (SHRM) and human resource practices in the People's Republic of China to assess the impact of these practices on firm performance and the employee relations climate. We also tested whether firm ownership moderates the above relationships. Empirical results from a sample of Chinese firms from various industries and regions showed that the levels of adoption of SHRM and HR practices were lower in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) than in foreign‐invested enterprises (FIEs) and privately owned enterprises (POEs). Both SHRM and HR practices were found to have direct and positive effects on financial performance, operational performance, and the employee relations climate. However, the moderating effect of ownership type was significant for financial performance only. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.     

Bus Competition in Ireland: Delayed by Regulatory Roadblocks

Competition in local bus services in Ireland has been prohibited for more than 80 years, with the majority of services operated by state‐owned monopolies. The Public Transport Regulation Act 2009 seemed to herald a radical departure. It established a new transport regulator and provided that, after an initial five‐year period, routes would be opened up to competitive tendering unless an extension of the incumbents' monopoly rights was necessary to guarantee continuity of services. Yet in December 2013 the regulator decided to extend the state bus companies' monopolies on the vast majority of their routes until the end of 2019. This paper argues that there is no economic evidence to support this decision, which is reminiscent of the previous policy approach of protecting the state companies and raises concerns of possible regulatory capture. The paper calls for the phased introduction of competitive tendering of all routes currently operated by the state bus companies as quickly as possible.     

Regulating a Manager‐controlled Natural Monopoly with Unknown Costs

We study the regulation of a manager‐controlled natural monopoly with unknown costs, borrowing from Baron and Myerson (BM) (1982), where the monopoly is controlled by the owner. We consider the case where the regulator can tax the owner as well as the case where she cannot. We find that the optimal price schedule generally lies below the one in the BM model and that it can be as low as the marginal cost if the compensation parameter is sufficiently small and the regulator cannot tax the monopoly owner. We also identify the cases where the monopoly owner prefers to delegate the control to a manager. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

自然垄断与规制理论的演进

通过对自然垄断的含义及技术经济特征的阐述,然后基于规制理论的演进过程的分析和研究,认为我国自然垄断产业规制改革,关键要纵览全局,摆脱以往国有经济的固有框架,打破垄断行为依托的行政特权,充分利用激励机制和约束机制的作用,有效发挥竞争主体作用,并形成动态调整模式。     

国有企业所得税与绩效目标的福利效应

结合国有企业的相对绩效考核机制,本文建立了一个包含国有企业等多元所有制部门的开放经济模型,以考察国有企业所得税、绩效目标等外生政策调整时的福利效应。数值分析结果表明,当国企相对业绩目标低于市场水平时,适度提高国企所得税负可增进经济效率与社会福利,减轻国企所得税负将适得其反。根据这一发现,为纠正2007年企业所得税改革对国企经营的约束放松,避免经济效率与社会福利损失,政府应提高对国企的绩效考核目标。     

Rent Seeking in the Cameroon Economy: Krueger's Analytic Technique Helps to Account for Development Lag in Colonial States

Abstract . Traditional economic theory regards the social costs of monopoly as the reduction in both consumer and producer surplus as a result of monopolization of certain sectors of the economy. Recent research has shown that a proper accounting of the social costs of monopoly must include the costs of obtaining and maintaining monopoly positions. Anne O. Krueger used the term “rent seeking” to refer to the expending of scarce resources by entrepreneurs to fight for rents created through government activity in the economy. Excessive interference in the economy by government can result in an increase in the social costs of monopoly. In a developing country such as Cameroon, where government activity in the economy has been quite pervasive since the latter part of the 1800s, opportunities have been created for rent seeking. This type of activity has helped to impede the economic growth of the country.     

The Performance Differential between Private and State Owned Enterprises: The Roles of Ownership,Management and Market Structure

abstract This article examines differences in performance between private companies (POEs) and state owned enterprises (SOEs), with an emphasis on the effects of market structure. The study uses a comprehensive panel covering in principle all registered companies during the 1990s in Norway, a country where SOEs play an important role in regular markets. Return on assets as well as costs relative to sales revenue are used as measures of performance in markets where SOEs and POEs compete with each other. Overall, POEs perform significantly better than SOEs. The study tests the hypothesis that SOE managers may learn from POE managers in environments with stronger competition, but finds only weak empirical support for such a learning mechanism.     

Performance Implications of Ties to the Government and SOEs: A Political Embeddedness Perspective

In many countries governments not only regulate business activities, but also become involved in the corporate governance of individual firms through ownership and board ties. While existing studies usually focus either on benefits of political connections or on costs of government influence, a political embeddedness perspective helps us consider both advantages and constraints associated with ties to the government. In particular, firms with direct ties to the government will experience significant costs associated with government officials' involvement in the corporate governance process. In contrast, firms with ties to state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) are connected to the government indirectly and thus, while getting access to state‐owned resources, avoid costs associated with the government's interventions. This study compares the performance consequences of board and ownership ties to the government with the consequences of board and ownership ties to SOEs. I find that ties to SOEs are associated with higher profitability, while no significant differences are discovered for firms with direct ties to the government.     

Entrepreneurial talent and economic development in China

In this paper, we argue that the economic miracle of China in the past three decades can be attributed to the reallocation of entrepreneurial talent from the government/state and agricultural sectors to business activities. This change is unprecedented in the past two thousand years of Chinese history. When entrepreneurial talent was moved more to business activities, it created wealth, and the economy boomed. Three dominant groups of entrepreneurs are identified: (1) Peasants-turned entrepreneurs, (2) officials-turned entrepreneurs, and (3) overseas-returned, and engineers-turned, entrepreneurs. They have emerged sequentially, and successively led three decades of economic growth. The success of the Chinese economy arises from a gradual replacement of position-based rights with property-based rights that has triggered this reallocation of entrepreneurial talent. We also argue that when position-based and property-based rights coexist, value-creating and rent-seeking can be complementary. Therefore, one should not be puzzled by the coexistence of rapid economic growth and pervasive corruption in China. In order to improve the efficiency of allocation of entrepreneurial talent and efforts, it is important to further reduce the domain of position-based rights, and build a better-defined and more effectively-protected property rights system.     

新时期我国民营企业管理模式探讨

民营经济已经成为当前国民经济发展的最为活跃的经济点,为了促进民营经济的发展,国家相关部门制定了许多利于民营企业发展的法规政策。但单靠国家政策的支持,而不转变管理模式,民营企业是不能做大做强的。因此在我国经济结构调整的关键时期,民营企业要调整经营管理模式,促进企业发展。     

网络效应与自然垄断产业的分拆：以电信业为例

针对我国自然垄断产业的分拆改革有两种相反观点,这些观点大多是从自然垄断产业的规模经济性、范围经济性及成本次可加性等特征来展开论述的。文章试图从自然垄断产业的网络效应出发,认为对待这些自然垄断产业的分拆改革应慎行。改革的关键在于引入替代品竞争和企业改制。