我国跨国公司融资问题分析

我国跨国企业资本结构不尽合理，资产负债率总体水平偏低，而且呈稳中趋降的趋势。造成这一现象的根本原因是我国跨国企业在融资顺序的选择上倾向于股权融资而忽视债权融资，存在明显的股权融资偏好，这与融资优序理论相悖。本文以跨国企业为研究对象，从我国跨国企业融资行为及其导致的资本结构存在的问题入手，通过对这种现象产生的原因的深入分析，对我国跨国企业融资结构优化提出了几点建议。     

基于产业集聚效应的高新技术产业竞争力研究

开篇实证检验了高新技术产业的集聚性,评述了产业竞争力的钻石模型,在该模型优缺点的基础上,提出了高新技术产业竞争力的双层环式模型,最后分别研究了内层环式构成因素和外层环式构成因素,剖析了集聚效应条件下高新技术产业竞争力。     

简化一般均衡模型中一般均衡点的确定

经济学教材在讨论一般均衡的时候,往往以两个人、两种生产要素、两种产品这种最简单的社会作为研究对象,它们通常只阐述了一般均衡的存在,但都没有说明这种最简单的社会一般均衡点的确定即以此作为研究对象。     

基于主成分分析的新疆与全国旅游产业竞争力评价

如何发展成为新疆21世纪真正的支柱产业是新疆旅游业的中心问题。通过主成分分析方法，可以看出新疆制定旅游业作为支柱产业的战略发展目标是有可能实现的，但要通过采取指导性的经济政策诱导资金流向旅游业，并进一步做好交通规划，加快交通事业的发展等，以此来促进旅游业的发展。     

跨国公司收入最大化的行为模型

Departing from the traditional profit-maximization assumption underlying the theory of the multinational enterprises (MNEs), this paper proposes a model of the revenue-maximizing MNE subject to the profit constraint. The nonlinear programming techniques are used for the equilibrium analysis of the MNE’ s decision-making. A set of optimal conditions is derived regarding the quantity of output, volume of intra-firm trade, allocation of multinational production, as well as transfer prices in both exogenous and endogenous cases. Under the context, a comparison of the behavioral differences is made between the revenue-maximizing MNE and the profit-maximizing MNE.      

Correlated equilibrium and sunspot equilibrium

Summary We show by an example that the sunspot equilibria of a competitive economy are not equivalent to the correlated equilibria if sunspots generate transfers between (extrinsic) states of nature (through a contingent commodities market). Nevertheless, we prove that the sunspot equilibrium allocations of a standard overlapping generations economy coincide with the (strategic form) correlated equilibrium allocations of a natural market game mimicking the economy.     

Infrastructure regulation and reallocations within industry: Theory and evidence from Indian firms

Many firms in developing countries adopt captive power generators to deal with expensive and unreliable supply of electricity. I present a model that combines upstream regulation with downstream heterogeneous firms in a monopolistic competition framework, where firms can pay a fixed cost to adopt this marginal cost-reducing device. The presence of captive power affects the market equilibrium by increasing the level of idiosyncratic productivity a firm needs to survive in the market and by re-allocating sales and profits towards the more productive, adopting firms. Additionally, the rate of adoption is shown to increase with the price of electricity, industries' electricity–intensity and with higher barriers to firm entry. The mechanisms I propose are present for a cross-section of Indian firms.     

我国电力行业规制改革两阶段技术效率对比分析

我国从20世纪80年代开始对电力行业进行规制改革,在一定程度上取得了成效,但是在电力行业依然存在高投入、低产出、低效率的现象。采用1999—2002年,2003—2007年规制改革两阶段的电力行业数据,运用随机前沿方法(SFA)分析我国内地31个省市电力行业的技术效率,并进而得出结论:我国电力行业技术效率总体不高,电力行业属于规模报酬递增行业并且资本弹性产出较大于劳动产出弹性,东中西部技术效率差距较大,但有逐渐趋同的趋势;从两阶段技术效率对比看,我国电力行业技术效率处于下降趋势,表明我国电力行业规制改革的成效不大。为提高我国电力行业的技术效率,最后提出了相应的对策建议。     

金融支持路径对风电产业技术创新影响的比较研究

寻找有效的金融支持路径对我国风电产业突破技术瓶颈具有重要意义。以风电产业为研究对象,建立协整与误差修正模型,分析金融支持与技术创新间的长期及短期均衡关系,在此基础上应用典型相关分析对金融支持与技术创新的具体关系进行讨论。研究表明：金融支持与技术创新间存在长期正向均衡关系,当技术创新水平偏离均衡状态时,误差修正项的反向修正机制可使其恢复到长期均衡;政府补贴对代表技术创新产出的专利数有正向推动作用,银行信贷额对研发支出和固定资产投入具有正向推动作用,股票市场对技术创新的作用不显著。     

On the nonexistence of recursive equilibrium in stochastic OLG economies

We study a class of stochastic Overlapping generations (OLG) economies that have one-memory equilibria, that is equilibria that are determined by the current and past realizations of the states of uncertainty. This class is negligible, but important. In particular, it contains all the known examples of nonexistence of recursive equilibrium. We show that, within this restricted domain, the existence of recursive equilibrium is actually typical, and such examples are therefore nonrobust. We thank Felix Kubler, Herakles Polemarchakis and Steve Spear for many useful discussions. This paper was started while the first author was visiting Columbia Business School.     

Temporary financial equilibrium

Summary. In a two-period pure exchange economy with financial assets, a temporary financial equilibrium is an equilibrium of the current spot and security markets given forecast functions of future prices and payoffs. The temporary equilibrium model can then be interpreted as an Arrow-Debreu economy where preferences depend on prices. This identification implies, among other consequences, the existence and the generic determinateness of the financial temporary equilibria associated with given forecast functions. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2001     

我国风电产业价值链全面解决方案研究

我国风电产业进入了从起步的孤立经营阶段到产业化发展阶段的过渡时期,出现了产业链盈利模式单一、资源分配不平衡、缺乏整合性和难以有效管理等问题。从产业价值链的角度,在分析传统风电产业价值链的基础上,通过构建风电产业价值链全面解决方案这种新型价值链模式,探讨其实现途径并搭建基于SaaS(Software as a Service,软件服务化)的价值链管理平台,以期解决我国风电产业化发展问题,并为风电产业的转型和增值提供理论支持。     

It matters where you go: Outward foreign direct investment and multinational employment growth at home

How does outward foreign direct investment (FDI) affect employment growth of the multinational corporations (MNCs) in the home country? Does the impact of outward investment differ by the level of development of the destination country of the FDI? Using a difference-in-difference approach, we assess the impact of starting to invest in less-advanced countries compared with investing in more-advanced countries. To obtain suitable control groups in each case, we use the propensity score method to select national firms that ex post did not take the investment decisions that we study even though ex ante they would have been equally likely to. We find that moving to less-advanced countries decreases a company's employment growth rate especially in the short run. On the other hand, moving to more-advanced countries does not consistently affect employment growth in any significant way. Including investment decisions of established multinationals in the estimation somewhat weakens but does not overturn this conclusion.     

Random belief equilibrium in normal form games

In defining random belief equilibrium (RBE) in finite, normal form games we assume a player's beliefs about others' strategy choices are randomly drawn from a belief distribution that is dispersed around a central strategy profile, the focus. At an RBE: (1) Each chooses a best response relative to her beliefs. (2) Each player's expected choice coincides with the focus of the other players' belief distributions. RBE provides a statistical framework for estimation which we apply to data from three experimental games. We also characterize the limit-RBE as players' beliefs converge to certainty. When atoms in the belief distributions vanish in the limit, not all limit-RBE (called robust equilibria) are trembling hand perfect Nash equilibria and not all perfect equilibria are robust.     

税收优惠政策对高技术产业创新效率的影响

基于2000-2017年《中国高技术产业统计年鉴》中29个省市面板数据,首先采用DEA Malmquist指数模型测算了中国高技术产业创新效率,在此基础上运用断点回归方法分析了税收优惠政策对我国高技术产业创新效率的影响。研究结果表明：①总体上以专利为产出指标的创新效率高于以新产品销售收入为产出指标的创新效率,并且以新产品销售收入为产出指标的创新效率处于较低水平,由此表明我国高科研投入与低实际产出的矛盾依然存在;②税收优惠政策对我国高技术产业创新效率有显著正向影响,税收优惠政策对技术研发阶段与科技转化阶段的影响效应不同;③税收优惠政策与企业规模、政府资助合理匹配可放大政策效果。     

何种区域创新环境组合能有效提升风电产业创新质量——基于fsQCA的组态分析

区域创新环境对高质量创新的影响已成为当前学术界重点关注的问题之一。以中国内地部分省市数据为研究样本,使用模糊集定性比较分析法研究不同区域创新环境影响风电产业创新质量的必要条件和路径组合。结果表明,区域创新环境中单一条件对风电产业创新质量影响较弱,而不同条件变量组合对风电产业创新质量提升具有较强的解释力。实证分析表明,存在两种影响风电产业创新质量的不同路径,且两种路径的核心条件均为市场发育程度、研发环境和政府支持,经济基础环境相较于产业结构具有更强的辅助作用。最后,结合实证结果,提出促进我国风电产业创新质量提升的建议。     

The industry life-cycle of the size distribution of firms

This paper analyzes the evolution of the distributions of output and employment across firms in U.S. manufacturing industries from 1963 until 1997. The firm size distribution changes significantly as an industry goes through stages of its life-cycle. The evolutions of the employment and output distributions also differ significantly, but display strong inter-industry regularities, including that the nature of the evolution depends on whether the industry is experiencing growth, shakeout, maturity, or decline. The observed patterns have implications for theories of industry dynamics and evolution.     

A general structure theorem for the Nash equilibrium correspondence

I consider n-person normal form games where the strategy set of each player is a non-empty compact convex subset of an Euclidean space, and the payoff function of player i is continuous in joint strategies and continuously differentiable and concave in the player i's strategy. No further restrictions (such as multilinearity of the payoff functions or the requirement that the strategy sets be polyhedral) are imposed. I demonstrate that the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence on this domain is homeomorphic to the space of games. This result generalizes a well-known structure theorem in [Kohlberg, E., Mertens, J.-F., 1986. On the strategic stability of equilibria. Econometrica 54, 1003–1037]. It is supplemented by an extension analogous to the unknottedness theorems in [Demichelis S., Germano, F., 2000. Some consequences of the unknottedness of the Walras correspondence. J. Math. Econ. 34, 537–545; Demichelis S., Germano, F., 2002. On (un)knots and dynamics in games. Games Econ. Behav. 41, 46–60]: the graph of the Nash equilibrium correspondence is ambient isotopic to a trivial copy of the space of games.     

Stability of the cooperative equilibrium in N-person prisoners' dilemma with sequential moves

Summary. Nishihara [3] showed that N-person prisoners' dilemma has a cooperative Nash equilibrium, if the players decide their actions sequentially in the order determined by Nature under a certain information structure, and if each player's payoffs satisfy a certain inequality. This paper examines the stability of this cooperative equilibrium against two matters: players' slight mistakes and deviations by coalitions. The main results are as follows: (i) if the inequality on each player's payoffs strictly holds, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strictly proper equilibrium; (ii) if N≤3, and if full cooperation is Pareto efficient in N-person prisoners' dilemma, then the cooperative equilibrium is a strong Nash equilibrium; (iii) the cooperative equilibrium is in general a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. Received: June 23, 1997; revised version: December 2, 1997     

Limit-pricing as Bertrand equilibrium

Summary. We consider a Bertrand duopoly model with increasing returns to scale where one of the firms have a cost advantage and prices vary over a grid. We find that typically more than one equilibria exist. However, there are only two perfect equilibria. Moreover, as the size of the grid becomes small, both these equilibria converge to the limit-pricing outcome. Received: February 25, 2000; revised version: January 9, 2001